Many describe our geopolitical moment as one of instability, but that word feels too weak for what we are living through. Some, like Mark Carney, argue that we are facing a rupture: a break with assumptions that anchored the global economic and political order for decades. Others, like Christine Lagarde, see a profound transition, a shift toward a new configuration of power, technology and societal expectations. Whichever perception we adopt, the implication is clear: leaders can no longer rely on yesterday’s mental models, institutional routines or governance templates. Johanna Mair is the Director of the Florence School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, where she leads education, training and research on governance beyond the nation state. Security, for example, is no longer a discrete policy field. It now reaches deeply into energy systems, artificial intelligence, cyber governance, financial stability and democratic resilience, all under conditions of strategic competition and mistrust. At the same time, competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity metrics or short-term growth rates. It is about a society’s capacity to innovate, regulate effectively and mobilize investment toward long-term objectives — from the green and digital transitions to social cohesion. This dense web of interdependence is where transnational governance is practiced every day. The European Union illustrates this reality vividly. No single member state can build the capacity to manage these transformations on its own. EU institutions and other regional bodies shape regulatory frameworks and collective responses; corporations influence infrastructure and supply chains; financial institutions direct capital flows; and civic actors respond to social fragmentation and governance gaps. Effective leadership has become a systemic endeavour: it requires coordination across these levels, while sustaining public legitimacy and defending liberal democratic principles. > Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them > with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways > that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. The Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute was created precisely to respond to this need. Located in Florence and embedded in a European institution founded by EU member states, the STG is a hub where policymakers, business leaders, civil society, media and academia meet to work on governance beyond national borders. Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. What makes this mission distinctive is not only the topics we address, but also how and with whom we address them. We see leadership development as a practice embedded in real institutions, not a purely classroom-based exercise. People do not come to Florence to observe transnational governance from a distance; they come to practice it, test hypotheses and co-create solutions with peers who work on the frontlines of policy and politics. This philosophy underpins our portfolio of programs, from degree offerings to executive education. With early career professionals, we focus on helping them understand and shape governance beyond the state, whether in international organizations, national administrations, the private sector or civil society. We encourage them to see institutions not as static structures, but as arrangements that can and must be strengthened and reformed to support a liberal, rules-based order under stress. At the same time, we devote significant attention to practitioners already in positions of responsibility. Our Global Executive Master (GEM) is designed for experienced professionals who cannot pause their careers, but recognize that the governance landscape in which they operate has changed fundamentally. Developed by the STG, the GEM convenes participants from EU institutions, national administrations, international organizations, business and civil society — professionals from a wide range of nationalities and institutional backgrounds, reflecting the coalitions required to address complex problems. The program is structured to fit the reality of leadership today. Delivered part time over two years, it combines online learning with residential periods in Florence and executive study visits in key policy centres. This blended format allows participants to remain in full-time roles while advancing their qualifications and networks, and it ensures that learning is continuously tested against institutional realities rather than remaining an abstract exercise. Participants specialize in tracks such as geopolitics and security, tech and governance, economy and finance, or energy and climate. Alongside this subject depth, they build capabilities more commonly associated with top executive programs than traditional public policy degrees: change management, negotiations, strategic communication, foresight and leadership under uncertainty. These skills are essential for bridging policy design and implementation — a gap that is increasingly visible as governments struggle to deliver on ambitious agendas. Executive study visits are a core element of this practice-oriented approach. In a recent Brussels visit, GEM participants engaged with high-level speakers from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, the European Parliament, NATO, Business Europe, Fleishman Hillard and POLITICO itself. Over several days, they discussed foreign and security policy, industrial strategy, strategic foresight and the governance of emerging technologies. These encounters do more than illustrate theory; they give participants a chance to stress-test their assumptions, understand the constraints facing decision-makers and build relationships across institutional boundaries. via EUI Throughout the program, each participant develops a capstone project that addresses a strategic challenge connected to a policy organization, often their own employer. This ensures that executive education translates into institutional impact: projects range from new regulatory approaches and partnership models to internal reforms aimed at making organizations more agile and resilient. At the same time, they help weave a durable transnational network of practitioners who can work together beyond the programme. Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete practice. Addressing the rupture or transition we are living through requires more than technical fixes. It demands leaders who can think systemically, act across borders and design governance solutions that are both unconventional and democratically legitimate. > Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a > commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete > practice. In a period defined by systemic risk and strategic competition, leadership development cannot remain sectoral or reactive. It must be interdisciplinary, practice-oriented and anchored in real policy environments. At the Florence School of Transnational Governance, we aim to create precisely this kind of learning community — one where students, fellows and executives work side by side to reimagine how institutions can respond to global challenges. For policymakers and professionals who recognize themselves in this moment of rupture, our programs — including the GEM — offer a space to step back, learn with peers and return to their institutions better equipped to lead change. The task is urgent, but it is also an opportunity: by investing in transnational governance education today, we can help lay the foundations for a more resilient and inclusive order tomorrow.

The composition of the next Danish government may hinge on a former prime minister with a penchant for brushing his teeth with hand soap. The Social Democrats of incumbent center-left Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen are projected to get the most votes when Danes go to the polls on March 24. But whether they can form a government will likely be decided by Lars Løkke Rasmussen, leader of the centrist Moderate Party. Rasmussen, a former prime minister currently serving as the country’s foreign minister, was the face of Copenhagen’s defiance of threats by U.S. President Donald Trump to annex Greenland earlier this year. At the time, he and Frederiksen seemed like a dynamic duo protecting the Kingdom. But just a day before Tuesday’s elections in Denmark, a right-leaning and a left-leaning bloc are nearly tied with each other in the polls, both just short of a majority in the country’s 179-seat parliament. Rasmussen’s Moderates, meanwhile, are projected to secure 12 seats. That sets him up to either backstop Frederiksen to form another broadly centrist government, or hand power to Deputy PM Troels Lund Poulsen, leader of the center-right Venstre party and the preferred PM candidate of the right-wing bloc. Frederiksen is using that reality to nudge voters towards supporting her. “If [Rasmussen] chooses to back another prime minister, then we will, with a very high possibility, get a right-wing government in Denmark,” she said recently. METTE DOESN’T DEFINE ME For the past four years, Frederiksen’s Social Democrats have governed in coalition with Venstre and Rasmussen’s Moderates — the latter named after a fictional political group in the hit Danish political drama, “Borgen.” The government’s right-leaning policies on migration, which are among the most hardline in Europe, and the lack of action on issues like the housing crisis were cited as key factors in the Social Democrats’ disastrous results in December’s nationwide municipal elections. In the wake of those votes, members of the party’s base called for Frederiksen to recalibrate and prioritize working with left-leaning parties. But the prime minister has kept her options open ahead of March 24, saying she can imagine a repeat partnership with “the political middle” as easily as an alliance with the left. The latter option is firmly opposed by Rasmussen, who wants a repeat of centrist governance. The politician led Venstre during two non-consecutive terms as prime minister from 2009 to 2019, but following an election defeat broke away to found the Moderates as an alternative to Denmark’s historic left-right political offer. Ahead of this week’s vote Rasmussen has ruled out facilitating a left-leaning coalition, saying he won’t partner with the far-left Red-Green Alliance whose support would be needed to make such a government viable. He also insists he’s not aiming to usher the right into power, as Frederiksen claims. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen speaks to journalists ahead of a European Council summit in Brussels, Belgium on March 19, 2026. | Jonathan Raa/NurPhoto via Getty Images “I will not be placed: I stand in the center, firmly, even when the winds blow,” he wrote on Facebook March 19. “The job is to pull together what is otherwise falling apart — because we already have plenty of forces pulling us in different directions.” THE GOAT Rasmussen has been an omnipresent figure in Danish politics for 40 years. In 1986, at 22, he became chairman of Venstre’s youth wing, kickstarting his political career. Since then he’s held multiple cabinet portfolios including finance, health, interior, foreign affairs and prime minister. In recent years he has leaned into his status as a meme on social media, where he is celebrated for his playful demeanor and unabashed chain-smoking. His insouciance and pragmatism — which extends to using hand soap to brush his teeth when toothpaste is unavailable — strikes a chord with Danes, especially amid a tense election. At the same time Poulsen and Frederiksen were dueling it out in a televised debate, Rasmussen uploaded a photo of himself with a goat on Instagram; the caption wished luck to the leaders of Denmark’s two biggest parties. The post referenced the term “greatest of all time” (GOAT) at a moment when his electoral opponents had the spotlight. In the comment section under the entry, users posted goat emojis and echoed the GOAT label. A SHOCK ENDGAME Even though Frederiksen’s Social Democrats are projected to win the most votes, Rasmussen asks why they should get to decide who takes the post of prime minister, per parliamentary tradition. “It’s a bit strange that the Social Democrats have never experienced sitting in government without having the post of prime minister,” he said recently. “I think they should experience that one day.” Despite having already held the crown twice himself, the leader of the Moderates isn’t opposed to becoming prime minister again. Some Danish political analysts say the scenario isn’t impossible. “If the election result is as messy as current polls suggest, and if neither the traditional blue nor red bloc has a majority without the Moderates, could a scenario emerge in which [Rasmussen] would and could go for the prime minister’s job himself?” public channel DR’s political correspondent Christine Cordsen posited. “There is no doubt that if the opportunity arises, he will go for it.” It wouldn’t be without precedent. In 1968 Hilmar Baunsgaard became Danish prime minister despite leading the smallest party in the governing coalition. Although Rasmussen admits he can’t imagine a government “where that would happen,” he also hasn’t rejected the idea of serving a third term as PM. “Rule it out entirely? That would be a strangely weak position to put yourself in when you’re the GOAT, right?”

Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob’s liberals lead by a narrow margin in Sunday’s national election over former right-wing populist leader Janez Janša, according to exit polls.  The preliminary results show Golob’s governing Freedom Movement party securing 29.9 percent of the vote, good for 30 seats in the country’s 90-seat chamber, ahead of Janša’s conservative Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) on 27.5 percent, equaling 27 seats. If those results hold, it would represent a substantial step back for Golob’s party, which won 41 seats in the last election in 2022. The Slovenian vote has been seen as a mood-check of the bloc’s electorate, with the EU tilting right since the 2024 European Parliament elections gave a boost to right-wing populist parties. A nationalist-populist government took power in the Czech Republic last year, adding to a pro-Moscow bloc that includes Slovakia and Hungary, while the far-right RN leads polling in France ahead of key 2027 presidential elections. If Janša, who has expressed admiration for U.S. President Donald Trump, were to lead the country again, it would give Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán another ally in the European Council. In remarks Sunday night at his party headquarters, Janša said the results show Slovenia has two choices: Either the incumbent liberal-left coalition could continue to govern, or a new right-wing coalition under SDS could take the reins. LIBERALISM VS. ILLIBERALISM Slovenes went to the polls after a dramatic campaign that in its final stretch was less about bread-and-butter issues than allegations of election interference.  Janša, a veteran politician who has served multiple terms as prime minister, campaigned on lower taxes and stronger governance, while Golob sought to frame the election in an interview with POLITICO as a choice between liberal democratic values and Janša’s Hungary-style illiberalism.  Leaked audio and video recordings published earlier this month and apparently designed to tie Golob’s government to corruption showed prominent Slovenian figures, including a former minister, apparently discussing illegal lobbying and the misuse of state funds.   Slovenian authorities said Israeli private intelligence firm Black Cube had carried out illegal surveillance and wiretapping and has visited SDS headquarters in December. Janša acknowledged he had been in contact with a figure linked to the firm, but denied hiring them to dig up dirt on the government.  In a letter sent earlier this week and obtained exclusively by POLITICO, Golob urged European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to investigate the alleged election interference, calling it “a clear hybrid threat against the European Union.”  Both parties sought to turn the scandal to their advantage ahead of the vote, with the SDS arguing the recordings were proof of high-level corruption while Golob’s supporters said it was evidence Janša was willing to collaborate with foreign entities to retake power.    The political row spilled over into Brussels, with the European People’s Party group, to which Janša’s party belongs, pushing last week for a European Parliament hearing on fresh allegations that Slovenia’s EU commissioner, Marta Kos — who hails from Golob’s party — had collaborated with Yugoslavia’s secret police decades ago.  Kos has denied the claims, and an official close to her cabinet described the accusations to POLITICO as politically motivated.  The first official results of Sunday’s election will be declared later in the evening.  Ali Walker contributed to this report.

Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1         Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation, procedural complexity and uneven implementation across  m ember s tates. As scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel, supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical development to manufacturing and patient access.  The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination  and supporting scale-up and manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive global biotechnology landscape .2       Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness will determine whether the  a ct translates into faster patient access, sustained investment and long-term resilience.  Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen:  Biotechnology sits at the intersection of health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to  research and development  growth . 3    At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25  percent of its global share of pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the  United States  and China.   The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector, influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients can benefit from new treatments.  > Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy > is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4   > >  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do  and why is it considered an important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?  Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market. By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future  —  and one that can deliver earlier patient benefit  —  so long as we can make it work in practice.  Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will effective delivery and coordination be most decisive? Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.   The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a  u nion-level regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory dialogue, help de-risk development   and promote more consistent implementation across  m ember  s tates.   They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination products  —  spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics  —  where overlapping requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8 and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment process. Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and accelerate development timelines .10 Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech scale-up, manufacturing  and long-term investment in Europe?  Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.   Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and quality?   Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle.  The Biotech Act will help ensure continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which  are  critical to success.   Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier planning for scale-up.    Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen. Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing  European Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster patient access . 11 Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?  Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent  m ember   state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks to address this.   These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and alignment with the EU AI Act ,12  European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance to provide greater operational clarity.  Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of complexity.   Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment, support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.  > These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier > societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the > latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14 > > Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.  Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?  Marrache:  To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary rigidity or administrative burden.  Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a global biotech hub.  Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?  Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the Biotech Act:    First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability and coordination in practice. Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that reflects the global nature of biotechnology.  And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use of  artificial intelligence   —  as a key driver of innovation in health biotechnology.  In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient benefit. An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential 2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en 3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf 4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4 5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en  7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en 8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January 2022. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en 9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices – Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr 10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act 12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024. Retrieved from https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai 13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en 14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Amgen Inc * The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act. More information here.

BUDAPEST — Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing the toughest election of his 16-year rule, and U.S. President Donald Trump and his MAGA movement are mobilizing to help him. Polls suggest the Hungarian leader is currently trailing his former ally-turned-challenger Péter Magyar, who has capitalized on voter frustration over record inflation, economic malaise and a string of political scandals. With Orbán’s dominance suddenly in question, Trump’s administration and leading MAGA figures have moved to bolster the man they regard as their most dependable ideological ally in Europe. For MAGA luminaries, Orbán isn’t merely a partner — he’s an inspiration. His hardline stance on migration, his battles against universities and “woke” cultural institutions, his hostility toward Brussels and skepticism toward Ukraine have long been held up as a governance model by American conservatives. “We were Trump before Trump,” boasts the website of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest. And in June 2024, U.S. Vice President JD Vance openly tipped his hat to Orbán, saying the Hungarian prime minister had “made smart decisions that we could learn from in the U.S.” And learn they have. “We have entered the policy-writing system of Trump’s team. We have deep involvement there,” bragged Orbán at a rally in Hungary during the 2024 White House race. Hungarian government and pro-Orbán think tanks, such as the Századvég Foundation and the Danube Institute, have also had a long ongoing relationship with Trump-aligned think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, sharing research, ideas and scholars. Above all, the U.S. president’s allies praise Orbán not just for his policies but for his steadfastness in contrast to other MAGA-friendly politicians — like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whom they dismiss for supporting Ukraine and for her willingness to work with former President Joe Biden between Trump’s two terms. “Orbán went out of his way to remain loyal to Donald Trump when he was out of power and written off politically,” said Benjamin Harnwell, the right-hand man of former Trump strategist Steve Bannon. And in June 2024, U.S. Vice President JD Vance openly tipped his hat to Orbán, saying the Hungarian prime minister had “made smart decisions that we could learn from in the U.S.” | Pool photo by Matt Rourke/Getty Images And now MAGA is returning the favor by pulling out the stops for the man Trump once described in a lengthy social media post as “a truly strong and powerful Leader … delivering phenomenal results” for Hungary. On a recent visit to Budapest, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio further underlined Trump’s endorsement, saying U.S. ties with Hungary were entering a “golden era” and promising financial support for the country if needed — but only if Orbán remains in power. “President Trump is deeply committed to your success, because your success is our success,” Rubio said. This visit from Washington’s top diplomat shows just how seriously the administration is taking Hungary’s April election. “For MAGA, the two most important elections this year are those in Hungary and the midterms in the United States,” said Timothy Ash of Britain’s Chatham House. And John McLaughlin, a veteran Republican strategist who worked on all three of Trump’s presidential campaigns, has been polling for Orbán. This is all because a defeat for the Hungarian prime minister would be a blow to the global populist movement, even as Washington ramps up support for other like-minded political actors across Europe. “It would be seen as an ideological or intellectual setback if he lost,” said Frank Furedi, an Orbán ally who heads the Brussels branch of the Hungarian government-backed Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC). “You have to remember that Orbán plays a disproportionately influential role in terms of the outlook of many of these parties and their leaders, who have a strong affection for him,” he added. “I think a defeat would have an impact at least in the short term, in terms of influencing continent-wide political dynamics.” TRUMP CARD Three weeks before the election, MAGA luminaries and national conservative and populist stars from across Europe are all set to gather in the Hungarian capital for a CPAC conference organized by the American Conservative Union — the fifth one since 2022. On a recent visit to Budapest, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio further underlined Trump’s endorsement. | János Kummer/Getty Images Orbán is hoping the U.S. president will be in attendance. Trump has a standing invitation to the event, and the Hungarian leader has made no secret he’d like nothing more. But while Trump teased a visit in January, he has so far remained noncommittal. Shortly before heading to Washington for last month’s inaugural meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace, Orbán reminded Hungarian radio the U.S. president “owes him” a visit. Though, he acknowledged, “things are changing so rapidly that we can’t plan even two weeks ahead.”  The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has only added to the uncertainty. Orbán has so far discreetly endeavored to distance himself from the Middle East war, delicately noting at a recent campaign rally that the president had sought his opinion ahead of the bombing of Iran, “given we [Hungary] have relations with Iran and friendly relations with Israel.”  He said that what’s happening isn’t what he’d advised, but added that the U.S. leader and Chinese President Xi Jinping will discuss serious measures to “stabilize the world’s state” when Trump visits Beijing, as he is expected to do later this month. Still, it’s unclear just how much MAGA’s support has actually aided the Hungarian prime minister. There’s no evidence that Rubio’s visit shifted opinion polls, noted Chatham House’s Ash. In fact, a subsequent poll published after his visit suggested Hungary’s center-right opposition widened its lead in February. Shortly before heading to Washington for last month’s inaugural meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace, Orbán reminded Hungarian radio the U.S. president “owes him” a visit. | Harun Ozalp/Anadolu via Getty Images Meanwhile, as Orbán has sought to portray the election as a referendum on the war in Ukraine and paint his challenger as a Brussels stooge, Magyar has successfully shifted the conversation to bread-and-butter issues.  His Tisza party currently enjoys a nine-point lead over Orbán’s Fidesz party, according to POLITICO’s Poll of Polls, and it has done this by channeling anger over inflation and economic mismanagement. Long vulnerable to external shocks, the Hungarian forint has come under renewed pressure following the recent geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East, and this has raised fears of higher energy prices and another inflationary spike, just as price growth had begun to cool. There’s also little agreement among commentators as to what extent further MAGA reinforcement — or even a visit from Trump — could rally support for Orbán. “I think it will fire up his supporters and firm up his existing voter base. Whether it makes any difference to anybody else or convinces people to vote one way or the other is an open question,” Furedi said. Trump isn’t in the habit of investing political capital in causes he believes are doomed. So, if Hungary’s polls continue to point toward an Orbán defeat, and the prime minister fails to regain momentum in his campaign’s final stretch, he may discover there are limits to how far — and how long — the U.S. president is prepared to go, even for a one of MAGA’s most celebrated international allies.

Across Europe, governments are moving quickly to harness the potential of artificial intelligence (AI). National strategies are being announced, innovation hubs funded and pilot programs launched. From healthcare to taxation, I have seen how AI is emerging as a powerful lever to enhance public services and safeguard digital resilience. Europe’s population is aging and economic pressure is being felt across the continent. At the same time, citizens expect faster, simpler services. In this context, departments are looking for targeted AI uses that reduce manual workload and improve service quality without adding risk or cost. > In order for AI to add value to an organization, it needs up‑to‑date data, > clear ownership and simple routes to information sharing across teams. However, progress is uneven. Many organizations are still at the trial stage. Capgemini research shows that nearly 90 percent plan to explore, pilot or implement agentic AI within the next two to three years, while EU institutions and member states are committing billions to digital transformation centered around AI. Only 21 percent of public sector organizations have advanced beyond experimentation to pilots or actual deployment of generative AI. The practical blocker is not enthusiasm: it is whether data is accurate, shared when needed and safe to use. A reality check for AI maturity In order for AI to add value to an organization, it needs up‑to‑date data, clear ownership and simple routes to information sharing across teams. Less than one in four organizations globally report high maturity in these fields. For civil servants, this often translates into small teams juggling operational delivery with transformation agendas, learning new tools on the job and managing risk without clear playbooks. > More than half of public sector organizations are concerned about AI > sovereignty, which is becoming central to safeguarding digital resilience. This gap matters. AI initiatives built on fragile data foundations may face risks such as inefficiency, bias and security vulnerabilities, which can erode trust in automated decisions, both internally and with citizens. Strengthening public sector data is therefore not only key to enabling AI, but also essential for improving the accuracy, efficiency and reliability of government decision-making. Getting the basics right also helps deliver ‘once‑only’ service patterns so citizens no longer need to repeatedly provide the same information to different authorities. By creating greater interoperability and portability, governments can reduce lock-in and strengthen long-term resilience. The readiness gap Europe is not lacking in ambition. Progress is underway, but common challenges remain; data silos between agencies, varying quality standards, unclear governance for data sharing and legacy systems that limit interoperability. Cultural hesitancy toward data-driven decision-making adds complexity, but it is not insurmountable. The good news is that these issues can be addressed with a strategic focus on data foundations and practical steps that reflect how government works: small, safe changes; clear owners; and visible benefits to users and staff. When data is accessible, trusted, and well managed, civil servants can share information confidently, driving innovation while maintaining compliance and security. > Setting clear targets, aligning strategy with operational reality, and > encouraging collaboration and shared behaviors across teams helps embed data > use into everyday work rather than treating it as an added burden. Through engagement with industry and public-sector stakeholders, I see growing momentum around these priorities and an opportunity for Europe to lead the way in scaling AI responsibly to deliver smarter, more efficient public services for citizens. Building the foundations of public sector AI Governments cannot buy their way into AI readiness, but can work to build it through sustained investment in four interconnected pillars. First, data sharing. Solving complex public sector challenges with AI depends on information flowing safely across organizational boundaries. In practice, this means making it easier for departments and agencies to reuse data that already exists. While most public sector organizations have initiatives underway, only 35 percent have rolled out or fully deployed data-sharing methods. Second, data control and sovereignty. Concerns about compliance and control are a daily reality for public sector leaders, and they are slowing AI adoption. More than half of public sector organizations are concerned about AI sovereignty, which is becoming central to safeguarding digital resilience. Compliance with data-localization laws and control over sensitive information become more complex when AI services are hosted in foreign jurisdictions. A 2024 European Commission report found that 80 percent of Europe’s digital technologies and infrastructure are imported. Third, a data-driven culture. This is a critical pillar of AI readiness. Setting clear targets, aligning strategy with operational reality, and encouraging collaboration and shared behaviors across teams helps embed data use into everyday work rather than treating it as an added burden. Fourth, data infrastructure. Robust, cloud-based data infrastructure is essential for storing, processing and analyzing data at scale, while respecting sovereignty requirements. Today, the lack of such infrastructure is the primary obstacle to effective data use. Only 41 percent of public sector executives say they can access data at the speed required for decision-making. Budget constraints are a real barrier, but they need not be paralyzing. By focusing on gradual, outcome-driven improvements rather than costly overhauls, organizations can demonstrate value and realize business outcomes. Public sector organizations such as the City of Tampere illustrate this four-pillar approach. By building data foundations gradually and strategically, while addressing data sharing, sovereignty, culture and infrastructure together, Tampere has shown how thoughtful investment can deliver tangible results without losing sight of long-term ambition. Achieving digital maturity AI can transform the public sector, but only if data readiness becomes the true measure of digital maturity. With sustained focus on governance, interoperability, culture, and infrastructure, governments can start to turn ambition into impact and deliver smarter, more trusted public services for every citizen.

As European health systems grapple with how to deliver increasingly advanced therapies, rare disease patients in Sweden still face everyday challenges — from securing a diagnosis to accessing appropriate care. Although rights are strong on paper, families often find themselves stitching together services across a decentralized system. Ågrenska is a national competence center in Sweden working to bridge those gaps. It supports people with rare diagnoses and their families in navigating health and social services. “But there’s a limit to what one organization can do,” says Zozan Sewger Kvist, Ågrenska’s CEO. POLITICO Studio spoke with her about where the Swedish system falls short and what must change across Europe to ensure patients are not left behind. POLITICO Studio: From Ågrenska’s experience working with families of rare disease patients across Sweden, where does the system most often break down? Zozan Sewger Kvist: For 25 years the families have been telling us the same thing: the system doesn’t connect. Zozan Sewger Kvist, CEO, Ågrenska The breakdown is most evident in health care, especially when transitioning from pediatric to adult care. But it also happens when patients are transitioning between schools, social services and medical teams. No one is looking at their care from a holistic point of view. Families become their own project managers. They are the ones booking appointments, chasing referrals, explaining the diagnosis again and again. It’s a heavy burden. That’s largely why our organization exists. We provide families with the knowledge, networks and tools to navigate the system and understand their rights. But there’s a limit to what one organization can do. In a perfect world, these functions would already be embedded within public care. > Without clear national coordination, it becomes much harder to monitor whether > families are actually receiving the support they are entitled to. PS: Access to rare disease care varies widely within many European countries and Sweden is no exception. In practical terms, what do those regional disparities look like? ZSK: Swedish families have the same rights across the country, but regional priorities differ. That leads to unequal access in practice. For example, areas with university hospitals tend to have stronger specialist networks and rehabilitation services. In more rural parts of the country, especially in the north, it is harder to attract expertise, and families feel that gap directly. In practical terms, that can mean something as basic as access to rehabilitation. In some regions, children receive coordinated physiotherapy, speech therapy and follow-up. In others, families struggle to access rehabilitation at all. And that’s a big issue because a lot of Sweden’s health care runs through rehabilitation — without it, referrals to other services and treatments can stall. PS: Would a comprehensive national rare disease strategy meaningfully change outcomes across regions? ZSK: The problem is compliance, not regulation. Sweden has strong rules but regions have almost full freedom to organize care, which makes consistency difficult. As it stands, without clear national coordination, it becomes much harder to monitor whether families are actually receiving the support they are entitled to. A national rare disease strategy would not solve everything but it would set expectations such as what the minimum level of care should look like, what coordination should include and how outcomes are followed up. A draft national strategy was developed in 2024, and there was real momentum. Patient organizations, health care experts and the government were all involved. Everyone was optimistic the framework would provide guidance and accountability. After some delays, work on the national strategy has resumed, so hopefully we will see it implemented soon. > Families often feel they need to take on a coordinating role themselves. They > describe an endless search — calling clinics, repeating their story, trying to > connect the dots. PS: Families often describe a long and fragmented path to diagnosis. Where does that journey tend to go wrong, and what would shorten it most? ZSK: Coordinated multidisciplinary teams would make the biggest difference — teams that can look at the whole condition, not just one symptom at a time. The challenge is that rare diseases often affect multiple organ systems. Several specialists may be involved, but they do not always work together, and it may not be clear who is taking responsibility for the whole case. When no one holds that overview, delays multiply. Sweden also lacks a fully integrated national health record system, so specialists may be looking at different pieces of the same case without seeing the full picture. Families often feel they need to take on a coordinating role themselves. They describe an endless search — calling clinics, repeating their story, trying to connect the dots. PS: Sweden participates in the European Reference Networks, yet you’ve suggested they’re underused. What’s missing in how Sweden leverages that expertise? ZSK: The ERNs are a strong, established framework for connecting specialists across borders. Swedish experts participate, but we are not using that structure to its full potential. Participation often appears project-based rather than long-term. Neighboring countries such as Norway, Denmark and Finland are more proactive in leveraging these collaborations. I would like to see Sweden invest more in turning these networks into durable partnerships that support clinical practice — not just research initiatives. > Rare disease care needs sustained political and financial follow-through. > Without that, families will continue to carry burdens that the system should > be managing. PS: Sweden often falls behind other EU countries in terms of access to orphan medicines (drugs that treat rare diseases). What needs to change in Sweden’s approach to ensure patients aren’t left behind? ZSK: Families are very aware of how access compares across Europe. They follow these discussions closely, and when a treatment is available in one country but not another, it is difficult for them to understand why. In Sweden, reimbursement decisions often come down to cost-effectiveness calculations. That makes access an ethical as well as an economic question. But for a family, it is hard to accept that a few additional years of life or stability are weighed against a financial threshold. Some families choose to cross borders for treatment. But that can be quite a complex, expensive process, depending on the kind of treatment. I think greater transparency and clearer communication about the criteria and long-term impact — not only the immediate cost — would make difficult outcomes easier to understand. PS: You’ve worked with families for decades. Have things materially improved — and what worries you most if reforms stall? ZSK: Unfortunately, I cannot say that things have materially improved. When I look back at the challenges families described 15 or 20 years ago, many of them are still the same. There have been some positive developments. Digital access means families are more informed and can connect more easily with others in similar situations. That has strengthened their voice. But structurally, many of the underlying gaps remain. Rare disease care needs sustained political and financial follow-through. Without that, families will continue to carry burdens that the system should be managing. Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Alexion Pharmaceuticals * The entity ultimately controlling the sponsor: AstraZeneca plc * The political advertisement is linked to policy advocacy around rare disease governance, funding, and equitable access to diagnosis and treatment across Europe More information here.

With a roar of rockets and bombs, a gasp of international outcry and the death of Iran’s supreme leader, President Donald Trump’s legacy became clearer than ever. He is burying the 20th Century: Its villains, its alliances, its political norms and ceasefires. And he is unleashing a future of uncertainty and disruption with no new equilibrium in sight. Across both his terms as president, and in so many different areas of policy and governance and culture, his signal achievements have been acts of demolition. His Supreme Court appointees struck down Roe v. Wade, ending the seething political and legal stalemate on abortion rights that governed America since the 1970s. His military interventions in Latin America have brought the Cuban government, one of the last surviving Cold War regimes, to the brink of collapse. His tariffs and trade threats have blown apart the Reagan-Clinton policy consensus on free trade, upending half a century of global commercial arrangements and diplomatic relations. His America First worldview and contempt for Europe’s political establishment have increasingly relegated NATO’s charter, the 1949 accord forging the globe’s most powerful military alliance, to antique status. His acts of corporate favoritism and personal enrichment, and his use of the justice system as a weapon of vengeance, have erased the post-Watergate regime of legal and ethical norms for the presidency. And in the first few hours of war in Iran, Trump’s attack killed the enduring leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ali Khamenei, a dictator as cruel as he was ancient. In every instance, Trump’s allies and admirers say he is completing the unfinished business of a generation: doing the work that other American leaders have been too weak or too conventional or too unpatriotic to do themselves. In each case, too, Trump is tearing down old structures and systems without a vision for replacing them. At age 79, Trump is himself a creation of the age he is now unwinding, with a worldview molded in America’s prosperous, socially turbulent decades after World War II. It is not evident that he’s interested in designing the grand policies of the future. Even if Trump had a modernizer’s imagination, there is not too much time left for him to build a new world. Trump has about 35 months left as president – about as long as it takes to make one major motion picture – and just eight months before a midterm election that could sap his power. It is not likely that before he leaves office we will see a stable global trade order, thriving new governments in Havana and Tehran or a post-NATO order of international security that reflects America’s overdue destiny as a Pacific nation. It is harder, still, to imagine that Trump might help lead a hard process of legislative compromise on other issues that have been intractable for decades, like abortion or the national debt — though he may be the one president who could force a grand bargain on immigration. Trump’s opponents have often criticized him for his vacant sense of history: his too-hasty dismissal of 20th Century achievements like NATO and NAFTA and START, his middle school-level commentary on figures like Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Jackson, his weird public musings about Frederick Douglass being recognized more and more. This philistinism and historical ignorance was at the heart of Joe Biden’s case against Trump. Biden deplored Trump as an insult to the American political tradition and promised to make Washington work, repair broken norms and turn over power to the next generation. His slow-moving, self-admiring, politically dysfunctional administration achieved none of these things. If there was a chance then to build a bridge to the 20th Century, Biden lost it. The next time the country chooses a replacement for Trump, resurrecting the past won’t even be an option. For American policymakers and voters, there’s no longer any prospect of mimicking détente with regimes in Iran and Cuba that are unraveling at this very hour. Barack Obama pursued that aim as part of his own 21st Century agenda; that path is now closed for good. America’s credibility as a trade negotiator and commercial partner is already changed forever; the next president will be unable to restore Bush-era trade relations even if he or she wants to. NATO’s place in the world won’t return to where it was in 1998 just because the next president says the right words about Washington’s commitment to its allies. This is already obvious to leaders looking at the United States from the outside in. “We know the old order is not coming back,” Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada said at the World Economic Forum last month. His speech, declaring an epochal “rupture” in geopolitics, was the climactic event of Davos for a reason. Yet for all Trump’s zeal to crush big institutions and enemies and conventions of the past, he has also failed so far to lock in an agenda for the future. Many of his policies — on technology, energy and international security — can be changed or undone with the stroke of a pen, as Biden’s were. Others, like Trump’s landmark tax cuts, are unpopular and face a dim fate whenever Democrats next win power. The variegated coalition that won the 2024 election for Trump, and raised Republican hopes of a lasting realignment, fractured within months of his inauguration. If the 20th Century is finally dead, this country’s trajectory in the 21st is an immense question mark. That is the great challenge Trump has left for the next president. For a visionary successor, it could also be an opportunity unmatched in recent U.S. history.

Zoja Surroi is political advisor to the prime minister of Kosovo. Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s second majority win in Kosovo shows it’s possible to inspire through governance. To understand how he won his second mandate, one has to understand why he won his first — and that is the desire for change. To correct a political course before it becomes irreversible and to move toward something better. At the time, I was filled with such hope, watching the results from the Harvard Kennedy School library, yet to join his cabinet. For decades, Kosovo — like much of the Balkans — had succumbed to the cliches of the region: Corruption was treated as inevitable, stability was prioritized over accountability, and the implicit assumption was that it was naïve to expect more from a post-conflict Balkan state than just free trade. But this felt genuinely new. It seemed Kurti was in politics for the right reasons — and he had the past to prove it. A former political prisoner under Serbian rule, he spent years in opposition as one of the only credible voices speaking for true independence in Kosovo. And the promise he represented was different: prosperity, modernity, non-corruption. The kind of politics that increases turnout and pulls back those who had disengaged. Kosovo had declared independence, but it had never quite received a fresh start — until then. Kosovo became an independent country in the 21st century. Its political identity has never been about settling for the crumbs of the 20th. And Kurti avoided the fate of many first-term reformers because he delivered. Fulfilling the promises you’ve set out for the people that count on you the most isn’t just the right thing to do — it’s also good politics. That mandate wasn’t built on spectacle or shiny mega-projects. It focused on the unglamorous work of governance: building a non-corrupt government, expanding social protection, making public higher education free and strengthening government institutions. These things don’t go viral, but they’re felt: Kosovo’s standing in international transparency indices has markedly improved. The World Bank removed Kosovo from its list of fragile and conflict-affected situations, and projected it as the fastest-growing economy in its region. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Kosovo rose 28 places during Kurti’s tenure. However, governing isn’t just about domestic reform, and Serbia remains the main external complication. As Kosovo reached its adulthood as a state this month, continued denial of its sovereignty looks increasingly anachronistic — and yet, it persists. And while Kosovo remains firmly pro-EU, Serbia has leaned in the opposite direction, deepening ties with Russia and tightening internal political control. This dynamic has real consequences: Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serb minority — roughly 4 percent of the population, one-third of which is concentrated around the north border — has worked against integration in the country. Political pluralism has been constrained, with one party effectively monopolizing the political field. And the dangers of this became brutally clear with the armed attack in Banjska in September of 2023. To that end, Kurti’s most ambitious — and controversial — policy has been his effort to close institutional vacuums in the north by extending the reach of Kosovo’s administrative authority. To some international partners, this appeared hasty, and the EU responded with punitive measures it has now lifted. But for many Kosovars, it was long overdue. Indeed, it’s difficult to convince a Kosovar that the threat Serbia represents is overstated. This is where Kurti’s victory takes on broader meaning. Whether in Kosovo or elsewhere, politics requires the courage to move beyond the center. It rewards those who stand for something — consistently and over time. Kosovo today exceeds many of the expectations once placed upon it. Its success is also the success of the U.S. and the EU, both of which helped shape its post-war institutions and remain deeply popular among its citizens. The question now isn’t if Kosovo belongs in the European project — it’s about Europe’s willingness to uphold its own values.

BERLIN — A multibillion-euro German military drone contract has triggered scrutiny inside Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s governing coalition over its most prominent investor, Trump-friendly billionaire Peter Thiel, putting its approval in doubt. Thiel is at the center of a political controversy over his investment in Stark, a Berlin-based defense-tech startup. German lawmakers question whether his minority stake could give him direct or indirect influence over the company’s decisions or access to sensitive defense information. They have also raised concerns about how the contract is priced and structured, saying key details on unit costs, quantities and optional volumes were redacted from documents presented to the country’s parliament. “The fact is that Peter Thiel openly rejects our democracy. We do not know how large his influence at Stark is. And even worse: The federal government cannot explain it,” Greens lawmaker Jeanne Dillschneider told POLITICO. “We need drones, no one disputes that. But the question of how large Thiel’s influence is must be clarified before we procure them.” The Thiel Foundation, a private foundation set up by Peter Thiel and contacted by POLITICO in an effort to seek a response, did not respond to emailed requests for comment. The confidential Stark contract, seen by POLITICO, is structured as a seven-year framework agreement with an initial fixed order worth €268.6 million. If all optional orders are exercised, the total value could rise to roughly €2.86 billion. The agreement covers the serial production of “deployment sets,” each consisting of 20 loitering munitions, a ground control station, spare parts and software and training packages. It would be one of Germany’s first purchases of loitering drones, which have become a low-cost weapon of choice in Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion. It’s unclear what Thiel’s share in the company is. The German-born investor, who is also an American citizen, is known for his support for President Donald Trump and for bankrolling conservative candidates such as Vice President JD Vance, aligning himself with the populist wing of the Republican party. That has raised concerns among German lawmakers, affecting the outlook for parliamentary approval of the deal. Under German law, any defense contract exceeding €25 million must receive explicit approval from the parliamentary budget committee, meaning a vote scheduled for Wednesday is legally required for the deal to proceed.  Stark declined to comment on the details of its shareholder structure but said any foreign investment exceeding a 10 percent threshold would trigger a mandatory review by Germany’s Economy Ministry. The same applies below that level if special rights exist, the company said, adding: “None of this applies.”  It also stated that no shareholder has information rights relating to its products and that any transfer of technical details would be subject to German export control approval. Boris Pistorius rejected the idea that Thiel’s involvement should stall the deal. | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images Defense Minister Boris Pistorius rejected the idea that Thiel’s involvement should stall the deal. Speaking to the Deutsche Welle broadcaster at the recent Munich Security Conference, he said: “I don’t know whether my information is correct or not, but as far as I’m informed, we are not talking about a key stakeholder — we are talking about somebody who has between 3 and 4.5 percent.” That, he added, means Thiel does not play “a key role as a stakeholder,” and while the issue should be considered seriously, it is “not an obstacle really to make contracts with that company.” However, the final decision lies not with his ministry but with parliament. COALITION SCRUTINY GROWS While the Greens were the first to target Thiel’s involvement, criticism has spilled over to Germany’s governing parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats.  Budget lawmakers who spoke with POLITICO on the basis of anonymity to speak candidly have since broadened their review to include pricing structures, delivery timelines and the overall scale of the framework agreement’s optional volumes.  A central point of scrutiny is timing: Berlin would be committing to serial production before a full munitions safety qualification has been completed. According to the contract, the qualification is expected by Sept. 30. The agreement contains exit clauses allowing the government to withdraw if the qualification fails, if performance benchmarks such as hit probability are not met, or if changes in the company’s ownership create security concerns. Lawmakers from both ruling coalition parties have also raised concerns after portions of the Stark contract were redacted. In particular, details relating to quantities and pricing were not fully visible to MPs. They say meaningful oversight becomes difficult if key financial parameters are not fully disclosed. “Responsibility does not mean rubber-stamping,” Christian Democratic budget lawmaker Andreas Mattfeldt wrote on LinkedIn, alluding to further examination of the procurement. “Responsibility means examining, questioning and, if necessary, correcting. For a strong Bundeswehr [German armed forces] and a clean handling of taxpayers’ money.”  In an explanatory memo to lawmakers seen by POLITICO, the Defense Ministry outlines the overall contract structure and aggregate values but doesn’t provide granular figures. It confirms that the initial fixed tranches amount to roughly €270 million per supplier and that the total ceiling values — roughly €2.9 billion for Stark — would only apply if all optional orders are exercised. Bloomberg first reported on the memo. That document does not, however, directly address why specific passages were withheld from committee review. That gap has added to frustration among some coalition MPs ahead of the vote. Lawmakers from Germany’s governing parties are now preparing a conditional approval that would attach binding requirements to the contract before it takes effect. According to two officials familiar with the talks, budget lawmakers are drafting language that would require closer oversight of pricing and limit how the larger optional parts of the deal can be triggered. The move suggests the contract is likely to pass, but not without new safeguards in response to concerns raised inside the coalition. Whether Stark clears the hurdle this week will determine not only the fate of the contract, but also whether the coalition is prepared to close ranks behind one of its most politically sensitive defense procurements. Doepfner Capital, led by Moritz Döpfner, the son of Axel Springer CEO Mathias Döpfner, is also an investor in Stark. Axel Springer owns POLITICO.