A fair, fast and competitive transition begins with what already works and then rapidly scales it up.  Across the EU commercial road transport sector, the diversity of operations is met with a diversity of solutions. Urban taxis are switching to electric en masse. Many regional coaches run on advanced biofuels, with electrification emerging in smaller applications such as school services, as European e-coach technologies are still maturing and only now beginning to enter the market. Trucks electrify rapidly where operationally and financially possible, while others, including long-haul and other hard-to-electrify segments, operate at scale on HVO (hydrotreated vegetable oil) or biomethane, cutting emissions immediately and reliably. These are real choices made every day by operators facing different missions, distances, terrains and energy realities, showing that decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones.  Building on this diversity, many operators are already modernizing their fleets and cutting emissions through electrification. When they can control charging, routing and energy supply, electric vehicles often deliver a positive total cost of ownership (TCO), strong reliability and operational benefits. These early adopters prove that electrification works where the enabling conditions are in place, and that its potential can expand dramatically with the right support. > Decarbonization is not a single pathway but a spectrum of viable ones chosen > daily by operators facing real-world conditions. But scaling electrification faces structural bottlenecks. Grid capacity is constrained across the EU, and upgrades routinely take years. As most heavy-duty vehicle charging will occur at depots, operators cannot simply move around to look for grid opportunities. They are bound to the location of their facilities.  The recently published grid package tries, albeit timidly, to address some of these challenges, but it neither resolves the core capacity deficiencies nor fixes the fundamental conditions that determine a positive TCO: the predictability of electricity prices, the stability of delivered power, and the resulting charging time. A truck expected to recharge in one hour at a high-power station may wait far longer if available grid power drops. Without reliable timelines, predictable costs and sufficient depot capacity, most transport operators cannot make long-term investment decisions. And the grid is only part of the enabling conditions needed: depot charging infrastructure itself requires significant additional investment, on top of vehicles that already cost several hundreds of thousands of euros more than their diesel equivalents.  This is why the EU needs two things at once: strong enablers for electrification and hydrogen; and predictability on what the EU actually recognizes as clean. Operators using renewable fuels, from biomethane to advanced biofuels and HVO, delivering up to 90 percent CO2 reduction, are cutting emissions today. Yet current CO2 frameworks, for both light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks, fail to recognize fleets running on these fuels as part of the EU’s decarbonization solution for road transport, even when they deliver immediate, measurable climate benefits. This lack of clarity limits investment and slows additional emission reductions that could happen today. > Policies that punish before enabling will not accelerate the transition; a > successful shift must empower operators, not constrain them. The revision of both CO2 standards, for cars and vans, and for heavy-duty vehicles, will therefore be pivotal. They must support electrification and hydrogen where they fit the mission, while also recognizing the contribution of renewable and low-carbon fuels across the fleet. Regulations that exclude proven clean options will not accelerate the transition. They will restrict it.  With this in mind, the question is: why would the EU consider imposing purchasing mandates on operators or excessively high emission-reduction targets on member states that would, in practice, force quotas on buyers? Such measures would punish before enabling, removing choice from those who know their operations best. A successful transition must empower operators, not constrain them.  The EU’s transport sector is committed and already delivering. With the right enablers, a technology-neutral framework, and clarity on what counts as clean, the EU can turn today’s early successes into a scalable, fair and competitive decarbonization pathway.  We now look with great interest to the upcoming Automotive Package, hoping to see pragmatic solutions to these pressing questions, solutions that EU transport operators, as the buyers and daily users of all these technologies, are keenly expecting. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is IRU – International Road Transport Union  * The ultimate controlling entity is IRU – International Road Transport Union  More information here.

BRUSSELS — The EU has struck a political agreement to overhaul the bloc’s foreign direct investment screening rules, the Council of the EU announced on Thursday, in a move to prevent strategic technology and critical infrastructure from falling into the hands of hostile powers. The updated rules — the first major plank of European Commission President’s Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security strategy — would require all EU countries to systematically monitor investments and further harmonize the way those are screened within the bloc. The agreement comes just over a week after Brussels unveiled a new economic security package. Under the new rules, EU countries would be required to screen investments in dual-use items and military equipment; technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and semiconductors; raw materials; energy, transport and digital infrastructure; and election infrastructure, such as voting systems and databases. As previously reported by POLITICO, foreign entities investing into specific financial services must also be subject to screening by EU capitals. “We achieved a balanced and proportionate framework, focused on the most sensitive technologies and infrastructures, respectful of national prerogatives and efficient for authorities and businesses alike,” said Morten Bødskov, Denmark’s minister for industry, business and financial affairs. It took three round of political talks between the three institutions to seal the update, which was a key priority for the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU. One contentious question was which technologies and sectors should be subject to mandatory screening. Another was how capitals and the European Commission should coordinate — and who gets the final say — when a deal raises red flags. Despite a request from the European Parliament, the Commission will not get the authority to arbitrate disputes between EU countries on specific investment cases. Screening decisions will remain firmly in the purview of national governments. “We’re making progress. The result of our negotiations clearly strengthens the EU’s security while also making life easier for investors by harmonising the Member States’ screening mechanism,” said the lead lawmaker on the file, French S&D Raphaël Glucksmann. “Yet more remains to be done to ensure that investments bring real added value to the EU, so that our market does not become a playground for foreign companies exploiting our dependence on their technology. The Commission has committed to take an initiative; it must now act quickly,” he said in a statement to POLITICO. This story has been updated.

LONDON — The British government hit back Wednesday after Donald Trump launched his latest broadside at London Mayor Sadiq Khan. The U.S. president told POLITICO in an interview Monday that Khan was “a horrible mayor” who had made the British capital city a  “different place” to what it once was. Trump added of Khan: “He’s an incompetent mayor, but he’s a horrible, vicious, disgusting mayor. I think he’s done a terrible job. London’s a different place. I love London. I love London. And I hate to see it happen.” Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy, a member of the U.K. cabinet, pushed backed at those remarks Wednesday, and heaped praise on her fellow Labour politician. “I strongly disagree with those comments,” she told Sky News. “I think Sadiq is doing a really good job and has been at the forefront of providing affordable housing [and] improvements to transport.” Nandy said Khan, London’s first Muslim mayor, had offered a model for the U.K. government to follow nationally. “He’s been one of the people who has set up multi-agency approaches to help young people with knife crime, gang violence that we’re learning from in government,” she said. “So I strongly disagree.” Asked explicitly if Trump’s comments were wrong, Nandy replied: “Yes he is.” In his wide-ranging interview with POLITICO, the U.S. president also claimed Khan — who has won three consecutive terms as mayor of London and has no power to determine national migration policy — had been elected “because so many people have come in. They vote for him now.” Pushed on why Prime Minister Keir Starmer hadn’t explicitly defended Khan from Trump’s attack, Nandy said she knows “the prime minister would disagree with those comments.” She added: “I’m sure that if you asked the prime minister if he was sitting in this studio today, he would say what I’ve said, which is that Sadiq is doing an incredibly good job for London. We’re proud of our mayors.” Khan told POLITICO Tuesday the U.S. president was “obsessed” with him and claimed Americans were “flocking” to live in London, because its liberal values are the “antithesis” of Trump’s. It’s not the first beef between the two politicians.  Trump once called Khan a “stone cold loser” and “very dumb” — after Khan compared Trump to “the fascists of the 20th century.” In 2018, Khan allowed anti-Trump activists to fly a blimp over parliament showing Trump as a crying baby in a diaper during his first state visit.

BRUSSELS — Postponing the start of the EU’s new carbon levy for building and road transport emissions by one year to 2028 is going to cost European governments lots of money, according to a top Danish official. Denmark, for instance, is estimated to lose half a billion euros in future revenues from the delay of the new carbon market (known as ETS2), said Christian Stenberg, deputy permanent secretary of state at the Danish climate ministry, at POLITICO’s Sustainable Future Summit. “The delay will mean that we will lack that tool for one year,” he told a panel discussion. “It will cost us quite a bit of revenue that we could have gotten,” he added. “About €0.5 billion.” “For the Danish economy [it] is not little.” To bring more skeptical EU countries on board, like Poland, Italy and Romania, and reach a deal on the EU’s new climate target for 2040, environment ministers pushed the European Commission to agree to postpone the new carbon pricing mechanism by one year. Stenberg explained that, as the talks over the 2040 climate target stretched overnight, he “had to go back to my finance ministry in the middle of the night and say the compromise will cost us this in revenue.” But the ETS2, which has raised concerns in a majority of EU governments that it will increase energy bills, is “the most cost effective way of reaching our targets within transportation and buildings,” Stenberg argued. “And cost effectiveness, at the end of the day, is to the benefit of the economy.” Chiara Martinelli, director of the NGO Climate Action Network Europe, also said on the panel that the delay of the new carbon market is “problematic,” and called on the EU to ensure that social measures to support people in the green transition come with the ETS2.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

EU countries are taking a harder look at who builds, owns and works on key infrastructure like ports, IT and rail — and that concern is now spilling into a wave of legislation aimed at countries like China. Sweden is the latest to move, proposing this week to give local authorities new powers to block “hostile states” from bidding on infrastructure if their involvement could threaten national security. “It’s part of a defense issue,” a Swedish official told POLITICO, describing growing worries about countries like China gaining access to public infrastructure. “We are acting very quickly on that, since we see a risk that hostile states might try to infiltrate infrastructure such as ports, but also IT solutions and energy infrastructure.” It’s also a worry in Poland, Austria and inside EU institutions — all of which are rushing to put in safeguards to block, or at least monitor, third-country investment in key tech and transport infrastructure. What accelerated Sweden’s move was a recent EU court ruling involving Turkish and Chinese companies bidding on two railway projects. Judges concluded that suppliers from countries without a free-trade agreement with the EU do not enjoy the same rights as EU firms — a reading Stockholm took as both a green light and a warning signal. Sweden’s new rules are due to take effect in 2027. No specific cases were cited, but the investigation repeatedly pointed to China — which also sits at the center of very similar concerns in Poland. Warsaw has long been uneasy about the scale of Chinese involvement in its ports. A new draft bill put forward by the country’s president would “adapt the existing regulations concerning the operation of ports, and in particular the ownership of real estate located within the boundaries of ports.” The president argued that the current model — state-owned port authorities holding land and infrastructure and leasing it long-term to terminal operators — needs tightening if the country wants to maintain control over assets of “fundamental importance to the national economy.” Gen. Dariusz Łuczak, former head of Poland’s Internal Security Agency and now adviser to the Special Services Commission, told Polish media late last month that “the most important provisions are those concerning the early termination of perpetual use agreements.” However, it’s unclear if the legislation will pass as President Karol Nawrocki is broadly opposed to the government led by Prime Minster Donald Tusk. The EU is also moving. Ana Miguel Pedro, a Portuguese member of the European Parliament with the center-right European People’s Party, told POLITICO in the spring that the growing presence of Chinese state-owned companies in European port terminals “is not just an economic concern, but a strategic vulnerability.” Those concerns appear in the bloc’s new military mobility package, which calls for member countries to put in place “stricter rules on the ownership and control of strategic dual use infrastructure.” Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas also flagged the Chinese presence in ports and said it will feature in the European Commission’s upcoming ports strategy, due in 2026. Austria has also been pushed into the debate after long-distance trains built by Chinese state-owned manufacturer CRRC rolled onto the Vienna-Salzburg line for the first time — triggering a political backlash. The country’s Mobility Minister Peter Hanke said the EU must tighten procurement and digital-security rules for state-backed rail purchases — and Vienna plans to propose new legislation before the end of the year. The Commission did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Industry is pushing Brussels to go even further. The European Rail Supply Industry Association argued that the bloc’s procurement rules are relics of an earlier era and asked the Commission to update them so companies from countries that shut out EU bidders cannot freely compete for European contracts. Sweden’s investigators saw the same risks. “Third-country suppliers without an agreement should not be given a more advantageous position than they have today and than other suppliers have,” Anneli Berglund Creutz, who led the Swedish government’s procurement review, told reporters. Contracting authorities, she added, should have the ability “to take into account the nationality of suppliers and to select suppliers from hostile states” — possibly excluding them “when that protects national security.”

BRUSSELS — When the colonial governments of Belgium and Portugal ordered the construction of a railway connecting oil- and mineral-rich regions in the African interior to the Atlantic, their primary objective was to plunder resources such as rubber, ivory and minerals for export to Western countries.  Today, that same stretch of railway infrastructure, snaking through Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola to the port of Lobito, is being modernized and extended with U.S. and EU money to facilitate the transport of sought-after minerals like cobalt and copper. Just this month, Jozef Síkela, the EU commissioner for international partnerships, signed a €116 million investment package for the corridor, often hailed as a model initiative under Global Gateway, the bloc’s infrastructure development program. This time around, however, Brussels says it’s committed to resetting its historically tainted relationship with the region — a message European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa will stress when they address African and EU leaders at a Nov. 24-25 summit in Luanda, Angola, which is this year celebrating 50 years of independence from Portuguese rule.  “Global Gateway is about mutual benefits,” von der Leyen said in a keynote speech in October. The program should “focus even more on key value chains,” including the metals and minerals needed in everything from smartphones to wind turbines and defense applications.  The aim, she said, is to “build up resilient value chains together. With local infrastructure, but also local jobs, local skills and local industries.”  Yet Brussels is scrambling to enter a region only to find that China got there first. Batches of copper sheets are stored in a warehouse and wait to be loaded on trucks in Zambia. | Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images African countries are already the primary suppliers of minerals to Beijing, which has secured access to their resource wealth — unhindered by any historical baggage of colonial exploitation — and is now the world’s dominant processor. Europe’s emphasis on retaining economic value in host countries — rather than merely extracting resources for export — answers calls by African leaders for a more equitable and sustainable approach to developing their countries’ natural resources.  “The EU has been quite vocal, since the beginning of the raw minerals diplomacy two years ago, saying: We want to be the ethical partner,” said Martina Matarazzo, international and EU advocacy coordinator at Resource Matters, a Belgian NGO focusing on resource extraction, which also has an office in Kinshasa, DRC.  But “there is a big gap” between what’s being said and what’s being done, she added, pointing out that it is still unclear how the Lobito Corridor can be a “win-win” project, rather than just facilitating the shipping of minerals abroad.  Brussels finds itself under growing pressure to diversify its supply chains of lithium, rare earths and other raw materials away from China — which has demonstrated time and again it is ready to weaponize its market dominance. To that end, it is drafting a new plan, due on Dec. 3, to accelerate the bloc’s diversification efforts.   In African countries, however, Brussels is still struggling to establish itself as an attractive, ethical alternative to Beijing, which has long secured vast access to the continent’s resources through large-scale investments in mining, processing and infrastructure.  To enter the minerals space, the EU needs to walk the talk in close cooperation with African leaders — doing so may be its only chance to secure resources while moving away from its extractivist past, POLITICO has found in conversations with researchers, policymakers and civil society.  RESOURCE RUSH Appetite for Africa’s vast natural riches first drew colonizers to the continent — and laid “the foundation for post-independence resource dependency and external interference,” according to the Africa Policy Research Institute. Now, the continent’s deposits of vital minerals have turned it into a strategic player, with Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema last year setting a goal of tripling copper output by the end of the decade, for instance. Beijing has often used Belt and Road, its international development initiative, to secure mining rights in exchange for infrastructure projects. Washington, which lags far behind Beijing, is also stepping up its game, with investments into Africa quietly overtaking China’s. President Donald Trump has extended the U.S. security umbrella to war-torn areas in exchange for access to resources, for example brokering a — shaky — peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC. EU companies are “really trying to catch up,” said Christian Géraud Neema Byamungu, an expert on China-Africa relations and the Francophone Africa editor of the China Global South Project. “They left Africa when there was a sense that Africa is not really a place to do business.” DOING THINGS DIFFERENTLY Against this backdrop, the key question for the EU is: What can it offer to set itself apart from other partners? On paper, the answer is clear: a responsible approach to resource extraction that prioritizes creating local economic value, along with high environmental and social standards.  “We want to focus on the sustainable development of value chains and how to work with our African partners to support their rise of the value chains,” said an EU official ahead of the Luanda summit, where minerals will be a key topic. “This is not about extraction only,” they added. But so far, that still has to translate into a concrete impact on the ground. “We are not at the point where we can see how really the EU is trying to change things on the ground in terms of value addition in DRC,” said Emmanuel Umpula Nkumba, executive director of NGO Afrewatch. “I am not naïve, they are coming to make money, not to help us,” he added.  Not only has offtake from the Lobito Corridor been slow, but the project has also come under fire for prioritizing Western interests over African development and agency, and for potentially leading to the destruction of local forests, community displacement and an overall lack of benefits for local populations.  The 2024 Lobito Corridor Trans-Africa Summit | Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images The EU, however, views the corridor as “a symbol of the partnership between the African and European continent and an example of our shared investment agenda,” according to a Commission spokesperson, who called it “a lifeline towards sustainable development and shared prosperity.” Finally, while “value addition” has become a catchphrase, it’s unclear whether EU and African leaders see eye to eye on what the term means.  African industry representatives and officials often point to building a domestic supply chain up to the final product. EU officials, by contrast, tend to envision refining minerals in the country of origin and then exporting them, according to a report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations. A SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS CASE? The second component of the EU’s approach — strong sustainability and human rights safeguards — faces major trouble, not least in the name of making the EU more competitive.  In Brussels, proposed rules that would require companies to police their supply chains for environmental harm and human rights violations are dying a slow death, as conservative politicians channel complaints from businesses that they can’t bear the cost of complying. An investigation by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre of the 13 mining, refining and recycling projects outside the bloc labeled “strategic” by the EU executive — including four in Africa — identified “an inconsistent approach to key human rights policies.”  However, under pressure from African leaders, stricter safeguards are slowly becoming more important in the sector: “high [environmental, social and governance] standards” are a core component of the African Union’s mining strategy published in 2024.  The Chinese, too, are adapting quickly.  “China’s also getting good with standards,” said Sarah Logan, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations who co-authored the assessment of African and European interpretations of value addition. “If they are made to, Chinese mining companies are very capable of adhering to ESG standards.”  Therefore, besides massively scaling up investment, the EU and European companies will need to turn their promise of being a reliable and ethical partner into reality — sooner rather than later. “The only way to distinguish ourselves from the Chinese is to guarantee these benefits for communities,” Spanish Green European lawmaker Ana Miranda Paz told a panel discussion on the Lobito Corridor in Brussels. This story has been updated with comment from the European Commission.

BRUSSELS — The far right last week broke through the firewall in the European Parliament and is now looking to flex its muscles again to secure a wider set of goals.   Next on the target list: Deporting more migrants, reversing a ban on the combustion engine, new rules on gene-edited crops, and even more red tape reductions for businesses. After decades of being sidelined by mainstream political parties, the far right scored a major victory last week when the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) ditched its traditional centrist allies and pressed ahead with plans to cut green rules for businesses that received the backing of lawmakers on the right. Now that the cordon sanitaire against the far right “has fallen,” there will be space for a right-wing majority to pass legislation “when it comes to competitiveness, in some areas of the Green Deal where they want to scale down the targets or the burdens for the businesses,” Anders Vistisen, chief whip for the far-right Patriots group, told POLITICO.   There’s dispute over how much cooperation actually took place last week, however. The EPP says it did not — and never will — negotiate directly with far-right groups. Instead, the EPP insists it merely puts forward its position, which may or may not be supported by others. “It is a lie that we negotiated with them,” EPP spokesperson Daniel Köster said following the green rules vote, after MEPs from the Patriots claimed there were formal compromises and negotiations between both parties. Yet the Patriots argue that EPP lawmakers, behind the scenes and at committee level, discreetly consult with their right-wing counterparts on areas where they have overlapping priorities. “They coordinate with us quite often on these files,” Vistisen said, “but it is becoming a little bit ridiculous and silly that they don’t just want to own up to it.” The extent of cooperation largely depends on which nationality the center-right lawmakers are from, according to the Patriots. “On a technical level we work constructively with almost all delegations, except with the German EPP,” Roman Haider, top Patriots MEP in the transport committee, told POLITICO, echoing comments from his colleague Paolo Borchia, a member of the industry and energy committee, who said only some national EPP delegations are open to talking. “Cooperation with the German EPP is practically impossible. They refuse any professional interaction with us,” said Haider. For many years, the German center-right has opposed co-operation with the far-right because of the country’s Nazi past. IT’S NOT OVER FOR THE CENTER Any further collaboration has clear boundaries — after all, many far-right lawmakers want to tear the EU down. The EPP also still needs the centre to pass a majority of files, such as the long-term EU budget. However, Italy’s Nicola Procaccini, chair of the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists (which ideologically sits between the EPP and the Patriots), told POLITICO that the right can easily team up on deregulation, migration, farming, and family issues. However, Italy’s Nicola Procaccini, chair of the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists (which ideologically sits between the EPP and the Patriots), told POLITICO that the right can easily team up on deregulation, migration, farming, and family issues. | Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty Images “In these issues for sure we are closer” on the right side of the Parliament, Procaccini said. He believes the cordon sanitaire, which kept the far right from power, is not dead, but that the first steps in tearing it down have been taken, and parts of the EPP are ready to openly work with the right-wing side of the hemicycle. Liberal and Socialist lawmakers point out the Patriots often coordinate closely with the ECR, which then presents their position to the EPP. According to a parliamentary official, granted anonymity to speak freely, the ECR acts as a “Trojan horse” for the Patriots to circumvent the cordon sanitaire. Asked about future deals with the far right, EPP spokesperson Pedro López de Pablo said: “We are fully committed to working with all our platform partners [Socialists and Democrats, the liberals of Renew] and they know our guiding principle is content, content, content.” Vistisen also acknowledged that, while lawmakers from the Patriots are ready to sit at the table and negotiate on all things related to deregulation and migration, the EPP continues to try to find compromises with the center. “It’s also a question of how many times the EPP wants to look ridiculous in this attempt to pretend that the central majority is the one that can be used to deregulate,” said Vistisen. He added that the EPP, as the Parliament’s biggest force, has the leverage to do whatever it wants and that “the only real negotiating strength that the Socialists have left” is calling a motion of no confidence in Ursula von der Leyen. The Commission president has faced — and comfortably survived — three such motions this year, brought by the far right and the far left. TOUGHER ON MIGRATION One major area where the far-right is hoping to lure the EPP into its arms is migration. In December, the Parliament is expected to vote on a new bill on “safe” non-EU countries to which member states could deport migrants, even if they are not originally from there, which the Patriots hope will be passed with a right-wing majority. They are already claiming that the price of securing their votes a second time will be higher. “We know that the EPP are struggling very much to get liberals and social democrats to play ball,” said Vistisen. “If they want to strike a deal with us, it has to be compromise amendments signed by ECR, EPP and Patriots. That is going to be a testing ground for whether the EPP publicly will make policy with us.” The right-wing majority could find common ground on a new deportations regulation proposed by the Commission in March, a key bill for von der Leyen as she seeks to appease calls from across the bloc for tougher migration policies. The lead negotiators on the file from ECR, Patriots, and the far-right Europe of Sovereign Nations group want to pull the EPP away from the center and pass a tougher version of the bill. “In terms of cooperation on the right, what I’ve heard thus far is that both the Patriots and ECR and ESN, but also EPP, are very much on the same line on a great number of issues,” Patriots’ lead negotiator Marieke Ehlers told POLITICO. Ehlers said she is in touch with her EPP counterpart, François-Xavier Bellamy, whose national party, Les Républicains, is advocating tougher migration policies in France.   Fabrice Leggeri, a Patriots MEP, also said that “there are talks or exchanges of views between Patriots for Europe and the EPP”. Bellamy did not respond to a request for comment. CUT, CUT, CUT The European Commission may have found a new ally in its simplification agenda, with right-wing and far-right groups in Parliament eager to tear down policy in the name of cutting bureaucracy and giving power back from Brussels to national capitals. Two of the most explosive files where the right-wing majority could team up are in the automotive sector, as the EPP, pushed by Germany, seeks to slash regulations it says are strangling the car industry. The Commission is set to put forward in December a revision of what is a de facto ban on the combustion engine by 2035, alongside a measure that could set an electric vehicle target for company cars and leasing companies. In Parliament, the EPP could kill both files with the help of the far right. Straight after winning the most seats in the 2024 election, EPP chief Manfred Weber told POLITICO that his group would overturn the 2035 combustion engine ban. The far-right has also made this a major campaign talking point, with the Czech Republic’s Motorist Party basing its entire platform on the issue. The Greens, the Socialists & Democrats and Renew don’t have a unified position on the ban, making things even easier for the EPP and far right to team up. “If the German EPP wants to stand by one of its core pre-election promises, namely ending the phase-out of the combustion engine, then they will have no choice but to work with us,” said Patriots MEP Haider. The digital omnibus, presented by the Commission on Wednesday, is also a potential area where the EPP and Socialists could fail to agree on a way forward, opening the door for a right-wing majority. The bill is being pitched by the Commission as a way to simplify the EU’s digital laws to make life easier for European companies. But the proposal put forward by the Commission on Wednesday seeks extensive changes to the EU’s data protection regulation (GDPR), many to the benefit of AI developers, which the socialists and liberals have said they will block. FARMING TARGETS The right-wing dynamic is also playing out in the talks on Europe’s new rules on gene-edited crops, where exhausted EPP negotiators are quietly weighing far-right votes as a fallback option to break a months-long Parliament deadlock. Italian right-wing lawmakers from the ECR and Patriots could end up delivering the majority needed to push a compromise through — a prospect left-wing MEPs say would result in a deal far too weak to protect the interests of small producers, consumers and the environment. And the next Common Agricultural Policy, the EU’s vast farm-subsidy program, could shift even more dramatically if pushed through with far-right backing. Instead of the slow trend toward stricter environmental and climate obligations, the new coalition arithmetic could deliver a CAP with fewer strings attached, looser oversight and even weaker green conditions, which have been long-standing wishes for both the EPP and far-right groups.

The problem of inequality has become so pressing that it needs coordinated global action to address it, a group of over 500 economists and scientists said on Friday. The group, which includes former Treasury Secretary and Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen along with French economist Thomas Piketty and Nobel Prize winner Daren Acemoglu, called in an open letter for the creation of a body akin to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to coordinate action against what it saw as disastrous effects on modern society. “We are profoundly concerned, as they are, that extreme concentrations of wealth translate into undemocratic concentrations of power, unravelling trust in our societies and polarising our politics,” read the letter, referring to the findings of a G20 research committee led by noted American economist Joseph Stiglitz. Just last week, shareholders of electric vehicle company Tesla voted to award the company’s CEO, Elon Musk, a pay package potentially worth $1 trillion, the largest in history. Musk, also the owner of social media platform X, is already the richest man in the world. The IPCC has spearheaded the collection and dissemination of the scientific consensus on climate change over the past four decades and acted as a powerful force to push green policy forward. The economists said a new “International Panel on Inequality” would play a similar role, gathering evidence and pushing governments to act to tackle wealth gaps.  The proposal was first contained in a recent report on inequality authored by a G20 research committee led by Stiglitz, who focused on inequality in his time as chief economist at the World Bank in the 1990s. The report found that between 2000 and 2024, the richest 1 percent of humanity had accumulated 41 percent of all new wealth — versus the 1 percent that had gone to the bottom half of the global population. That’s equal to an average gain of $1.3 million for the top 1 percent, versus $585 for people in the poorest half. There have been marked political consequences of these large differences between the rich and the poor, with the report finding that countries with high levels of inequality were “seven times more likely to experience democratic decline than more equal countries.”  Stiglitz said in an interview with POLITICO that the growing gap between rich and poor is evidence that the past four decades of middle-of-the-road governance on both sides of the Atlantic has failed. Populists across the West, including U.S. President Donald Trump, had seized the moment, playing on the grievances that failure had stoked, he said.  “I do think that centrist politicians on both sides of the Atlantic bought into the neoliberal fantasy that if you had trade liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, you would have more growth, and trickle-down economics would make sure that everyone would benefit,” said Stiglitz.  He praised the recent victory of the Democratic Socialist mayor-elect of New York, Zohran Mamdani, who he said was addressing people’s everyday concerns, in contrast to politicians of both the center-left and center-right. Mamdani, who last week surged to victory after defeating both Democratic rival Andrew Cuomo and Republican contender Curtis Sliwa, ran a strikingly effective media campaign centered on the city’s spiraling cost of living. His platform included promises to provide free bus travel, state-owned supermarkets and rent-controlled apartments.   Stiglitz, who described himself as “very market friendly,” nonetheless said he thought the left-wing mayor had opened up space for debate. Zohran Mamdani, who last week surged to victory after defeating both Democratic rival Andrew Cuomo and Republican contender Curtis Sliwa, ran a strikingly effective media campaign centered on the city’s spiraling cost of living. | Sarah Yenesel/EPA “He’s saying things that are important to people: things like housing, food, transport, health care,” said Stiglitz. “He’s just ticking down the list of things that make for the necessities of a decent life, and he’s saying things aren’t working right.”  Stiglitz won his Nobel Prize in 2001 for work on information asymmetries in markets, and served as a chief economist at the World Bank and as chair of the Council of Economic Advisers during former President Bill Clinton’s administration, where he had a famously rocky relationship with Treasury Secretary Larry Summers. With its embrace of globalization and the Internet revolution, Clinton’s team was hugely influential in drawing the parameters for the modern world economy. The influential economist said that tackling inequality wasn’t just a moral choice, but a political necessity. He added that the yawning gap between the rich and poor was undermining the U.S. in its economic and technological competition with China. “[The U.S.] won’t win if we are a divided society, a polarized society,” said Stiglitz, echoing rhetoric of the last Cold War. “The greatest weakness in the U.S. today is this division.”

The spirit of mutirão — communities joining forces to get something done — runs deep in Brazil’s culture. Here at COP30 it is inescapable. The phrase is on the lips of negotiators from nearly 200 countries and it has become the defining ethos of this conference: global climate cooperation built on shared effort and mutual accountability.  National governments and cities, campaigners and businesses must now come together in that same spirit to move from the age of negotiation to the decade of delivery. Here in Belém it is impossible to forget why this matters. Every country has its story of floods, heatwaves, wildfires or supercharged storms that strike hardest in the places least able to cope. At both the Brazilian Ministry of Cities and C40 Cities we see every day that adapting to current challenges and turning the tide on the climate crisis are not separate challenges but part of one mission: to protect the people and places we love now and for generations to come. We are becoming a planet of urbanites, even here in the Amazon rainforest there are nearly 22 million people living in cities like Belém, so it’s crucial to combine preservation with sustainable and inclusive development for those communities. Across Brazil and around the world, cities are already facing up to this challenge. They are greening streets, serving sustainable and nutritious lunches to school children, keeping the most vulnerable safe from heat and floods, designing urban areas that meet the needs of people — not cars — and creating good green jobs for all.  > Every country has its story of floods, heatwaves, wildfires or supercharged > storms that strike hardest in the places least able to cope. Last week we both joined mayors, governors and regional leaders representing more than 14,000 cities, towns, states and provinces at the Bloomberg COP30 Local Leaders Forum in Rio de Janeiro. It was the largest and most diverse gathering of subnational climate leaders in history, and it sent an unmistakable message to national governments: local leadership is already delivering and it is ready to go further.  Via C40/Caroline Teo – GLA Following this historic moment and boosted by the COP30 presidency’s willingness to put urban climate action to the fore, cities came to COP30 with three clear offers: 1. Partner with us to implement national climate plans and turn strategies into results that improve lives. 2. Invest in the local project pipeline. More than 2,500 projects seek support and thousands more can follow if the political will is forthcoming. 3. Make COP a place of action and accountability where progress is measured not in pledges but in cleaner air, reduced health risks and green jobs created.  If countries accept these offers the COP process itself can evolve from negotiation to delivery, from promises to proof that the Paris Agreement goals can be not just agreed but also delivered.  This is not just a theory. It is already happening here. Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s leadership Brazil has embedded ‘climate federalism’ into national policy, linking the federal government, states and municipalities in coordinated delivery for the good of all Brazilians and the planet.   Research shows that, in countries that are part of the Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships for Climate Action (CHAMP), collaboration between national and subnational governments could close 37 percent of the global emissions gap needed to stay on a Paris-aligned pathway. Launched at COP28, CHAMP already includes 77 nations and continues to grow. Brazil is showing what this looks like in practice and is inspiring more countries to take action.  Via 10 Billion Solutions, Mariana Castaño Cano On the city side of the equation the evidence is unequivocal. Per-capita emissions in C40 Cities are falling five times faster than the global average and more than 70 percent of C40 cities have already peaked emissions and are now delivering significant emissions reductions. Many C40 cities are also committing to a Yearly Offer of Action, demonstrating how to translate global ambition into measurable progress by announcing every year what they will do in the next 12 months to accelerate climate action.  To unlock that progress the financial system must evolve too. The world’s development and climate finance architecture was designed for national ministries not city halls. Yet cities control or influence most of the decisions that shape emissions from transport, waste, buildings and land use. This means they can enhance and accelerate the implementation of National Climate Plans. Much more could be achieved if urban climate finance is increased and local governments have direct access to the capital they need. The Baku to Belém Roadmap is calling for $1.3 trillion of annual climate investment to support developing countries. This could help scale-up finance and make it more reliable and accessible while prioritizing a just and resilient transition. Cities have the projects, partners and are the closest level of government to people’s daily needs — enhanced collaboration, preparation and direct access to finance can help bring their ambitious visions to life.     > To unlock that progress the financial system must evolve too. The world’s > development and climate finance architecture was designed for national > ministries not city halls. We have both witnessed here in Brazil how quickly change accelerates when local and national leaders come together. When buses run on clean power, when families in flood-prone neighborhoods move into resilient homes, when air is cleaner and streets are safer, climate policy stops being abstract. It becomes tangible progress that citizens can see and support.  If COP30 becomes the moment the world embraces climate federalism and genuine national and sub-national collaboration, then Brazil will have set a new global standard for collective climate delivery and a real just transition.  The decade of delivery begins here in Belém. Let us build it together, in mutirão.