Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music In der Generaldebatte zeichnet Kanzler Friedrich Merz ein Bild globaler Unsicherheit und bittet um Geduld für komplexe Lösungen. Doch die Rede zeigt einen Regierungschef, der zunehmend erklären muss, warum zentrale Konflikte seiner Koalition ungelöst bleiben. Parallel sorgen brisante Trump-Leaks International für Aufsehen. Aufzeichnungen zweier Telefonate legen nahe, dass Trumps Unterhändler Steve Witkoff mit Kreml-Berater Juri Uschakow über mögliche Bedingungen eines Ukraine-Deals spricht. Für die Europäer wird das zur Gefahr: Sie sind außen vor, aber müssen am Ende jede Vereinbarung mittragen. Entscheidend wird nun die Debatte über die russischen Frozen Assets: Nur wenn es gelingt, diese Vermögen für einen milliardenschweren Ukraine-Kredit zu nutzen, hat Europa wieder Einfluss.  Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. Legal Notice (Belgium) POLITICO SRL Forme sociale: Société à Responsabilité Limitée Siège social: Rue De La Loi 62, 1040 Bruxelles Numéro d’entreprise: 0526.900.436 RPM Bruxelles info@politico.eu www.politico.eu

Europe must work to unleash the untapped potential of its internal market, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde said, noting that she given the very same message in 2019 – before Russia’s war on Ukraine and U.S. President Donald Trump’s disruptive second presidency. Speaking at the annual European Banking Congress in Frankfurt, Lagarde said the ECB estimates that internal barriers in services and goods markets are equivalent to tariffs of around 100 percent and 65 percent, respectively. While acknowledging that barriers cannot be removed entirely, she pointed out to three key steps to boost potential. These include a overhaul of EU governance to see the bloc move to qualified majority voting to avoid legislation being bogged down by individual vetoes. The EU should also introduce a pan-European regime for corporate law, the so-called 28th regime. Finally, it should revive the principle of mutual recognition to allow goods and services to move freely within its Single Market. Lagarde gave political leaders a pat on the back for boosting government spending on defense and infrastructure, and for learning from the experience of past crises. “The fiscal packages now being implemented for defense and infrastructure – especially here in Germany – are coming at the right time for Europe and will have a measurable effect on growth,” she said.

Domènec Ruiz Devesa is president of the Union of European Federalists and was an MEP from 2019 to 2024. Negotiations on the EU’s 2028–2034 Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) have entered a new phase of political significance. Traditionally, this process follows a familiar pattern: The European Commission proposes a draft budget, the Council bargains behind closed doors, then, at the final stage, the Parliament is called in to give or withhold consent. It’s a sequence of affairs that has long placed the Parliament in a weak position before a nearly finished deal — but not this time. In a break from previous iterations, this time the Parliament intervened early and managed to secure concessions. This is a feat that should be acknowledged. However, recognizing this success shouldn’t obscure the political stakes that remain. Following the Commission’s initial proposal, the Parliament was able to assert itself at the very start of the MFF process through a joint letter from the presidents of its main political groups, expressing clear institutional expectations, financial priorities and political conditions. As a result, the Commission offered improvements regarding the role of regional authorities in the implementation of agricultural and cohesion programs, and accepted an enhanced role for the Parliament to monitor the MFF’s execution. As previously noted by this very publication, the Parliament’s unusually early involvement was able to influence the framework before the Council began its negotiations — a notable break from precedent that should be seen as a strategic gain for parliamentary democracy at the European level. It’s a move that demonstrates the Parliament can impact the overall direction of EU governance when it acts strategically and cohesively. It suggests that parliamentary authority in budgetary affairs isn’t just a legal formality but a tool that can shape policy. And even more crucially, it is an institutional win that the Parliament should take credit for. However, it’s important to note that many in the Parliament still view these changes as insufficient. As highlighted by the Socialists and Democrats, Greens and Renew Europe groups, though this early intervention demonstrates that the Parliament can influence the MFF process, the substance of these modifications doesn’t address other structural concerns regarding the budget’s size, long-term strategic priorities or governance transparency. The decisive phase still lies ahead, and the central negotiations won’t occur between the Parliament and the Commission but between the Parliament and the Council. The Council, representing member countries, traditionally holds the stronger position — especially when unanimity is required. Still, the Parliament’s consent is indispensable. So, if it is to play an equal role in shaping the bloc’s strategic future, the Parliament must be willing to use its veto power if necessary. And in order to act effectively, it must link its consent on the MFF to broader issues beyond the budget. The MFF isn’t merely a financial plan — it is the backbone of Europe’s political priorities for the coming decade. And it shouldn’t be adopted in isolation from the bloc’s strategic goals or its capacity to act. But for that to happen, three things must take place: First, the so-called “passerelle clauses” need to be activated. This would allow the Council to shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting in specific policy areas without the need for treaty reform, which is essential to overcome persistent deadlocks. Next comes European defense. Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union provides a mutual defense clause, which could potentially lead to a common defense. In an era of heightened geopolitical tension, reliance on fragmented national capabilities is untenable. However, a credible European security posture would require joint procurement as well as shared operational planning. Therefore, linking MFF funding to concrete steps in defense integration would improve European security while also reinforcing the bloc’s global credibility. Lastly, there has to be movement on treaty reform. In November 2023, the Parliament approved a proposal to reform the EU Treaties, aiming to update the institutional framework, democratize decision-making and enhance the bloc’s capacity to act — particularly in terms of enlargement. But such reform cannot advance without political pressure, as the Council has little incentive to take up the proposal unless the Parliament conditions its agreement to the MFF on progress in the reform process. The MFF negotiations thus present a strategic opportunity. They aren’t only about allocating funds or how these funds are supervised — as fundamental as this is. They’re also about determining the direction of European integration. If the Parliament approves an MFF that doesn’t support the reforms needed to strengthen a potentially larger bloc, then its moment of influence will be wasted. The achievements of the first phase show that coordinated parliamentary action can, indeed, shape outcomes. Now, the next step is to use that influence where it matters most: in negotiations with the Council. The Parliament must be strategic and firm. Only then can it ensure that the next MFF isn’t merely a financial instrument but the foundation for a more capable, united and democratic union.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Friedrich Merz trifft den türkischen Präsidenten Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – und das vor dem Hintergrund massiver innenpolitischer Spannungen in der Türkei: Ein neuer Haftbefehl gegen Oppositionsführer Ekrem İmamoğlu, staatliche Eingriffe in die Pressefreiheit und wachsendes Misstrauen gegenüber Deutschland. Gemeinsam mit Deniz Yücel analysiert Rixa Fürsen, was die Reise des Kanzlers bedeutet – politisch, wirtschaftlich und strategisch. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es morgens um 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team bringen euch jeden Morgen auf den neuesten Stand in Sachen Politik — kompakt, europäisch, hintergründig. Und für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Unser Berlin Playbook-Newsletter liefert jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Hier gibt es alle Informationen und das kostenlose Playbook-Abo. Mehr von Berlin Playbook-Host und Executive Editor von POLITICO in Deutschland, Gordon Repinski, gibt es auch hier:   Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

BRUSSELS ― Ursula von der Leyen comfortably overcame her critics ― but her relationship with the European Parliament will never be the same again. In one of the most politically bruising weeks of her second term, the European Commission president faced down two motions of no confidence as well as a rebellion by lawmakers in her own conservative party. She remains safely in her job, and even came out of the fight with strengthened support, but there’s a price to pay. She’ll now have to take the Parliament — long considered the weakest of the EU’s three main institutions — much more seriously than she, or her predecessors, have done before. And Parliament’s voice is getting stronger just as far-right groups, like Patriots for Europe, are becoming more influential in the chamber. For lawmakers who have struggled for years to be given the same consideration as national leaders in the European Council, the spectacle of von der Leyen humbly vowing to take their views into account is a victory. It coincides with the recent revision of the framework agreement between the Commission and Parliament, which gave the elected assembly slightly more oversight over the Commission — useful for Parliament President Roberta Metsola to showcase the modest concessions she scored, and even more useful for von der Leyen to show MEPs she cares about them. “MEPs are steadily increasing their grip on lawmaking by holding the Commission to its treaty obligations,” said Andrew Duff, a former European lawmaker and co-author of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. “This is much more important than posturing censure motions.” KID GLOVES But for von der Leyen, who’s also battling pushback from EU leaders like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over her plans for a “drone wall” to fend off Russian air incursions, the more assertive Parliament is a problem, because she has to fight on two fronts to keep her agenda on track. She gave heed to the new power dynamic Monday when, responding to critiques from the far-right and far-left leaders who tabled the motions against her, she struck a conciliatory tone. Gone were the defiant notes of her speech to Parliament in July, when she accused the sponsors of a no-confidence motion of being puppets of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This time von der Leyen was wearing kid gloves. German lawmaker René Repasi told POLITICO that the group could put forward its own censure motion within the next six months unless Ursula von der Leyen. | Martin Bertrand and Hans Lucas/Getty Images Parliament’s grievances “come from a place of genuine and legitimate concern,” she said. The softer tone may have to do with the realization that it’s not just fringe politicians challenging her, but members of her own political tribe. The motions not only dented von der Leyen’s image but also gave her Socialist and liberal allies a perfect opportunity to air their frustrations, showing Europe that Brussels is not immune to the political instability hitting the continent. The Socialists & Democrats, for example, have doubled down on their demands, with prominent German lawmaker René Repasi telling POLITICO’s EU Confidential podcast that von der Leyen has six months to deliver on her promises to the group, or it could put forward its own censure motion. Von der Leyen “has to deliver,” Repasi said. THEY ALWAYS FALL IN LINE An even bigger headache for the Commission president is that lawmakers in her own political group, the conservative European People’s Party, are rebelling against a long-term budget plan she presented in July. While not unprecedented ― the EPP sank big chunks of von der Leyen’s green agenda last year ― such defiance shows her political family growing more assertive. Even so, diplomats still argue that when it comes to the pecking order of EU institutions, the Council, with its national leaders, still reigns supreme. “I don’t believe in this new Parliament, sorry,” said one diplomat who was granted anonymity to speak frankly. “They can threaten, but when a leader picks up the phone, they always fall in line.” A case in point: Despite threatening to torpedo von der Leyen’s omnibus bill, the socialists fell into line after Merz asked his Spanish counterpart, Pedro Sanchez, to rein in his fellow socialists. Indeed, despite the Parliament’s assertiveness, the EU’s pecking order remains more or less intact. That won’t be much comfort to von der Leyen. Max Griera and Sarah Wheaton contributed reporting.