U.S. regulators this week proposed easing capital rules on big U.S. banks in a package of proposals that departs from globally agreed-upon standards. Now, it’s sparking calls from European trade groups to loosen the EU’s own version of the rules. On Thursday, U.S. bank regulators released a number of potential rule changes intended to align U.S. policy with a 2017 global agreement known as Basel III. Its provisions imply a 2.4 percent decrease in capital held by the largest U.S. banks and bigger cuts for smaller banks. European regulators, anticipating the U.S. move, had already been discussing loosening their own requirements, which currently call for raising the capital that banks must have on hand by around 8 percent by 2033. But the breadth of the U.S. proposal has prompted trade groups in Europe to push officials to move faster. Taken together, the moves could weaken the global regulatory framework instituted on both sides of the Atlantic after the 2008 financial crisis. “The U.S. proposal appears to mark a clear shift toward easing capital constraints to support lending and growth, while Europe seems to continue moving in a different direction,” said Sébastien de Brouwer, deputy CEO of the European Banking Federation, a trade group. The United States’ pullback is “making it more urgent than ever to review the EU framework to preserve competitiveness and financing capacity of European banks,” he said. Over the past few months, European regulators had started to reevaluate the competitiveness of the bloc’s banking sector, especially as major European economies have struggled to keep pace with U.S. growth. EU heads of government called Thursday night, in a statement agreed upon before the release of the U.S. proposal, for the European Commission “to propose targeted amendments to the prudential framework in order to enhance the capacity of the banking sector to finance the European economy.” The Commission is also authoring a report on the competitiveness of its banking sector, due after the summer, which will pave the way for legislative proposals. This is set to be a wide-ranging report that could relate to bank capital requirements or other policies. The European Central Bank has already made recommendations for simplifying the bloc’s banking rules ahead of the report, including calling for lighter Basel rules for small banks and for capital buffers to be merged. None of its recommendations were as sweeping as what the U.S. has proposed, however. The U.S. proposal departs from the intent of the original Basel accords, a long process in which global regulators worked to address the root causes of the global financial crisis, critics say. Regulators in 2017 reached an agreement around the framework for jurisdictions to mitigate risks. “This definitely goes against not just the ethos but the intent, spirit and goal of Basel III,” said Dennis Kelleher, CEO of Better Markets, an advocacy group that supports stronger financial regulation. “This proposal when finalized will inevitably ignite another global race to the regulatory bottom” One of the biggest departures relates to the unwinding of the “output floor,” which sets a minimum capital threshold for banks’ trading activities. The new proposal uses a new risk-weighting approach that would do away with the threshold. “This will encourage other jurisdictions to do the same, undermining a key reform and cornerstone of the Basel III agreement,” Federal Reserve board member Michael Barr said Thursday. In the 2017 international talks, the U.S. had argued in favor of a restrictive output floor. Major European banks argued that would hike their capital requirements above and beyond those of the U.S., given the makeup of European banks’ trading books, stymieing lending to the real economy. The threshold was ultimately set at a lower rate than what American negotiators wanted. European regulators had recently moved to delay implementation of the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, the portion of Basel focused specifically on so-called market risk, or rules governing how to capitalize banks’ trading activities. “Removing the output floor for market risk is a divergence from international standards, and we will carefully assess the impact on internationally active banks, in particular, with respect to the ongoing discussions on EU FRTB implementation and banking competitiveness in Europe,” said Caroline Liesegang, head of prudential regulation and research at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, which represents large banks. In the past, U.S. regulators had tended to “gold plate” the country’s rules for big banks, meaning they put in provisions above and beyond what Basel requires in order to acknowledge the United State’s central role in the global financial system and push for stricter global standards. In 2023, U.S. regulators failed to pass a capital proposal that would have raised aggregate capital by 16 percent and would have adhered more strictly to the international framework. On Thursday, U.S. regulators said the international standards should not be an unnecessary barrier to the needs of the U.S. financial system. “We should not seek to punish U.S. consumers and businesses by imposing higher costs of credit, or forcing credit availability outside of the banking system, particularly if this is done only to show greater alignment with Basel or any other international standard,” said Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle Bowman, who led the U.S. central bank’s crafting of the proposal. The dilution of the agreement and its pullback on capital “will make it more challenging for the U.S. to use Basel, as it so often has, to further its own agenda,” said Kathryn Judge, professor at Columbia Law School. In the U.K., which has since left the bloc, the capital rules are expected to have less of an impact on banks than EU peers. A spokesperson for the Prudential Regulation Authority, the U.K.’s main banking regulator, said that the thinking remains the same as in its final rules, which will see the market risk rules apply from 2028. The European Commission declined to comment. The Basel Committee said it doesn’t comment on individual jurisdictions. The Federal Reserve declined to comment. Bjarke Smith-Meyer and Elliot Gulliver-Needham contributed to this report.

PARIS — Lionel Jospin, a Socialist prime minister under center-right French President Jacques Chirac, has died at age 88, his family told AFP. Jospin, a household name in France and a social-democratic heavyweight, left politics after failing to qualify for the second round of the 2002 presidential election, which saw far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen qualify for the first time. The result sent shockwaves through the country and foreshadowed the National Rally’s steady rise to become France’s most popular party under the leadership of Le Pen’s daughter, Marine Le Pen. Jospin, a defender of traditional parties, had criticized President Emmanuel Macron for making them obsolete and the French president’s “hubris” in a book published in 2020. Macron praised Jospin as “a great French figure” in a social media post Monday. “Through his rigor, courage and ideal of progress, he embodied a lofty vision of the Republic,” Macron wrote on X. Jospin, who successfully united the left camp during his tenure as the party’s leader in the 1990s and became prime minister in 1997, supported the left-wing alliance uniting the Socialists, the Greens and far-left France Unbowed during the 2022 legislative election campaign. But he cautioned against France Unbowed leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s disruptive political strategy shortly after the election, warning of its potentially destructive effects on the broader left in an interview with Le Monde. Jospin’s death was announced the morning after local elections that are setting the scene for the 2027 presidential race, at a time when the left is weakened by deep divisions among moderates over whether uniting with a dominant but increasingly toxic Mélenchon is inevitable — or risking sinking the left’s ship.

The Trump administration is telling foreign officials and others that it will not reschedule a summit between the U.S. president and Chinese leader Xi Jinping until the Iran war ends. A Washington-based diplomat privy to U.S.-China summit planning confirmed that the administration has made clear “the next dates for the Trump-Xi summit will only be proposed after the active part of the Iran conflict is over.” A Washington-based individual close to the administration also briefed on White House summit planning confirmed the administration shared that timeline. POLITICO granted both the people anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about sensitive diplomatic discussions. The U.S. State Department directed queries to the White House. The White House denied the summit timeline was tied to the Iran war. “This is fake news. The United States and China are having productive discussions about rescheduling President Trump’s visit — announcements are forthcoming,” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said. The Chinese embassy said it had “no information to provide” about the possible delay in summit scheduling. The long-anticipated meeting between Trump and Xi had originally been planned for the end of March, but Trump said Monday the meeting would be pushed back “a month or so” because “we’ve got a war going on.” On Thursday, he said it would happen in “about a month and a half.” Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt suggested the meeting might not take place until after May. “The president has some things here at home in May that he has to attend to, and I’m sure President Xi is a very busy man, as well, so we’ll get the dates on the books as soon as we can,” Leavitt said. Tying the summit preparations to the end of the Iran conflict could mean additional delays to a meeting intended to maintain stability in a fragile U.S.-China trade truce. As the war on Iran enters its fourth week, the Trump administration appears to be preparing for a longer conflict. The U.S. has made detailed plans for the deployment of ground troops onto Iranian soil, CBS News reported Friday. The administration is also moving to dispatch thousands of troops to the region. Trump told reporters Thursday he’s “not putting troops anywhere” but then added: “If I were, I certainly wouldn’t tell you.” “There are operational constraints to managing a war from a foreign country — particularly a hostile one like China,” said the person close to the administration. “It would be terribly awkward for Trump and Xi to transact in this climate.” On Friday, Trump signaled a potential wind-down in the Iran conflict in a Truth Social post, suggesting the U.S. could scale back its role while pushing allies to take on more responsibility in securing the Strait of Hormuz, the major commercial waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. “We are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great military efforts in the Middle East,” Trump wrote. Trump and Xi made progress toward heading off an intensified trade war in an October meeting in South Korea. During that meeting, Xi committed to Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products like soybeans and the elimination of many of Beijing’s restrictions on critical minerals exports. In return, Trump agreed to extend a pause on triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods. Wendy Cutler, a former negotiator in the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, argued this work can continue even if Trump and Xi don’t meet again in person. “The stabilization part of this won’t necessarily be jeopardized without a meeting,” she said. “Now, if something happens in the war, either foreseen or unforeseen, there’s just lots of flash points that can threaten this truce, which are unforeseeable at this period.” Rush Doshi, former senior director for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, said a meeting between the two leaders is important to strengthening and maintaining the bilateral relationship. “Without leader-to-leader communication to manage a relationship of this complexity until the war is over — and there’s no sense of when the war is going to be over — there’s a real risk the relationship is going to be less stable than people might have expected,” said Doshi, now at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Netflix co-CEO Ted Sarandos arrives in Brussels on Tuesday with a clear message for EU regulators ahead of a looming review of Europe’s streaming rules: Don’t overcomplicate them. In an exclusive interview with POLITICO, Sarandos said Netflix can live with regulation — but warned the EU not to fracture the single market with a patchwork of national mandates as officials prepare to reopen the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. “It doesn’t make it a very healthy business environment if you don’t know if the rules are going to change midway through production,” Sarandos said. He also warned regulators are underestimating YouTube as a direct competitor for TV viewing, too often treating it like a social media platform with “a bunch of cat videos” than a massive streaming rival. Sarandos’ effort to win over European regulators comes soon after the collapse of Netflix’s bid to buy Warner Bros. Discovery — but Sarandos maintained that the political dynamics around the deal only “complicated the narrative, not the actual outcomes.” He added that there was no political interference in the deal, and he shrugged off President Donald Trump’s demand to remove Susan Rice, a former national security adviser under President Barack Obama, from the Netflix board. “It was a social media post,” Sarandos said. “It was not ideal, but he does a lot of things on social media.” This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. What’s bringing you back to Brussels now? Well, we have ongoing meetings with regulators around Europe all the time. We have so much business in Europe, obviously, and so this has been on the books for quite a while. Can you give me a little bit of a sense of who you’re meeting with, and what is the focus? I think one of the things to keep in mind is that we’ve become such an important part, I’d think, of the European audiovisual economy. We’ve spent, in the last decade, over $13 billion in creating content in Europe. It makes us one of the leading producers and exporters of European storytelling. First of all, we’ve got a lot of skin in the game in Europe, obviously. We work with over 600 independent European producers. We created about 100,000 cast and crew jobs in Europe from our productions. So we talk to folks who are interested in all the elements of that — how to keep it, how to maintain it, how to grow it and how to protect it. In terms of regulation in the EU, Netflix is governed by a directive here. The commission is looking to reopen that this year. There seems to be a sense here from regulators that the current rules don’t create a level playing field between the broadcasters, the video on demand, the video sharing, and so they may look to put more requirements on that. How steeped in the details are you there? And how would Netflix react to more rules put on Netflix at this moment? Well, first and foremost, we comply with all the rules that apply to us in terms of how we’re regulated today. We have seen by operating around the world that those countries where they lean more into incentives than the strict regulatory scheme, that the incentives pay off. We’ve got multibillion dollar investments in Spain and the UK, where they have really leaned into attracting production through incentives versus regulatory mandates, so we find that that’s a much more productive environment to work in. But the core for me is that obviously they’re going to evolve the regulatory models, but as long as they remain simple, predictable, consistent — the single market, the benefit of the single-market is this — as long as these rules remain simple, predictable and consistent, it’s a good operating model. I think the more that it gets broken up by individual countries and individual mandates, you lose all the benefits of the single market. There’s a lot of talk in Brussels right now about simplification, getting rid of a lot of red tape. Do you think the rules that you’re governed by would benefit from a similar kind of effort to simplify, of pulling back on a lot of these patchwork of rules, even at the EU? Look, I think it doesn’t make it a very healthy business environment if you don’t know if the rules are going to change midway through production, so for me, having some stability is really important, and I understand that we’re in a dynamic market and a dynamic business, and they should reflect the current operating models that we’re in too. We want to work closely with the regulators to make sure that what they’re doing and what we’re doing kind of reflect each other, which is trying to protect the healthy work environment for folks in Europe. When you meet with regulators here, is there a message you’re going to be delivering to them or what do you want them to walk away with in terms of the bottom line for you in terms of your business at this moment in the EU? I think some things are well understood and other things I think are less so. I think our commitment to European production is unique in the world. Both in our original production but also in our investment in second right’s windows that we pre-invest in films that compel production. Tens of millions of dollars’ worth of film production is compelled by our licensing agreements as well beyond our original production. And the fact that we work with local European producers on these projects — I think there’s a misconception that we don’t. And the larger one is the economic impact that that brings to Europe and to the world with our original program strategy that supports so many, not just the productions themselves but even tourism in European countries. Think about President [Emmanuel] Macron pointing out that 38 percent of people who went to France last year cited “Emily in Paris” as one of the top reasons they went. We’ve seen that in other countries. We saw it in Madrid with the “Casa de Papel.” And so it’s one of those things where it really raises all boats across the economies of these countries. Regulators often focus on the competition between streaming services, but as you know very well, younger audiences are spending more time on platforms like YouTube. Do you think policymakers are underestimating that shift? Would you like to see that taken into account more in the regulatory landscape? One of the things that we saw in recent months with the Warner Brothers transaction is a real deep misunderstanding about what YouTube is and isn’t. YouTube is a straightforward direct competitor for television, either a local broadcaster or a streamer like Netflix. The connected television market is a zero-sum screen. So whichever one you choose, that’s what you’re watching tonight. And you monetize through subscription or advertising or both, but at the end of the day, it’s that choosing to engage in how you give them and how, and how that programming is monetized is a very competitive landscape and it includes YouTube. I think what happens is people think of YouTube as a bunch of cat videos and maybe some way to, to promote your stuff by putting it on there for free. But it turns out it is a zero-sum game. You’re going to be choosing at the expense of an RTL or Netflix. I think in this case it’s one of these things where recognizing and understanding that YouTube is in the same exact game that we are. Do you feel like you’re on different planes though, in the eyes of regulators at this moment? I don’t think that they see them as a direct competitor in that way. I think they think of that as an extension of social media. And the truth is when we talk about them as a competitor, we’re only talking about them on the screen. I’m not talking about their mobile usage or any of that. You know, about 55 percent of all YouTube engagement now is on the television through their app. So to me, that’s the thing to keep an eye on. As you get into this, it’s a pretty straightforward, competitive model and we think probably should have a level playing field relative to everybody else. Who do you view as Netflix’s main competitors today? Look, our competitive space is really the television screen. When people pick up the remote and pick what to watch, everyone is in that mix. We identified YouTube — this isn’t new for us — we identified YouTube as a competitor in the space 10 years ago, even before they moved to the television. And I think, for the most part, TikTok forced their hand to move to the television because they were kind of getting chased off the phone more or less by TikTok. I think that’s the other one that regulators should pay a lot of attention to is what’s happening with the rise of TikTok engagement as well. It’s not directly competitive for us, but it is for attention and time and to your point, maybe the next generation’s consumer behavior. Last question on regulation: With the EU looking at the rules again, there’s a tendency always to look to tinker more and more and do more. Is there a point at what regulation starts affecting your willingness to invest in European production? Well, like I said, those core principles of predictability and simplicity have really got to come into play, because I think what happens is, just like any business, you have to be able to plan. So, if you make a production under one set of regs and release it under another, it’s not a very stable business environment. The topic that dominated a lot of your attention in recent months was obviously the merger talks with Warner Brothers Discovery. I know you’ve said it didn’t work for financial reasons. I want to ask you a little bit about the political dynamics. How much did the political environment, including the Susan Rice incident, how much did that complicate the calculus in your mind? I think it complicated the narrative, not the actual outcomes. I think for us it was always a business transaction, was always a well-regulated process in the U.S. The Department of Justice was handling it, everything was moving through. We were very confident we did not have a regulatory issue. Why would that be? It’s because it was very much a vertical transaction. I can’t name a transaction that was similar to this that has ever been blocked in history. We did not have duplicated assets. We did have a market concentration issue in the marketplace that we operate in. And I think that’s the feedback I was getting back from the DOJ and from regulators in general, which was, they understood that, but I do think that Paramount did a very nice job of creating a very loud narrative of a regulatory challenge that didn’t exist. But looking back to those early days of the merger discussions, did you have an appreciation for what might follow in terms of that complicated narrative? Yeah. Look, I think it opens up the door to have a lot of conversations that you wouldn’t have had otherwise, but that’s okay. A lot great things came out of it, the process itself. I would say in total, we had a price for where we thought this was good for our business. We made our best and final offer back in December and it was our best and final offer. So that’s all. But what came out a bit that’s positive is, we’ve had really healthy conversations with folks who we hardly ever talked to, theater operators, as a good example. I had a great meeting in February with the International Union of Cinemas, and the heads from all the different countries about what challenges they have, how we could be more helpful, or how they could be helpful to us too. I think we’ll come out of this with a much more creative relationship with exhibitions around the world. And by way of example, doing things that we haven’t done before. I don’t recommend testifying before the Senate again, but it was an interesting experience for sure. Probably a good learning experience. Hopefully not in the future for anything that you don’t want to be there for, but yes. Yeah, exactly. We’ve always said from the beginning, the Warner transaction was a nice-to-have at the right price, not a must-have-at-any-price. The business is healthy, growing organically. We’re growing on the path that we laid out several years ago and we didn’t really need this to grow the business. These assets are out there through our growth period and they’re going to be out there and for our next cycle growth as well and we’ve got to compete with that just like we knew we had to at the beginning. This was I think something that would fortify and maybe accelerate some of our existing models, but it doesn’t change our outcome. Are there regrets or things you might have wished you’d done differently? I mean honestly we took a very disciplined approach. I think we intentionally did not get distracted by the narrative noise, because we knew, we recognized what it was right away, which is just narrative noise. This deal was very good for the industry. Very good for both companies, Warner Brothers and Netflix. Our intent was obviously to keep those businesses operating largely as they are now. All the synergies that we had in the deal were mostly technologies and managerial, so we would have kept a big growth engine going in Hollywood and around the world. The alternative, which we’ve always said, is a lot of cutting. I think regulators in Europe and regulators in the U.S. should keep an eye on horizontal mergers. They should keep a close eye on [leveraged buyouts]. They typically are not good for the economy anywhere they happen. What were you preparing for in terms of the EU regulatory scrutiny with Warner Brothers? What was your read on how that might have looked? I think we’re a known entity in Europe. Keep in mind, like in Q4 of last year, we reported $3.5 billion or $3.8 billion in European revenues. So 18 percent year-on-year growth. The EU is now our largest territory. We’re a known entity there. The reason we didn’t take out press releases, we had meetings in Europe as we know everybody. We talked to the regulators, both at the EU and at the country level. And I do think that in many of the countries that we operate in, we’re a net contributor to the local economy, which I think is really important. We’ve got 12 offices across Europe with 2,500 people. So we’re members of the local ecosystem, we’re not outsiders. With President Trump, he demanded that Netflix remove Susan Rice from the board or pay the consequences. Did that cross a line for you in terms of political interference? It was a social media post, and we didn’t, no, it did not. It was not ideal, but he does a lot of things on social media. So you didn’t interpret it as anything bigger than that. I mean, he does that one day, he could obviously weigh in on content the next day. How does somebody like you manage situations like that? I think it’s really important to be able to separate noise from signal, and I think a lot of what happens in a world where we have a lot of noise. There was so much attention to you going to the White House that day. And we didn’t learn until several days later that you didn’t actually have the meetings that were predicted. Before you arrived in Washington that day, had you already made the decision not to proceed? Not before arriving in Washington, but we knew the framework for if this, then that. So, yeah, I would say that it was interesting, but again, we don’t make a big parade about our meetings with government and with the regulators. I had a meeting on the books with the DOJ scheduled several weeks before, meeting with Susie Wiles, the president’s chief of staff, scheduled several months before, unrelated to the Warner Brothers deal. And that was just the calendar that lined up that way. We didn’t know when Warner Brothers would make the statement about the deal. It’s all very dramatic, like it belongs on Netflix as a movie. There was paparazzi outside of the White House waiting for me when I came out. I’ve never experienced that before. Yeah, it’s a remarkable story. I would tell you, and I’m being honest with you, there was no political interference in this deal. The president is interested in entertainment and interested in deals, so he was curious about the mechanics of things and how things were going to go or whatever, but he made it very clear that this was under the DOJ. So it’s just like we all spun it up from the media? How do you explain it all? First of all, Netflix is clickbait. So people write about Netflix and it gets read. And that’s a pretty juicy story. And [Trump] said, and by the way, like I said, he makes statements sometimes that lead to the beliefs of things that do and sometimes that don’t materialize at all. But I found my conversations with him were 100 percent about the industry, protecting the industry. And I think it’s very healthy that the president of the United States speaks to business leaders about industries that are important to the economy. To what degree did the narrative or the fact that David Ellison had a relationship or seemed to have a relationship with people in Washington who were in power, that that might have swayed or changed the dynamic at the end with where Warner Brothers went though? I can’t speak to what their thinking is on it. I feel like for me, it’s very important to know the folks in charge, but I wouldn’t count on it if you’re doing something that is not in the best interest of the country or the economy. You talked with Trump in the past about entertainment jobs. Were there specific policies you’ve advocated to him or anything that he brought up on that point? He has brought up tariffs for the movie and television industry many times. And I’ve hopefully talked to him the way out of them. I just said basically the same thing I said earlier. I think that incentive works much better. We’re seeing it in the U.S. things like the states compete with each other for production incentives and those states with good, healthy incentive programs attract a lot of production, and you’ve seen a lot of them move from California to Georgia to New Jersey, kind of looking for that what’s the best place to operate in, where you could put more on the screen. And I do think that having the incentives versus tariffs is much better. Netflix is now buying Ben Affleck’s AI company. What areas do you see AI having the most potential to change Netflix’s workflow? My focus is that AI should be a creator tool. But with the same way production tools have evolved over time, AI is just a rapid, important evolution of these tools. It is one of those. And the idea that the creators could use it to do things that they could never do before to do it. Potentially, they could do faster and cheaper. But the most impact will be if they can make it better. I don’t think faster and cheaper matters if it’s not better. This is the most competitive time in the history of media. So you’ve gotta be better every time out of the gate. And faster and cheaper consumers are not looking for faster and cheaper, they’re looking for better. I do think that AI, particularly InterPositive, the company we bought from Ben, will help creators make things better. Using their own dailies, using their own production materials to make the film that they’re making better. Still requires writers and actors and lighting techs and all the things that you’d use to make a movie, but be able to make the movie more effective, more efficient. Being able to do pick up shots and things like this that you couldn’t do before. It’s really remarkable. It’s a really remarkable company. As AI improves, do you see the role of human voice actors shrinking at Netflix? What’s interesting about that is if you look at the evolution of tools for dubbing and subtitling, the one for dubbing, we do a lot of A-B tests that people, if you watch something and you don’t like it, you just turn it off. The one thing that we find to be the most important part of dubbing is the performance. So good voice actors really matter. Yeah, it’s a lot cheaper to use AI, but without the performance, which is very human, it actually runs down the quality of the production. Will it evolve over time? Possibly, but it won’t evolve without the cooperation and the training of the actual voice actors themselves too. I think what will happen is you’ll be able to do things like pick up lines that you do months and months after the production. You’ll be able to recreate some of those lines in the film without having to call everybody back and redo everything which will help make a better film. You’re in the sort of early stages of a push into video podcast. What have you learned so far about what works and what doesn’t? It’s really early. The main thing is we’ve got a broad cross-section of podcasts. It’s nowhere near as complete as other podcast outlets yet. But the things that we leaned into are the things that are working. We kind of figured they would. You’ve got true crime, sports, comedy, all those things that we do well in the doc space already. And I really am excited about things where people can develop and deepen the relationship with the show itself or the [intellectual property] itself. Our Bridgerton podcast is really popular, and people really want to go deeper and we want to be able to provide that for them. I think a video podcast is just the evolution of talk shows. We have tried to and failed at many talk shows over the years, and for the most part it’s because the old days of TV, when 40 million people used to tune in to the Tonight Show every night, [are over]. What’s happened now is that it’s much smaller audiences that tune into multiple shows in the form of a podcast every day. And then they come up to be way bigger than the 40 million that Johnny Carson used to get. They’re all individual, and it’s a deeper relationship than it is a broad one. So instead of trying to make one show for the world, you might have to make hundreds or thousands of shows for the whole world.

Anton, a 44-year-old Russian soldier who heads a workshop responsible for repairing and supplying drones, was at his kitchen table when he learned last month that Elon Musk’s SpaceX had cut off access to Starlink terminals used by Russian forces. He scrambled for alternatives, but none offered unlimited internet, data plans were restrictive, and coverage did not extend to the areas of Ukraine where his unit operated. It’s not only American tech executives who are narrowing communications options for Russians. Days later, Russian authorities began slowing down access nationwide to the messaging app Telegram, the service that frontline troops use to coordinate directly with one another and bypass slower chains of command. “All military work goes through Telegram — all communication,” Anton, whose name has been changed because he fears government reprisal, told POLITICO in voice messages sent via the app. “That would be like shooting the entire Russian army in the head.” Telegram would be joining a home screen’s worth of apps that have become useless to Russians. Kremlin policymakers have already blocked or limited access to WhatsApp, along with parent company Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, Microsoft’s LinkedIn, Google’s YouTube, Apple’s FaceTime, Snapchat and X, which like SpaceX is owned by Musk. Encrypted messaging apps Signal and Discord, as well as Japanese-owned Viber, have been inaccessible since 2024. Last month, President Vladimir Putin signed a law requiring telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access at the request of the Federal Security Service. Shortly after it took effect on March 3, Moscow residents reported widespread problems with mobile internet, calls and text messages across all major operators for several days, with outages affecting mobile service and Wi-Fi even inside the State Duma. Those decisions have left Russians increasingly cut off from both the outside world and one another, complicating battlefield coordination and disrupting online communities that organize volunteer aid, fundraising and discussion of the war effort. Deepening digital isolation could turn Russia into something akin to “a large, nuclear-armed North Korea and a junior partner to China,” according to Alexander Gabuev, the Berlin-based director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. In April, the Kremlin is expected to escalate its campaign against Telegram — already one of Russia’s most popular messaging platforms, but now in the absence of other social-media options, a central hub for news, business and entertainment. It may block the platform altogether. That is likely to fuel an escalating struggle between state censorship and the tools people use to evade it, with Russia’s place in the world hanging in the balance. “It’s turned into a war,” said Mikhail Klimarev, executive director of the internet Protection Society, a digital rights group that monitors Russia’s censorship infrastructure. “A guerrilla war. They hunt down the VPNs they can see, they block them — and the ‘partisans’ run, build new bunkers, and come back.” THE APP THAT RUNS THE WAR On Feb. 4, SpaceX tightened the authentication system that Starlink terminals use to connect to its satellite network, introducing stricter verification for registered devices. The change effectively blocked many terminals operated by Russian units relying on unauthorized connections, cutting Starlink traffic inside Ukraine by roughly 75 percent, according to internet traffic analysis by Doug Madory, an analyst at the U.S. network monitoring firm Kentik. The move threw Russian operations into disarray, allowing Ukraine to make battlefield gains. Russia has turned to a workaround widely used before satellite internet was an option: laying fiber-optic lines, from rear areas toward frontline battlefield positions. Until then, Starlink terminals had allowed drone operators to stream live video through platforms such as Discord, which is officially blocked in Russia but still sometimes used by the Russian military via VPNs, to commanders at multiple levels. A battalion commander could watch an assault unfold in real time and issue corrections — “enemy ahead” or “turn left” — via radio or Telegram. What once required layers of approval could now happen in minutes. Satellite-connected messaging apps became the fastest way to transmit coordinates, imagery and targeting data. But on Feb. 10, Roskomnadzor, the Russian communications regulator, began slowing down Telegram for users across Russia, citing alleged violations of Russian law. Russian news outlet RBC reported, citing two sources, that authorities plan to shut down Telegram in early April — though not on the front line. In mid-February, Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev said the government did not yet intend to restrict Telegram at the front but hoped servicemen would gradually transition to other platforms. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said this week the company could avoid a full ban by complying with Russian legislation and maintaining what he described as “flexible contact” with authorities. Roskomnadzor has accused Telegram of failing to protect personal data, combat fraud and prevent its use by terrorists and criminals. Similar accusations have been directed at other foreign tech platforms. In 2022, a Russian court designated Meta an “extremist organization” after the company said it would temporarily allow posts calling for violence against Russian soldiers in the context of the Ukraine war — a decision authorities used to justify blocking Facebook and Instagram in Russia and increasing pressure on the company’s other services, including WhatsApp. Telegram founder Pavel Durov, a Russian-born entrepreneur now based in the United Arab Emirates, says the throttiling is being used as a pretext to push Russians toward a government-controlled messaging app designed for surveillance and political censorship. That app is MAX, which was launched in March 2025 and has been compared to China’s WeChat in its ambition to anchor a domestic digital ecosystem. Authorities are increasingly steering Russians toward MAX through employers, neighborhood chats and the government services portal Gosuslugi — where citizens retrieve documents, pay fines and book appointments — as well as through banks and retailers. The app’s developer, VK, reports rapid user growth, though those figures are difficult to independently verify. “They didn’t just leave people to fend for themselves — you could say they led them by the hand through that adaptation by offering alternatives,” said Levada Center pollster Denis Volkov, who has studied Russian attitudes toward technology use. The strategy, he said, has been to provide a Russian or state-backed alternative for the majority, while stopping short of fully criminalizing workarounds for more technologically savvy users who do not want to switch. Elena, a 38-year-old Yekaterinburg resident whose surname has been withheld because she fears government reprisal, said her daughter’s primary school moved official communication from WhatsApp to MAX without consulting parents. She keeps MAX installed on a separate tablet that remains mostly in a drawer — a version of what some Russians call a “MAXophone,” gadgets solely for that app, without any other data being left on those phones for the (very real) fear the government could access it. “It works badly. Messages are delayed. Notifications don’t come,” she said. “I don’t trust it … And this whole situation just makes people angry.” THE VPN ARMS RACE Unlike China’s centralized “Great Firewall,” which filters traffic at the country’s digital borders, Russia’s system operates internally. Internet providers are required to route traffic through state-installed deep packet inspection equipment capable of controlling and analyzing data flows in real time. “It’s not one wall,” Klimarev said. “It’s thousands of fences. You climb one, then there’s another.” The architecture allows authorities to slow services without formally banning them — a tactic used against YouTube before its web address was removed from government-run domain-name servers last month. Russian law explicitly provides government authority for blocking websites on grounds such as extremism, terrorism, illegal content or violations of data regulations, but it does not clearly define throttling — slowing traffic rather than blocking it outright — as a formal enforcement mechanism. “The slowdown isn’t described anywhere in legislation,” Klimarev said. “It’s pressure without procedure.” In September, Russia banned advertising for virtual private network services that citizens use to bypass government-imposed restrictions on certain apps or sites. By Klimarev’s estimate, roughly half of Russian internet users now know what a VPN is, and millions pay for one. Polling last year by the Levada Center, Russia’s only major independent pollster, suggests regular use is lower, finding about one-quarter of Russians said they have used VPN services. Russian courts can treat the use of anonymization tools as an aggravating factor in certain crimes — steps that signal growing pressure on circumvention technologies without formally outlawing them. In February, the Federal Antimonopoly Service opened what appears to be the first case against a media outlet for promoting a VPN after the regional publication Serditaya Chuvashiya advertised such a service on its Telegram channel. Surveys in recent years have shown that many Russians, particularly older citizens, support tighter internet regulation, often citing fraud, extremism and online safety. That sentiment gives authorities political space to tighten controls even when the restrictions are unpopular among more technologically savvy users. Even so, the slowdown of Telegram drew criticism from unlikely quarters, including Sergei Mironov, a longtime Kremlin ally and leader of the Just Russia party. In a statement posted on his Telegram channel on Feb. 11, he blasted the regulators behind the move as “idiots,” accusing them of undermining soldiers at the front. He said troops rely on the app to communicate with relatives and organize fundraising for the war effort, warning that restricting it could cost lives. While praising the state-backed messaging app MAX, he argued that Russians should be free to choose which platforms they use. Pro-war Telegram channels frame the government’s blocking techniques as sabotage of the war effort. Ivan Philippov, who tracks Russia’s influential military bloggers, said the reaction inside that ecosystem to news about Telegram has been visceral “rage.” Unlike Starlink, whose cutoff could be blamed on a foreign company, restrictions on Telegram are viewed as self-inflicted. Bloggers accuse regulators of undermining the war effort. Telegram is used not only for battlefield coordination but also for volunteer fundraising networks that provide basic logistics the state does not reliably cover — from transport vehicles and fuel to body armor, trench materials and even evacuation equipment. Telegram serves as the primary hub for donations and reporting back to supporters. “If you break Telegram inside Russia, you break fundraising,” Philippov said. “And without fundraising, a lot of units simply don’t function.” Few in that community trust MAX, citing technical flaws and privacy concerns. Because MAX operates under Russian data-retention laws and is integrated with state services, many assume their communications would be accessible to authorities. Philippov said the app’s prominent defenders are largely figures tied to state media or the presidential administration. “Among independent military bloggers, I haven’t seen a single person who supports it,” he said. Small groups of activists attempted to organize rallies in at least 11 Russian cities, including Moscow, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, in defense of Telegram. Authorities rejected or obstructed most of the proposed demonstrations — in some cases citing pandemic-era restrictions, weather conditions or vague security concerns — and in several cases revoked previously issued permits. In Novosibirsk, police detained around 15 people ahead of a planned rally. Although a small number of protests were formally approved, no large-scale demonstrations ultimately took place. THE POWER TO PULL THE PLUG The new law signed last month allows Russia’s Federal Security Service to order telecom operators to block cellular and fixed internet access. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, said subsequent shutdowns of service in Moscow were linked to security measures aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and countering drone threats, adding that such limitations would remain in place “for as long as necessary.” In practice, the disruptions rarely amount to a total communications blackout. Most target mobile internet rather than all services, while voice calls and SMS often continue to function. Some domestic websites and apps — including government portals or banking services — may remain accessible through “whitelists,” meaning authorities allow certain services to keep operating even while broader internet access is restricted. The restrictions are typically localized and temporary, affecting specific regions or parts of cities rather than the entire country. Internet disruptions have increasingly become a tool of control beyond individual platforms. Research by the independent outlet Meduza and the monitoring project Na Svyazi has documented dozens of regional internet shutdowns and mobile network restrictions across Russia, with disruptions occurring regularly since May 2025. The communications shutdown, and uncertainty around where it will go next, is affecting life for citizens of all kinds, from the elderly struggling to contact family members abroad to tech-savvy users who juggle SIM cards and secondary phones to stay connected. Demand has risen for dated communication devices — including walkie-talkies, pagers and landline phones — along with paper maps as mobile networks become less reliable, according to retailers interviewed by RBC. “It feels like we’re isolating ourselves,” said Dmitry, 35, who splits his time between Moscow and Dubai and whose surname has been withheld to protect his identity under fear of governmental reprisal. “Like building a sovereign grave.” Those who track Russian public opinion say the pattern is consistent: irritation followed by adaptation. When Instagram and YouTube were blocked or slowed in recent years, their audiences shrank rapidly as users migrated to alternative services rather than mobilizing against the restrictions. For now, Russia’s digital tightening resembles managed escalation rather than total isolation. Officials deny plans for a full shutdown, and even critics say a complete severing would cripple banking, logistics and foreign trade. “It’s possible,” Klimarev said. “But if they do that, the internet won’t be the main problem anymore.”

STRASBOURG — EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos is facing fresh allegations that she collaborated with the Yugoslav secret police in the 1980s, after a member of the European Parliament claimed to have new proof. The allegations, which came up during the Slovenian commissioner’s confirmation hearing in the Parliament in 2024 and which Kos then denied, have resurfaced ahead of Slovenia’s March 22 election with support from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s own party. Slovenian MEP Romana Tomc, a vice president of the center-right European People’s Party — the largest group in the Parliament — said Thursday she had written to the Commission claiming to have fresh evidence that Kos collaborated with Yugoslavia’s spy agency and demanding an investigation. Tomc told POLITICO Kos was not honest when “claiming that she didn’t collaborate in the secret service … We have to do something with this information.” A spokesperson for the EPP said: “Romana Tomc has kept the EPP Group closely informed about the latest revelations concerning Commissioner Marta Kos. The Group will examine the matter carefully. For now, we note that Commissioner Kos has not denied these new revelations. The ball is now in her court.” Kos did not respond to POLITICO’s repeated requests for comment. But a Commission official said Kos “went through the extensive and thorough vetting process” to become a commissioner, adding that the Parliament “approved Commissioner Kos’s appointment in the same process as all 27 Commissioners.” An official close to the commissioner’s office, who was granted anonymity to speak about the sensitive allegations, told POLITICO: “She [Kos] is very aware political opponents will use these kinds of things to score points in the Slovenian elections, but she is laser-focused on her job as enlargement commissioner.” Kos will appear before the Parliament’s foreign affairs committee on Monday to discuss enlargement, and is also expected to face questions about the allegations. At the Parliament in Strasbourg on Tuesday, Tomc presented a book by Slovenian author Igor Omerza showing documents they said proved Kos worked with the Yugoslav spy agency. The Slovenian MEP’s questions to the Commission include whether the EU executive intends to investigate the claims against Kos and whether further revelations could affect the commissioner’s “credibility.” “I was never a collaborator or informant of the secret service of Yugoslavia,” Kos told MEPs at her hearing in 2024, calling the allegations “lies” and “disinformation.” Slovenia heads to a vote later this month, pitting the governing left-liberal coalition, which Kos formerly belonged to, against the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party, to which Tomc belongs. The latter is currently leading in the polls. Gabriel Gavin contributed to this report from Brussels.

Scattered among the candy shelves and freezer cabinets in Russian supermarkets across Germany are advertisements promoting a business with a service the government has tried to outlaw: a logistics company specialized in moving packages from the heart of Germany to Russia, in defiance of European Union sanctions. Trade restrictions have been in place since 2014 and were tightened just after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when Western nations began to impose far-reaching financial and trade sanctions on Russia. But an investigation by the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, which includes POLITICO, has identified a clandestine Berlin-based postal system that exploits the special status of postal parcels to transport all kinds of European goods — including banned electronics components — into President Vladimir Putin’s empire. We know every stop and turn in the route because we sent five packages and used digital tracking devices to follow them — through an illicit 1,100-mile journey that undermines the sanctions regime European policymakers consider their strongest tool to generate political pressure on Russian leaders by weakening their country’s economy. LS Logistics said its internal controls make violations of EU sanctions “virtually impossible” but that it was not immune from customers making fraudulent declarations about the goods they ship. “Sanctions enforcement is whack-a-mole,” said David Goldwyn, who worked on sanctions policy as U.S. State Department coordinator for international energy affairs and now chairs the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s energy advisory group. “It’s a hard process, and you have to constantly be adapting to how the evaders are adapting.” THE UZBEK LABEL In late December, we packed five square brown parcels with electronic components specifically banned under EU sanctions and addressed the parcels to locations in Moscow and St. Petersburg. When we brought our parcels to the counters of Russian supermarkets in Berlin, we told salespeople the packages included books, scarves and hats. But they never checked inside the packages, which in fact held banned electronic components we rendered unusable before packing. Salespeople charged us 13 euros per kilogram, about $7 per pound, refusing to provide receipts. What makes these cardboard packages even more special is their disguise: The employee does not affix Russian postal stickers to the boxes, but rather those of UzPost, the national postal service of Uzbekistan. The former Soviet republic is not subject to EU sanctions. UzPost maintains close ties to the Russian postal service, according to a person familiar with the entities’ history of cooperation granted anonymity to discuss confidential business practices. Tatyana Kim, the CEO of Russian ecommerce marketplace Wildberries and reputedly her country’s richest woman, recently acquired a large stake in UzPost, according to media reports. “We work with partners, including private postal service providers,” the Uzbek postal service stated in response to our inquiry. “They can use our solutions for deliveries.” In Germany, registered logistics companies are permitted to provide postal services — including pick-up, sorting and delivery — for international postal operators. However, the Federal Network Agency, which is responsible for postal oversight, says the Uzbek postal service is not authorized to perform any of these functions in Germany. (The Federal Network Agency said in a response to our inquiry that it is “currently reviewing” the case and that it would pursue penalties for LS if it is found to be using Uzbek documents without authorization.) After our packages spent one to two days at the supermarkets, we saw them begin to move. Inside each package we had placed a small black GPS device, naming them “Alpha,” “Beta,” “Gamma,” “Delta” and “Epsi.” We could track their movements in real time in an app, watching them closely as they wound through Berlin’s roads to Schönefeld, site of the capital’s international airport. There they stopped, unloaded into a modern warehouse that has been repurposed into a Russian shadow postal service. COLOGNE, TECHNICALLY In 2014, a retired professional gymnast was tasked with launching a subsidiary of Russia’s national postal service, the RusPost GmbH, which would operate with official authorization to collect, process and deliver postal items in Germany, according to a former employee granted anonymity to speak openly about the business. For 18 years, the St. Petersburg-raised Alexey Grigoryev had competed and coached at Germany’s highest levels, winning three national championship titles with the KTV Straubenhardt team and working with an Olympic gold medalist on the high bar. But he had no evident experience in the postal business. RusPost’s German business model collapsed upon the imposition of an expanded sanctions package in the weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Much like American sanctions on Russia, the European Union blocks sensitive technical materials that could boost the Russian defense sector, while allowing the export of personal effects and quotidian consumer items. “The sanctions are accompanied by far-reaching export bans, particularly on goods relevant to the war, in order to put pressure on the Russian war economy,” according to a statement the Federal Ministry of Economics provided us. In March 2022, while conducting random checks of postal traffic to Moscow, customs officials discovered sanctioned goods (including cash, jewelry and electrical appliances) in numerous RusPost packages. The Berlin public prosecutor’s office launched an investigation of the company, concluding that a former RusPost managing director had deliberately failed to set up effective control mechanisms, in breach of his duties. He was charged with 62 counts of attempting to violate the Foreign Trade and Payments Act over an eight-month period; criminal proceedings are ongoing. The Russian postal network did not quite disappear, however. A new company called LS Logistics Solution GmbH was formed in December 2022, according to corporate filings. LS filled its top jobs, including customs manager and head of customer service, with former RusPost employees, according to their LinkedIn profiles. The new company listed as its business address an inconspicuous semi-detached house in a residential area of Cologne, across from a church. When we visited, we found an old white mailbox whose plated sign lists LS Logistics alongside dozens of other companies supposed to be housed there. But none of them seemed to be active. The building was empty during business hours, its mailbox overflowing with discolored brochures and old newspapers. The operational heart of LS is the warehouse complex in Berlin-Schönefeld, just a few minutes from the capital’s airport. The building itself is functional and anonymous: a long, gray industrial structure with several metal rolling doors, some fitted with narrow window slits. Through them, towering stacks of parcels are visible, packed tightly, sorted roughly, stretching deep into the hall. Trucks arrive and depart regularly, from loading bays lit by harsh white floodlights that cut through the otherwise quiet industrial area. Behind the warehouse lies a wide concrete parking lot where a black BMW SUV with a license plate bearing the initials AG is often parked. We saw a man resembling Grigoryev enter the car. The former head of RusPost officially withdrew from the postal business after authorities froze the company’s operations. Unofficially, however, the 50-year-old’s continued presence in Schönefeld suggests otherwise. According to one former RusPost employee, the warehouse near the airport serves as a collection point for parcels from all over Europe. Other logistics companies with Russian management have listed the warehouse as their business address, some of their logos decorating the façade. LS Logistics Solution GmbH has the largest sign of them all. THE A2 GETAWAY According to tracking devices, our packages spent several days in the warehouse before being loaded onto 40-ton trucks covered with grey tarps, among several that leave every day loaded with mail. They were then driven toward the Polish border, through the German city of Frankfurt (Oder). Without any long stops, the 40-ton trucks traversed Poland on the A2 motorway, past Warsaw. Two days after leaving Berlin, they were approaching the eastern edge of the European Union. They arrived at a border checkpoint in Brest, the Belarusian city where more than a hundred years ago Russia signed a peace pact with Germany to withdraw from World War I. Now it marked the last place for European officials to identify contraband leaving for countries they consider adversaries. In 2022, the European Union applied a separate set of sanctions on Belarus because its leader, Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Putin, has supported Russia’s presence in Ukraine. Yet despite provisions that should have stopped our packages from leaving Poland, they moved onward into Belarus, their tracking devices apparently undetected. What makes this possible is the special legal status that accompanies international mail. While a formal export declaration is required for the export of regular goods, such as those moving via container ship or rail freight, simplified paperwork helps speed up the departure process for postal items. At Europe’s borders, this distinction becomes crucial, as postal packages are examined largely on risk-based checks rather than comprehensive inspections. “International postal items are subject to the regular provisions of customs supervision both on import and on export and transit and are checked on a risk-oriented basis in accordance with applicable EU and national legislation, including with regard to compliance with sanctions regulations,” the German General Customs Directorate stated in response to our inquiry. Two of our tracking devices briefly lost their signal in Belarus — likely part of a widespread pattern of satellite navigation systems being disrupted across Eastern Europe — but after a journey of around 1,100 miles, they all showed the same destination. Our packages had reached Russia’s largest cities. Ukrainian authorities told us they were not surprised by our investigation. The country’s presidential envoy for sanctions policy, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, said at the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin that his government regularly collects intelligence on such schemes and shares it with international partners. “Nobody is doing enough, if you look at the number of cases,” Vlasiuk said. ONE STEP BEHIND After the arrival of the packages, we confronted all parties involved, including LS Logistics Solution GmbH, the mysterious shipper that helped transport the goods from Europe to Russia. We called Grigoryev several times, but he never answered; efforts to reach him through the company failed as well. An LS executive would not answer our questions about his role. “Our internal control mechanisms are designed in such a way that violations of EU sanctions are virtually impossible,” LS managing director Anjelika Crone wrote to us. “Shipments that do not meet the legal requirements are not processed further. We are not immune to fraudulent misdeclarations, such as those that obviously underlie the ‘test shipments’ you refer to.” Crone said she could not answer further questions due to data protection and contractual confidentiality concerns. This month, Germany took steps to strengthen enforcement of its sanctions regime, expanding the range of violations subject to criminal penalties. The law, passed by the Bundestag in January, amends the country’s Foreign Trade and Payments Act to integrate a European Union directive harmonizing criminal sanctions law across its 27 member states and ensure efficient, uniform enforcement. Germany was one of the 18 countries put on notice by EU officials last May for having failed to follow the 2024 directive. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, which is responsible for implementing the new policy, argued in a statement to the Axel Springer Global Reporters Network that the very ingenuity of the logistics network we unmasked operating within Germany was a testament to the strength of the country’s sanctions regime. “The state-organized Russian procurement systems operate at enormous financial expense to create ever new and more complex diversion routes,” said ministry spokesperson Tim-Niklas Wentzel. “This confirms that the considerable compliance efforts of many companies and the work of the sanctions enforcement authorities in combating circumvention are also having a practical effect. Procurement is becoming increasingly difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for Russia.” According to those who have tried to administer sanctions laws, that argument rings true — but only partly. “It’s probably more fair to say that sanctions had a material impact and increased the cost of bad actors to achieve their goals. But to say that they’re working well is probably overstating the truth of the matter,” said Max Meizlish, formerly an official with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and now a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “When there’s evasion, it requires enforcement,” Meizlish went on. “And when you need more enforcement I think it’s hard to make a compelling case that the tool is working as intended.” The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network is a multi-publication initiative publishing scoops, investigations, interviews, op-eds and analysis that reverberate across the world. It connects journalists from Axel Springer brands—including POLITICO, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, and Onet— on major stories for an international audience. Their ambitious reporting stretches across Axel Springer platforms: online, print, TV, and audio. Together, these outlets reach hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music For decades, Europeans shared a simple belief: that the world — however messy — ultimately runs on rules. But what if the escalating war in Iran shows that these rules no longer apply? In this episode of EU Confidential, host Sarah Wheaton speaks to two foreign affairs experts who help unpack how the ongoing crisis in the Middle East impacts Europe. Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming book “Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail,” argues the Iranian conflict is a good example of a world increasingly defined by “un-order.” Meanwhile, Rym Momtaz, editor-in-chief of Strategic Europe at Carnegie Europe and a longtime observe of European and Middle East politics, helps us understand Europe’s response to the U.S.-Israeli strikes in a wider geopolitical context. If you have thoughts or questions about the podcast, you can reach us on our WhatsApp: +32 491 05 06 29. **A message from Neste: The world needs to keep moving, but with reduced emissions. Neste’s sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and renewable diesel are available today. Let’s fuel change. Learn more at neste.com/change.**

LONDON — The self-styled “eco-populist” leader of Britain’s Greens rose to the top of his party with a promise to take on both Keir Starmer and Nigel Farage — and win. This morning, in one corner of north-west England at least, Zack Polanski and his newest MP, Hannah Spencer, have done just that.  Spencer convincingly won Thursday’s Gorton and Denton by-election with 40.6 percent of the vote, keeping Farage’s Reform in second place and pushing the governing Labour Party into third.  The Green vote climbed 27.4 percentage points on 2024’s result — and the win marks their first-ever by-election victory. It caps six months in which Polanski has presided over a leap in his party’s poll ratings and sought to retool its message. He has actively channeled Farage’s UK media strategy by putting himself front and center of an argument for change painted in primary colors — but faced accusations of stoking division in the process. “I don’t want everyone to agree with what I or the Green Party is saying,” Polanski told POLITICO in an interview in October. “What I do want everyone to know is, I’ll always say what I mean.” ‘REACHING THE CEILING’  Polanski won a landslide victory in the Greens’ heated leadership election last year, handing him the reins of a party that had already made inroads at the last election. “We were reaching a ceiling of where you could get to by [the] ground game alone,” Polanski reflected of the Greens’ past performance when speaking to POLITICO last year. “What maybe was holding us back was not being heard in the national media.”   Polanski has said he wants to “make sure that the media have an easy access point” to the party, and the Green leader seems willing to go to places where he’ll have to put up a fight, too — including a colorful on-air battle with Piers Morgan. He has overseen a steady polling uptick for the left-wing outfit, as borne out in POLITICO’s Poll of Polls. “There’s a definite and obvious increase,” says YouGov’s Head of European Political and Social Research Anthony Wells.  “He’s already far better known than [predecessors] Carla Denyer and Adrian Ramsay were.”  “It’s not like the public are in love with him, but the public do … dislike him less than most of the party leaders,” Wells added. ‘WE KNOW HOW IT FEELS TO BE LOOKED DOWN ON’ Friday’s victory speech by Spencer, the party’s newest MP, shows how Polanski has also tried to foreground cost-of-living concerns, at the expense of the Greens’ traditional eco message. Spencer — a borough councillor, plumber and self-described “pretty normal person” — mixed attacks on billionaires with a direct appeal to Britain’s “white working class.” “We know how it feels to be looked down on, maybe because we didn’t do well at school, maybe because … we are shut out of places we should be in,” she said. “To people here in Gorton and Denton who feel left behind and isolated. I see you and I will fight for you.” The Greens campaigned hard, flooding the constituency with up to 400 volunteers a day. But Spencer and Polanski have also faced claims that they have pushed a “sectarian” message in directly appealing to the seat’s Muslim vote over the war in Gaza. “We are losing our country,” said Reform’s second-placed candidate Matt Goodwin in response to Spencer’s victory Friday. “A dangerous Muslim sectarianism has emerged. We have only one general election left to save Britain.” Green volunteers on the campaign trail were surrounded by boxes of leaflets draped in the Palestinian flag. They focused on Gaza as an issue, and the party actively highlighted comments by Starmer that had previously inflamed tensions between Labour and Muslim supporters. Leaflets were handed out to worshippers at the mosque at prayer times. Spencer rejected the charge of running a divisive campaign Friday morning, saying that “whilst our communities may sometimes be labeled in different ways, the thing everyone seems to have underestimated here, especially over the last few weeks, is how similar we all actually are.” CONVICTION POLITICS   As Farage bids to eclipse the Conservatives as a right-wing force in British politics, he has used regular defections to Reform UK to show he’s on the march. Polanski has tried similar, crowing about defections by ex-Labour councilors from the left.  In video campaigning, too, Polanski has taken a leaf out of Reform’s book. He peppered his leadership run with arresting monologues to camera, and has opted to weigh in on — rather than duck — the divisive issue of immigration.  Praising the contribution of migrants when polling shows the public want lower levels is a risky bet. The Green leader argues voters will respect a clear stance, even if they disagree. “People who know that their politicians are telling the truth and are speaking with conviction are always preferred,” he says.  Speaking to POLITICO in February, Spencer argued that the Greens were already neutralizing one Labour attack: that a vote for Polanksi’s party would simply let Reform in. “The whole Labour strategy sort of seems to be the tactical one again of vote Labour to keep Reform out, but everyone’s used to hearing them saying that about the Tories,” Spencer said. “And I think now people are thinking: why would we keep just doing that as a threat rather than voting for who we actually want to vote for?” Whether the victory Friday translates into electoral success beyond Gorton, however, remains an open question. May’s local elections will offer the first, broad-scale ballot box test of Polanski’s pitch.  Sam Blewett and Matt Honeycombe-Foster contributed reporting.

LONDON — Reform UK is not a one-man band anymore. At least, that’s what Nigel Farage wants you to think. The leader of Britain’s populist right-wing party named four politicians to lead on key policy areas on Tuesday, after months of deliberate ambiguity about who does what in his top team. At a made-for-TV event in Westminster’s Church House — where Tony Blair addressed Labour MPs after his 1997 landslide — Farage promised an economic “super department” modelled on German rebuilding after World War 2, led by his deputy Richard Tice. Recent Conservative Party defectors Robert Jenrick and Suella Braverman will lead on the Treasury brief and education, skills and equalities respectively, while millionaire donor Zia Yusuf, Reform’s head of policy, will focus on home affairs and migration. Farage gave all four “shadow” government job titles, despite British convention reserving these only for the party of parliamentary opposition (the Conservatives). But his upstart party’s poll lead — and instability in the center-left Labour government — mean pressure has been growing for him to color in the lines of his plan for Britain. The message so far embodies the tension at the heart of Reform’s pitch to voters — be radical enough to inspire right-leaning voters but safe enough to keep their vote; give enough detail to look serious but not tie itself up in knots; and be Farage-focused enough to benefit from his stardust without turning into a one-man show. Here, POLITICO looks at what today’s line-up shows about Farage’s plan for government. 1) REFORM IS STILL MORE A CAMPAIGNING FORCE THAN A GOVERNMENT-IN-WAITING Farage insists Britain could get a snap general election in 2027, but his choice of priorities today — zoning in on hot-button issues such as migration, net zero and gender — shows a party focused more on contentious debate than the quiet, boring work of government. This is in stark contrast to Labour, which tried to avoid ideological spats in 2023 and 2024 in favor of technocratic preparations for power (which Labour officials later complained were a disaster). Much of this is just basic political strategy. Polls show Reform’s lead, while still substantial, has narrowed in recent months and there are more votes in migration and economic policies than in having spokespeople on foreign affairs or defense (both roles remain unfilled). Some things will also take time. Reform’s policy teams have long been thinly-staffed, though the party hired 25 new staff at its London HQ who started in January, said two people briefed on the detail (and granted anonymity to speak freely). A third person briefed on the details said the party is planning to work up detailed energy and business policies in time for its conference in September. But ultimately, Farage focuses on issues such as migration and supposed liberal creep because he feels strongly about them, and has done so for decades. His choices today show Britain will have a more radical, ideologically-driven government if he is prime minister. 2) THE RUBBER WILL START HITTING THE ROAD Farage and his allies announced a blizzard of policy ideas, but without firm decisions or timings, and questions will now grow about how Reform will get there and when. Tice said he wants GDP growth of 3 to 4 percent per year and to bury “net stupid zero” climate rules. He vowed to work up an industrial strategy focused on areas such as steel and car-making, and promised a “British sovereign wealth fund,” with more details to be unveiled next week. All this will require trade-offs. Tice wants to strip away regulation; the property tycoon questioned in November whether 30,000 pages of EU-derived financial sector rules could be stripped back to 100 pages. But at the same time, Reform does not rule out state involvement in strategic heavy industries. (Farage denied this would be “socialism.”) Likewise, Jenrick said taxes are “clearly too high” and promised to “build an economy that serves alarm clock Britain” — people who get up early for work — but was thin on the detail of any specific tax cuts. Fundamental questions about the shape of policy or the economy under Reform have yet to be answered. Four groups are due to finish work in May on regulation, growth capital, pensions and savings, and tax. Farage and Tice have toyed with the idea of scrapping the “triple lock” (which guarantees large increases in the state pension) but have not reached a conclusion. Braverman said 50 percent of young people should enter manual trades, while Tice has suggested a complete overhaul of pensions for public sector workers; these policies are yet to be fleshed out. At the same time, Farage’s appointees have their hands full — especially Tice, whose theoretical super-department would cover business, trade, energy and housing policy. He is also still in charge of Reform’s cost-cutting efforts in local councils. Some basic questions about personnel remain unanswered, too. Yusuf did not clarify at Tuesday’s event whether his role as “head of policy” remains intact. And as neither an MP nor a member of the House of Lords, Yusuf — a tech-investing millionaire — will not be required to declare his outside interests while running Reform’s home affairs policy, which could lead to more scrutiny of him personally. 3) FARAGE IS FIGHTING HARD IN THE CULTURE WARS Farage and his allies continue to take a leaf out of U.S. President Donald Trump’s book, doling out hardline policies and rhetoric on contentious issues — and picking strategic fights with journalists. Yusuf reiterated Reform’s plan for mass deportations, calling recent immigration the “most profound betrayal of the British electorate in history,” claiming people have “literally died” as a result. He promised that the U.K. would not just leave the European Convention on Human Rights, but “derogate from every international treaty that would otherwise then be used to frustrate and upend deportations.” That could be a long list. Braverman said “social transitioning” for gender-questioning children — where they change their pronouns, clothes or name — would be “absolutely banned in all schools, no ifs, no buts.” She also said Reform would abolish the equalities department “on day one,” repeal the 2010 Equality Act and abolish the “pernicious, divisive notion of protected characteristics,” which set down the terms of workplace discrimination in law. While these policies bear similarities with the Conservative Party, they are designed to go a step further and show that Reform is serious about tearing up many of the agreed-upon rules that have underpinned British policy and politics for decades. 4) … BUT HE’S ALSO DESPERATE TO WIN VOTERS’ TRUST Reform’s whole strategy on the economy is to reassure voters that it can be credible. Farage tore up £90 billion of promised tax cuts from his party’s 2024 manifesto in the name of fiscal credibility, despite saying today that he wants to upend the “prevailing economic orthodoxy” of the last few decades. The Conservative Party sensed this weakness last fall and moved to position itself as the reliable choice on the economy. Reform strategists know that it is one of the Tories’ advantages in polling, and a vulnerability in their own reputation that must be patched. They will partly know this because Jenrick himself was a prominent Tory until only a few weeks ago. The new “shadow chancellor” — who will re-state his own reassurance message in a press conference on Wednesday — said in September that he was “terrified” of a financial crash on the scale of 2008. Today, he promised a “government in waiting that can be trusted with the economy” and will work up policy in conversation with business. Hence, the details of any tax cuts under Reform remain vague and will be a key point of tension if Farage ever enters Downing Street. The leader said today that he “might” support tax breaks for people who have “quite a few children.” If he were PM, that sort of comment would lead news bulletins for days. Tice has called for “mad ideas” from the business community to support his deregulation drive. There are other areas where Reform wants to reassure. In her vision of the education system, Braverman promoted the Michaela Community School in north-west London, which the Tories have repeatedly looked to for inspiration. And Farage has long distanced himself from the far-right activist Tommy Robinson, knowing of his toxicity with center-ground voters. Perhaps the biggest bid at reassurance is hauling in former Tories. Jenrick and Braverman defected recently. Thatcherite Tice was a Conservative until 2019 and Yusuf only left the party in 2024. There could be more defectors to come, given the defense and foreign affairs jobs have been conspicuously left open. 5) THE ‘ONE-MAN BAND’ CHARGE IS STICKING Farage used the event to show that his party will have “a little bit less of me,” in his words: “If I was hit by a bus tomorrow, Reform has its own brand, Reform has its own identity.” Yet Farage has always struggled to shake off his own fame and done little to dispel it. Of the five lecterns arranged in a V-shape, his was the most prominent, central and closest to the audience. He repeatedly answered questions that were directed at his colleagues, and joked that if they are “disloyal,” they “won’t be here very long.” While Farage is more an electoral strategist than a deep policy thinker, some believe his picks simply reinforce his dominance over his party (for now). For example, Yusuf has so far focused much of his energy on tech and economic policy, while Jenrick has not held an economic brief for several years. One senior figure involved in Reform said of Jenrick’s appointment: “It’s a clear sign by Nigel that he doesn’t want an imperial chancellor like Gordon Brown or George Osborne. This is a statement that growth policy is going to be driven out of the business department.” There are plenty more appointments to come. But quite simply, there won’t be room in the spotlight for everyone — and much of that spotlight is taken up by Farage himself.  James Orr, a senior advisor to Farage, perhaps put it best last September, saying: “Don’t underestimate how much effect a small band of dedicated people in the cockpit of the nation can do.” That cockpit just got a little bigger; now Reform just has to decide who is at the controls. Noah Keate and Andrew McDonald contributed reporting.