Many describe our geopolitical moment as one of instability, but that word feels too weak for what we are living through. Some, like Mark Carney, argue that we are facing a rupture: a break with assumptions that anchored the global economic and political order for decades. Others, like Christine Lagarde, see a profound transition, a shift toward a new configuration of power, technology and societal expectations. Whichever perception we adopt, the implication is clear: leaders can no longer rely on yesterday’s mental models, institutional routines or governance templates. Johanna Mair is the Director of the Florence School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, where she leads education, training and research on governance beyond the nation state. Security, for example, is no longer a discrete policy field. It now reaches deeply into energy systems, artificial intelligence, cyber governance, financial stability and democratic resilience, all under conditions of strategic competition and mistrust. At the same time, competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity metrics or short-term growth rates. It is about a society’s capacity to innovate, regulate effectively and mobilize investment toward long-term objectives — from the green and digital transitions to social cohesion. This dense web of interdependence is where transnational governance is practiced every day. The European Union illustrates this reality vividly. No single member state can build the capacity to manage these transformations on its own. EU institutions and other regional bodies shape regulatory frameworks and collective responses; corporations influence infrastructure and supply chains; financial institutions direct capital flows; and civic actors respond to social fragmentation and governance gaps. Effective leadership has become a systemic endeavour: it requires coordination across these levels, while sustaining public legitimacy and defending liberal democratic principles. > Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them > with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways > that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. The Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute was created precisely to respond to this need. Located in Florence and embedded in a European institution founded by EU member states, the STG is a hub where policymakers, business leaders, civil society, media and academia meet to work on governance beyond national borders. Our mission is to teach and train current and future leaders, equipping them with the knowledge, skills and networks to tackle global challenges in ways that are both innovative and grounded in democratic values. What makes this mission distinctive is not only the topics we address, but also how and with whom we address them. We see leadership development as a practice embedded in real institutions, not a purely classroom-based exercise. People do not come to Florence to observe transnational governance from a distance; they come to practice it, test hypotheses and co-create solutions with peers who work on the frontlines of policy and politics. This philosophy underpins our portfolio of programs, from degree offerings to executive education. With early career professionals, we focus on helping them understand and shape governance beyond the state, whether in international organizations, national administrations, the private sector or civil society. We encourage them to see institutions not as static structures, but as arrangements that can and must be strengthened and reformed to support a liberal, rules-based order under stress. At the same time, we devote significant attention to practitioners already in positions of responsibility. Our Global Executive Master (GEM) is designed for experienced professionals who cannot pause their careers, but recognize that the governance landscape in which they operate has changed fundamentally. Developed by the STG, the GEM convenes participants from EU institutions, national administrations, international organizations, business and civil society — professionals from a wide range of nationalities and institutional backgrounds, reflecting the coalitions required to address complex problems. The program is structured to fit the reality of leadership today. Delivered part time over two years, it combines online learning with residential periods in Florence and executive study visits in key policy centres. This blended format allows participants to remain in full-time roles while advancing their qualifications and networks, and it ensures that learning is continuously tested against institutional realities rather than remaining an abstract exercise. Participants specialize in tracks such as geopolitics and security, tech and governance, economy and finance, or energy and climate. Alongside this subject depth, they build capabilities more commonly associated with top executive programs than traditional public policy degrees: change management, negotiations, strategic communication, foresight and leadership under uncertainty. These skills are essential for bridging policy design and implementation — a gap that is increasingly visible as governments struggle to deliver on ambitious agendas. Executive study visits are a core element of this practice-oriented approach. In a recent Brussels visit, GEM participants engaged with high-level speakers from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, the European Parliament, NATO, Business Europe, Fleishman Hillard and POLITICO itself. Over several days, they discussed foreign and security policy, industrial strategy, strategic foresight and the governance of emerging technologies. These encounters do more than illustrate theory; they give participants a chance to stress-test their assumptions, understand the constraints facing decision-makers and build relationships across institutional boundaries. via EUI Throughout the program, each participant develops a capstone project that addresses a strategic challenge connected to a policy organization, often their own employer. This ensures that executive education translates into institutional impact: projects range from new regulatory approaches and partnership models to internal reforms aimed at making organizations more agile and resilient. At the same time, they help weave a durable transnational network of practitioners who can work together beyond the programme. Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete practice. Addressing the rupture or transition we are living through requires more than technical fixes. It demands leaders who can think systemically, act across borders and design governance solutions that are both unconventional and democratically legitimate. > Across our activities at the STG, a common thread runs through our work: a > commitment to defending and renewing the liberal order through concrete > practice. In a period defined by systemic risk and strategic competition, leadership development cannot remain sectoral or reactive. It must be interdisciplinary, practice-oriented and anchored in real policy environments. At the Florence School of Transnational Governance, we aim to create precisely this kind of learning community — one where students, fellows and executives work side by side to reimagine how institutions can respond to global challenges. For policymakers and professionals who recognize themselves in this moment of rupture, our programs — including the GEM — offer a space to step back, learn with peers and return to their institutions better equipped to lead change. The task is urgent, but it is also an opportunity: by investing in transnational governance education today, we can help lay the foundations for a more resilient and inclusive order tomorrow.

Iranian missiles late Saturday hit two southern Israeli towns close to a nuclear facility in what Tehran said was retaliation for Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear site at Natanz. More than 160 people were injured in the strikes, which hit the towns of Dimona and Arad near Israel’s Negev Nuclear Research Center, according to the Israeli health ministry. The attack came as U.S. President Donald Trump warned that the United States will “obliterate” energy plants in Iran if the government in Tehran doesn’t fully open the Strait of Hormuz, giving the country a 48-hour deadline to comply. Tehran warned in reply that any strike on its energy facilities would prompt retaliatory attacks on U.S. and Israeli energy and infrastructure facilities. Iranian state TV said Saturday’s strikes by Tehran were a response to an attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility earlier in the day, according to the BBC. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran’s parliament, said the fact that ballistic missiles evaded Israeli defenses and struck near the nuclear research site appears to signal “a new phase” in the war. “If Israel is unable to intercept missiles in the heavily protected Dimona area, it is, operationally, a sign of entering a new phase of the conflict,” he posted on social media network X. “Israel’s skies are defenseless.” He added that the “time has come to implement the next pre-planned schemes,” without providing further details. Israeli military spokesman Effie Defrin said the strikes did not represent a new threat. “The air defense systems operated but did not intercept the missile. We will investigate the incident and learn from it,” he wrote on X. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said it had been a “very difficult evening,” and vowed to “continue to strike our enemies on all fronts.” The International Atomic Energy Agency said it was aware of the strikes near the nuclear research center and has not received any indication of damage to the facility, nor any information from regional states indicating that abnormal radiation levels have been detected.

Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1         Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation, procedural complexity and uneven implementation across  m ember s tates. As scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel, supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical development to manufacturing and patient access.  The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination  and supporting scale-up and manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive global biotechnology landscape .2       Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness will determine whether the  a ct translates into faster patient access, sustained investment and long-term resilience.  Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen:  Biotechnology sits at the intersection of health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to  research and development  growth . 3    At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25  percent of its global share of pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the  United States  and China.   The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector, influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients can benefit from new treatments.  > Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy > is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4   > >  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do  and why is it considered an important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?  Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market. By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future  —  and one that can deliver earlier patient benefit  —  so long as we can make it work in practice.  Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will effective delivery and coordination be most decisive? Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.   The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a  u nion-level regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory dialogue, help de-risk development   and promote more consistent implementation across  m ember  s tates.   They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination products  —  spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics  —  where overlapping requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8 and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment process. Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and accelerate development timelines .10 Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech scale-up, manufacturing  and long-term investment in Europe?  Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.   Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and quality?   Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle.  The Biotech Act will help ensure continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which  are  critical to success.   Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier planning for scale-up.    Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen. Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing  European Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster patient access . 11 Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?  Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent  m ember   state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks to address this.   These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and alignment with the EU AI Act ,12  European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance to provide greater operational clarity.  Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of complexity.   Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment, support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.  > These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier > societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the > latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14 > > Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.  Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?  Marrache:  To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary rigidity or administrative burden.  Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a global biotech hub.  Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?  Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the Biotech Act:    First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability and coordination in practice. Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that reflects the global nature of biotechnology.  And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use of  artificial intelligence   —  as a key driver of innovation in health biotechnology.  In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient benefit. An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential 2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en 3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf 4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4 5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en  7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en 8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January 2022. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en 9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices – Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr 10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act 12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024. Retrieved from https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai 13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en 14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Amgen Inc * The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act. More information here.

FRANKFURT —  Germany’s government has redirected the bulk of funds originally earmarked for infrastructure into covering budget gaps, according to new reports from two leading research institutes — raising fresh doubts about Berlin’s ability to deliver on its long-promised investment drive. The findings — coming a year after German lawmakers approved historic constitutional reforms to unlock hundreds of billions of euros in borrowing — could expose Chancellor Friedrich Merz to fresh criticism that his government has failed to harness a €500 billion infrastructure and climate fund to revive Germany’s stagnating economy. The scale of the misallocation is striking, according to the reports. The Cologne-based German Economic Institute (IW) calculates that 86 percent of the funds were diverted, while the Ifo Institute puts the figure at an even more damning 95 percent. “We have found that policymakers have used almost all of the debt-financed funds for other purposes, namely, to cover budget shortfalls. This is a major problem,” said Ifo President Clemens Fuest. After two consecutive years of recession, Germany’s economy barely grew in 2025. It was widely expected to pick up speed in 2026, helped by public investment. But a rebound appears to have failed to materialize thus far.  New headwinds from the conflict in the Middle East will make any recovery even more contingent on effective government spending, analysts warn. The IW report calculated that, last year, the governing coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Berlin tapped just 42 percent of funds originally earmarked. The conservatives and SPD “had the chance to clear the investment backlog. So far, they have not taken it,” said Tobias Hentze of the German Economic Institute. According to Ifo, borrowing from the €500 billion fund increased by €24.3 billion in 2025. Actual federal investments, however, rose by only €1.3 billion overall from 2024. The reason, says Ifo, is that Berlin shifted investment commitments from the current budget into the special fund — known as the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality, or SVIK — in order to make room for higher day-to-day spending. As such, the net increase in actual overall investment has been minuscule. “There were shifts of individual items from the core budget into the debt-financed [special fund] SVIK, particularly grants in the transport sector, which meant that less was invested in the core budget than in previous years,” said Ifo researcher Emilie Höslinger. “A large part of the special fund’s investments is therefore not truly additional.” Germany’s Bundesbank has previously called on the government to use the SVIK’s borrowing capacity “more purposefully” to ensure that the borrowed money actually creates the potential for faster growth in future, which will in turn make it easier to service the debt that has been taken on. Before the fund was launched, critics including the Federation of German Industries (BDI) warned that the potentially beneficial effects of the SVIK risked being diluted unless the money was put to use properly.

Teresa Graham, © EFPIA European governments navigate an ever more competitive global landscape, stagnating productivity and competing demands on budgets. We have successfully faced and solved many challenges in the past, but this situation is different: the choices we make today will shape our health care systems and patient care, and these choices will dictate Europe’s economic performance and global relevance for decades to come. For those of us in the life sciences, these aren’t just macroeconomic trends — they are the pulse of a system that determines how quickly a breakthrough reaches a patient. It is a high-stakes environment where policies on health care and innovation carry urgent human and economic consequences. When a medicine has the power to treat or potentially cure, neither innovators nor policymakers want to drag their heels, because no person requiring health care can afford the luxury of delay. > The true economic burden of health care isn’t financing health innovation, but > the cost of failing to do so. Europe’s challenge is clear: we must better align our industrial strength in life science with public health goals, ensuring innovation reaches both patients and economies faster. The question is no longer what Europe wants to be — it is where Europe chooses to invest to remain a global player. Health as e conomic i nfrastructure Under the weight of mounting budget pressures, it is understandable that governments often view health primarily as a cost to be contained. However, this perspective is disconnected from modern economic reality. And let me be clear: the true economic burden of health care isn’t financing health innovation, but the cost of failing to do so. For years, Europe has already been paying the price of lost productivity: citizens forced out of the workforce too early and chronic diseases managed too late. For instance, cardiovascular diseases alone cost the E uropean U nion economy up to €282 billion annually. This creates a massive yet avoidable strain on national budgets, especially as pharmaceutical innovation is estimated to be responsible for up to two-thirds of life expectancy gains in high-income countries . 1 > Every medical breakthrough that enables a citizen to return to work or care > for their family is a direct investment in Europe’s economic strength. We must shift our mindset . H ealth is not merely a social good; it is economic infrastructure. Healthier societies are inherently more productive and resilient, and every medical breakthrough that enables a citizen to return to work or care for their family is a direct investment in Europe’s economic strength. Investing in innovation today is the only way to secure a competitive workforce and reduce long-term systemic costs. The c ompetitiveness t est: a s trategic a sset, n ot a l ine i tem Europe’s life sciences sector is one of the few remaining areas that retains genuine global competitiveness and strength, contributing more than €300 billion to annual output and supporting 2 million high-skilled jobs across m ember s tates . 2 It anchors Europe’s trade resilience, generating a trade surplus 66 percent higher than all other EU sectors combined . 3 But the warning signs are clear: while Europe still accounts for 20 percent of global pharmaceutical research and development , its share of global investment is shrinking as capital and talent migrate elsewhere . 4 Europe’s world-class science is being held back by fragmentation and regulatory inertia. > We must treat this sector as a pillar of our sovereignty and a strategic > asset, not merely a cost to be managed. If we want to lead the next wave of medical breakthroughs, we must move at the speed of global change. This requires a fundamental shift: simplifying clinical trial regulations, deploying AI-driven digital tools, incentivizing research through strong intellectual property frameworks and establishing a public-private dialogue on innovative pharmaceuticals. We need a clear action plan, not just more legislation, to translate our scientific leadership into tangible health outcomes.   We must treat this sector as a pillar of our sovereignty and a strategic asset, not merely a cost to be managed.  A  c onsequential  c hoice  Europe has to choose. Either we can continue to approach life science innovation as a budgetary threat, only to reali z e too late that we have weakened our competitiveness and delayed new treatments for patients. Or we can recogni z e innovation for what it is  —  an economic multiplier that strengthens our productivity, resilience  and global influence  —  and ensure that Europe remains a place where the next generation of medical breakthroughs is discovered, developed  and delivered to patients.  There is no middle ground. Europe must stop focus ing solely on the cost of innovation and start asking how much innovation it can afford to lose. In the global race for talent and capital, hesitation is a decision. The rest of the world is not waiting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1. The value of health: Investing in Europe’s future [EPC 2026] 2. Economic and Societal Footprint of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe [VE / PwC 2024] 3. International trade of EU and non-EU countries since 2002 by SITC [Eurostat 2026] 4. The 2025 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard [EC 2025] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The entity ultimately controlling the sponsor is European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) * The political advertisement is linked to  EU pharmaceutical regulation and innovation policy. More information here.

Dr. Daniel Steiners This is not an obituary for Germany’s economic standing. It is an invitation to shift perspective: away from the language of crisis and toward a clearer view of our opportunities — and toward the confidence that we have more capacity to shape our future than the mood indicators might suggest. For years, Germany seemed to be traveling along a self-evident path of success: growth, prosperity, the title of export champion. But that framework is beginning to fray. Other countries are catching up. Parts of our industrial base appear vulnerable to the pressures of transformation. And global dependencies are turning into strategic vulnerabilities. In short, the German model of success is under strain. Yet a glance at Europe’s economic history suggests that moments like these can also contain enormous potential — if strategic thinking and decisive action come together. One example, which I find particularly striking, takes us back to 1900. At the time, André and Édouard Michelin were producing tires in a relatively small market, when the automobile itself was still a niche product. They could have focused simply on improving their product. Instead, they thought bigger; not in silos, but in systems. With the Michelin Guide, they created incentives and orientation for greater mobility: workshop directories, road maps, and recommendations for hotels and restaurants made travel more predictable and attractive. What began as a service booklet for motorists gradually evolved into an entire ecosystem — and eventually into a globally recognized benchmark for quality. > In times of change, those who recognize connections and are willing to shape > them strategically can transform uncertainty into lasting strength. What makes this example remarkable is that the real innovation did not lie in the tire itself or merely even a clever marketing idea to boost sales. It lay in something more fundamental: connected thinking and ecosystem thinking. The decision to see mobility as a broad space for value creation. It was the courage to break out of silos, to recognize strategic connections, to deepen value chains — and to help define the standards of an emerging market. That is precisely the lesson that remains relevant today, including for policymakers. In times of change, those who recognize connections and are willing to shape them strategically can transform uncertainty into lasting strength. Germany’s industrial health economy is still too often viewed in public debate in narrowly sectoral terms — primarily through the lens of health care provision and costs. Strategically, however, it has long been an industrial ecosystem that spans research, development, manufacturing, digital innovation, exports and highly skilled employment. Just as Michelin helped shape the ecosystem of mobility, Germany can think of health as a comprehensive domain of value creation. The industrial health economy: cost driver or engine of growth? Yes, medicines cost money. In 2024, Germany’s statutory health insurance system spent around €55 billion on pharmaceuticals. But much of that increase reflects medical progress and the need for appropriate care in an aging society with changing disease patterns. Innovative therapies benefit both patients and the health system. They can improve quality and length of life while shifting treatment from hospitals into outpatient care or even into patients’ homes. They raise efficiency in the system, reduce downstream costs and support workforce participation. > In short, the industrial health economy is not merely part of our health care > system. It is a key industry, underpinning economic strength, prosperity and > the financing of our social security systems. Despite public perception, pharmaceutical spending has remained remarkably stable for years, accounting for roughly 12 percent of total expenditures in the statutory health insurance system. That figure also includes generics — medicines that enter the ‘world heritage of pharmacy’ after patent protection expires and remain available at low cost. Truly innovative, patent-protected medicines account for only about seven percent of total spending. Against these costs stands an economic sector in which Germany continues to hold a leading international position. With around 1.1 million employees and value creation exceeding €190 billion, the industrial health economy is among the largest sectors of the German economy. Its high-tech products, bearing the Made in Germany label, are in demand worldwide and contribute significantly to Germany’s export surplus. In short, the industrial health economy is not merely part of our health care system. It is a key industry, underpinning economic strength, prosperity and the financing of our social security systems. Its overall balance is positive. The central question, therefore, is this: how can we unlock its untapped potential? And what would it mean for Germany if we fail to recognize these opportunities while economic and innovative capacity increasingly shifts elsewhere? Global dynamics leave little room for hesitation Governments around the world have long recognized the strategic importance of the industrial health economy — for health care, for economic growth and for national security. China is demonstrating remarkable speed in scaling and implementing biotechnology. The United States, meanwhile, illustrates how determined industrial policy can look in practice. Regulatory authorities are being modernized, approval procedures accelerated and bureaucratic barriers systematically reduced. At the same time, domestic production is being strategically strengthened. Speed and market size act as magnets for capital — especially in a sector where research is extraordinarily capital-intensive and requires long-term planning security. When innovation-friendly conditions and economic recognition of innovation meet a large, well-funded market, global shifts follow. Today roughly 50 percent of the global pharmaceutical market is located in the United States, about 23 percent in Europe — and only 4 to 5 percent in Germany. This distribution is no coincidence; it reflects differences in economic and regulatory environments. At the same time, political pressure is growing on countries that benefit from the American innovation engine without offering an equally attractive home market or recognizing the value of innovation in comparable ways. Discussions around a Most Favored Nation approach or other trade policy instruments are moving in precisely that direction — and they affect Europe and Germany directly. For Germany, the implications are clear. Those who want to attract investment must strengthen their competitiveness. Those who want to ensure reliable health care must appropriately reward new therapies. Otherwise, these global dynamics will inevitably affect both the economy and health care at home. Already today, roughly one in four medicines introduced in the United States between 2014 and 2023 is not available in Europe. The gap is even larger for gene and cell therapies. The primacy of industrial policy: from consensus to action — now Germany does not lack potential or substance. We still have a strong industrial base, a tradition of invention, outstanding universities and research institutions, and a private sector willing to invest. Political initiatives such as the coalition agreement, the High-Tech Agenda and plans for a future strategy in pharmaceuticals and medical technology provide important impulses, which I strongly welcome. > A fair market environment without artificial price caps or rigid guardrails is > the strongest magnet for private capital, long-term investment and a resilient > health system. But programs must now translate into a coherent action plan for growth. We need innovation-friendly and stable framework conditions that consider health care, economic strength and national security together — as a strategic ecosystem, not as separate silos. The value of medical innovation must also be recognized in Germany. A fair market environment without artificial price caps or rigid guardrails is the strongest magnet for private capital, long-term investment and a resilient health system. Faster approval procedures, consistent digitalization and a determined reduction of bureaucracy are essential if speed is once again to become a competitive advantage and a driver of innovation. Germany can reinvent itself, of that I am convinced. With courage, strategic determination and an ambitious push for innovation. The choice now lies with us: to set the right course and unlock the potential that is already there.

The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies. Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to recent results from The POLITICO Poll. Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip the balance of global power away from the West. Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S. to China. The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office. That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also shared that sentiment. Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only further strained relationships with top allies. Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a partnership rather than a rivalry. “The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,” Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and is only focused on itself.” These sentiments are already being translated into action. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing with Chinese purchase orders for European products. Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it could happen in practice. By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of global supply chains. Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China. A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media and other short-form video platforms for information on China. And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing content deemed negative toward China. According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while simultaneously degrading its own democratic values. The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,” said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.” “It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she added. There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s grand policy vision. China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels. “There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration. This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI. The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to develop the first superintelligent AI. But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese tech, even in the realm of AI. As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that way. About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for the world. By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies. This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and its policies. Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate Beijing’s rise. “Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” METHOLODGY The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

U.S. President Donald Trump may think his war in Iran is a boon for the oil industry — but his way of putting it is causing consternation. “The United States is the largest Oil Producer in the World, by far, so when oil prices go up, we make a lot of money,“ Trump wrote in a Truth Social post Wednesday as crude prices rose to $95 per barrel, a 40 percent increase from where they were before the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran nearly two weeks ago. Trump’s post highlights the industry’s complicated relationship with the president — and its messaging conundrum. While oil companies are benefiting financially from the nearly $30-per-barrel run up in crude prices since the war started, executives are also worried that volatile prices are making business decisions difficult, and high prices will generate public backlash. “The idea that the industry profits from war and death is not one a VP of public relations wants to promote,” said Mark Jones, political science fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute. Trump’s post drew groans from some in the industry. “Oh, boy….” one energy industry strategist responded when shown Trump’s social media post. Trump’s message also feeds into a perception that oil companies are looking to gouge consumers, said a second industry official granted anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to speak publicly. “This highlights the complicated relationship the oil industry has with the president,” the industry official said. “President Trump’s overarching concern is always the price at the pump — and the lower the better. There is also some notion that the oil and gas industry secretly works to raise prices, which is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the industry works on a global and transparent market basis.” Trump’s post also plays into some voters’ cynicism about business in general and the oil industry in particular, said Mark Mizruchi, a University of Michigan professor who focuses on the economic and political behavior of large American corporations. “The interesting thing about Trump’s statement is that he inadvertently stated a belief that a lot of people have — that something like this happens and the oil companies will make a lot of money,” Mizruchi said. “It probably didn’t occur to him that people — including in the industry — weren’t happy about that” statement. The White House has maintained that the price of oil and gasoline — which has jumped 60 cents per gallon since the fighting started — will ultimately come down after the war because new supplies from Iran will come onto the global markets. “Ultimately, once the military objectives of Operation Epic Fury are completed and the Iranian terrorist regime is neutralized, oil and gas prices will drop rapidly again, potentially even lower than before the strikes begin,” White House spokesperson Taylor Rogers said. “As a result, American families will benefit greatly in the long term.” In the meantime, Rogers said, the administration “has and will continue working cooperatively with leaders in the energy industry to stabilize markets.” The war is already causing difficulty for the industry. Oil companies operating solely in the United States will get pure short-term profit from the spike in prices, but large international companies may have to shut down assets they’re operating in the Persian Gulf, white the supply shock afflicting Southeast Asia and Europe could also persuade countries to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, Jones said. Andrea Woods, a spokesperson for the American Petroleum Institute, said in a statement that the industry is “focused on working with the administration to ensure safe and reliable operations in the region.” “Energy market volatility does not benefit anyone, including producers who rely on certainty and stability for long-term business decisions,” Woods said. The oil industry has had a volatile relationship with Trump since his first administration, one where they benefit from some of his policies — but also suffer under others, like tariffs. And while Trump is one of the industry’s biggest cheerleaders, he has also dragged them into politics in ways industry executives are not always comfortable with. Trump on the campaign trail made a point of asking oil industry executives for a billion dollars, but the industry overall contributed $75 million, according to an analysis of campaign contributions by the environmental communications firm Climate Power — less than Trump’s campaign received from SpaceX, the firm owned by billionaire Elon Musk. Harold Hamm, the chair and founder of oil company Continental Resources and an informal energy adviser to Trump in his first and second terms, initially backed Florida Governor Ron DeSantis in the 2024 presidential campaign. Trump also tried to push oil company executives into publicly supporting his administration’s military action against Venezuela and promising to quickly invest in drilling for oil in the country. That move met pushback from some executives who didn’t share Trump’s optimism on how easy it would be to revive Venezuela’s oil fields. Democrats and environmental groups wasted little time to use Trump’s post to slam the administration and the oil industry. “I’ve been saying forever that Donald Trump’s energy policy is to prioritize the interest of energy producers (high prices) over consumers (low prices),” Rep. Sean Casten (D-Ill.) said in an X post. “It appears he agrees with me.” “Instability makes oil prices soar,” Lorne Stockman, international research director at Oil Change International said in a press release response to the post. “As geopolitical tensions rise, Trump’s fossil fuel billionaire donors reap windfall profits while people are being killed and working people around the world face higher energy and food costs.” In Trump’s post, the president isn’t talking about families grappling with their bills, said Jesse Lee, a senior adviser at Climate Power. “Trump is talking about the people he cares about most — the oil and gas billionaires who spent millions of dollars to get him elected,” Lee said in an email. “Trump will always put his billionaire buddies first, and working families will always be left to pay the price.” Rising oil prices are expected to be a political liability for Republicans heading into midterm elections later this year. Even besides higher prices at the local gas station, the effect of increased crude costs will hit voter pocketbooks in a myriad of ways. Companies across a range of industries have started to implement energy surcharges to absorb higher fuel costs, Raymond James analyst Pavel Molchanov said in note to clients. “UPS and Maersk (shipping), Ecolab (chemicals), and Cathay Pacific (aviation) are among the firms unveiling surcharges this week,” Molchanov said in the note. “We expect more such announcements until oil prices cool meaningfully from four-year highs.”

BRUSSELS — The European Union’s anti-deforestation law will put United States producers off exporting to the European market, harming EU competitiveness, a senior official with the U.S. Department of Agriculture told reporters in Brussels Friday. The law, also called EUDR, is “going to discourage us from looking at the European market” and from “paying attention to any European rules [linked to deforestation],” the official said. The law as it stands would affect $9 billion of U.S. trade to the EU annually, added the official, who spoke to journalists on condition that he was not named. A delegation of U.S. government representatives is finishing a tour of EU capitals — including Madrid, Rome, Paris, Berlin and Brussels — to lobby governments to simplify the EUDR ahead of an upcoming review of the rules next month. One example of a sector that could be affected is livestock farming, the official said, arguing these farmers depend on soybeans to feed their animals, and Europe does not produce enough protein feed. “It needs to import from countries that are better at it, like us,” he said, warning that the U.S. stopping that export “will drive up their costs, hurt their competitiveness.” The EU’s anti-deforestation law requires that companies police their supply chains to ensure that any commodities they use, such as palm oil, beef or coffee, have not contributed to deforestation. After complaints from industry groups and trade partners, EU institutions in December agreed to put off implementation of the law by a year — until Dec. 2026 — and mandated the Commission to present a review of the rules by April. “It’s particularly difficult for us because these [compliance] costs will be borne by our producers,” said the official. U.S. farmers also don’t want to share information on their farms with foreign governments, he said. Washington’s main qualms with the law include the fact that there’s no category of “negligible” risk in the EU’s ranking of countries by risk of deforestation. The U.S. — like all EU member countries as well as China, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Vietnam and others — has been labeled “low risk” under the EU’s deforestation classification system. Members of the European Parliament in the center-right European People’s Party have also backed the introduction of a “no risk” category, “for countries with stable or expanding forest areas.” The senior official also complained about a stipulation in the law that if the level of deforestation in any country exceeds 70,000 hectares annually, that country cannot be considered “low risk.” That standard “just doesn’t work for us,” they said. “It’s not fair.” Representatives from the European Commission are meeting with members of the delegation on Friday “at technical level” to discuss the law, a spokesperson for the European Commission confirmed to POLITICO. European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall told reporters in January that there would be no new legislative proposal come April, saying businesses need “predictability.” A 2024 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated that, in 2023, U.S. exports of the seven commodities under the EUDR accounted for approximately 3 percent of the value of U.S. exports to the EU, “so overall the EUDR may not significantly affect U.S. trade.” European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall told reporters in January that there would be no new legislative proposal come April, saying businesses need “predictability.” | Gabriel Luengas/Europa Press via Getty Images Still, the authors wrote, the law could affect U.S. producers of specific commodities covered by the law. In 2023, the highest value of covered commodities exported to the EU from the U.S. were wood and wood products ($4.5 billion), soybeans ($4 billion), rubber ($1.1 billion), and cattle, such as beef and related products ($409 million). Environmental groups are calling on EU governments and the Commission to stick by the EUDR and keep the rules intact. “Misleading and self-serving foreign pressure on the EU should not distract policy-makers from staying focused on facts,” said Anke Schulmeister-Oldenhove, manager for forests at WWF EU, in an emailed statement. “Every year the EUDR is postponed results in the loss of nearly 50 million trees and the release of 16.8 million tonnes of CO₂ into the atmosphere.”

Poland is looking into whether an attempted cyberattack on a nuclear research facility was carried out by Iran, the government said on Thursday. The country’s digital minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said in an emailed statement that Poland had “identified an attempted cyberattack on the servers of the National Centre for Nuclear Research,” which authorities had thwarted. He told local media that the attack was carried out “in the past few days,” Reuters reported.  The nuclear center said in a statement that “all safety systems operated according to procedures.” A reactor is “operating safely and smoothly at full power,” Jakub Kupecki, the center’s director said in the statement. The facility carries out research into nuclear energy; Poland does not have nuclear weapons of its own.  Polish cybersecurity services and the energy ministry are working with the facility, Gawkowski said.  The minister told local media that there are early signals suggesting the attack came from Iran, Reuters reported. “The first identifications of the entry vectors … are related to Iran,” he said, adding that more investigation is required.  Gawkowski added that hackers could also have used indicators linking the attack to Iran in efforts to hide their real origins. Poland has faced a huge number of Russian cyberattacks since the war in Ukraine began in 2022. Western cyber and intelligence agencies have warned critical entities to be on high alert for Iranian cyberattacks following the start of the conflict in late February. The Iranian embassy in Warsaw did not immediately respond to a request for comment.