Iris Ferguson is a global adviser to Loom and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience. Ann Mettler is a distinguished visiting fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former director general of the European Commission. After much pressure, European leaders delayed a decision this week amid division on whether to tighten market access through a “Made in Europe” mandate and redouble efforts to reduce the bloc’s strategic dependencies — particularly on China. This decision may appear technocratic, but the hold-up signals its importance and reflects a larger strategic reality shared across the Atlantic. Security, industry and energy have all fused into a single race to control the systems that power modern economies and militaries. And increasingly, success will hinge on whether the U.S. and Europe can confront this reality together, starting with the one domain that’s shaping every other: energy. While traditional defense spending still grabs headlines, today’s battlefield is being reshaped just as profoundly by energy flows and critical inputs. Advanced batteries for drones, portable power for forward-deployed units and mineral supply chains for next-generation platforms — these all point to the simple truth that technological and operational superiority increasingly depends on who controls the next generation of energy systems. But as Europe and the U.S. look to maintain their edge, they must rethink not just how they produce and move energy, but how to secure the industrial base behind it. Energy sovereignty now sits at the center of our shared security, and in a world where adversaries can weaponize supply chains just as easily as airspace or sea lanes, the future will belong to those who build energy systems that are resilient and interoperable by design. The Pentagon already understands this. It has tested distributed power to shorten vulnerable fuel lines in war games across the Indo-Pacific; it has watched closely how mobile generation units keep the grid alive under Russian attack in Ukraine; and it is exploring ways to deliver energy without relying on exposed logistics via new research on solar power beaming. Each of these cases clearly demonstrates that strategic endurance now depends on energy agility and security. But currently, many of these systems depend on materials and manufacturing chains that are dominated by a strategic rival: From batteries and magnets to rare earth processing, China controls our critical inputs. This isn’t just an economic liability, it’s a national security vulnerability for both Europe and the U.S. We’re essentially building the infrastructure of the future with components that could be withheld, surveilled or compromised. That risk isn’t theoretical. China’s recent export controls on key minerals are already disrupting defense and energy manufacturers — a sharp reminder of how supply chain leverage can be a form of coercion, and of our reliance on a fragile ecosystem for the very technologies meant to make us more independent. So, how do we modernize our energy systems without deepening these unnecessary dependencies and build trusted interdependence among allies instead? The solution starts with a shift in mindset that must then translate into decisive policy action. Simply put, as a matter of urgency, energy and tech resilience must be treated as shared infrastructure, cutting across agencies, sectors and alliances. Defense procurement can be a catalyst here. For example, investing in dual-use technologies like advanced batteries, hardened micro-grids and distributed generation would serve both military needs and broader resilience. These aren’t just “green” tools — they’re strategic assets that improve mission effectiveness, while also insulating us from coercion. And done right, such investment can strengthen defense, accelerate innovation and also help drive down costs. Next, we need to build new coalitions for critical minerals, batteries, trusted manufacturing and cyber-secure infrastructure. Just as NATO was built for collective defense, we now need economic and technological alliances that ensure shared strategic autonomy. Both the upcoming White House initiative to strengthen the supply chain for artificial intelligence technology and the recently announced RESourceEU initiative to secure raw materials illustrate how partners are already beginning to rewire systems for resilience. Germany gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. | Tan Kexing/Getty Images Finally, we must also address existing dependencies strategically and head-on. This means rethinking how and where we source key materials, including building out domestic and allied capacity in areas long neglected. Germany recently gave the bloc one such example by moving to reduce its reliance on Chinese-made wind components in favor of European suppliers. Moving forward, measures like this need EU-wide adoption. By contrast, in the U.S., strong bipartisan support for reducing reliance on China sits alongside proposals to halt domestic battery and renewable incentives, undercutting the very industries that enhance resilience and competitiveness. This is the crux of the matter. Ultimately, if Europe and the U.S. move in parallel rather than together, none of these efforts will succeed — and both will be strategically weaker as a result. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas recently warned that we must “act united” or risk being affected by Beijing’s actions — and she’s right. With a laser focus on interoperability and cost sharing, we could build systems that operate together in a shared market of close to 800 million people. The real challenge isn’t technological, it’s organizational. Whether it be Bretton Woods, NATO or the Marshall Plan, the West has strategically built together before, anchoring economic resilience with national defense. The difference today is that the lines between economic security, energy access and defense capability are fully blurred. Sustainable, agile energy is now part of deterrence, and long-term security depends on whether the U.S. and Europe can build energy systems that reinforce and secure one another. This is a generational opportunity for transatlantic alignment; a mutually reinforcing way to safeguard economic interests in the face of systemic competition. And to lead in this new era, we must design for it — together and intentionally. Or we risk forfeiting the very advantages our alliance was built to protect.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Der Konflikt um das Rentenpaket bringt Friedrich Merz in Bedrängnis. Nach dem Deutschlandtag der Jungen Union steht der Kanzler noch mehr unter Druck. Rasmus Buchsteiner und Gordon Repinski analysieren, warum Merz die Stimmung in Rust unterschätzt hat, welche Fehler in der Kommunikation entstanden sind und warum der Streit das Vertrauen in seine Führungsrolle erschüttert. Parallel reist SPD-Co-Chef Lars Klingbeil als Vizekanzler und Finanzminister nach China. Der Besuch soll Vertrauen schaffen, birgt aber neue Spannungen zwischen Berlin und Peking. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview erklärt Steffen Krach, SPD-Spitzenkandidat für Berlin, wie er Vertrauen in seine Partei zurückgewinnen will, welche Lehren er aus dem Rentenstreit zieht und warum aus seiner Sicht gegebenenfalls auch die Mütterrente nochmals zu besprechen sein wird. Seine Themen für die Hauptstadt: Wohnraum, Familie und Sicherheit. Die Ausgabe mit Edi Rama und Vjosa Osmani findet ihr hier. Den Podcast von Paul Ronzheimer, in dem Gordon heute zu Gast ist, findet ihr hier. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

ATHENS — The Trump administration has a new European target in its crosshairs: China’s state ownership of Piraeus port in Greece. “It is unfortunate, but I think there’s ways around it, that something could be worked out, whether you pursue a path of enhancing output in other areas or perhaps that Piraeus could be for sale,” the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, said in an interview with local outlet Antenna TV. China invested heavily in debt-ridden Greece during the country’s lengthy economic crisis, with the goal of making it a hub for Chinese exports. Athens actively courted Beijing as companies from other Western countries turned away from Greece, spooked by its financial woes and infamous bureaucracy. Cosco, China’s state-owned shipping company, secured a majority stake in Greece’s largest port of Piraeus in 2016, making it a key part — the so-called dragon’s head — of its global infrastructure project, known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Guilfoyle, a former TV host on US broadcaster Fox, suggested that Beijing’s current influence could potentially be balanced by increased American investment in other infrastructure projects. “I think it’s very important to have American infrastructure here to help support the region. To perhaps, in fact, enhance output from other ports and areas to balance against the Chinese influence with the port of Piraeus,” she said. Greece sold Piraeus port under pressure from the country’s European creditors, and Cosco was the only company to submit an offer. Guilfoyle added that Washington sees Greece as a rising energy hub crucial to securing energy independence “to push back against Russian and Chinese interests.”

China has agreed to resume shipments of key chips for Europe’s automotive sector, the EU’s top trade official announced on Saturday. The Chinese government will grant exemptions to the strict licensing requirements that were introduced following the seizure of Dutch-based Nexperia, provided that purchasers promise to only use the semiconductors for civilian purposes, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said in a post on X. The Dutch government in October seized control of Nexperia, a subsidiary of Chinese firm Wingtech produces semiconductors that are widely used in the European automotive sector. Nexperia is headquartered in Nijmegen in the northeast of the Netherlands. The Dutch government announced on Thursday that the trade truce reached between Washington and Beijing would enable the resumption of exports of Nexperia’s chips from China. A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce said on Saturday that the Dutch government has yet to take any concrete actions concerning the seizure of Nexperia, and that Beijing had agreed to a request from the Dutch Economy Ministry to send officials to China for discussions. “The source and responsibility for the current chaos in the global semiconductor supply chain lie with the Netherlands,” said the Chinese ministry spokesperson. Šefčovič said he is in close engagement with both the Chinese and Dutch authorities in order to establish a “lasting, stable” consensus that ensures the full restoration of semiconductor flows.

The Chinese government has agreed to resume exports of key chips for the European auto sector, according to Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof. “We were informed by China that they will enable the resumption of supplies from Chinese factories from Nexperia,” Schoof told Bloomberg Friday on the sidelines of the COP30 climate summit in Brazil. The crisis was sparked in October when the Netherlands seized control of the Dutch-based chipmaker, a subsidiary of Chinese chip giant Wingtech, prompting Beijing to impose retaliatory export restrictions. Schoof told the newswire that the resolution was the result of cooperation between the Netherlands, Germany and the European Commission, as well as recent Dutch-Chinese diplomatic talks, alongside a trade detente between the U.S. and China. German auto firm Aumovio disclosed on an earnings call on Friday that it had been informed that it had received the necessary permissions to begin importing Nexperia’s chips.

BRUSSELS — Huawei was rushed back into the EU’s most influential solar panel lobby after threatening legal action in reaction to its earlier expulsion over its alleged involvement in a bribery and corruption scandal.   That’s outraging other solar power companies, worried that creating a special membership category for Huawei could undermine the ability of SolarPower Europe to effectively represent the industry in Brussels.  “The conduct reported … specifically the handling of Huawei’s membership has seriously undermined both my personal confidence and that of our organization in the governance of SPE,” Elisabeth Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß, CEO of Austrian company Fronius, wrote in a letter to SPE, which was obtained by POLITICO.  Lawyers for Huawei and SolarPower Europe met at the end of May for negotiations, an industry insider told POLITICO, which culminated in SPE sending a final agreement to the Chinese company at the beginning of September.   Huawei argued that the European Commission’s decision to ban its lobbyists from any meetings with the executive or the European Parliament was unlawful and did not warrant a full expulsion from SPE, said the insider, who spoke on condition of being granted anonymity over fears of retaliation for speaking out.  The ban on Huawei lobbyists was put in place in March after Belgian authorities accused the company of conducting a cash-for-influence scheme and bribing MEPs to ensure their support of Huawei’s interests.  At the time, Huawei maintained it has a “zero-tolerance stance against corruption.”  During the Sept. 29 meeting to reinstate Huawei’s membership, SPE told its board of directors that the organization wanted to avoid a lawsuit and a potentially costly trial.  Instead, SPE proposed making Huawei a passive member that would not actively participate in the group’s workstreams — an option the board accepted, POLITICO reported earlier this month.   Huawei did not respond to a request for comment about its legal threat.  SPE acknowledged the threat in a letter to Fronius, one of its board members, on Thursday. “Based on legal advice and with the assistance of external lawyers, SolarPower Europe held discussions with Huawei with a view to avoiding litigation and protracted legal uncertainty regarding Huawei’s membership status, while preserving SolarPower Europe’s uninterrupted and unrestricted access to the EU Institutions and other relevant stakeholders,” reads the letter obtained by POLITICO.  The SPE’s letter was a response to an Oct. 20 letter from the Austrian solar panel manufacturer sent to the lobby after POLITICO’s story was published on Oct. 9. Fronius called for full transparency over the reinstatement of Huawei and action against any appearance of corruption.  The Austrian company’s concern is that SPE will be “unable to effectively represent” the sector given the EU’s ban on direct contact with Huawei or groups that lobby on its behalf, Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß told POLITICO in an email.   Fronius is also raising questions about whether SPE can designate a company as a passive member — a status that does not exist in the organization’s bylaws.  “To our knowledge, SPE’s status do not include such a membership category,” Fronius’s letter to SPE reads. “We request a clear explanation of what this form of membership is based on.”  SPE did not raise the issue of member status in its response to Fronius.   The lobbying practices of Huawei and other Chinese companies are under a microscope over concerns around the influence they wield over crucial technologies, including renewable energy and 5G mobile data networks.  While it is better known as a telecom giant, Huawei is also a leader in manufacturing inverters, which turn solar panels’ electricity into current that flows into the energy grid.  Cybersecurity experts warn inverters offer a back door for bad actors to hack into the grid and tamper with or shut it down through remote access.  Two members of the European Parliament sent a letter to the European Commission earlier this month warning of such risks and urging the executive to restrict high-risk vendors like Huawei from investing in Europe’s critical infrastructure.  “Inverters are the brain of a [solar panel] system, connected to the internet and must be remotely controllable for updates. This applies regardless of who the manufacturer is,” Engelbrechtsmüller-Strauß said. “If European legislation does not address the ‘manufacturer risk,’ then energy security in Europe will be jeopardized, which I consider critical.” 

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Außenminister Wadephul sagt seine China-Reise kurzfristig ab. Ein Vorgang, der zeigt, wie sehr sich die Machtverhältnisse verschoben haben. Hans von der Burchard analysiert, wie China Deutschland die Grenzen aufzeigt, warum die EU zum Vermittler wird  und welche Folgen die Eskalation hat. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht Markus Frohnmaier, außenpolitischer Sprecher der AfD, über Pekings Rolle in der Welt, deutsche Interessen und warum er die Regierung für „hypermoralisch“ hält. Danach: Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt will Deutschland besser gegen Cyberangriffe wappnen und erlaubt künftig auch digitale Gegenschläge. Rixa Fürsen erklärt, wie schwierig das Konzept der Abwehr ist und warum Zuständigkeiten zwischen Bund, Ländern und Bundeswehr so unklar sind. Zum Schluss: Ein Blick auf die SPD, die in Bielefeld gegen den Kanzler und damit die eigene Regierung demonstriert. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Friday postponed an imminent diplomatic trip to China, over a dearth of meetings on his schedule. “The trip cannot take place at this time and will be postponed to a later date,” said a spokesperson for Germany’s Federal Foreign Office. With the exception of a sitdown with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, there were not enough meetings with the Beijing side on his agenda, the spokesperson added. Wadephul’s bombshell will likely roil relations between Berlin and Beijing. It comes amid an increasing deterioration of Germany-China relations in recent months over Beijing’s export curbs on rare earths and microchips, as well as German criticism over China’s posture toward Taiwan and behavior in the South China Sea. A few hours earlier, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche announced that Berlin was lodging a diplomatic protest against China for blocking semiconductor shipments. “We have been hit hard by the chip shortage because the German economy depends on these chips,” she said in Kyiv. In August, Wadephul also noted that China was providing “crucial” support to Russia that enabled President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing war against Ukraine. The foreign minister was originally scheduled to depart for China on Sunday. Wadephul had planned to press Beijing to ease export restrictions on rare earths and semiconductors, he told Reuters on Thursday — and discuss pushing Russia toward negotiations to end its war in Ukraine. Brussels, for its part, is pressing ahead in talks with Beijing. The European Commission on Friday told reporters that it “can confirm that both in-person and virtual high-level technical meetings will take place next week” after the bloc’s Commissioner for Trade Maroš Šefčovič spoke to his Chinese counterpart Wang Wentao on Tuesday.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music It’s been a week where the politics of the Middle East and Britain’s relations with China have loomed large over Westminster. For all the backslapping and goodwill of Sharm el-Sheikh, will the ceasefire and exchange of hostages and prisoners in Gaza pave the way for a political solution? What part could Britain play? And how will the row over the collapsed Chinese spy case play out at home as the blame game between the government, opposition and prosecutors continues to rumble on? What impact will it have on Keir Starmer’s attempts to boost economic relations with China? Anne McElvoy talks to one of Westminster’s most prominent figures on foreign affairs, Emily Thornberry, who chairs the influential Foreign Affairs Select Committee of MPs. As one of Labour’s most senior backbenchers and a former shadow attorney general, she’s been unafraid to be a critical friend of Starmer. She’s also joined by Tim Ross, POLITICO’s chief political correspondent for Europe and the U.K., who’s been reporting on the reaction to President Trump’s Gaza peace plan and gauging the mood in Westminster over the row about Chinese espionage.

The Belgian security officer who was arrested and indicted for espionage last week worked for the City of Brussels local police unit, local media reported and one person with knowledge of the case confirmed to POLITICO. The individual, who is believed to have been co-opted for his access to the international diplomatic world in Brussels, was arrested last Thursday and later released under strict restrictions, POLITICO first reported. A spokesperson for the local police service overseeing the City of Brussels — the largest of 19 municipalities in the Belgian capital’s metropolitan area — and Ixelles said they “can confirm that an internal investigation is currently underway.” “We will not comment further while the process is ongoing. Appropriate measures will be taken based on the conclusions of this inquiry,” the spokesperson said in a statement. The federal prosecutor’s office and federal police services declined to comment. The City of Brussels police unit also oversees the areas around the European Union institutions in Brussels. The charges relate to spying for China, one of the people told POLITICO earlier, adding that the officer is also being investigated as to whether he additionally spied for Russia. The arrest comes amid mounting pressure on Belgium’s security agencies. In February, Belgian publication Le Soir revealed that Chinese hackers had infiltrated state security systems between 2021 and 2023, in what is considered the agency’s largest-ever data breach.