OLIVIER COLOM, LE “GRAND AMI” FRANÇAIS DE JEFFREY EPSTEIN Pendant des années, un ancien conseiller diplomatique à l’Elysée a joué pour Jeffrey Epstein l’intermédiaire entre politiques, hauts fonctionnaires et personnalités du monde des affaires. By  PAUL DE VILLEPIN, MARION SOLLETTY AND PAULINE DE SAINT REMY Illustration par Natália Delgado/POLITICO PARIS — “Est-ce que Sarkozy est dans les parages, j’aimerais le rencontrer si tu crois que ça peut être marrant”, écrit Jeffrey Epstein à Olivier Colom, par mail, en octobre 2013. Le Français à qui le multimillionnaire américain s’adresse est un ancien membre de la cellule diplomatique de l’Elysée sous Nicolas Sarkozy. Son nom, jusque-là inconnu du grand public, apparaît à plusieurs centaines de reprises parmi les trois millions de documents publiés fin janvier par le ministère américain de la Justice, baptisés “Epstein files”. En remontant le fil de la correspondance entre ces deux hommes, qui s’étale sur plusieurs années, POLITICO en a appris un peu plus cette relation. Celle-ci en dit beaucoup sur la façon dont Epstein, condamné dès 2008 dans une procédure de plaider-coupable pour avoir eu des relations sexuelles tarifées avec des mineures, avant d’être inculpé en 2019 dans une procédure fédérale plus lourde pour des faits de trafic sexuel sur mineurs, a tissé sa toile en France. C’est en 2011 qu’Olivier Colom apparaît pour la première fois dans la boîte mail jeevacation@gmail.com, l’une des principales adresses électroniques utilisées par le financier. Vingt mois après être sorti d’un centre de détention en Floride, Epstein est de passage à Paris où il possède un appartement avenue Foch, dans le XVIe arrondissement. Au cours de ce séjour, le diplomate et ex-ministère norvégien Terje Roed-Larsen, proche d’Epstein, lui suggère dans un message de rencontrer Colom. Cet énarque de 41 ans est alors conseiller diplomatique à l’Elysée, où il est chargé des affaires globales et de la préparation des sommets internationaux pour le président de la République Nicolas Sarkozy. PANTOUFLAGE ET ENTREGENT Parmi ceux qui ont côtoyé Colom au travail, plusieurs personnes dépeignent, sous couvert d’anonymat, un “bon diplomate, très sociable” ou encore un homme “posé et caustique”. “C’était quelqu’un de très gentil, très smart et très professionnel, qui ne s’est jamais comporté de manière déplacée”, raconte une cheffe d’entreprise, mise en relation avec lui par Epstein au milieu des années 2010. “Il était très imbu de lui-même”, nuance l’une des ses anciennes relations de la banque. De 2013 à 2018 au moins, Colom et Epstein seront en contact régulier. Après son départ de l’Elysée en 2012, le Français nourrit un certain ressentiment à l’égard de la Sarkozie, pour n’avoir pas hérité d’un poste à la hauteur de ses espérances, d’après plusieurs ex-collègues au Palais. Il se reconvertit alors dans le privé, rejoignant en 2013 le groupe bancaire Edmond de Rothschild. Il y travaille avec la belle-fille du fondateur et membre du conseil d’administration, Ariane de Rothschild. Une femme avec qui Jeffrey Epstein lui-même entretenait de longue date des interactions fréquentes sur des questions tant professionnelles que personnelles, comme l’attestent des centaines de mails. Contactée, celle qui est désormais patronne de l’établissement bancaire nous a fait savoir, par un porte-parole, qu’elle n’avait “aucune connaissance de la conduite et du comportement personnel de M. Epstein” à l’époque, et qu’elle a été “profondément choquée par les agissements révélés ces dernières années”. Elle “condamne sans ambiguïté ces comportements et les crimes dont il s’est rendu coupable”. EPSTEIN VEUT RENCONTRER SARKOZY Dans toute la période, le Français joue ou prétend jouer le rôle d’ouvreur de portes à Paris pour son “grand ami” américain. “Quand tu seras à Paris, quel genre de personnes souhaites-tu rencontrer ?”, le questionne Colom le 24 septembre 2013. Réponse d’Epstein : “Des intellos, scientifiques… ou de très très mignonnes vingtenaires”. Les deux hommes prennent pour habitude de se voir à l’occasion de leurs allées et venues respectives entre New York et Paris. Des morceaux de l’agenda d’Epstein, qui figurent dans ses mails, attestent de rendez-vous réguliers. Epstein propose à plusieurs reprises à Colom de séjourner sur son île privée, située dans les Îles Vierges des Etats-Unis. Si Colom répond en août 2013 qu’il “adorerait découvrir [l’] île un jour”, rien n’indique que ce dernier s’y soit rendu. Les deux hommes échangent en revanche blagues douteuses et allusions à caractère sexuel. “Tu es où en ce moment ?”, demande par exemple Colom à Epstein le 17 juin 2013. “Sur mon île dans les Caraïbes, avec un aquarium rempli de filles.” Dans la même conversation, ils semblent ensuite évoquer, dans un double langage, leurs préférences sexuelles, comparant les femmes à des poissons et crustacés. Dans ses messages, Colom laisse penser qu’il se plie en quatre, fin 2013 et début 2014, pour tenter d’organiser une rencontre entre Epstein et Nicolas Sarkozy, dont il a été le sherpa-adjoint à l’Elysée, à la demande expresse du multimillionnaire. Le 31 octobre 2013, le Français écrit : “Je déjeune avec lui [Sarkozy] mardi prochain 5 novembre, je lui demanderai.” Quelques semaines plus tard, Olivier Colom, qui indique à plusieurs occasions être resté en contact avec l’ex-locataire de l’Elysée, demande à Epstein s’il lui serait possible d’organiser un “rendez-vous discret entre Sarko et Hillary Clinton à NY”. Le 24 janvier 2014, Epstein propose à Colom de venir chez lui, avenue Foch, en compagnie de Nicolas Sarkozy pour discuter de la situation au Moyen-Orient avec Ehud Barak, ancien Premier ministre israélien. Les mails ne permettent néanmoins pas d’établir si ces entrevues ont finalement eu lieu. Interrogé par POLITICO, le cabinet de Nicolas Sarkozy, après recherche, confirme qu’une rencontre publique avec Hillary Clinton a bien eu lieu en avril 2014, mais n’a pas trouvé trace d’une aide d’Olivier Colom pour organiser l’entrevue. Aucune trace non plus d’une rencontre avec Ehud Barak et Epstein, Olivier Colom s’étant d’ailleurs, à partir 2012, peu à peu éloigné de l’ancien président, qui avait ses propres conseillers diplomatiques. RÉSEAUTAGE À TOUS LES ÉTAGES Un autre homme politique français, Bruno Le Maire, a rencontré Jeffrey Epstein par l’entremise d’Olivier Colom. En septembre 2013, le Français informe ainsi l’Américain de son voyage imminent à New York et lui indique que son “ami” Bruno Le Maire “ex-ministre de Sarkozy et futur candidat à l’élection présidentielle sera également ‘en ville’”. Colom précise alors que celui qui fut aussi son camarade de promotion à l’Ena, cherche à lever des fonds. Contacté par POLITICO, l’entourage de Bruno Le Maire confirme qu’il s’est bien rendu, lors d’un passage à New-York en septembre 2013, à la résidence new-yorkaise d’Epstein dans le très chic Upper East Side, Colom lui ayant fait savoir que des “responsables économiques” souhaitaient le rencontrer. Ce n’est qu’en arrivant sur place que le futur patron de Bercy aurait découvert qu’il se trouvait chez Epstein — il ne serait resté que quelques minutes avant de “tourner les talons”.   Quelques années plus tard, le 24 novembre 2018, alors que Bruno Le Maire est désormais ministre de l’Economie et des Finances d’Emmanuel Macron, Epstein demande à Colom s’il a “gardé contact avec Bruno ?”.  Celui-ci lui répond “qu’il le voit régulièrement”, ainsi que “son directeur de cabinet” — Emmanuel Moulin à l’époque. Dans une correspondance précédente, peu après la nomination de Bruno Le Maire à Bercy, Colom se targue même d’être “l’un des plus vieux amis” de celui qui est aujourd’hui secrétaire général de l’Elysée. Le prétendu entremetteur se pousse-t-il du col ? Oui, d’après Emmanuel Moulin, qui a connu Olivier Colom du temps où tous deux travaillaient à l’Elysée. Sollicité par POLITICO, celui-ci nous affirme ne l’avoir rencontré, dans les années qui suivirent, qu’“une ou deux fois en 2017” tout au plus, dans un cadre professionnel — depuis 2016, Colom, après avoir quitté Edmond de Rothschild, travaille comme consultant à l’international via sa société de conseil “OC Advisory”. Grâce à son carnet d’adresses dans le corps diplomatique, Colom propose encore à son ami américain, en 2013, de rencontrer le représentant permanent de la France à l’ONU. Epstein sollicite aussi son aide pour obtenir un rendez-vous avec le  consul de France à New York — Bertrand Lortholary, aujourd’hui ambassadeur en Chine —, afin de renouveler le visa Schengen de l’un de ses assistantes qu’il présente également comme sa petite amie. Dans un autre échange, daté de juillet 2013, les deux hommes spéculent sur le nom du futur ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Paris, Epstein laisse entendre à Colom qu’il pense savoir qu’Anna Wintour, encore puissante patronne de Vogue US, est candidate, ce que la presse évoquait à l’époque. Les échanges révèlent que Jeffrey Epstein, pourtant réputé pour son vaste réseau de relations, comptait sur Olivier Colom pour constamment lui présenter des personnalités marquantes lors de ses passages à Paris. “Es-tu dans le coin aujourd’hui ? Je serais ravi de rencontrer toute personne dont tu penses qu’elle me plairait”, lui écrit Epstein en juin 2013. Colom s’exécute et propose à Epstein de rencontrer tout à tour un ami eurodéputé (dont l’identité n’est pas citée), une star montante de la politique indienne ou encore, en mai 2014, le “vice-ministre russe de l’économie” avec qui Colom dit qu’il s’apprête à prendre un verre dans un bar parisien. Une autre fois, il lui raconte un dîner chez Jean Todt [président de la fédération internationale de l’automobile] en présence de l’ancien premier ministre du Qatar, Abdallah ben Khalifa Al Thani et de Rachida Dati. “Ça a l’air drôle, mais où sont les filles mignonnes”, rétorque Epstein. Réponse de son correspondant français : “Nulle part… ennuyeux. Il faut vraiment que je vienne te voir.” RENVOI D’ASCENSEUR En retour, le financier propose également à Colom de profiter de son réseau. En septembre 2013, Epstein propose par exemple de le convier à un repas avec Ehud Barak, dont Epstein était proche, ou encore avec Joshua Cooper Ramo, qu’il présente comme le ‘bras droit de [Henry] Kissinger. Au milieu de leurs échanges décousus, tantôt au sujet d’opportunités d’affaires, de voyages ou de montages financiers, apparaissent des propositions plus inattendues. “Tu veux acheter un vignoble à Margaux, j’ai une grosse propriété qui n’attend que toi”, fait miroiter Colom en avril 2014. Quelques mois auparavant, il s’enquiert des recherches de petit personnel d’Epstein : “Je me renseigne pour ta future assistante, mais il faut que tu en embauches une pas trop jolie…”, ose-t-il. Une autre fois, ayant eu vent — par Ariane de Rothschild — de sa quête d’un majordome, il lui suggère le profil d’un homme “qui servait Sarko à l’Elysée”. Au gré de leurs correspondances se dessine entre les deux hommes une relation allant au-delà de la sphère professionnelle. Dès 2013, ils sont suffisamment proches pour échanger des remarques salaces, comme évoqué plus haut. Leur amitié s’assortit aussi d’un soutien moral et matériel pour Colom lorsque, en 2014, celui qui est alors banquier d’affaires traverse une mauvaise passe sur le plan personnel. L’ex-diplomate fait part au financier de ses problèmes conjugaux, trouvant chez Epstein une oreille compatissante. “Merde alors [sic], tu es le bienvenu pour venir te reposer sur l’île”, lui écrit ainsi ce dernier. Trois mois plus tard, à en croire leurs échanges, il met à disposition de Colom son chauffeur ainsi qu’un appartement, lors d’un voyage familial de ce dernier à New York. L’été suivant, en 2015, Colom, manifestement frustré par sa situation financière, demande conseil à Epstein : “Je ne gagne pas assez, j’adorerais venir te voir”, confie-t-il, tout en informant Epstein de son divorce imminent. “Tu peux venir me voir quand tu veux, où tu veux”, je suis toujours disponible pour toi”, le rassure Epstein.  De fait, Epstein aidera manifestement Colom à négocier son départ du groupe Edmond de Rothschild où il officie alors comme secrétaire général jusqu’à début 2016. A l’issue d’intenses échanges, Epstein l’informe en effet le 3 février 2016 qu’Ariane de Rothschild — qui est en copie du mail — est d’accord pour lui accorder une indemnité de départ de 1,5 million d’euros étalé sur plusieurs mois et que Colom est désormais soumis à un accord de confidentialité. Contacté par différents canaux, Olivier Colom a décliné un échange téléphonique et nous a invités à lui transmettre nos questions par écrit. Il n’a plus donné suite malgré nos relances.

PARIS — La loi de finances 2026 à peine envoyée au Conseil constitutionnel, les députés s’apprêtent à enquêter sur “l’imposition des plus hauts patrimoines et des revenus les plus élevés et leur contribution au financement des services publics”, a appris POLITICO auprès de deux sources parlementaires. Le groupe d’élus indépendants Liot est à l’initiative de cette demande de commission d’enquête, qui doit être entérinée mardi à l’issue de la conférence des présidents de l’Assemblée nationale. L’ancien rapporteur général du budget Charles de Courson, député depuis plus de trente ans, en est le signataire. Les désaccords sur la taxe Zucman et ses variantes lors du budget 2026, le faible rendement de la nouvelle contribution différentielle sur les hauts revenus ou encore les récents propos de l’ex-ministre de l’Economie Eric Lombard, sont à l’origine de ce choix, explique une source au sein du groupe Liot, qui y voit une manière d’avoir un “débat dépassionné” avant le prochain exercice budgétaire. “Il demeure difficile d’apprécier de manière globale et objectivée le niveau réel d’imposition supporté, compte tenu de la diversité des sources de revenus, de la structure des patrimoines, de l’empilement des prélèvements et de l’existence de mécanismes juridiques complexes”, soutient Charles de Courson dans sa proposition de résolution. Le député ambitionne également de documenter l’ampleur et les moyens de lutte contre l’évasion fiscale.

PARIS — Anti-immigration MEP Sarah Knafo of the Reconquest party is set to advance to the second round of the Paris mayoral election in what would be a historic first for a far-right candidate, according to new polling shared with POLITICO. The survey from Cluster17, a prominent French pollster, shows Knafo, who formally entered the race in January, winning 10 percent of the vote in the municipal election next month. The data suggests her campaign is building traction — a surprise in a city where the far right has always struggled — as she was on course to win only 6 percent in December. Reconquest is the party founded by Knafo’s partner, maverick far-right politician and commentator Ériz Zemmour, who came fourth in the first round of the 2022 presidential election. Candidates who meet the 10 percent support threshold in the first round on March 15 advance to the runoff and earn representation on the city council. As it stands, that would see an unprecedented five-way race in the second round on March 22. Socialist candidate Emmanuel Grégoire leads the race with 33 percent of the vote, according to the poll. He’s followed by Rachida Dati, the conservative culture minister, at 26 percent. Centrist Pierre-Yves Bournazel scored 14 percent, while Sophia Chikirou of the hard-left France Unbowed drew 12 percent. Knafo’s platform includes several radical proposals such as halving the number of public workers in Paris and rowing back on some of current Mayor Anne Hidalgo’s signature policies, including reducing the speed limit on the Paris ring road. Hidalgo also banished cars from the banks of the Seine River, but Knafo wants instead to build a two-story passageway on the banks, with cars traveling underground and pedestrians above. Grégoire and Dati are clear front-runners in the race, but both have incentives to forge an alliance with candidates on their political extremes between the first and second rounds. Jean-Yves Dormagen, president and founder of Cluster17, warned that Dati is “caught in a pincer movement” between Knafo to her right and Bournazel in the center. “Dati doesn’t have a good campaign dynamic,” Dormagen said. Despite Grégoire facing a similar risk of being outflanked by Chikirou to his left, the Socialist candidate’s strong polling with voters from multicultural backgrounds — a “decisive group” in Paris — gives him a boost, the pollster said. “It’s a real problem for Sophia Chikirou,” said Dormagen.

Son entrée tonitruante dans la campagne a déjà produit des effets : Sarah Knafo atteint pour la première fois la barre des 10% d’intentions de vote aux municipales de mars à Paris (soit le seuil de qualification pour le second tour), dans un sondage* réalisé par l’institut Cluster 17 que POLITICO publie en exclusivité. Le score de la candidate de Reconquête ouvre la voie à une possible quinquangulaire, avec le maintien de cinq candidats. “Sarah Knafo récupère un tiers des électeurs qui ont voté Rassemblement national aux européennes et un quart de ceux qui ont voté Les Républicains”, constate Jean-Yves Dormagen, président de Cluster 17. La candidate de Reconquête progresse de quatre points par rapport à la dernière étude de l’institut au mois de novembre, où elle ne s’était pas encore lancée dans la bataille. Cette dynamique se fait au détriment du candidat du RN, Thierry Mariani, qui perd deux points d’intentions de vote (il chute à 4%) mais aussi de Rachida Dati. La ministre de la Culture, pourtant en campagne active, recule d’un point (26%) par rapport à novembre. “Dati n’est pas sur une bonne dynamique de campagne, elle est prise en tenaille”, ajoute Dormagen. L’analyse des intentions de vote en fonction de l’appartenance à des “clusters” types que réalise l’institut de sondages montre que Dati est “concurrencée sévèrement sur plusieurs espaces”, selon Dormagen. A sa droite, Sarah Knafo capte une partie de l’électorat étiqueté “conservateur” par Cluster 17. A sa gauche, Pierre-Yves Bournazel, le représentant d’Horizons, séduit une partie importante des électeurs “centristes” et “libéraux”. Ce proche d’Edouard Philippe, soutenu par Renaissance, se maintient à 14% d’intentions de vote. “Pour Dati, il est quasiment impossible de gagner en cas de maintien [à la fois] d’une liste plus à droite et d’une liste plus au centre”, estime le sondeur. “Il faudra qu’on rassemble tout le monde”, a admis la ministre de la Culture sur RTL, dimanche, adoptant un ton plus mesuré à l’égard de Bournazel qu’elle n’avait pas ménagé jusqu’à présent. LES ECOLOGISTES FONT GRIMPER GRÉGOIRE En face, Emmanuel Grégoire marque des points avec le ralliement de l’écologiste David Belliard et du communiste Ian Brossat, mi-décembre : le socialiste fait la course en tête et gagne trois points (33%) par rapport à novembre, tandis que Sophia Chikirou (La France insoumise) en perd deux (12%), mais reste en situation de se maintenir. A noter que le député de Paris séduit 27% des électeurs de l’Insoumise Manon Aubry lors des européennes de 2024. “Comme l’avait fait Anne Hidalgo, Grégoire est en train de prendre l’électorat ‘multiculturaliste‘ (63% des intentions de vote), un groupe décisif à Paris ; c’est un vrai problème pour Sophia Chikirou”, remarque Jean-Yves Dormagen — cette catégorie d’électorat, surreprésentée dans les grandes villes, est notamment sensible aux enjeux sociaux et environnementaux, selon la typologie de l’institut. Il y voit une conséquence de l’alliance passée avec le candidat Vert : “Cette gauche a beaucoup de sympathie pour les écolos et accorde une prime à l’union.” (*) Sondage réalisé par Cluster 17 pour POLITICO entre le 28 et le 31 janvier 2026 sur un échantillon de 1201 Français dont 1104 inscrits sur les listes électorales à Paris, et représentatifs de la population parisienne, par âge, genre, catégorie socioprofessionnelle, arrondissements d’habitation et votes antérieurs (Présidentielle 2022, Européennes 2024 et Municipales 2020). La marge d’erreur pour 1104 personnes est comprise entre 1,5 et 2,8 points.

PARIS — Parisian voters will in March choose a new mayor for the first time in 12 years after incumbent Anne Hidalgo decided last year against running for reelection. Her successor will become one of France’s most recognizable politicians both at home and abroad, governing a city that, with more than 2 million people, is more populous than several EU countries. Jacques Chirac used it as a springboard to the presidency. The timing of the contest — a year before France’s next presidential election — raises the stakes still further. Though Paris is not a bellwether for national politics — the far-right National Rally, for example, is nowhere near as strong in the capital as elsewehere — what happens in the capital can still reverberate nationwide. Parisian politics and the city’s transformation attract nationwide attention in a country which is still highly centralized — and voters across the country observe the capital closely, be it with disdain or fascination. It’s also not a winner-take-all race. If a candidate’s list obtains more than 10 percent of the vote in the first round, they will advance to the runoff and be guaranteed representation on the city council. Here are the main candidates running to replace Hidalgo: ON THE LEFT EMMANUEL GRÉGOIRE Emmanuel Grégoire wants to become Paris’ third Socialist Party mayor in a row. He’s backed by the outgoing administration — but not the mayor herself, who has not forgiven the 48-year-old for having ditched his former job as her deputy to run for parliament last summer in a bid to boost his name recognition. HIS STRENGTHS: Grégoire is a consensual figure who has managed, for the first time ever, to get two key left-wing parties, the Greens and the Communists, to form a first-round alliance and not run their own candidates. That broad backing is expected to help him finish first in the opening round of voting. Emmanuel Grégoire. | Thomas Samson/AFP via Getty Images His falling-out with Hidalgo could also turn to his advantage given her unpopularity. Though Hidalgo will undoubtedly be remembered for her work turning Paris into a green, pedestrian-friendly “15 minute” city, recent polling shows Parisians are divided over her legacy. It’s a tough mission, but Grégoire could theoretically campaign on the outgoing administration’s most successful policies while simultaneously distancing himself from Hidalgo herself. ACHILLES’ HEEL: Grégoire can seem like a herbivorous fish in a shark tank. He hasn’t appeared as telegenic or media savvy as his rivals. Even his former boss Hidalgo accused him of being unable to take the heat in trying times, a key trait when applying for one of the most exposed jobs in French politics. Polling at: 32 percent Odds of winning: SOPHIA CHIKIROU Sophia Chikirou, a 46-year-old France Unbowed lawmaker representing a district in eastern Paris, hopes to outflank Grégoire from further to the left. HER STRENGTHS: A skilled political operative and communications expert, Chikirou is one of the brains behind left-wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s last two presidential runs, both of which ended with the hard left trouncing its mainstream rival — Grégoire’s Socialist Party. Sophia Chikirou. | Joel Saget/AFP via Getty Images She’ll try to conjure up that magic again in the French capital, where she is likely to focus her campaign on socially mixed areas near the city’s outer boundaries that younger voters, working-class households and descendants of immigrants typically call home. France Unbowed often performs well with all those demographics. ACHILLES’ HEEL: Chikirou is a magnet for controversy. In 2023, the investigative news program Cash Investigation revealed Chikirou had used a homophobic slur to refer to employees she was feuding with during a brief stint as head of a left-wing media operation. She also remains under formal investigation over suspicions that she overbilled Mélenchon — who is also her romantic partner — during his 2017 presidential run for communications services. Her opponents on both the left and right have also criticized her for what they consider rose-tinted views of the Chinese regime. Chikirou has denied any wrongdoing in relation to the overbilling accusations. She has not commented on the homophobic slur attributed to her and seldom accepts interviews, but her allies have brushed it off as humor, or a private conversation. Polling at: 13 percent Odds of winning: ON THE RIGHT RACHIDA DATI Culture Minister Rachida Dati is mounting her third bid for the Paris mayorship. This looks to be her best shot. HER STRENGTHS: Dati is a household name in France after two decades in politics. Culture Minister Rachida Dati. | Julien de Rosa/AFP via Getty Images She is best known for her combative persona and her feuds with the outgoing mayor as head of the local center-right opposition. She is the mayor of Paris’ 7th arrondissement (most districts in Paris have their own mayors, who handle neighborhood affairs and sit in the city council). It’s a well-off part of the capital along the Left Bank of the Seine that includes the Eiffel Tower. Since launching her campaign, Dati has tried to drum up support with social media clips similar to those that propelled Zohran Mamdani from an unknown assemblyman to mayor of New York. Hers have, unsurprisingly, a right-wing spin. She’s been seen ambushing migrants, illicit drug users and contraband sellers in grittier parts of Paris, racking up millions of views in the process. ACHILLES’ HEEL: Dati is a polarizing figure and tends to make enemies. Despite being a member of the conservative Les Républicains, Dati bagged a cabinet position in early 2024, braving the fury of her allies as she attempted to secure support from the presidential orbit for her mayoral run. But the largest party supporting President Emmanuel Macron, Renaissance, has instead chosen to back one of Dati’s center-right competitors. The party’s leader, Gabriel Attal, was prime minister when Dati was first appointed culture minister, and a clash between the two reportedly ended with Dati threatening to turn her boss’s dog into a kebab. (She later clarified that she meant it jokingly.) If she does win, she’ll be commuting from City Hall to the courthouse a few times a week in September, when she faces trial on corruption charges. Dati is accused of having taken funds from French automaker Renault to work as a consultant, while actually lobbying on behalf of the company thanks to her role as an MEP. Dati is being probed in other criminal affairs as well, including accusations that she failed to declare a massive jewelry collection. She has repeatedly professed her innocence in all of the cases. Polling at: 27 percent Odds of winning: PIERRE-YVES BOURNAZEL After dropping Dati, Renaissance decided to back a long-time Parisian center-right councilman: Pierre-Yves Bournazel. HIS STRENGTHS: Bournazel is a good fit for centrists and moderate conservatives who don’t have time for drama. He landed on the city council aged 31 in 2008, and — like Dati — has been dreaming of claiming the top job at city hall for over a decade. His low profile and exclusive focus on Parisian politics could also make it easier for voters from other political allegiances to consider backing him. Pierre-Yves Bournazel. | Bastien Ohier/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images ACHILLES’ HEEL: Bourna-who? The Ipsos poll cited in this story showed more than half of Parisians said they “did not know [Bournazel] at all.” Limited name recognition has led to doubts about his ability to win, even within his own camp. Although Bournazel earned support from Macron’s Renaissance party, several high-level Parisian party figures, such as Europe Minister Benjamin Haddad, have stuck with the conservative Dati instead. Macron himself appears unwilling to back his party’s choice, in part due to Bournazel being a member of Horizons, the party of former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe — who turned full Brutus and publicly called on the president to step down last fall. “I don’t see myself putting up posters for someone whose party has asked the president to resign,” said one of Macron’s top aides, granted anonymity as is standard professional practice. Polling at: 14 percent Odds of winning: ON THE FAR RIGHT THIERRY MARIANI Thierry Mariani, one of the first members of the conservative Les Républicains to cross the Rubicon to the far right, will represent the far right National Rally in the race to lead Paris. Though the party of the Le Pen family is currently France’s most popular political movement, it has struggled in the French capital for decades. Thierry Mariani. | Bertrand Guay/AFP via Getty Images HIS STRENGTHS: The bar is low for Mariani, as his party currently holds no seats on the city council. Mariani should manage to rack up some votes among lower-income households in Parisian social housing complexes while also testing how palatable his party has become to wealthier voters before the next presidential race. ACHILLES’ HEEL: Mariani has links to authoritarian leaders that Parisians won’t like. In 2014, he was part of a small group of French politicians who visited then-President of Syria Bashar al-Assad. He has also met Russia’s Vladimir Putin and traveled to Crimea to serve as a so-called observer in elections and referendums held in the Ukrainian region annexed by Russia — trips that earned him a reprimand from the European Parliament. Polling at: 7 percent Odds of winning: SARAH KNAFO There’s another candidate looking to win over anti-migration voters in Paris: Sarah Knafo, the millennial MEP who led far-right pundit-turned-politician Éric Zemmour’s disappointing 2022 presidential campaign. Knafo has not yet confirmed her run but has said on several occasions that it is under consideration. HER STRENGTHS: Though Zemmour only racked up around 7 percent of the vote when running for president, he fared better than expected in some of Paris’ most privileged districts. The firebrand is best known for popularizing the “great replacement” conspiracy theory in France — that white populations are being deliberately replaced by non-white. She appeals to hardline libertarian conservatives whose position on immigration aligns with the far right but who are alienated by the National Rally’s protectionism and its support for the French welfare state. Sarah Knafo. | Bastien Ohier/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images Knafo, who combines calls for small government with a complete crackdown on immigration, could stand a chance of finishing ahead of the National Rally in Paris. That would then boost her profile ahead of a potential presidential bid. If she reaches the 10 percent threshold, she’d be able to earn her party seats on the city council and more sway in French politics at large. ACHILLES’ HEEL: Besides most of Paris not aligning with her politics? Knafo describes herself as being “at an equal distance” from the conservative Les Républicains and the far-right National Rally. That positioning risks squeezing her between the two. Polling at: 7 percent Odds of winning: EDITOR’S NOTE: Poll figures are taken from an Ipsos survey of 849 Parisians released on Dec. 12.

BRUSSELS ―European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told EU leaders at their summit on Thursday that the Mercosur trade won’t be signed as scheduled on Saturday and instead would wait until next month, two EU diplomats told POLITICO. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said he agreed to Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s request to postpone the signature so she can reassure the country’s farmers that they wouldn’t be undercut by cheap poultry and beef, von der Leyen told the group, according to the diplomats. An eleventh-hour turnaround from Meloni threw into disarray a self-imposed objective of signing the agreement this week with the Mercosur countries, which includes Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Meloni asked the Brazilian leader for more time to back the agreement, which has been 25 years in the making, so she can secure domestic support in favor of the deal.

One trillion US dollars of gross domestic product (GDP) has been surpassed. Poland has entered the ranks of the world’s 20 largest economies, symbolically ending a phase of chasing the West that has lasted more than three decades. The Polish Development Fund’s (PFR) new strategy seeks to address the challenge of avoiding the medium-level development trap and transitioning from the role of subcontractor to that of investor. This year marks a turning point in Polish economic history. After years of transformation, reforms and overcoming civilizational deficits, Poland has reached a point that the generation of ‘89 could only dream of. GDP crossed the symbolic barrier of US$1 trillion, and we proudly enter the exclusive club of the world’s 20 largest economies. Diversified Polish exports are breaking records, and innovative companies are conquering global markets. Sound like a happy ending? Not necessarily. Via PFR Investing for future generations Poland’s past success invites tougher challenges in a brutal world. The cheap labor growth model is dead; demographics are relentless. PFR analyses highlight declining employment as a core issue — without bold changes, stagnation looms. Piotr Matczuk, PFR president, says Poland needs an impetus for resilience, innovation and growth. PFR’s 2026-2030 strategy is that roadmap, urging a shift to high gear. On Dec. 10, it unveiled investments for future generations. Geopolitics enters the balance sheet PFR’s strategy marks a paradigm shift: integrating economics with security. Business now anchors state security, with “economic and defence resilience” as a core pillar — viewing security spending as essential insurance, not cost. > The PFR’s strategy is clear: the competitiveness of the Polish economy depends > directly on access to cheap and clean energy. PFR has invested in WB Electronics, Poland’s defense leader in command systems and drones. It expands beyond arms via dual-use tech: algorithms, encrypted communications and autonomous drones often from civilian startups. This spring’s PFR Deep Tech program backs venture capital (VC) for scaling these firms; IDA targets innovations for logistics, cybersecurity and future defense. The focus is Poland’s technological sovereignty. Controlling key security links — from ammo to artificial intelligence — ensures economic maturity resilient to geopolitical shocks. > Poland needs a boost to our resilience, innovation and growth rate. That is > why the new strategy emphasizes investment in new technologies, infrastructure > and the financial security of Poles. We want the PFR to be a catalyst for > change and a partner of choice — an institution that invests for future > generations, sets quality standards in development financing and supports > Polish entrepreneurs in boosting their international presence. > > Piotr Matczuk, President, PFR Piotr Matczuk, President, PFR / Via PFR Energy: to be or not to be for the industry If defense is the shield, then energy is the bloodstream. The PFR’s strategy is clear: the competitiveness of the Polish economy depends directly on access to cheap and clean energy. Without accelerating the transformation, Polish companies, instead of increasing their share in foreign markets, may lose their position. This is why the fund wants to enter the game as an investor where the risks are high, but the stakes are even higher — into an investment gap that the commercial market alone will not fill.  The concept of local content, in other words the participation of domestic companies in the supply chain, is key to the new strategy. This is where the circle closes. The Baltic Hub is not just a container terminal. Investment in the T5 installation terminal is the foundation, as the Polish offshore will not be built with the appropriate participation of a domestic port. This is a classic example of how the PFR works: building ‘hard’ infrastructure that becomes a springboard for a whole new sector of the economy.  The end of being a subcontractor: capital emancipation Taking inspiration from, among others, France’s Tibi Initiative, in mid-November 2025 the Polish minister of finance and economy, Andrzej Domański, announced the Innovate Poland program. The PFR plays a leading role in what will be the largest initiative in the history of the Polish economy to invest in innovative projects. Thanks to cooperation with Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), PZU and the European Investment Fund, Innovate Poland is already worth 4 billion złoty, and the program multiplier may reach as much as 3-4. The combined development and private capital will be invested by experienced VC and private equity funds. The aim is to further Poland’s economic development — driven by innovative companies that make a profit. In the first phase, it is expected to finance up to 250 companies at various stages of development. Via PFR The expansion of Polish companies abroad is also part of the effort for advancement in the global hierarchy. Their support is one of the pillars of the new PFR strategy. For three decades, Poland has played the role of the assembly plant of Europe — solid, cheap and hard-working. However, the highest margins, flowing from having a global brand and market control, went overseas. Polish companies need to stop being anonymous subcontractors and become owners of assets in foreign markets.  Here, the PFR acts as financial leverage. The support for the Trend Group is a prime example of this maturing process. This is a transaction with a symbolic dimension: it reverses the investment vector of the 1990s, when German capital was consolidating Polish assets. Today, it is Polish entities that are increasingly becoming leaders in offering industrial solutions in the European Union. > Polish companies need to stop being anonymous subcontractors and become owners > of assets in foreign markets. However, these ambitions extend beyond the Western direction. The strategy strongly emphasizes Poland’s role in the future reconstruction of Ukraine and the consolidation of the Central and Eastern European region. The involvement of the PFR in the operations of the Euvic Group on the Ukrainian IT market is a good example. In the digital world, big players have more power, and the PFR strives to ensure that the decision-making centers of those growing giants remain in Poland. Most importantly, Polish businesses are no longer alone in this struggle. The strategy institutionalizes the concept of ‘Team Poland’. In this initiative, the PFR provides capital; BGK, a state development bank, offers debt solutions; the KUKE, an insurance company, insures the risk; and the Polish Investment and Trade Agency provides promotional support. Acting like a one-stop shop, all these institutions enable Polish capital to compete as a partner in the global league. This is part of the Polish government’s modern economic diplomacy strategy, led by Domański. Capital for generations. From an employee to a stakeholder in the economy  All grand plans need fuel. Mature economies like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom harness citizens’ savings via capital markets. PFR’s strategy boldly demands Poland’s success create generational wealth: turning the average Kowalski from an employee into a stakeholder. Diagnosis is brutal: Poles save little (6.38 percent compared with the EU’s 14.32 percent in Q1 2024) and inefficiently, favoring low-interest deposits. Employee Capital Plans (PPK) drive cultural change. Hard data demonstrate this: 67 percent average returns over five years crush traditional savings. It’s a virtuous cycle — PPK capital feeds stock markets, finances company growth and loops profits back to future pensioners. An architect, not a firefighter  The new PFR strategy for 2026-30 is a clear signal of a paradigm shift. The company, which many Polish entrepreneurs still see as a firefighter extinguishing the flames of the pandemic with billions from the Anti-Covid Financial Shields, is definitively taking off its helmet and putting on an engineer’s hard hat. It is shifting from interventionist to creator mode, abandoning the role of ‘night watchman’ of the Polish economy to that of its ‘chief architect’. This is an ambitious attempt to establish an institution in Poland that not only provides capital, but also actively shapes the country’s economic landscape, setting the direction for development for decades to come.

LONDON — Britain’s steel industry is having a tough time. Thanks to the EU, it’s about to get even tougher. As 2025 comes to a close, a combination of new tariffs from Washington and Brussels has left the sector teetering on the edge. And now it’s going to be smacked by Brussels’ new carbon import taxes. The maelstrom could leave the industry “irreversibly and profoundly harmed,” according to its representative body. The EU’s catchily-named Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) goes live from the start of 2026. It will charge importers for the carbon price of their goods and introduce reams of new paperwork. In the long run, British businesses will be exempt from the levy, thanks to Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s EU reset. In May, Brussels and London agreed to link their carbon emissions trading systems, bringing the U.K. into the exclusive club of “third countries” that won’t have to pay. But those negotiations will take time, and until they are complete British steelmakers will face higher costs selling into the EU — by far their biggest overseas market. On Wednesday the two capitals issued a joint statement pledging to complete talks by sometime in 2026, in time for an as-yet-to-be-scheduled summit. For U.K. steel, it’ll feel like a long wait. “The EU CBAM creates barriers to U.K. steel exports to Europe and piles additional costs and admin onto our steelmakers at a time when global trade is increasingly turbulent,” Frank Aaskov, UK Steel’s director for energy and climate change policy, told POLITICO. The ripple effects of the EU’s new policy are also expected to lead to steel from abroad being diverted to the less protectionist U.K., providing further competition on the domestic market for beleaguered producers. “Our U.K. steel industry is largely unprotected as the EU CBAM risks redirecting steel flows away from Europe and into open markets like ours,” Aaskov added. He argued this was arguably “worse” than the CBAM charges themselves. The industry body is urging the U.K. government to get a move on linking its carbon market with the EU to secure an exemption. It also wants ministers to develop the U.K.’s own version of CBAM, something promised for 2027. Aaskov called for “urgent” steel import quota measures to stop the influx of diverted foreign products, without which “the U.K. steel industry is likely to be irreversibly and profoundly harmed.” BRIDGING THE GAP British exporters across carbon-intensive industries, including steel along with heavy manufacturing like concrete and chemicals, were hoping for a “bridging” deal that would shield U.K. businesses from CBAM levies while ETS linkage was being negotiated. None materialized. Instead, the EU agreed a blanket exemption for electricity imports from neighboring countries and a slate of other category exemptions, such as for small and medium-sized businesses. It’s an approach the U.K. — with its highly interlinked, cross-channel electricity market — will do well out of at the macro level. But it leaves steel exposed, at least temporarily. Despite Starmer supposedly securing a widely-trumpeted exception back in May, those tariffs still remain in place. | Pool Photo by Alastair Grant via Getty Images “We’re not exempting anyone,” European Commissioner for Climate Wopke Hoekstra told a press conference Wednesday.  “But the moment we will be fully linking those [carbon markets], it is likely that there will be an exemption.” Hoekstra added that “the price that [the U.K.] will be paying is actually minimal” and that that was “just one of the realities of how the system works.” While the scheme technically starts from Jan. 1, declarations of the carbon embedded in imports — and the associated fees — won’t be due until September 2027. Adam Berman, director of policy and advocacy at trade body Energy UK, told a briefing of journalists ahead of the announcement: “I understand the position of the European Commission, which is that they will inevitably be concerned that any exemption that they might offer on an ad hoc basis to a country like the U.K. would then lead to countries like China and India — which are the main targets of the CBAM — turning around and saying: ‘Why don’t you give us equal treatment?’” One EU official, granted anonymity to speak candidly, told POLITICO: “The companies, or the sectors that are actually concerned when it comes to the U.K., are very limited. So there will be an impact, but it will be very, very limited. And it will be also limited in time, because once the ETS agreement is in place it won’t be a question anymore.” A U.K. government official said: “ETS linkage will remove CBAM. In the interim, we’ve always told businesses they need to prepare for January.” The carbon levy is just the latest challenge for the industry, which sells 78 percent of its exported steel to the EU — totalling 1.9 million tons in 2024. Back in March, it was slapped with 25 percent tariffs by Donald Trump’s protectionist U.S. administration. Despite Starmer supposedly securing a widely-trumpeted exception back in May, those tariffs still remain in place. Then in October, British steelmakers learned they would be in the firing line from Brussels, too. The EU plans, which were in part a blanket response to Trump’s tariffs, as well as Chinese dumping, will cut its steel import quotas in half. The industry said it was “the biggest crisis the U.K. steel industry has ever faced.” In an interview with POLITICO on Monday, the EU’s trade chief Maroš Šefčovič said the U.K. and EU were “close allies” and “definitely on the first list of the countries with whom to start to talk” about the coming tariffs. Where those talks might lead, he didn’t say. Additional reporting from Brussels by Camille Gijs and Antonia Zimmerman

President Donald Trump’s latest round of Europe-bashing has the U.S.’s allies across the Atlantic revisiting a perennial question: Why does Trump hate Europe so much? Trump’s disdain for America’s one-time partners has been on prominent display in the past week — first in Trump’s newly released national security strategy, which suggested that Europe was suffering from civilizational decline, and then in Trump’s exclusive interview with POLITICO, where he chided the “decaying” continent’s leaders as “weak.” In Europe, Trump’s criticisms were met with more familiar consternation — and calls to speed up plans for a future where the continent cannot rely on American security support. But where does Trump’s animosity for Europe actually come from? To find out, I reached out to a scholar who’d been recommended to me by sources in MAGA world as someone who actually understands their foreign policy thinking (even if he doesn’t agree with it). “He does seem to divide the world into strength and weakness, and he pays attention to strength, and he kind of ignores weakness,” said Jeremy Shapiro, the research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on Trump’s strained relations with the continent. “And he has long characterized the Europeans as weak.” Shapiro explained that Trump has long blamed Europe’s weakness on its low levels of military spending and its dependence on American security might. But his critique seems to have taken on a new vehemence during his second term thanks to input from new advisers like Vice President JD Vance, who have successfully cast Europe as a liberal bulwark in a global culture war between MAGA-style “nationalists” and so-called globalists. Like many young conservatives, Shapiro explained, Vance has come to believe that “it was these bastions of liberal power in the culture and in the government that stymied the first Trump term, so you needed to attack the universities, the think tanks, the foundations, the finance industry, and, of course, the deep state.” In the eyes of MAGA, he said, “Europe is one of these liberal bastions.” This conversation was edited for length and clarity. Trump’s recent posture toward Europe brings to mind the old adage that the opposite of love isn’t hate, it’s indifference. Do you think Trump hates Europe, or does he just think it’s irrelevant? My main impression is that he’s pretty indifferent toward it. There are moments when specific European countries or the EU really pisses him off and he expresses something that seems close to hatred, but mostly he doesn’t seem very focused on it. Why do you think that is? He does seem to divide the world into strength and weakness, and he pays attention to strength, and he kind of ignores weakness. And he has long characterized the Europeans as weak for a bunch of different reasons having to do with what seems to him to be a decadence in their society, their immigration, their social welfare states, their lack of apparent military vigor. All of those things seem to put them in the weak category, and in Trump’s world, if you’re in the weak category, he doesn’t pay much attention to you. What about more prosaic things like the trade imbalance and NATO spending? Do those contribute to his disdain, or does it originate from a more guttural place? I get the impression that it is more at a guttural level. It always seemed to me that the NATO spending debate was just a stick with which to beat the NATO allies. He has long understood that that’s something that they felt a little bit guilty about, and that’s something that American presidents had beat them about for a while, so he just sort of took it to an 11. The trade deficit is something that’s more serious for him. He’s paid quite a bit of attention to that in every country, so it’s in the trade area where he takes Europeans most seriously. But because they’re so weak and so dependent on the United States for security, he hasn’t had to deal with their trade problems in the same way. He’s able to threaten them on security, and they have folded pretty quickly. Does some of his animosity originate from his pre-presidency when he did business in Europe? He likes to blame Europeans for nixing some of his business transactions, like a golf course in Ireland. How serious do you think that is? I think that’s been important in forming his opinion of the EU rather than of Europe as a whole. He never seems to refer to the EU without referring to the fact that they blocked his golf course in Ireland. It wasn’t even the EU that blocked it, actually — it was an Irish local government authority — but it conforms to the general MAGA view of the EU as overly bureaucratic, anti-development and basically as an extension of the American liberal approach to development and regulation, which Trump certainly does hate. That’s part of what led Trump and his movement more generally to put the EU in the category of supporters of liberal America. In that sense, the fight against the EU in particular — but also against the other liberal regimes in Europe — became an extension of their domestic political battle with liberals in America. That effort to pull Europe as a whole into the American culture war by positioning it as a repository of all the liberal pieties that MAGA has come to hate — that seems kind of new. That is new for the second term, yeah. Where do you think that’s coming from? It definitely seems to be coming from [Vice President] JD Vance and the sort of philosophers who support him — the Patrick Deneens and Yoram Hazonys. Those types of people see liberal Europe as quite decadent and as part of the overall liberal problem in the world. You can also trace some of it back to Steve Bannon, who has definitely been talking about this stuff for a while. There does seem to be a real preoccupation with the idea that Europe is suffering from some sort of civilizational decline or civilization collapse. For instance, in both the new national security strategy and in his remarks to POLITICO this week, Trump has suggested that Europe is “decaying.” What do you make of that? This is a bit of a projection, right? If you look at the numbers in terms of immigration and diversity, the United States is further ahead in that decay — if you want to call it that — than Europe. There was this view that emerged among MAGA elites in the interregnum that it wasn’t enough to win the presidency in order to successfully change America. You had to attack all of the bastions of liberal power. It was these bastions of liberal power in the culture and in the government that stymied the first Trump term, so you needed to attack the universities, the think tanks, the foundations, the finance industry and, of course, the deep state, which is the first target. It was only through attacking these liberal bastions and conquering them to your cause that you could have a truly transformative effect. One of the things that they seem to have picked up while contemplating this theory is that Europe is one of these liberal bastions. Europe is a support for liberals in the United States, in part because Europe is the place where Americans get their sense of how the world views them. It’s ironic that that image of a decadent Europe coexists with the rise of far-right parties across the continent. Obviously, the Trump administration has supported those parties and allied with them, but at least in France and Germany, the momentum seems to be behind these parties at the moment. That presents them with an avenue to destroy liberal Europe’s support for liberal America by essentially transforming Europe into an illiberal regime. That is the vector of attack on liberal Europe. There has been this idea that’s developed amongst the populist parties in Europe since Brexit that they’re not really trying to leave the EU or destroy the EU; they’re trying to remake the EU in their nationalist and sovereigntist image. That’s perfect for what the Trump people are trying to do, which is not destroy the EU fully, but destroy the EU as a support for liberal ideas in the world and the United States. You mentioned the vice president, who has become a very prominent mouthpiece for this adversarial approach to Europe — most obviously in his speech at Munich earlier this year. Do you think he’s just following Trump’s guttural dislike of Europe or is he advancing his own independent anti-European agenda? A little of both. I think that Vance, like any good vice president, is very careful not to get crosswise with his boss and not contradict him in any way. So the fact that Trump isn’t opposed to this and that he can support it to a degree is very, very important. But I think that a lot of these ideas come from Vance independently, at least in detail. What he’s doing is nudging Trump along this road. He’s thinking about what will appeal to Trump, and he’s mostly been getting it right. But I think that especially when it comes to this sort of culture war stuff with Europe, he’s more of a source than a follower. During this latest round of Trump’s Euro-bashing, did anything stand out to you as new or novel? Or was it all of a piece with what you had heard before? It was novel relative to a year ago, but not relative to February and since then. But it’s a new mechanism of describing it — through a national security strategy document and through interviews with the president. The same arguments have achieved a sort of higher status, I would say, in the last week or so. You could sit around in Europe — as I did — and argue about the degree to which this really was what the Trump administration was doing, or whether this was just a faction — and you can still have that argument, because the Trump administration is generally quite inconsistent and incoherent when it comes to this kind of thing — but I think it’s undoubtedly achieved a greater status in the last week or two. How do you think Europe should deal with Trump’s recurring animosity towards the continent? It seems they’ve settled on a strategy of flattery, but do you think that’s effective in the long run? No, I think that’s the exact opposite of effective. If you recall what I said at the beginning, Trump abhors weakness, and flattery is the sort of ultimate manifestation of weakness. Every time the Europeans show up and flatter Trump, it enables them to have a good meeting with him, but it conveys the impression to him that they are weak, and so it increases his policy demands against them. We’ve seen that over and over again. The Europeans showed up and thought they had changed his Ukraine position, they had a great meeting, he said good things about them, they went home and a few weeks later, he had a totally different Ukraine position that they’re now having to deal with. The flattery has achieved the sense in the Trump administration that they can do anything they want to the Europeans, and they’ll basically swallow it. They haven’t done what some other countries have done, like the Chinese or the Brazilians, or even the Canadians to some degree, which is to stand up to Trump and show him that he has to deal with them as strong actors. And that’s a shame, because the Europeans — while they obviously have an asymmetric dependence on the United States, and they have some weaknesses — are a lot stronger than a lot of other countries, especially if they were working together. I think they have some capacity to do that, but they haven’t really managed it as of yet. Maybe this will be a wake-up call to do that.

BRUXELLES — La commissaire européenne chargée de la Concurrence, Teresa Ribera, n’a pas mâché ses mots contre l’administration Trump, l’accusant d’utiliser le “chantage” pour contraindre l’UE à assouplir sa réglementation du numérique. Le secrétaire américain au Commerce, Howard Lutnick, a suggéré lundi à Bruxelles que les Etats-Unis pourraient modifier leur approche en matière de droits de douane sur l’acier et l’aluminium si l’UE revoyait ses règles en matière de numérique. Les responsables européens ont interprété ses remarques comme visant les réglementations phares de l’UE, notamment celle sur les marchés numériques (DMA). “C’est du chantage”, a considéré la commissaire espagnole dans un entretien à POLITICO mercredi. “Le fait que ce soit leur intention ne signifie pas que nous acceptons ce genre de chantage.” Teresa Ribera — qui, en tant que première vice-présidente exécutive de la Commission, est la numéro 2 de l’exécutif européen derrière la présidente Ursula von der Leyen — a souligné que la réglementation européenne du numérique ne devrait pas avoir de lien avec les négociations commerciales. L’équipe de Donald Trump cherche à réviser l’accord conclu par le président américain avec Ursula von der Leyen dans son golf écossais en juillet. Ces déclarations interviennent à un moment sensible des négociations commerciales en cours. Washington considère le DMA comme discriminatoire, parce que les grandes plateformes technologiques qu’il réglemente — comme Microsoft, Google ou Amazon — sont presque toutes américaines. Il s’insurge également contre le règlement sur les services numériques (DSA), qui vise à limiter les discours haineux illégaux et la désinformation en ligne, car il est conçu pour encadrer les réseaux sociaux comme X d’Elon Musk. Teresa Ribera a rappelé que ces règles étaient une question de souveraineté, et qu’elles ne devraient pas entrer dans le champ d’une négociation commerciale. “Nous respectons les règles, quelles qu’elles soient, qu’ils ont établies pour leurs marchés : le marché numérique, le secteur de la santé, l’acier, tout ce que vous voulez […] les voitures, les normes”, a-t-elle posé en parlant des Etats-Unis. “C’est leur problème, leur réglementation et leur souveraineté. Il en va de même ici.” Teresa Ribera, avec la commissaire aux Technologies numériques Henna Virkkunen, supervise le DMA, qui veille au bon comportement des grandes plateformes numériques et à une concurrence équitable. Elle a vivement réagi aux propos tenus par Howard Lutnick lors de sa rencontre avec des responsables et des ministres européens lundi, martelant que “les règles européennes en matière de numérique ne sont pas à négocier”. Henna Virkkunen tenait la même ligne mardi. Lundi, elle a présenté à ses homologues américains le paquet de mesures de simplification de l’UE, comprenant la proposition d’omnibus numérique. Ce paquet a été présenté comme une initiative européenne visant à réduire les formalités administratives, mais certains l’ont interprété comme une tentative de répondre aux préoccupations des Big Tech américaines en matière de régulation. Le secrétaire américain au Commerce, Howard Lutnick, a suggéré lundi à Bruxelles que les Etats-Unis pourraient modifier leur approche en matière de droits de douane sur l’acier et l’aluminium si l’UE revoyait ses règles en matière de numérique. | Nicolas Tucat/Getty Images Interrogée sur les raisons qui l’ont poussée à faire une déclaration aussi forte, Teresa Ribera a répondu que les remarques d’Howard Lutnick constituaient “une attaque directe contre le DMA”, avant d’ajouter : “Il est de ma responsabilité de défendre le bon fonctionnement du marché numérique en Europe.” DES FISSURES APPARAISSENT Malgré la réplique intransigeante de Teresa Ribera, la solidarité des Etats membres envers le DMA commence doucement à se fissurer. Après la réunion de lundi, Howard Lutnick a pointé que certains ministres européens du Commerce n’étaient pas aussi réticents que la Commission à l’idée de revoir les règles numériques de l’UE : “Je vois beaucoup de ministres […] certains sont plus ouverts d’esprit que d’autres”, a-t-il observé sur Bloomberg TV, affirmant que si l’Europe veut des investissements américains, elle doit changer son modèle de régulation. Parmi les participants, au moins une Européenne semble d’accord. L’Allemande Katherina Reiche, qui s’est exprimée en marge de la réunion, a déclaré à la presse qu’elle était favorable à un nouvel assouplissement des règles de l’UE en matière de numérique. “L’Allemagne a clairement fait savoir qu’elle voulait avoir la possibilité de jouer un rôle dans le monde numérique”, a exposé Katherina Reiche, citant en particulier le DMA et le DSA. Les efforts de lobbying déployés par Washington contre les règles européennes sur le numérique s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’une bataille plus large menée par les Etats-Unis au niveau mondial pour affaiblir les lois sur le numérique dans les pays étrangers. Ce mois-ci, la Corée du Sud a cédé au lobbying de l’administration Trump en revenant en arrière sur son propre projet d’encadrement de la concurrence dans le secteur numérique. Le représentant américain au commerce prépare son rapport 2026 et lance une nouvelle série de consultations dans les semaines à venir. Entre-temps, la Commission poursuit son évaluation des règles dans le cadre de son Digital Fairness Fitness Check et de la révision en cours du DMA. Mais entre le lobbying de Washington et les Etats membres qui se désolidarisent, la question n’est pas seulement de savoir ce à quoi va aboutir la révision du DMA, mais s’il peut survivre à la guerre commerciale. Cet article a d’abord été publié par POLITICO en anglais, puis a été édité en français par Jean-Christophe Catalon.