The Trump administration wants to work with traditional allies to secure new supplies of critical minerals. But months of aggression toward allies, culminating with since-aborted threats to seize Greenland, have left many cool to the overtures. While the State Department has drawn a lengthy list of participating countries for its first Critical Minerals Ministerial scheduled for Wednesday, a number of those attending are hesitant to commit to partnering with the U.S. in creating a supply chain that bypasses China’s current chokehold on those materials, according to five Washington-based diplomats of countries invited to or attending the event. State Department cables obtained by POLITICO also show wariness among some countries about signing onto a framework agreement pledging joint cooperation in sourcing and processing critical minerals. Representatives from more than 50 countries are expected to attend the meeting, according to the State Department — all gathered to discuss the creation of tech supply chains that can rival Beijing’s. But the meeting comes just two weeks since President Donald Trump took to the stage at Davos to call on fellow NATO member Denmark to allow a U.S. takeover of Greenland, and that isn’t sitting well. “We all need access to critical minerals, but the furor over Greenland is going to be the elephant in the room,” said a European diplomat. In the immediate run-up to the event there’s “not a great deal of interest from the European side,” the person added. The individual and others were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic relationships. Their concerns underscore how international dismay at the Trump administration’s foreign policy and trade actions may kneecap its other global priorities. The Trump administration had had some success over the past two months rallying countries to support U.S. efforts to create secure supply chains for critical minerals, including a major multilateral agreement called the Pax Silica Declaration. Now those gains could be at risk. Secretary of State Marco Rubio wants foreign countries to partner with the U.S. in creating a supply chain for the 60 minerals (including rare earths) that the U.S. Geological Survey deems “vital to the U.S. economy and national security that face potential risks from disrupted supply chains.” They include antimony, used to produce munitions; samarium, which goes into aircraft engines; and germanium, which is essential to fiber-optics. The administration also launched a $12 billion joint public-private sector “strategic critical minerals stockpile” for U.S. manufacturers, a White House official said Monday. Trump has backed away from his threats of possibly deploying the U.S. military to seize Greenland from Denmark. But at Davos he demanded “immediate negotiations” with Copenhagen to transfer Greenland’s sovereignty to the U.S. That makes some EU officials leery of administration initiatives that require cooperation and trust. “We are all very wary,” said a second European diplomat. Rubio’s critical minerals framework “will not be an easy sell until there is final clarity on Greenland.” Trump compounded the damage to relations with NATO countries on Jan. 22 when he accused member country troops that deployed to support U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 of having shirked combat duty. “The White House really messed up with Greenland and Davos,” a third European diplomat said. “They may have underestimated how much that would have an impact.” The Trump administration needs the critical minerals deals to go through. The U.S. has been scrambling to find alternative supply lines for a group of minerals called rare earths since Beijing temporarily cut the U.S. off from its supply last year. China — which has a near-monopoly on rare earths — relented in the trade truce that Trump brokered with China’s leader Xi Jinping in South Korea in October. The administration is betting that foreign government officials that attend Wednesday’s event also want alternative sources to those materials. “The United States and the countries attending recognize that reliable supply chains are indispensable to our mutual economic and national security and that we must work together to address these issues in this vital sector,” the State Department statement said in a statement. The administration has been expressing confidence that it will secure critical minerals partnerships with the countries attending the ministerial, despite their concerns over Trump’s bellicose policy. “There is a commonality here around countering China,” Ruth Perry, the State Department’s acting principal deputy assistant secretary for ocean, fisheries and polar affairs, said at an industry event on offshore critical minerals in Washington last week. “Many of these countries understand the urgency.” Speaking at a White House event Monday, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum indicated that 11 nations would sign on to a critical minerals framework with the United States this week and another 20 are considering doing so. Greenland has rich deposits of rare earths and other minerals. But Denmark isn’t sending any representatives to the ministerial, according to the person familiar with the event’s planning. Trump said last month that a framework agreement he struck with NATO over Greenland’s future included U.S. access to the island’s minerals. Greenland’s harsh climate and lack of infrastructure in its interior makes the extraction of those materials highly challenging. Concern about the longer term economic and geostrategic risks of turning away from Washington in favor of closer ties with Beijing — despite the Trump administration’s unpredictability — may work in Rubio’s favor on Wednesday. “We still want to work on issues where our viewpoints align,” an Asian diplomat said. “Critical minerals, energy and defense are some areas where there is hope for positive movement.” State Department cables obtained by POLITICO show the administration is leaning on ministerial participants to sign on to a nonbinding framework agreement to ensure U.S. access to critical minerals. The framework establishes standards for government and private investment in areas including mining, processing and recycling, along with price guarantees to protect producers from competitors’ unfair trade policies. The basic template of the agreement being shared with other countries mirrors language in frameworks sealed with Australia and Japan and memorandums of understanding inked with Thailand and Malaysia last year. Enthusiasm for the framework varies. The Philippine and Polish governments have both agreed to the framework text, according to cables from Manila on Jan. 22 and Warsaw on Jan. 26. Romania is interested but “proposed edits to the draft MOU framework,” a cable dated Jan. 16 said. As of Jan. 22 India was noncommittal, telling U.S. diplomats that New Delhi “could be interested in exploring a memorandum of understanding in the future.” European Union members Finland and Germany both expressed reluctance to sign on without clarity on how the framework aligns with wider EU trade policies. A cable dated Jan. 15 said Finland “prefers to observe progress in the EU-U.S. discussions before engaging in substantive bilateral critical mineral framework negotiations.” Berlin also has concerns that the initiative may reap “potential retaliation from China,” according to a cable dated Jan. 16. Trump’s threats over the past two weeks to impose 100 percent tariffs on Canada for cutting a trade deal with China and 25 percent tariffs on South Korea for allegedly slow-walking legislative approval of its U.S. trade agreement are also denting enthusiasm for the U.S. critical minerals initiative. Those levies “have introduced some uncertainty, which naturally leads countries to proceed pragmatically and keep their options open,” a second Asian diplomat said. There are also doubts whether Trump will give the initiative the long-term backing it will require for success. “There’s a sense that this could end up being a TACO too,” a Latin American diplomat said, using shorthand for Trump’s tendency to make big threats or announcements that ultimately fizzle. Analysts, too, argue it’s unlikely the administration will be able to secure any deals amid the fallout from Davos and Trump’s tariff barrages. “We’re very skeptical on the interest and aptitude and trust in trade counterparties right now,” said John Miller, an energy analyst at TD Cowen who tracks critical minerals. “A lot of trading partners are very much in a wait-and-see perspective at this point saying, ‘Where’s Trump really going to go with this?’” And more unpredictability or hostility by the Trump administration toward longtime allies could push them to pursue critical mineral sourcing arrangements that exclude Washington. “The alternative is that these other countries will go the Mark Carney route of the middle powers, cooperating among themselves quietly, not necessarily going out there and saying, ‘Hey, we’re cutting out the U.S.,’ but that these things just start to crop up,” said Jonathan Czin, a former China analyst at the CIA now at the Brookings Institution. “Which will make it more challenging and allow Beijing to play divide and conquer over the long term.” Felicia Schwartz contributed to this report.

Europe’s chemical industry has reached a breaking point. The warning lights are no longer blinking — they are blazing. Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out before our eyes. Consider the energy situation: this year European gas prices have stood at 2.9 times higher than in the United States. What began as a temporary shock is now a structural disadvantage. High energy costs are becoming Europe’s new normal, with no sign of relief. This is not sustainable for an energy-intensive sector that competes globally every day. Without effective infrastructure and targeted energy-cost relief — including direct support, tax credits and compensation for indirect costs from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) — we are effectively asking European companies and their workers to compete with their hands tied behind their backs. > Unless Europe changes course immediately, we risk watching an entire > industrial backbone, with the countless jobs it supports, slowly hollow out > before our eyes. The impact is already visible. This year, EU27 chemical production fell by a further 2.5 percent, and the sector is now operating 9.5 percent below pre-crisis capacity. These are not just numbers, they are factories scaling down, investments postponed and skilled workers leaving sites. This is what industrial decline looks like in real time. We are losing track of the number of closures and job losses across Europe, and this is accelerating at an alarming pace. And the world is not standing still. In the first eight months of 2025, EU27 chemicals exports dropped by €3.5 billion, while imports rose by €3.2 billion. The volume trends mirror this: exports are down, imports are up. Our trade surplus shrank to €25 billion, losing €6.6 billion in just one year. Meanwhile, global distortions are intensifying. Imports, especially from China, continue to increase, and new tariff policies from the United States are likely to divert even more products toward Europe, while making EU exports less competitive. Yet again, in 2025, most EU trade defense cases involved chemical products. In this challenging environment, EU trade policy needs to step up: we need fast, decisive action against unfair practices to protect European production against international trade distortions. And we need more free trade agreements to access growth market and secure input materials. “Open but not naïve” must become more than a slogan. It must shape policy. > Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in > the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported > products meet those same standards. Europe is also struggling to enforce its own rules at the borders and online. Our producers comply with the strictest safety and environmental standards in the world. Yet resource-constrained authorities cannot ensure that imported products meet those same standards. This weak enforcement undermines competitiveness and safety, while allowing products that would fail EU scrutiny to enter the single market unchecked. If Europe wants global leadership on climate, biodiversity and international chemicals management, credibility starts at home. Regulatory uncertainty adds to the pressure. The Chemical Industry Action Plan recognizes what industry has long stressed: clarity, coherence and predictability are essential for investment. Clear, harmonized rules are not a luxury — they are prerequisites for maintaining any industrial presence in Europe. This is where REACH must be seen for what it is: the world’s most comprehensive piece of legislation governing chemicals. Yet the real issues lie in implementation. We therefore call on policymakers to focus on smarter, more efficient implementation without reopening the legal text. Industry is facing too many headwinds already. Simplification can be achieved without weakening standards, but this requires a clear political choice. We call on European policymakers to restore the investment and profitability of our industry for Europe. Only then will the transition to climate neutrality, circularity, and safe and sustainable chemicals be possible, while keeping our industrial base in Europe. > Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular > future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. In this context, the ETS must urgently evolve. With enabling conditions still missing, like a market for low-carbon products, energy and carbon infrastructures, access to cost-competitive low-carbon energy sources, ETS costs risk incentivizing closures rather than investment in decarbonization. This may reduce emissions inside the EU, but it does not decarbonize European consumption because production shifts abroad. This is what is known as carbon leakage, and this is not how EU climate policy intends to reach climate neutrality. The system needs urgent repair to avoid serious consequences for Europe’s industrial fabric and strategic autonomy, with no climate benefit. These shortcomings must be addressed well before 2030, including a way to neutralize ETS costs while industry works toward decarbonization. Our industry is an enabler of the transition to a climate-neutral and circular future, but we need support for technologies that will define that future. Europe must ensure that chemical recycling, carbon capture and utilization, and bio-based feedstocks are not only invented here, but also fully scaled here. Complex permitting, fragmented rules and insufficient funding are slowing us down while other regions race ahead. Decarbonization cannot be built on imported technology — it must be built on a strong EU industrial presence. Critically, we must stimulate markets for sustainable products that come with an unavoidable ‘green premium’. If Europe wants low-carbon and circular materials, then fiscal, financial and regulatory policy recipes must support their uptake — with minimum recycled or bio-based content, new value chain mobilizing schemes and the right dose of ‘European preference’. If we create these markets but fail to ensure that European producers capture a fair share, we will simply create new opportunities for imports rather than European jobs. > If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and > beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. The Critical Chemicals Alliance offers a path forward. Its primary goal will be to tackle key issues facing the chemical sector, such as risks of closures and trade challenges, and to support modernization and investments in critical productions. It will ultimately enable the chemical industry to remain resilient in the face of geopolitical threats, reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy. But let us be honest: time is no longer on our side. Europe’s chemical industry is the foundation of countless supply chains — from clean energy to semiconductors, from health to mobility. If we allow this foundation to erode, every other strategic ambition becomes more fragile. If you weren’t already alarmed — you should be. This is a wake-up call. Not for tomorrow, for now. Energy support, enforceable rules, smart regulation, strategic trade policies and demand-driven sustainability are not optional. They are the conditions for survival. If Europe wants a strong, innovative resilient chemical industry in 2030 and beyond, the decisions must be made today. The window is closing fast. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  * The ultimate controlling entity is CEFIC- The European Chemical Industry Council  More information here.

As trilogue negotiations on the End-of-Life Vehicles Regulation (ELVR) reach their decisive phase, Europe stands at a crossroads, not just for the future of sustainable mobility, but also for the future of its industrial base and competitiveness. The debate over whether recycled plastic content in new vehicles should be 15, 20 or 25 percent is crucial as a key driver for circularity investment in Europe’s plastics and automotive value chains for the next decade and beyond. The ELVR is more than a recycled content target. It is also an important test of whether and how Europe can align its circularity and competitiveness ambitions. Circularity and competitiveness should be complementary  Europe’s plastics industry is at a cliff edge. High energy and feedstock costs, complex regulation and investment flight are eroding production capacity in Europe at an alarming rate. Industrial assets are closing and relocating. Policymakers must recognize the strategic importance of European plastics manufacturing. Plastics are and will remain an essential material that underpins key European industries, including automotive, construction, healthcare, renewables and defense. Without a competitive domestic sector, Europe’s net-zero pathway becomes slower, costlier and more import-dependent. Without urgent action to safeguard plastics manufacturing in Europe, we will continue to undermine our industrial resilience, strategic autonomy and green transition through deindustrialization. The ELVR can help turn the tide and become a cornerstone of the EU’s circular economy and a driver of industrial competitiveness. It can become a flagship regulation containing ambitious recycled content targets that can accelerate reindustrialization in line with the objectives of the Green Industrial Deal. > Policymakers must recognize the strategic importance of > European plastics manufacturing. Without a competitive domestic sector, > Europe’s net-zero pathway becomes slower, costlier and more import-dependent. Enabling circular technologies  The automotive sector recognizes that its ability to decarbonize depends on access to innovative, circular materials made in Europe. The European Commission’s original proposal to drive this increased circularity to 25 percent recycled plastic content in new vehicles within six years, with a quarter of that coming from end-of-life vehicles, is ambitious but achievable with the available technologies and right incentives. To meet these targets, Europe must recognize the essential role of chemical recycling. Mechanical recycling alone cannot deliver the quality, scale and performance required for automotive applications. Without chemical recycling, the EU risks setting targets that look good on paper but fail in practice. However, to scale up chemical recycling we must unlock billions in investment and integrate circular feedstocks into complex value chains. This requires legal clarity, and the explicit recognition that chemical recycling, alongside mechanical and bio-based routes, are eligible pathways to meet recycled content targets. These are not technical details; they will determine whether Europe builds a competitive and scalable circular plastics industry or increasingly depends on imported materials. A broader competitiveness and circularity framework is essential  While a well-designed ELVR is crucial, it cannot succeed in isolation. Europe also needs a wider industrial policy framework that restores the competitiveness of our plastics value chain and creates the conditions for increased investment in circular technologies, and recycling and sorting infrastructure. We need to tackle Europe’s high energy and feedstock costs, which are eroding our competitiveness. The EU must add polymers to the EU Emissions Trading System compensation list and reinvest revenues in circular infrastructure to reduce energy intensity and boost recycling. Europe’s recyclers and manufacturers are competing with materials produced under weaker environmental and social standards abroad. Harmonized customs controls and mandatory third-party certification for imports are essential to prevent carbon leakage and ensure a level playing field with imports, preventing unfair competition. > To accelerate circular plastics production Europe needs a true single market > for circular materials. That means removing internal market barriers, streamlining approvals for new technologies such as chemical recycling, and providing predictable incentives that reward investment in recycled and circular feedstocks. Today, fragmented national rules add unnecessary cost, complexity and delay, especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises that form the backbone of Europe’s recycling network. These issues must be addressed. Establishing a Chemicals and Plastics Trade Observatory to monitor trade flows in real time is essential. This will help ensure a level playing field, enabling EU industry and officials to respond promptly with trade defense measures when necessary. We need policies that enable transformation rather than outsource it, and these must be implemented as a matter of urgency if we are to scale up recycling and circular innovations and investments.  A defining moment for Europe’s competitiveness and circular economy > Circularity and competitiveness should not be in conflict; together, they will > allow us to keep plastics manufacturing in Europe, and safeguard the jobs, > know-how, innovation hubs and materials essential for the EU’s climate > neutrality transition and strategic autonomy. The ELVR is not just another piece of environmental legislation. It is a test of Europe’s ability to turn its green vision into industrial reality. It means that the trilogue negotiators now face a defining choice: design a regulation that simply manages waste or one that unleashes Europe’s industrial renewal. These decisions will shape Europe’s place in the global economy and can provide a positive template for reconciling our climate and competitiveness ambitions. These decisions will echo far beyond the automotive sector. Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Plastics Europe AISBL * The advertisement is linked to policy advocacy on the EU End-of-Life Vehicles Regulation (ELVR), circular plastics, chemical recycling, and industrial competitiveness in Europe. More information here.

BRUSSELS — In the midst of a geopolitical storm, Brussels is racing to put together a new plan by the end of this year to diversify European supply of so-called critical raw materials — such as lithium and copper — away from China.  The thing is: We’ve been here before. So far, the European Commission has provided few details on its new plan, beyond that it would touch upon joint purchasing, stockpiling, recycling of resources and new partnerships. It already addressed those measures two years ago in its first initiative on the issue, the Critical Raw Materials Act.  Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen has been forced to act by Beijing’s expansion and tightening of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals this month, as trade tensions with Washington escalated. Europe was caught in the crossfire — China accounts for 99 percent of the EU’s supply of the 17 rare earths, and 98 percent of its rare earth permanent magnets. The new “RESourceEU” plan is expected to follow a similar model to the REPowerEU plan, under which the Commission in 2022 proposed investing €225 billion to diversify energy supply routes after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  That has European industry daring to hope that Brussels will do more than just recycle an old initiative and address the main obstacles to diversifying the bloc’s supply chains of minerals it needs for everything from renewable energy to defense applications. The biggest of them all? A lack of cash to back new mining, processing and manufacturing initiatives, both within and outside the EU. “It’s all still very much in its infancy,” said Florian Anderhuber, deputy director general of lobby group Euromines. “We hope that there will be a bigger push that goes beyond the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act,” he added. “It doesn’t help anyone if this is just a label for things that are already in the pipeline.” CODEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP The EU should not count on any trade reprieve that may result from U.S. President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday. After all, Beijing has shown time and again that it has no reservations about weaponizing economic dependencies. The key question is whether, this time around, pressure will remain high enough for the EU to mobilize brainpower and assets at the kind of scale it did when it sought to break the bloc’s decades-old reliance on Russian oil and gas. “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. “We learned this lesson painfully with energy; we will not repeat it with critical materials. So it is time to speed up and take the action that is needed.” “Europe cannot do things the same way anymore,” von der Leyen said as she announced the initiative last weekend. | Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images In the here and now, the EU wants to persuade a visiting Chinese delegation at talks in Brussels on Friday to speed up export approvals for its top raw materials importers. In parallel, energy and environment ministers from the G7 group of industrialized nations are slated to wargame how to de-risk their mineral supply chains in Toronto, Canada, on Thursday and Friday. MONEY, MONEY, MONEY When the Commission unveiled its first grand plan to break over-reliance on China in 2023 — the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) — industry leaders and analysts mostly lamented one thing: a lack of funding on the table.  “Money has been a real bottleneck for Europe’s raw materials agenda,” said Tobias Gehrke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Mining, processing, recycling, and stockpiling all need serious financing.” If the EU fails to free up more resources, experts warn that it is bound to fall short of the goal set in the CRMA, of extracting at least 10 percent of its annual consumption of select minerals by the end of the decade, with no more than 65 percent of some raw materials coming from a single country. It’s a steep target — especially for rare earths, where Beijing has over decades built up a de facto monopoly. While the EU executive has selected strategic projects both within and outside the EU that should benefit from faster permitting than their usual lead times of 10 to 15 years to production, those efforts are yet to bear fruit. “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report, calling for a “permanent European Minerals Investment Network.”  “To finance such projects, the next EU budget must provide substantial, dedicated [Critical Raw Material] funding, and financial institutions must deploy innovative de-risking and financing tools,” the European Initiative for Energy Security argues in a new report. | Aris Oikonomou/AFP via Getty Images The REPowerEU plan — a package of documents, including legal acts, recommendations, guidelines and strategies — was mostly financed by loans left over from the bloc’s pandemic recovery program. Similarly, RESourceEU must become “resource strategy backed by real funding,” said Hildegard Bentele, a member of the European Parliament who’s been working on critical minerals for years.  “This requires a European Raw Materials Fund, modelled on successful instruments in several Member States, to support strategic projects across the entire value chain, from extraction to recycling,” the German Christian Democrat said. THAT’LL COST YOU It’s about more than just throwing money at the problem: The Commission’s haste in rolling out its plan is raising doubts that it will meet the needs of a highly complex market — along with concerns that environmental safeguards will be neglected. “As long as European industries can buy cheaper materials from China, other producers do not stand a chance,” warned Gehrke.  In Toronto, G7 ministers will launch a new Critical Minerals Production Alliance (CMPA), a Canadian-led initiative that seeks to secure “transparent, democratic, and environmentally responsible critical minerals,” and also to counter market manipulation of supply chains, said a senior Canadian government official.  This would suggest creating so-called standards-based markets that are ring-fenced to protect critical minerals produced responsibly, to agreed environmental and social standards. A price floor would be set within that market, while minerals produced elsewhere — at lower prices but also lower standards — would face a tariff.  Beyond the immediate funding issues, ramping up mining in the EU and its neighbourhood also comes at a high societal cost. With local resistance to new mines, usually linked to environmental and social concerns, being one of the key obstacles to new projects, investors are often hesitant to pour money into a project that risks being derailed shortly after. “The EU is choosing geopolitical expediency over human rights and ecological integrity, sacrificing frontline communities for a strategy that is neither sustainable nor just, instead of building a durable and values-based autonomy that invests in systemic circularity and rights-based partnerships,” said Diego Marin, a senior policy officer for raw materials and resource justice at the European Environmental Bureau, an NGO.  Jakob Weizman and Camille Gijs contributed reporting from Brussels. Zi-Ann Lum contributed reporting from Toronto, Canada.

LIVERPOOL, England — U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Tuesday that he will “fight with every breath” he has to win back voters lured by the “snake oil” of the left and right — and laid out an appeal promising renewal to benefit the working class. His speech on the penultimate day of Labour’s party conference in Liverpool was littered with references to Nigel Farage, whose Reform UK is leading in polls, but Starmer aimed at the extremes on both sides, including those within his own party calling for a wealth tax. The prime minister said that he wanted “no more lectures” from “self-appointed” working-class champions, arguing that growth — and taking long difficult decisions that will “not be cost free” or “comfortable” for Labour members or MPs — is the solution for what ails Britain today. He said that Britain had failed to rebuild following the global financial crisis more than a decade ago, and had stuck with failed policies on globalization, mass immigration, and declining industry and training, creating a country where voters are now seduced by a “tempting path” of so-called easy answers. But to those who have nothing positive to say about the U.K.’s future, Starmer offered a kaleidoscope of positive images. “We will fight you with everything we have because you are the enemy of national renewal,” he said, picking out audience members who have delivered for their communities through recycling school uniforms or scrubbing graffiti from “all the way from the South Downs to the Shetland Islands,” before asking, over and over: “Is that broken, Britain?” MOVING ON FROM LABOUR’S PAST In a speech littered with stories of meeting voters including shipbuilders on the River Clyde in Scotland, childcare workers in Nuneaton and a woman worried about immigration in Oldham, Starmer attempted to align his personal story “from a working-class background to this” with the experience of voters across the U.K. “I owe everything to this country and its values,” he said. Nigel Farage, in a live-streamed statement on X following Keir Starmer’s speech, responded that the prime minister and the party’s conference had “descended into the gutter.” | Leon Neal/Getty Images He went on to recount that his father did not feel respected because he worked with his hands as a working class toolmaker, and that when Starmer went to university he felt put on a pedestal — but then went on to proclaim that Tony Blair’s target to send 50 percent of children to university is no longer “right for our times,” and pledged to replace it with a target of two-thirds for universities and apprenticeships. On immigration, he said his party had become a “party that patronized working people” for having concerns about immigration. He added that there was a clear line between British values of patriotism and free speech separating the “thuggery” of those inciting racist violence. FARAGE CLAIMS ‘ABUSE’ Farage, in a live-streamed statement on X following Starmer’s speech, responded that the prime minister and the party’s conference had “descended into the gutter.” He claimed Starmer’s attack on Reform policies as “racist” suggested that the prime minister thought anyone who supports Reform was also a racist. “I don’t normally worry about abuse being thrown at me,” Farage said, claiming that “this language will incite and encourage the radical left — I’m thinking of Antifa” and “directly threatens the safety of our elected officials and our campaigners.” He invoked the recent killing of Charlie Kirk in the U.S. as evidence of the potential for political violence, and added that he now thinks Starmer is “unfit to be prime minister.”

GENEVA — When yet another round of global plastic treaty talks fell apart in Switzerland last month, many negotiators and civil society groups were plunged into despair. “We’ve just wasted money, wasted time,” said Heni Unwin, a Māori marine scientist with the Aotearoa Plastic Pollution Alliance, just after talks to halt the environmental crisis collapsed. “We are the ones who get impacted with all of the trash left by all of the world [that] turns up on our shores.” But through the gloom of yet another failed summit, some saw a glimmer of hope emanating from an unlikely source: China. In its closing speech, the Asian superpower and world’s biggest plastic producer subtly changed its language on tackling the plastic crisis, admitting the problem has to do with the entire life cycle of plastic and thus raising hopes of a breakthrough at a next round of talks. It comes as Beijing moves to fill a vacuum left by the United States’ withdrawal from global engagement under President Donald Trump and his “America First” agenda. “They don’t go back when they make shifts like this,” said Dennis Clare, a legal adviser for Micronesia with nearly 20 years of experience in U.N. environment treaty negotiations, referring to China. He added that the country “has a lot of gravity, so things start to blow the way they flow.” The stakes are high. The plastics industry currently accounts for 3.4 percent of the world’s total greenhouse gas emissions — that’s more than aviation — and plastic production is on track to almost triple by 2060. Plastic waste is flowing into the world’s oceans at a rate of around 10 million metric tons per year, and increasing. In its efforts to tackle the problem, the United Nations has now hosted six rounds of talks since 2022. The European Union has been among those pushing for an ambitious treaty that puts limits on plastic production — while oil-producing countries, which see plastic as among the remaining growing markets for fossil fuels, have bitterly opposed any such measures. THE CHINESE WILD CARD Countries in the self-named High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution — which backs a “comprehensive” approach addressing the full lifecycle of plastic — have long targeted China as a powerful potential ally. They face strong resistance from major oil-producing countries including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran — and, most recently, the U.S. under the Trump administration’s “drill, baby, drill” ethos (oil is the main raw material from which plastic is made). While China is the world’s top consumer and producer of plastic, the country has also ushered in several restrictions on the production, sale and consumption of single-use plastics in a bid to stem a national pollution crisis. This has made it more aligned with high-ambition countries than some other major plastic producers. The Asian superpower and world’s biggest plastic producer subtly changed its language on tackling the plastic crisis. | Adek Berry/Getty Images Observers also see the country looking to expand its global influence via the U.N. — especially in the wake of the U.S. retreat from multilateralism. “We should firmly safeguard the status and authority of the U.N., and ensure its irreplaceable, key role in global governance,” President Xi Jinping said in a speech at a meeting of Asian leaders near Beijing on Sept. 1, attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. “My sense is that, of course, they’re also seeing that space opening, generally around environment,” said David Azoulay of the Center for International Environmental Law. “And the U.S. retreating creates a vacuum that China will probably want to fill in their own way.” That could work out well for high-ambition countries. China is an “important partner for the EU” in the talks, European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall told POLITICO during the Geneva negotiations. “Our strategy since Busan has always been to break China away from Saudi [Arabia] and the U.S.,” said one negotiator from a country within the High Ambition Coalition, granted anonymity to discuss closed-door talks. With China on board, they added, the assumption is that other major players including Russia and India, as well as Southeast Asian countries, will “become more comfortable” with a comprehensive plastic treaty. Several delegates and observers noted more openness from China on several measures in Geneva, including those aimed at phasing out problematic plastic products — culminating in a public statement that many see as a seemingly subtle yet seismic shift. “Plastic pollution is far more complex than we expected,” said Chinese representative Haijun Chen at the closing plenary session. “It runs through the entire chain of production, consumption and recycling and waste management, as well as relates to the transition of development models of over 190 U.N. countries.” China’s assertion that plastic pollution stems from the full lifecycle of plastic — and is not solely a waste management issue, as claimed by the likes of Saudi Arabia and Iran — reflects a “break” from other, more reluctant plastic-producing countries, said the high-ambition negotiator. It follows a compromise made among some key delegations “hours before that plenary statement.” “The question for us now is how to protect that understanding that was made that last night into a new meeting,” they added. ISOLATE AND ATTACK The broad contours of a compromise could include moving away from attempting to enforce a percentage reduction on plastic production — a red line for several countries, including China — and instead looking at other measures tackling the full plastic lifecycle, like global restrictions on certain kinds of “problematic” products. That’s the gist of a draft treaty text released on the final day of plastic treaty talks last month — which garnered support from many high-ambition countries, but was knocked down by oil and plastic producers. Some countries are “trying to block us from working on that text right now,” complained Danish Environment Minister Magnus Heunicke in a closing press conference. That could work out well for high-ambition countries. China is an “important partner for the EU” in the talks, European Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall said. | Dursun Aydemir/Getty Images Countries are insisting on “unrealistic elements,” countered Iran’s Massoud Rezvanian Rahaghi at the closing plenary, and employing “unfair and restricting tactics to exclude a large number of parties in very undemocratic ways.” The hope, the anonymous high-ambition negotiator said, is that China’s shifting position will help to “isolate” the ringleaders of the oil producers’ group — namely the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. “Hopefully you will see some of the countries in their group also isolate or move away from them. Like Egypt potentially, maybe others in North Africa,” they added. IF ALL ELSE FAILS But the talks cannot continue indefinitely. The patience of smaller, poorer countries — increasingly resentful of having to pile resources into fruitless talks — is wearing thin, and financial support for the talks coming from countries that have been supporting the negotiations has a limit. While China’s shift and some elements of the most recent draft text encouraged some governments, there’s no guarantee the talks won’t collapse again. At least one country that has been financially supporting the negotiations is looking into how the treaty talks have been run, checking for evidence of a “mismanaged process,” said the high-ambition negotiator, though they were not able to name the country. That could result in requests for changes to the process in hopes of moving forward more efficiently at a next round of meetings, the date for which has not yet been set. Should the deadlock continue, though, there’s also the possibility of taking the process outside the current framework, explained Clare, the Micronesia adviser. That could entail countries adding a specific plastic treaty protocol to other existing and adjacent agreements, like the Basel Convention — designed to control the movements of hazardous waste between nations — or the Rotterdam Convention, another global treaty aimed at managing hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade. “The value of the process is that we all know where countries stand, so it wouldn’t take long to consummate an agreement among those who have similar positions,” said Clare. “The question would be, to what extent does that agreement have the scope to turn the tables on this problem?”

The leaders of France and Germany issued a joint call Friday for cuts to EU water pollution and chemical safety rules, in a bid to help European industry.   In a joint statement adopted at the 25th Franco-German Council of Ministers in Toulon, France, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz backed calls for a revision of REACH — the EU’s chemical legal framework — that’s focused on “reducing burdens” by “streamlining procedures.”  It comes months before the European Commission is due to present its long-delayed revision of REACH. The EU executive has signaled that the revision’s primary aim would be to simplify rules and speed up procedures for industry — to the dismay of civil society groups.  The two governments also pushed for an easing of financial constraints for Europe’s struggling chemicals industry. Merz and Macron pushed for an easing of recently-revised urban wastewater rules, which require cosmetics and pharmaceuticals companies to bear the bulk of the costs of cleaning up micropollutants in urban wastewater from the end of 2028. The Commission has already committed to producing an updated study on impacts of the extended producer responsibility scheme, following strong industry pushback.   The statement from the EU’s two biggest economies sends a strong message to Brussels to push ahead with its drive to cut red tape. “To unleash our companies’ full potential of growth and productivity it is … urgent to substantially ease the complexity and simplify the European Union’s regulatory environment,” the document states.  MATERIALS RECYCLING FOCUS  The two leaders repeated calls for better rules to facilitate the recycling and reuse of critical raw materials (CRM), as EU countries scramble to reduce dependency on Chinese minerals essential in defense and the energy transition.   Paris and Berlin committed to “work together on the design of the CRM aspects of the Circular Economy Act and coordinate their efforts” in the hope of “reaping the benefits” of the policy proposal, the draft reads.   The Circular Economy Act is expected in 2026 and aims to facilitate the transfer of materials waste between EU countries to boost recycling and reuse across European industries.   Back in 2023, the two EU countries had already pledged further cooperation on critical raw materials alongside Italy, including by setting up working groups for new extraction, processing and recycling projects.   Giorgio Leali contributed reporting.

Policymakers are overlooking a $370 billion market that will determine whether climate goals succeed or fail.  In the grand narrative of the clean energy transition, materials like lithium, rare earths and silicon dominate headlines. Yet the most strategically important materials for this transition may be hiding in plain sight, dismissed by policymakers as environmental villains rather than recognized as the enablers of human progress they truly are. The $370 billion blind spot Polyolefins — the family of materials that includes polyethylene and polypropylene — represent perhaps the greatest strategic oversight in contemporary clean industry policy Here is a reality check. Polyolefins represent a global market approaching $370 billion, growing at over 5 percent annually.1,2 They make up nearly half of all plastics consumed in Europe.3 By 2034, global production is expected to hit 371 million tons.4  Yet in the European Union’s Clean Industrial Deal — a €100 billion strategy for industrial competitiveness — polyolefins receive barely a mention.4 This represents a profound strategic miscalculation. While policymakers focus on securing access to exotic critical materials like lithium and cobalt, they overlook the fact that polyolefins are already critical materials— they simply happen to be abundant rather than scarce. In the infrastructure-intensive clean energy transition ahead, abundance is not a weakness; it is the ultimate strategic advantage. > While policymakers focus on securing access to exotic critical materials like > lithium and cobalt, they overlook the fact that polyolefins are already > critical materials. The EU’s REPowerEU plan calls for 1,236 GW of renewable capacity by 2030 — more than double today’s levels.4 Every offshore wind farm, solar array and electric grid connection depends on polyolefins. They insulate cables, protect components and form structural parts of turbines and solar panels. Every solar panel relies on polyolefin elastomers to protect its inner workings for up to 30 years, even in harsh weather.8 And every grid connection depends on polyethylene-insulated cables to carry electricity efficiently across long distances. 7 Multiply these requirements across thousands of installations, and the strategic importance of polyolefins becomes undeniable. Yet, currently, the policy framework treats these materials as afterthoughts, focusing instead on the relatively small quantities of rare elements in generators and inverters while ignoring the massive volumes of polyolefins that make the entire system possible. Beyond energy: the hidden dependencies The strategic importance of polyolefins extends far beyond energy infrastructure. As one example, modern medical systems depend fundamentally on polyolefin materials for syringes, IV bags, tubing and protective equipment. Global food security increasingly depends on polyolefin-based packaging systems that extend shelf life, reduce waste and enable distribution networks — feeding billions of people. Meanwhile, water infrastructure relies on polyethylene pipes engineered for 100-year lifespans. These applications are rarely considered alongside energy priorities — a dangerous fragmentation of strategic thinking. The waste challenge and a circular solution Let’s be clear, plastic waste is a real environmental challenge demanding urgent action. However, the solution is not abandoning these essential materials, it is building the infrastructure to capture their full value in circular systems. The fundamental error in current approaches is treating waste as a material problem rather than a systems problem. Europe currently captures only 23 percent of polyolefin waste for recycling, despite these materials representing nearly two-thirds of all post-consumer plastic waste.3 That’s not because the material can’t be recycled. The infrastructure to do so isn’t at the scale needed to collect, sort and recycle waste to meet future circular feedstock needs. Polyolefins are among the most recyclable materials we have. They can be mechanically recycled multiple times. And with chemical recycling, they can even be broken down to their molecular building blocks and rebuilt into virgin-quality material. That’s not just circularity, it’s circularity at scale. This matters because the EU’s target of 24 percent material circularity by 20305 is unlikely to be met without polyolefins. However, current frameworks treat them as obstacles rather than enablers of circularity. The economic transformation The transition represents an economic transformation, creating competitive advantages for regions implementing it effectively. A region processing 100,000 tons of polyolefin waste annually could capture €100-130 million in additional economic value while creating up to 1,000 jobs.6 > A region processing 100,000 tons of polyolefin waste annually could capture > €100-130 million in additional economic value while creating up to 1,000 jobs. At the end of the day, the clean energy transition must be affordable. Polyolefins help make that possible. They’re cheaper, lighter and longer lasting than many alternatives. Manufacturers with access to cost-effective recycled feedstocks can reduce input costs by 20-40 percent compared with virgin materials. Polyethylene pipes cost 60-70 percent less than steel alternatives while lasting twice as long.9 These aren’t marginal gains. They’re system-level efficiencies that make the difference between success and failure at scale. The strategic choice The real challenge isn’t technical, it’s institutional. Polyolefins sit at the crossroads of materials, environmental and industrial policy, yet these areas are treated as separate domains. There’s also a geopolitical angle. Unlike lithium or rare earths, polyolefins can be produced from diverse feedstocks — natural gas, biomass and even captured CO2 — enabling domestic production and supply chain resilience. This flexibility is a major asset, but current policies largely overlook it. > The path forward requires recognizing polyolefins as strategic assets rather > than environmental problems. The path forward requires recognizing polyolefins as strategic assets rather than environmental problems. This means including them in critical materials assessments — not because they are scarce, but because they are essential. It means coordinating research and development efforts rather than leaving them to fragmented market forces. Most importantly, it means recognizing that the clean energy transition will succeed or fail based on our ability to build infrastructure at unprecedented scale and speed. And that infrastructure will be built primarily from materials that combine performance, abundance, sustainability and cost-effectiveness in ways only polyolefins can provide. The choice facing policymakers is clear: continue treating polyolefins as problems to be managed or recognize them as strategic assets enabling the clean energy future. The regions that understand this integration first will shape the global economy for decades to come. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Grand View Research. (2024). Polyolefin Market Size, Share, Growth | Industry Report, 2030. Retrieved from https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/polyolefin-market 2. Fortune Business Insights. (2024). Polyolefin Market Size, Share & Growth | Global Report [2032]. Retrieved from https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/polyolefin-market-102373 3. Plastics Europe. (2025). Polyolefins. Retrieved from https://plasticseurope.org/plastics-explained/a-large-family/polyolefins-2/ 4. European Commission. (2025). Clean Industrial Deal. Retrieved from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en 5. European Commission. (2022). Circular economy action plan. Retrieved from https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en 6. Watkins, E., & Schweitzer, J.P. (2018). Moving towards a circular economy for plastics in the EU by 2030. Institute for European Environmental Policy. Retrieved from https://ieep.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Think-2030-A-circular-economy-for-plastics-by-2030-1. 7. Institute of Sustainable Studies (2025). EU Circular Economy Act aims to double circularity rate by 2030 EU Circular Economy Act – Institute of Sustainability Studies 8. López-Escalante, M.C., et al. (2016). Polyolefin as PID-resistant encapsulant material in PV modules. Solar Energy Materials and Solar Cells, 144, 691-699. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927024815005206 9. PE100+ Association. (2014). Polyolefin Sewer Pipes – 100 Year Lifetime Expectancy. Retrieved from https://www.pe100plus.com/PPCA/Polyolefin-Sewer-Pipes-100-Year-Lifetime-Expectancy-p1430.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BERLIN — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said Tuesday that their countries would enhance collaboration on defense and critical minerals. “We are deepening our bilateral cooperation, and we are doing so with great gratitude and deep conviction,” Merz said during a joint press conference with Carney in Berlin. “Canada and Germany have a great deal in common.” The further cooperation comes as U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs hit both countries hard, while they also aim to shift their industries away from reliance on Russia and China. The countries’ economy ministers, looking toward that purpose, were set to sign an agreement on critical minerals, which was seen by POLITICO. The accord will focus on the development of lithium, rare earth elements, copper tungsten, gallium, germanium and nickel to counter China’s monopolistic control of materials needed to power everything from military equipment and electric vehicles to quantum computing. “One of the big vulnerabilities that’s been exposed by the Ukraine war, it was exposed by Covid, it’s been exposed by the changing global trade dynamics, [is] our vulnerabilities in supply chains including in critical metals and minerals,” said Carney. “Canada can play a role in accelerating that diversification for Germany and for Europe.” Just like Brussels, Berlin is keen to slash its dependence on China for the so-called critical minerals needed to power the bloc’s green, digital and defense ambitions. Ottawa is an attractive partner to achieve that — Canada has some 200 mines extracting a variety of minerals and metals, many of which are classified as critical raw materials. A number of Canadian Cabinet members, including Defense Minister David McGuinty, Industry Minister Mélanie Joly and Energy Minister Tim Hodgson traveled alongside Carney to Berlin. Carney announced he would visit Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems in the northern German city of Kiel later Tuesday, alongside Joly and McGuinty, while Hodgson was set to deliver a major speech to CEOs from the energy, manufacturing and defense industries. “We’re in the process of renewing our submarine fleet,” Carney said, adding that Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems was one of the two finalists to take on the project. Carney and Merz also said they discussed security guarantees for Ukraine, but did not provide concrete details. Camille Gijs contributed to this report from Brussels.

ATHENS — The European Union is investigating potential misuse of at least €11.9 million of EU funds in a recycling project in Greece, as the country’s notorious struggle to meet Brussels’ waste management standards shows no sign of ending. The probe follows EU-commissioned reports by Greek auditors that found irregularities with how much the project cost and how it’s run.   One of the reports, seen by POLITICO, found several problems with the way the recycling centers operate, including a total lack of controls over what happens to the waste that is collected. The EU investigation, led by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, comes on the back of Greece’s long-standing issues with implementing EU laws on waste management, which have resulted in massive fines imposed on the Mediterranean country. The project in question is a set of “recycling units” or kiosks built by Greek recycling company TEXAN and spread out across the Attica, Peloponnese and Crete regions. Locals can get money back for recycling plastic, metal and glass items in these kiosks that aren’t packaging. “There is no information from [Attica waste management body] EDSNA on what happens to the waste after their collection, except for a report on its placement in a TEXAN storage facility for the year 2023,” the report seen by POLITICO reads, adding that not all storage units have been installed. EPPO’s investigation is based on the findings of the audit committee’s reports, among other documents, according to an official familiar with the case. The €220 million project was co-financed by the EU via a European Operational Program.   In 2023, the financial audit committee had slapped a €2.9 million refund penalty on EDSNA after finding “serious irregularities” with the purchasing contract awarded to TEXAN. The company had won the tender for the project despite suggesting that the kiosks would be around five times more expensive than what it could cost based on market prices.  Greece is also on track to fail on its obligation to recycle 55 percent of municipal waste and 65 percent of packaging waste this year. | Orestis Panagiotou/EPA “It cannot be confirmed whether EDSNA investigated what a reasonable budget for the recycling centers would be, given that the market research it conducted and referred to, did not concern at least two independent [companies], but two [companies] with a common interest and an exclusive relationship, which then, of course, submitted the only bid in the tender in question and won the contract,” a separate report said, according to local media reports at the time.  Following the second audit, completed in July and first revealed by Greece’s newspaper Kathimerini, a second €3 million fine was imposed, half the amount of EU funds used for the recycling centers in the three regions, as the report notes.  BAD STUDENTS  Greece’s poor track record with recycling and respecting EU laws on waste is notorious.   According to 2022 data from the European statistical office Eurostat, the municipal waste recycling rate in Greece hovered around 17 percent, compared to the EU average of 49 percent.  Greece is also on track to fail on its obligation to recycle 55 percent of municipal waste and 65 percent of packaging waste this year, the European Commission found in its 2025 environmental implementation review. The country had already “missed the 2020 target to recycle 50 percent of its municipal waste by a great margin” the review says.   In the EU, Greece is one of five members paying fines for not complying with environmental policies. To date, the country has sent about €230 million to Brussels to make up for these violations, according to the review.   Out of the 19 open infringement cases against Greece on environmental matters, six are related to waste management, from illegal landfilling to not properly applying laws on packaging waste. Local NGOs, meanwhile, have repeatedly warned of systemic disorders in the sector.