Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Der EU-Handelsausschuss hat für den Zolldeal mit den USA gestimmt, doch das Tauziehen ist noch nicht vorbei: Zwei Abgeordnete kämpfen als Delegation aus Brüssel in Washington um letzte Garantien. Joana Lehner und Jürgen Klöckner sprechen über das Finale und beleuchten zusammen mit einem US-Kollegen, ob Donald Trump den Deal als politischen Sieg im Inland verkaufen kann oder ob die deutsche Industrie weiterhin Milliarden an Zöllen verliert. Im Policy Talk begrüßen die beiden VDA-Präsidentin Hildegard Müller. Sie spricht über das „weinende und lachende Auge“ der Branche, die aktuelle Milliardenbelastung durch US-Zölle und die schwindende Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Standorts Deutschland. Müller warnt: Wenn Europa wirtschaftlich schwach wird, verliert es im Spiel der Großmächte an Relevanz. In Berlin tobt derweil ein Ökonomen-Streit: Neue Studien vom ifo-Institut und dem IW Köln werfen der Regierung vor, große Teile des bisher eingesetzten Sondervermögens für Haushaltslöcher statt für neue Investitionen zu nutzen. Rasmus Buchsteiner berichtet Off the Record über das anfängliche Kommunikationsdebakel im Finanzministerium und die Frage, warum die versprochenen Bagger in den Kommunen noch immer nicht rollen. „Power & Policy“ zeigt jede Woche, wo und wie die Entscheidungen in der Wirtschaftspolitik fallen. ⁠Jürgen Klöckner⁠ und ⁠Joana Lehner⁠ von POLITICO sprechen mit Top-Entscheidern und liefern Off-the-Record-Einblicke aus der Redaktion und Machtzentren. Präzise Analysen, lange bevor Gesetze beschlossen sind. Der Podcast für alle in Wirtschaft und Politik, die einen Wissensvorsprung brauchen — immer donnerstags. Für Policy-Profis: Abonnieren und die Pro-Newsletter ⁠Industrie & Handel⁠, ⁠Energie & Klima ⁠und ⁠Gesundheit⁠. Jetzt kostenlos testen. Fragen und Feedback gern an ⁠powerandpolicy@politico.eu⁠ POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 ⁠information@axelspringer.de⁠ Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

The 21st century is more likely to belong to Beijing than to Washington — at least that’s the view from four key U.S. allies. Swaths of the public in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. have soured on the U.S., driven by President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions, according to recent results from The POLITICO Poll. Respondents in these countries increasingly see China as a more dependable partner than the U.S. and believe the Asian economic colossus is leading on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence. Critically, Europeans surveyed see it as possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. but harder to reduce reliance on China — suggesting newfound entanglements that could drastically tip the balance of global power away from the West. Here are five key takeaways from the poll highlighting the pivot from the U.S. to China. The POLITICO Poll — in partnership with U.K. polling firm Public First — found that respondents in those four allied countries believe it is better to depend on China than the U.S. following Trump’s turbulent return to office. That appears to be driven by Trump’s disruption, not by a newfound stability in China: In a follow-up question, a majority of respondents in both Canada and Germany agreed that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has become harder to depend on — not because China itself has become a more reliable partner. Many respondents in France (38 percent) and the U.K. (42 percent) also shared that sentiment. Under Trump’s “America First” ethos, Washington has upended the “rules-based international order” of the past with sharp-elbowed policies that have isolated the U.S. on the global stage. This includes slow-walking aid to Ukraine, threatening NATO allies with economic punishment and withdrawing from major international institutions, including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Human Rights Council. His punitive liberation day tariffs, as well as threats to annex Greenland and make Canada “the 51st state,” have only further strained relationships with top allies. Beijing has seized the moment to cultivate better business ties with European countries looking for an alternative to high U.S. tariffs on their exports. Last October, Beijing hosted a forum aimed at shoring up mutual investments with Europe. More recently, senior Chinese officials described EU-China ties as a partnership rather than a rivalry. “The administration has assisted the Chinese narrative by acting like a bully,” Mark Lambert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for China and Taiwan in the Biden administration, told POLITICO. “Everyone still recognizes the challenges China poses — but now, Washington no longer works in partnership and is only focused on itself.” These sentiments are already being translated into action. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a “rupture” between Ottawa and Washington in January and backed that rhetoric by sealing a trade deal with Beijing that same month. The U.K. inked several high-value export deals with China not long after, while both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have returned from recent summits in Beijing with Chinese purchase orders for European products. Respondents across all four allied countries are broadly supportive of efforts to create some distance from the U.S. — and say they’re also more dependent on China. In Canada, 48 percent said it would be possible to reduce reliance on the U.S. and believe their government should do so. In the U.K., 42 percent said reducing reliance on the U.S. sounded good in theory, but were skeptical it could happen in practice. By contrast, fewer respondents across those countries believe it would actually be possible to reduce reliance on China — a testament to Beijing’s dominance of global supply chains. Young adults may be drawn to China as an alternative to U.S. cultural hegemony. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were significantly more supportive than their older peers of building a closer relationship with China. A recent study commissioned by the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — a Beijing-based think tank — suggests most young Europeans get their information about China and Chinese life through social media. Nearly 70 percent of those aged 18 to 25 said they rely on social media and other short-form video platforms for information on China. And the media they consume is likely overwhelmingly supportive of China, as TikTok, one of the most popular social media platforms in the world, was built by Chinese company ByteDance and has previously been accused of suppressing content deemed negative toward China. According to Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, younger generations believe the U.S. has led efforts to depict China as an authoritarian regime and a threat to democracy, while simultaneously degrading its own democratic values. The trend “pushes a narrative that ‘we’ve been lied to’ about what China is,” said Bachulska, as “social sentiment among the youth turns against the U.S.” “It’s an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. politics,” she added. There’s a clear consensus among those surveyed in Europe and Canada that China is winning the global tech race — a coveted title central to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s grand policy vision. China is leading the U.S. and other Western nations in the development of electric batteries and robotics, while Chinese designs have also become the global standard in electric vehicles and solar panels. “There has been a real vibe shift in global perception of Chinese tech and innovation dominance,” said Sarah Beran, who served as deputy chief of mission in the U.S. embassy in Beijing during the Biden administration. This digital rat race is most apparent in the fast-paced development of artificial intelligence. China has poured billions of dollars into research initiatives, poaching top tech talent from U.S. universities and funding state-backed tech firms to advance its interests in AI. The investment appears to be paying off — a plurality of respondents from Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is more likely to develop the first superintelligent AI. But these advancements have done little to change American minds. A majority of respondents in the U.S. still see American-made tech as superior to Chinese tech, even in the realm of AI. As Washington and its allies grow more estranged, the perception of the U.S. as the dominant world power is in retreat — though most Americans don’t see it that way. About half of all respondents in Canada, Germany, France and the U.K. believe that China is rapidly becoming a more consequential superpower. This is particularly true among those who say the U.S. is no longer a positive force for the world. By contrast, 63 percent of respondents in the U.S. believe their nation will maintain its dominance in 10 years — reflecting major disparities in beliefs about global power dynamics between the U.S. and its European allies. This view of China as the world’s power center may not have been entirely organic. The U.S. has accused Beijing of pouring billions of dollars into international information manipulation efforts, including state-backed media initiatives and the deployment of tools to stifle online criticism of China and its policies. Some fear that a misplaced belief among U.S. allies in the inevitability of China surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower could be helping accelerate Beijing’s rise. “Europe is capable of defending itself against threats from China and contesting China’s vision of a more Sinocentric, authoritarian-friendly world order,” said Henrietta Levin, former National Security Council director for China in the Biden administration. “But if Europe believes this is impossible and does not try to do so, the survey results may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” METHOLODGY The POLITICO Poll was conducted from Feb. 6 to Feb. 9, surveying 10,289 adults online, with at least 2,000 respondents each from the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and Germany. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography, and have an overall margin of sampling error of ±2 percentage points for each country. Smaller subgroups have higher margins of error.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war is putting Volkswagen’s globalization strategy — and profits — at risk. The danger was highlighted Tuesday when the German carmaker released its 2025 results, showing a sharp 53.5 percent drop in operating profit to €8.9 billion. CEO Oliver Blume blamed the firm’s worst result in a decade on the Trump tariffs, stiff competition in China, and a strategy reversal at luxury subsidiary Porsche. VW spent decades building a global supply chain, but the new era unleashed by Trump’s trade wars and the rapid decline of the carmaker’s Chinese market are calling that strategy into question. One example of how the old approach no longer works is the carmaker’s extensive production in Mexico, where costs are lower and a free trade agreement gave it access to the United States. Trump’s 27.5 percent tariffs on all goods from Mexico have now blocked that pipeline. “We have a strong localized footprint in Mexico. It’s no longer worthwhile to export them from Mexico into the U.S.,” Blume said in a call with media. Another setback is Porsche. The luxury cars are all made in Europe, exposing them to the full force of U.S. tarrifs. Volkswagen now expects revenue for this year to stay flat or grow by a mere 3 percent. “We are operating in a fundamentally different environment,” Blume said. The stagnating growth means Germany’s flagship automaker will continue to cut costs and jobs, including the politically fraught task of shuttering factories at home. The carmaker also has to battle to protect its key European market from Chinese encroachment. With the U.S. effectively blocking Chinese cars thanks to steep tariffs and a ban on connected cars, Beijing’s carmakers are on the hunt for new customers — and have set their sights on Europe. “We will need to do more because our costs are still too high in Europe, and we have to pitch ourselves against our competitors in Europe,” Blume said, adding that includes Chinese brands “because it’s a big business potential here for the Chinese in Europe so we have to fight back.” Volkswagen and its German peers have strong brand loyalty in their home market, but Blume warned it’s only a matter of time before Chinese automakers begin making inroads. It’s a war Volkswagen is already fighting in China, which was once its biggest market and revenue stream. However, the shift to electric vehicles and Chinese consumer preferences for domestic brands has chipped away at Volkswagen’s standing. VW is launching new EVs in China this year as it looks to regain its place as the country’s top automaker. But losing its place at the top of the podium in China has meant considerably less revenue is making its way back to Germany and helping to fund factories that have higher energy and worker costs. In 2024 Volkswagen announced cost-cutting measures that led to 35,000 lost jobs and the closure of German factories for the first time in its history. That number will now balloon to 50,000 jobs in Germany by 2030, with the cuts affecting all of its brands including Audi and Porsche. The EU’s rearmament push offers a potential silver lining, though, as arms-makers look to take advantage of slack demand in the auto industry combined with the sector’s mastery of mass production. “No solution has been taken,” Blume said in reference to VW’s Osnabrück factory, which could be shuttered. “We’re currently in talks with defense companies throughout the course of the year.”

BRUSSELS — The European Commission will adopt the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) on Wednesday, finally backing the landmark measure that would define a European preference in green public procurement after several delays. Haggling over the planned regulation went right down to the wire, with a meeting of cabinet chiefs that began on Monday spilling into Tuesday, the day before Ursula von der Leyen’s College of Commissioners will now sign off on an agreed text. According to one Commission official, another 44 changes were made to the draft at the meeting that ran into overtime. Paula Pinho, the Commission’s chief spokesperson, confirmed at Tuesday’s regular midday briefing that “commissioners are expected to adopt a proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act.” The landmark measure would define a “Made in EU” preference in green public procurement — while pushing back a decision for six months on whether friendly third countries can be included in its scope. This means that, even after Wednesday’s announcement, countries like the U.K. or Switzerland will still need to lobby to get inside the tent. The IAA would also set restrictions on inward investment for dominant players in strategic green industries. These would mainly have China in mind, and cover batteries and energy storage, electric vehicles and components, solar photovoltaic, and the extraction, processing and recycling of critical raw materials, according to a draft obtained by POLITICO last week. An earlier version of the proposal, which is being overseen by Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, was panned last month by as many as nine departments of the EU executive. By the end of last week that was down to three, including the Commission’s powerful trade department, according to one person familiar with the discussion. They were granted anonymity to discuss the closed-door talks. Germany also led a rearguard action by 10 EU countries — which styled themselves as the Friends of Industry — who support less industry regulation and more open trade, with Economy Minister Katherina Reiche saying it would create “a regulatory wasteland that nobody can understand anymore.” With so many changes being made at the last minute, including dropping entire industries like tech from the purview of the legislation, critics say the bill is nowhere near ready for prime time and is at risk of being heavily revised when it goes for review by the Council of the EU, which represents the bloc’s 27 member countries, and European lawmakers. Additional reporting by Gerardo Fortuna.

EUROPE’S VANISHING CARS ARE JEOPARDIZING ITS RAW MATERIALS SECURITY Used cars are a treasure trove of metals essential in energy technology, but the EU is letting them vanish without a trace. By MARIANNE GROS in Brussels Illustration by Natália Delgado/ POLITICO EU decision-makers don’t have to look far to find cheap critical raw materials: Just 5 kilometers away from the EU quarter, car dealers up and down Heyvaert Street are scooping them up and shipping them to Africa. Dealerships in this industrial precinct in southwest Brussels send European used vehicles — many too polluting to be allowed on the continent’s roads — to African countries like Senegal, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, where the market for Europe’s unwanted automobiles is thriving. That one street intimately connects the capital of the EU — where some 10 million new cars hit the roads each year — to a global supply chain of used vehicles that sustains road transport in developing markets. One day these cars will end up in junkyards far away, and with them tons of valuable metals that the EU could recycle and reuse to run its economy. But Europe’s age-old habit of exporting unwanted goods is coming back to bite it as the bloc looks to recycle its way out of its reliance on raw materials imported from China.  The EU is scrambling to secure new sources of critical metals and minerals necessary for clean energy and military technology — a task of increasing urgency as geopolitical tensions disrupt traditional supply chains. For a small continent like Europe that is poor in natural resources but rich in consumer goods, old cars are a promising source of these materials. The vehicles are full of metals such as copper, platinum and steel that are essential in a long list of critical industries such as clean energy and military technology. And they’ll become even more valuable as early generations of electric vehicles — full of battery metals like lithium, cobalt and nickel — reach the end of their lifespans. But the EU isn’t close to taking advantage of this prospect. Along with those that are legally exported, between 3 million and 4 million end-of-life cars disappear without a trace from the EU each year. That’s a third of all cars that get deregistered. Some go missing because of a gap in the paper trail. Others get exported through obscure trade routes. Many are dismantled illegally, with the more valuable parts sold online or in non-compliant dealerships — while the rest are dumped, creating a pollution risk. “We see big and currently unused potential in recycling, reuse and also substitution” of critical raw materials, said Keit Pentus-Rosimannus, a member of the European Court of Auditors who last month co-authored a report on the EU’s difficulties in securing a supply of critical raw materials.  But that recycling and reuse can only happen if the waste products, e.g. cars, make it to recycling hubs in the first place.  The market for Europe’s unwanted automobiles is thriving in cities like Lagos in Nigeria. | Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images “The illegal dismantling and export of [end-of-life vehicles] is mainly motivated by profits from the sale of spare parts and metals,” the German Environment Agency wrote in a study on the topic back in 2020. Unauthorized dismantlers are “neglecting proper depollution, to avoid additional costs,” the study explained.  In a separate paper published in 2022, the agency estimated that 20 percent of all German vehicles that “go missing” — over 72,000 cars — are exported illegally.  According to Interpol data, nearly 3.6 million vehicles and vehicle parts from Europe — not just EU countries — were registered in the Stolen Motor Vehicles database as of Dec. 31, 2025. EUROPE’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY  The EU has made materials recycling a strategic pillar of its mission to reduce reliance on imports from China in an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment. Europe’s economy runs on importing critical raw materials, such as nickel, copper and lithium, as well as rare earths and so-called platinum group metals like palladium or platinum. It needs them to build car engines, weapons and products that contribute to the bloc’s green tech transition, including batteries, chips and solar panels.   While the metals are mined all over the world, China overwhelmingly dominates the processing and refining of these critical raw materials.  To address this, the European Commission says it wants to launch new mining projects, sign deals with other countries to diversify its supply, and promote recycling projects.  With the introduction of the Critical Raw Materials Act in 2024, EU governments are required to adopt national circularity measures to boost the recovery of critical raw materials and simplify permitting processes for recycling and recovery projects. The law says that 25 percent of the EU’s annual strategic raw material consumption should come from domestic recycling by 2030. Last December, the Commission announced additional measures as part of a new plan called RESourceEU.  But many argue that progress is too slow. “Most EU targets that are in place do not incentivize the recycling of specific individual materials. High processing costs, limited availability of materials, technical and regulatory issues also make the use of the recycling sector less competitive,” the Court of Auditors’ Pentus-Rosimannus said. Others say the EU is doing little to reduce consumption in the first place. Policymakers need to be “addressing [materials] consumption aspects to accelerate this process in addition to everything else that is being done on the recycling part” said the European Environment Agency’s head of the clean and circular economy group, Daniel Montalvo. EU policies should tackle “how we can change this upstream part of the material cycle so that we use products more intensively and for longer,” he added. RECYCLERS NEED HELP  End-of-life vehicles should all end up in one of Europe’s 13,000 authorized treatment facilities like the one in Menen, Belgium, which straddles the country’s border with France and is run by recycling company Galloo.   Running a recycling center is expensive and illegal dismantlers create unfair competition because they avoid regulatory and compliance costs. | Sebastian Kahnert/picture alliance via Getty Images “We can dismantle 17 cars at once here. Usually, we treat 10 to 15 thousand cars a year, but this year we’re around 3 or 4 thousand on this site,” said Emmanuel Katrakis, the company’s director of public and regulatory affairs. Galloo set up Valorauto, a joint venture with French-Italian automaker Stellantis, in 2023. Valorauto runs a vehicle take-back and recycling service through 300 authorized treatment facilities in Western Europe. The low turnover in Europe’s car fleet — a result of stagnating sales since the Covid pandemic due to Europe’s weaker economy — means fewer cars end up in recycling centers. Once the vehicles reach what can only be described as a cemetery for cars, the vehicles get scrubbed of polluting substances and taken apart. Most of the plastic, rubber, glass and iron can be recycled. Crucially, the more precious resources in their engines, catalytic converters and electrical systems can be collected. Two thirds of vehicles that reach end-of-life status end up in this system.  But running a recycling center is expensive. Illegal dismantlers create unfair competition because they avoid regulatory and compliance costs, which drives the price down, while also diverting some of the end-of-life-vehicle flow — and therefore revenue — away from authorized centers.  “We’re tired of having bad actors in our sectors who are willing to work with a completely illegal market,” Katrakis said.  Cars also get dropped off with missing parts.”We’re going to buy their car for €150, maybe €200, but they know they can sell their catalytic converter separately for €60. They do the math,” he added.  For Valorauto’s general manager, Thomas Delgado, online marketplaces should be held responsible for enabling the car dismantling grey market, saying they don’t monitor the sellers properly. “There are several marketplaces that should do their part to help [us] fight this system” he said, by preventing individual sellers from selling a car part unless they can prove they are registered as an authorized treatment facility.   Then there are Europe’s faulty registration systems. A lot of these cars go missing because they are sold second-hand in another country but are never deregistered in their country of origin. “Today we have national computer systems that are supposed to track things, but they’re totally overwhelmed,” Delgado said.  There are also gaps between the car registries and the database of insured vehicles. Responsibility for monitoring these systems is often shared by several national ministries.  National governments have tried to address the issue by creating incentives for car owners to drop their vehicles off at authorized centers. In Denmark, for example, owners can get a “scrapping premium” when their vehicle is dropped off at an approved dealer.  A new regulation on end-of-life vehicles aims to clarify when a car is legally considered waste.  | Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images At the EU level, a new regulation on end-of-life vehicles aims to address the issue with “clearer rules on the distinction between a used vehicle and an end-of-life vehicle” and “a strict framework for transfers of ownership,” but some of the technical aspects of the law are still being discussed. The law also aims to clarify when a car is legally considered waste.  The automotive sector is glad to see the EU will “implement an EU-wide registration/deregistration system and regulate the export of ELVs outside the EU, preventing valuable raw materials from leaving the European market,” according to ACEA, the sector’s main lobby.  GETTING A SECOND LIFE  Over 800,000 used vehicles are exported from the EU each year, mainly to African countries, according to EU data. The revised end-of-life vehicle regulation states that only roadworthy cars can be exported from the EU.   Just because a car isn’t allowed on the streets of a European city doesn’t mean it should be dismantled immediately, however.   “It’s important to make the distinction because they are not necessarily at the end of life everywhere,” said Pierre Hajjar, chief executive officer of Socar Shipping Agencies, a vehicle shipping company on Brussels’ Heyvaert St. Last December local police raided the street, seizing 45 vehicles and forcing several dealerships to close for not complying with national rules on cash payments or for not having the right environmental permits.   With the revised end-of-life-vehicle regulation, the EU wants to increase traceability so “only high-quality, technically fit European vehicles will be exported.” But for African markets, Hajjar says that’s already the case.  “For Africa, everything goes by boat, everything is extremely traceable,” he said, because port authorities and maritime shipping companies have high thresholds for the kind of vehicles that can be exported. “Whereas in Eastern countries it’s road transport … there isn’t really any traceability, they cross the borders quite easily,” he added.  

California Gov. Gavin Newsom handed his arch nemesis a backhanded compliment on Saturday, noting President Donald Trump’s attacks on Europe have united the continent in critical ways. Newsom, during a panel at the Munich Security Conference, said Trump’s behavior toward the alliance — from threatening to seize Greenland to questioning the NATO alliance and enacting punishing tariffs — is compelling the continent to interact more closely on major issues. “I believe Europe feels more united today than it has in some time,” Newsom said to loud applause. “And perhaps maybe that is the one contribution of Donald Trump.” Newsom’s jab at the president came as Munich attendees digested a Saturday speech from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, which took a measured tone toward the strained transatlantic relationship and called for a revitalization of ties between the beleaguered allies. His comments were a significant shift from Vice President JD Vance’s inflammatory speech last year, which lambasted Europe and called it a continent heading toward “civilizational suicide.” While administration officials such as U.S. ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker insist Trump’s handling of foreign relationships has made both the U.S. stronger and safer, Newsom argued America is more isolated and weaker than it was before Trump took office. Look no further than Canada’s electric vehicles deal with China, he said, referring to trade agreements American allies have signed with other countries in recent months. “That used to be us, so it breaks my heart.” Newsom told the panel that the speech, in which Rubio said the U.S. and Europe “belong together,” was a sign the Trump administration is responding to Europe’s “conviction, character, purpose.” The governor’s foray into European politics at the conference appeared, in many ways, like a test run for his 2028 presidential ambitions. The term-limited politician has sought to elevate his international profile in recent months. He traveled to Davos, Switzerland, for the World Economic Forum in January and chastised world leaders for not strongly confronting the president. Newsom on Friday told a different Munich panel that the tension between the U.S. and its longtime allies is “temporary,” and not just because Trump will leave the White House in 2029. On Saturday, he predicted a Democratic takeover in the November midterms and said he believes the Supreme Court will soon take away the president’s sweeping tariff powers. The specter of transatlantic partnership, he said, is still here. “It’s not dead, it’s dormant,” Newsom said. “You may need to sleep with one eye open. It will take time, but it’s certainly not dead.”

BRUSSELS — Chinese goods continue to flood into the European Union as the bloc’s manufacturing base struggles to cope. The EU’s trade deficit in goods with China widened to €359.3 billion in 2025, up nearly a fifth from €304.5 billion in 2024, according to data published by Eurostat on Friday. The figure is the total value of all goods imported from China, minus the goods exported to the country. The widening deficit was the driven both by a 6.3 percent increase in imports from China, and a 6.5 percent decline in EU exports to China. The widening deficit exposes Europe’s inability to compete in industries ranging from basic chemicals to cars. In 2025, China’s global trade surplus in goods hit a record of nearly $1.2 trillion — with Donald Trump’s U.S. tariffs redirecting its export glut to more open economies like Europe. China has been on an inexorable economic ascent since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. Neither the 2008 financial crisis, nor the recent deflation of a vast real estate bubble, has been enough to knock it off course. While Chinese businesses used to occupy the bottom of the value chain — assembling electronics, producing basic chemicals, or manufacturing low-end consumer goods — they’ve steadily moved to the technology frontier. Chinese champions operate in everything from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence and robotics. EU leaders are alert to the threat. Speaking at an EU industry summit in Antwerp on Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron called on the European Commission to act more swiftly to erect trade protections when China uses subsidies to give an unfair leg-up to its industry. “We have a big issue today. We are too slow,” said the French leader talking about the Commission’s lengthy probe into Chinese electric vehicles that resulted in the imposition of duties in late 2024. It was useless, Macron said, if the European Commission takes two years to find out that a Chinese company was relying on state aid to undercut its European competitors. “I mean, thank you, happy I was right, but it’s over. So we have to accelerate much more swiftly the process for these inquiries, clearly,” Macron added. France’s High Commission for Strategy and Planning estimates that a quarter of the country’s exports are “directly threatened” by Chinese competition. For Germany, that number rises to a third. The advisory body has recommended that the EU retaliate with a weaker euro — which would give exporters a boost — and across-the-board tariffs. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng seemed to offer an olive branch at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland last month. In a speech made in the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to annex Greenland, He promised that China would uphold the international trade order and “open its door still wider to the world.” He also said that the government would move to fix economic imbalances that had sapped domestic demand and added to the export glut. But policymakers, both in EU capitals and the Berlaymont, are skeptical that China is serious about any shift toward household consumption. French Finance Minister Roland Lescure said this week that Chinese officials have been “saying the right things” with talk of “rebalancing of the Chinese economy with more consumption.” But, he told reporters: “We feel that so far, there’s been a lot of talk, but not many results yet.” It’s an attitude shared by top Commission trade official Joanna Szychowska who, at a conference last month, said the EU should not “all of a sudden become friends with China today because we have a shift in U.S. policy.” “China is very much focused on transactions. Now we have to ask ourselves the question of what transactions we can make — so what is our leverage, what is our strength?” added Szychowska, who is director for Asia, services and digital trade. Additional reporting by Zia Weise and Geoffrey Smith.

ALDEN BIESEN, Belgium — The European Union should open up more to its trade partners in public procurement and curb Chinese investment in sectors like green tech, according to a new draft of a landmark industry act obtained by POLITICO on Thursday. Free-trade partners like the United Kingdom and Japan will breathe a sigh of relief as the draft Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) foresees a definition of “Made in EU” that includes “trusted partners.” Brussels wants to throw up a higher barrier to investment from China by imposing a cap on foreign direct investment by countries that dominate a given global industry. The leak of the bill came as EU leaders held a retreat at a Belgian castle to wargame ways to reverse the bloc’s industrial decline in the face of China’s export dominance and America’s tech supremacy. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is trying to find a balance between France’s protectionist instincts and calls for more openness led by Germany, Italy and the EU’s Nordic contingent. Leaders played down differences as they gathered at the Alden Biesen estate, with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni saying her views on industrial strategy converged with those of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and brushing off suggestions the duo were trying to isolate French President Emmanuel Macron. “It is not something that we do against someone else, by excluding someone else,” she told reporters. Leaders reached a form of consensus on areas including the concept of a European preference, where there was openness to examining what it may mean and where it may be needed, according to a person briefed on the talks. The meeting kicked off an intense month of politicking on restoring EU competitiveness and its single market project, with the IAA due out on Feb. 25 and leaders to reconvene for a full-blown summit on March 19-20. The draft drew a swift and strong rebuke from Chinese business. “The latest version of the Industrial Accelerator Act is likely to undermine the investment confidence of leading Chinese companies,” the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to the EU said. “Beyond the political signaling, many of the proposed measures raise serious practical concerns, including the feasibility of mandatory local partnership requirements, which in many cases may simply not be commercially or technologically viable.” A big question mark over the industry push, which is being led by Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné, is whether it can be sufficiently decisive to turn the economic tide. “Whatever new FDI rules will be enacted will be ineffective,” said Yanmei Xie, a senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Each EU member country has a different agenda and building a united front against Chinese dominance is a near impossibility. “Whoever is the lowest denominator becomes the de facto gatekeeper.” TRUSTED PARTNERS The latest draft of the IAA, which runs to 96 pages, broadens the definition of a European preference as it would apply to public procurement and other taxpayer-funded programs in energy-intensive industries, net-zero technologies and the automotive sector. In so doing it should allay fears among friendly trading nations of a “Fortress Europe” scenario.  The scope of Made in EU should include content originating from the EU and the European Economic Area, which spans Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The draft also leaves the door open to “trusted partners” whose manufacturing “should be deemed equivalent to Union origin content.” Earlier on Thursday, Séjourné dismissed the notion that the Made in EU push would exclude trade partners. His cabinet said there was broad support, both politically and in industry for the work of the Commission, although “opinions diverge on the conditions and modalities of its implementation.” A broader Made in EU concept will be welcome in the U.K. after the country’s finance minister, Rachel Reeves, said on Wednesday that Britain needed to be part of the Made in EU club. “I actually support the idea of some sort of ‘Made in Europe’ or ‘Made in countries that share each other’s values,’” she told an event. Japan, a major auto exporter, will also welcome the shift. The country “very much meets the definition of a Trusted Partner of the EU,” Patrick Keating, Honda Europe’s head of government affairs, told POLITICO.  GETTING TOUGHER The EU executive doubled down on its efforts to curb foreign direct investments from China in its latest draft.  Should the current form hold, the IAA would limit investments by companies based in countries that control more than 40 percent of global manufacturing capacity across four sectors: batteries, electric vehicles, solar technologies, and the processing and recycling of critical raw materials. “The sectors indicated — those in which Beijing is a leader — as well as the reference to the 40 percent manufacturing capacity, highlight how the increasingly clear target of these measures are Chinese foreign direct investments,”said Luca Picotti, a lawyer at Italy’s Osservatorio Golden Power. The Commission’s proposal, which effectively mirrors Beijing’s 1980s forced joint venture policy, remains in the new draft. Chinese automakers that could be forced to give up some of their technology to their European competitors are pushing back on that strategy. BYD CEO Stella Li has called the model “outdated.” “It’s not efficient: We take decisions in a second, a joint venture takes months. It’s a model of the past,” she told Italian daily Corriere della Sera at the Davos World Economic Forum last month. Governments would also be compelled under the IAA to buy more climate-friendly materials, though the scope of the requirement remains elusive in the latest draft of the upcoming industry booster. The act also proposes introducing voluntary green steel labels.  The scale of the Commission’s intervention remains unclear in the draft, which is missing a section devoted to specific materials as well as a set of annexes, though hints are sprinkled throughout the document. “Public procurement is a powerful lever,” von der Leyen told industry representatives at an event in Antwerp on Wednesday, noting it amounts to 15 percent of EU GDP. “This is massive financial firepower controlled by European governments. But too often, we see that our public buyers have to take the subsidized foreign products instead of the high-quality European alternatives. That is homegrown value that we are leaving on the table.”  Aude van den Hove reported from Alden Biesen, Francesca Micheletti, Jordyn Dahl and Sebastian Starcevic from Brussels, and Zia Weise from Antwerp.

BRUSSELS — Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson is looking forward to meeting his fellow leaders at a castle in the Belgian countryside on Thursday but not even these relaxed surroundings can quell the EU’s simmering divisions. The chief agitator this time is French President Emmanuel Macron, who is pushing for a new “Buy European” drive — which would seek to favor the EU’s own companies in areas of strategic importance such as defense, steel and electric vehicles. Macron has triggered concern among some of his counterparts, including Kristersson, who leads a proudly free-trading nation and is deeply suspicious of states intervening in markets.  “Well, him and I, we quite often friendly-argue with each other on these matters,” Kristersson said of his relations with Macron, during an interview with POLITICO. “I don’t always agree with the methods.” The European Commission is expected soon to unveil proposals for how a “European preference” could operate to help boost the bloc’s production in strategic industries. Macron appeared increasingly isolated this week, with Germany knocking back his proposal for more joint EU debt to fund strategic investments, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warning of “a fine line to walk” on the concept of a “European preference.” Even so, the crisis in transatlantic relations — inflamed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on allies in his quest to acquire Greenland — has made it more urgent for EU leaders to strengthen the bloc’s economic might, Kristersson said.  Macron has a point that Europe must be more “self-reliant,” Kristersson said, but trying to protect European supply chains and businesses from international competition will not necessarily help the competitiveness of the EU economy.  “I think European preference, if that means having [such] extremely good companies, products, services in Europe that they are unavoidable for the rest of the world, then I’m very much in favor of it,” Kristersson said. “If it means protecting European companies, for European purchase or European procurement, which makes them avoid competition from other parts of the world, I am not at all sure that’s a good idea.” He called for European leaders to improve the conditions for companies to thrive: better infrastructure, education, research and new trade agreements with countries outside the bloc.  Kristersson gave the example of audio streaming platform Spotify, which is headquartered in Stockholm, as a rare European success in an otherwise sparse landscape for tech giants. Spotify, he said, is Europe’s “one big tech company” right now. “Otherwise most of the companies have turned to the U.S.”  A more open approach to promoting European businesses should embrace British and Norwegian firms, he said, arguing that exposing companies to competition from Korea or China or the U.S. actually helps make them more competitive.  “There is always a risk of protecting companies that basically are not that competitive as their competitors would be, or a race for closeness,” he said “I mean, if the world goes in a direction where we try to trade only with neighbors, I think that would be a bad idea.”  Kristersson said he hoped the EU’s 27 leaders would use the current “crisis” in relations with the U.S. to inject “a sense of urgency” into the discussion and agree to concrete action on improving the bloc’s capacity to defend itself and boost its businesses.  “There is always, obviously, the risk of the opposite,” he said. “Every crisis consumes all the oxygen in the room, so that sometimes we are better on crisis management than on systemic, long-term reform.”

Yanmei Xie is senior associate fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. After Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke at Davos last week, a whole continent contracted leadership envy. Calling the rules-based order — which Washington proselytized for decades before stomping on — a mirage, Carney gave his country’s neighboring hegemonic bully a rhetorical middle finger, and Europeans promptly swooned. But before the bloc’s politicians rush to emulate him, it may be worth cooling the Carney fever. Appearing both steely and smooth in his Davos speech, Carney warned middle powers that “when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness.” Perhaps this was in reference to the crass daily coercion Canada has been enduring from the U.S. administration. But perhaps he was talking about the subtler asymmetry he experienced just days before in Beijing. In contrast to his defiance in Switzerland, Carney was ingratiating during his China visit. He signed Canada up for a “new strategic partnership” in preparation for an emerging “new world order,” and lauded Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a fellow defender of multilateralism. The visit also produced a cars-for-canola deal, which will see Canada slash tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles from 100 percent to 6.1 percent, and lift the import cap to 49,000 cars per year. In return, China will cut duties on Canadian canola seeds from 84 percent to 15 percent. In time, Ottawa also expects Beijing will reduce tariffs on Canadian lobsters, crabs and peas later this year and purchase more Canadian oil and perhaps gas, too. The agreement to launch a Ministerial Energy Dialogue will surely pave the way for eventual deals. These productive exchanges eventually moved Carney to declare Beijing a “more predictable” trade partner than Washington. And who can blame him? He was simply stating the obvious — after all, China isn’t threatening Canada with annexation. But one is tempted to wonder if he would have needed to flatter quite so much in China if his country still possessed some of the world’s leading technologies. The truth is, Canada’s oil and gas industry probably shouldn’t really be holding its breath. Chinese officials typically offer serious consideration rather than outright rejection out of politeness — just ask Russia, which has spent decades in dialogue with Beijing over a pipeline meant to replace Europe as a natural gas market. The cars-for-canola deal also carries a certain irony: Canada is importing the very technology that makes fossil fuels obsolete. China is electrifying at dizzying speed, with the International Energy Agency projecting its oil consumption will peak as early as next year thanks to “extraordinary” electric vehicle sales. That means Beijing probably isn’t desperate for new foreign suppliers of hydrocarbons, and the ministerial dialogue will likely drag on inconclusively — albeit courteously — well into the future. This state of Sino-Canadian trade can be seen as classic comparative advantage at work: China is good at making things, and Canada has abundant primary commodities. But in the not-so-distant past, it was Canadian companies that were selling nuclear reactors, telecom equipment, aircraft and bullet trains to China. Yet today, many of these once globe-spanning Canadian high-tech manufacturers have either exited the scene or lead a much-reduced existence. Somewhere in this trading history lies a cautionary tale for Europe. Deindustrialization can have its own self-reinforcing momentum. As a country’s economic composition changes, so does its political economy. When producers of goods disappear, so does their political influence. And the center of lobbying gravity shifts toward downstream users and consumers who prefer readily available imports. Europe’s indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products | STR/AFP via Getty Images Europe already has its own version of this story: Its indigenous solar manufacturers have been driven to near extinction by much cheaper Chinese products over the span of two decades. Currently, its solar industry is dominated by installers and operators who favor cheap imports and oppose trade defense. Simply put, Carney’s cars-for-canola deal is a salve for Canadian consumers and commodity producers, but it’s also industrial policy in reverse. In overly simplified terms, industrial policy is about encouraging exports of finished products over raw materials and discouraging the opposite in order to build domestic value-added capacity and productivity. But while Canada can, perhaps, make do without industry — as Carney put it in Davos, his ambition is to run “an energy superpower” — Europe doesn’t have that option. Agri-food and extractive sectors aren’t enough to stand up the continent’s economy — even with the likes of tourism and luxury goods thrown in. China currently exports more than twice as much to the EU than it imports. In container terms, the imbalance widens to 4-to-1. Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs estimates Chinese exports will shave 0.2 percentage point or more of GDP growth in Germany, Spain and Italy each year through 2029. And according to the European Central Bank, cars, chemicals, electric equipment and machinery — sectors that form Europe’s industrial backbone — face the most severe job losses from China trade shock. Europe shares Canada’s plight in dealing with the U.S., which currently isn’t just an unreliable trade partner but also an ally turned imperialist. This is why Carney’s speech resonates. But U.S. protectionism has only made China’s mercantilism a more acute challenge for Europe, as the U.S. resists the bloc’s exports and Chinese goods keep pouring into Europe in greater quantities at lower prices. European leaders would be mistaken to look for trade relief in China as Carney does, and bargain away the continent’s industrial capacity in the process. Whether it’s to resist an expansionist Russia or an imperial U.S., Europe still needs to hold on to its manufacturing base.