President Donald Trump has often frustrated European allies with his overt entreaties to Russian President Vladimir Putin and harsh words for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. But behind the seeming imbalance is a longer-term strategic goal – countering China. The Trump administration believes that incentivizing Russia to end the war in Ukraine, welcoming it back economically and showering it with U.S. investments, could eventually shift the global order away from China. It’s a gamble – and one Ukrainians are concerned with – but it underscores the administration’s belief that the biggest geopolitical threat facing the United States and the West is China, not Putin’s Russia. While countering China isn’t the only reason the administration wants a truce, it does help explain why after more than 15 months of fruitless talks and multiple threats to walk away, the president’s team – special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner – keep looking for a breakthrough. A Trump administration official, granted anonymity to discuss ongoing negotiations, said finding a “way to align closer with Russia” could create “a different power balance with China that could be very, very beneficial.” The administration’s desire to use Ukraine peace negotiations to counter China has not been previously reported. But many observers believe this plan has little hope of succeeding – at least while Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping remain in charge. And the idea of giving Russia economic incentives to grow closer to the U.S. is concerning for Ukraine, said a Ukrainian official, granted anonymity to discuss diplomatic matters. “We had such attempts in the past already and it led to nothing,” they said. “Germany had [Ostpolitik, Germany’s policy toward the East], for that and now Russia is fighting the deadliest war in Europe.” And when it comes to banking on breaking apart China and Russia, the Ukrainian official noted that both countries “have one [thing] in common which you can not beat – they hate the U.S. as a symbol of democracy.” Still, the strategy is in keeping with the administration’s broader foreign policy initiatives aimed at least in part in countering Chinese influence. Taking out Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and pressuring Cuba’s government to the brink of collapse all diminishes China’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. The administration threatened Panama, which withdrew from Chinese leader Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative a month after Trump took office and called Peru’s deal with China surrounding its deepwater port in Chancay a “cautionary tale.” And striking Iran shifted China’s oil import potential, as Tehran supplied Beijing with more than 13 percent of its oil in 2025, according to Reuters. Indeed, the Trump administration official noted that between Venezuela, Iran and Russia, China was buying oil at below-market rates, subsidizing its consumption “to the tune of over $100 billion a year for the last several years.” “So that’s been a massive subsidy for China by being able to buy oil from these places on the black market, sometimes $30 a barrel lower than what the spot market is,” the person said. Even as there are reports that Russia is sharing intelligence with Iran, the U.S. and Russia keep talking. Witkoff and Kushner met with Kirill Dmitriev, a top adviser to Putin, last week. The Russians called the meeting “productive.” Witkoff said they’d keep talking. These negotiations and the broader efforts to counter China now take place under the spectre of Trump asking several countries, including China, for help securing the Strait of Hormuz. The National Security Strategy, released in November, spilled a fair amount of ink on China, though it often doesn’t mention Beijing directly. Many U.S. lawmakers — from both parties — consider China the gravest long-term threat to America’s global power. “There is a longstanding kind of U.S. strategic train of thought that says that having Russia and China working together is very much not in our interests, and finding ways to divide them, or at least tactically collaborate with the partner who’s less of a long term strategic threat to us,” said said Alexander Gray, Trump’s National Security Council chief of staff in his first term. Gray, who is currently the CEO of American Global Strategies, a consulting firm, compared the effort to former Secretary of State and national security adviser Henry Kissinger, who spearheaded President Richard Nixon’s trip to China during the Cold War in an effort to pull that country away from the Soviet Union. The State Department declined to comment for this report. However, a State Department spokesperson previously told POLITICO that China’s economic ties with Latin American countries present a “national security threat” for the U.S. that the administration is actively trying to mitigate. The White House declined to comment. Fred Fleitz, another Trump NSC chief of staff in his first term, noted that the president has “pressed Putin to end the war to normalize Russia’s relationship with the U.S. and Europe,” and wants Russia to rejoin the G8. “It is clear that Trump wants to find a way to end the war in Ukraine and to coexist peacefully with Russia,” said Fleitz, who now serves as the vice chair for American Security at the America First Policy Institute. “But I also believe he correctly sees the growing Russia-China alliance as a far greater threat to U.S. and global security than the Ukraine War and therefore wants to find ways to improve U.S.-Russia relations to weaken or break that alliance.” Others, however, remain skeptical. Craig Singleton, senior director of the China program at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the goal to break Russia and China is “appealing in theory, but in practice the partnership between Moscow and Beijing is iron-clad.” “Obviously there is nothing wrong with testing diplomacy and President Trump is a dealmaker. But history probably suggests that this won’t really result in much,” Singleton added. “The likely outcome [with Russia] is limited tactical cooperation with the U.S., not some sort of durable break with Beijing.” And China seeks to keep Russia as an ally and junior partner in its relationship as a counter to Western powers. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed the relationship in a press conference this month, saying, “in a fluid and turbulent world, China-Russia relationship has stood rock-solid against all odds.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio, shortly after his confirmation, hinted at the broader strategy, saying in an interview, that “a situation where the Russians are permanently a junior partner to China, having to do whatever China says they need to do because of their dependence on them” is not a “good outcome” for Russia, the U.S. or Europe. But Rubio, like the Trump administration official given anonymity to discuss ongoing negotiations, both acknowledged that fully severing those ties would be a tough lift. “I don’t know if we’ll ever be successful at peeling them completely off a relationship with the Chinese,” Rubio said in February of last year. Adam Savit, director for China policy at the America First Policy Institute, argued that “Russia matters at the margins, but it won’t be a decisive variable in the U.S.-China competition,” and that the “center of gravity is East Asia.” “Russia gives China strategic depth, a friendly border, energy supply, and a second front in Ukraine to sap Western attention,” he said. “Getting closer to Russia could complicate China’s strategic position, but Moscow is a declining power and solidly the junior partner in that relationship.”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Von der Freigabe strategischer Ölreserven über die umstrittene Preisobergrenze an Tankstellen bis hin zur verschärften Missbrauchsaufsicht durch das Kartellamt: Jürgen Klöckner und Joanna Lehner erklären die Mechanismen hinter den Maßnahmen und warum Reiches Vorgänger Robert Habeck plötzlich wieder als Referenz dient. Im Policy Talk berichtet der Logistikunternehmer und Münchner IHK-Vizepräsident Georg Dettendorfer aus der Praxis. Er schildert, wie Treibstoffgleitklauseln in Verträgen die Liquidität mittelständischer Unternehmen auffressen, warum Frachtraum aus Osteuropa verschwindet und weshalb er jetzt staatliche Darlehen nach dem Vorbild der Corona-Soforthilfen fordert. Gesundheitsministerin Nina Warken muss Milliarden sparen, um die Krankenkassen zu stabilisieren. Warum sie dabei keine Rücksicht auf die mächtige Pharmalobby nehmen kann und weshalb sie für diesen Sparkurs dringend die Rückendeckung von Kanzler Friedrich Merz benötigt, ordnet Jürgen Klöckner ein. ⁠Hier den neuen Pro-Newsletter „Gesundheit am Morgen“ kostenlos testen.⁠ „Power & Policy“ zeigt jede Woche, wo und wie die Entscheidungen in der Wirtschaftspolitik fallen. ⁠Jürgen Klöckner⁠ und ⁠Joana Lehner⁠ von POLITICO sprechen mit Top-Entscheidern und liefern Off-the-Record-Einblicke aus der Redaktion und Machtzentren. Präzise Analysen, lange bevor Gesetze beschlossen sind. Der Podcast für alle in Wirtschaft und Politik, die einen Wissensvorsprung brauchen — immer donnerstags. Für Policy-Profis: Abonnieren und die Pro-Newsletter ⁠Industrie & Handel⁠, ⁠Energie & Klima ⁠und ⁠Gesundheit⁠. Jetzt kostenlos testen. Fragen und Feedback gern an ⁠powerandpolicy@politico.eu⁠ POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 ⁠information@axelspringer.de⁠ Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

BRUSSELS — In the corridors of Brussels, policymakers endlessly debate the intricacies of the Vision for Agriculture and Food, the urgency of the European Child Guarantee and the future of the Common Agricultural Policy. Yet the place where these high-level strategies actually collide, and succeed or fail, is likely the noisiest room in any building: the school canteen. This week, as we mark International School Meals Day, we need to stop treating school food as a mere logistical cost or a side dish to education. Instead, we must recognize it for what it is: the single most powerful but under-utilized lever for systemic change. Beyond the plate: a systemic warning The statistics are sobering. Today, one in four European adolescents is overweight or obese, according to the World Health Organization. This is not merely a matter of individual choice or poverty. This trend is driven by a food landscape where ultra-processed, low-nutrient options have become the most accessible and affordable default for almost every family, regardless of socio-economic background. For many children, school meals are the only reliable window of high-quality nutrition in a day otherwise dominated by a broken food system. On the production side, our farmers are protesting for fair incomes, while the climate crisis demands a shift to sustainable food systems. It sounds like an impossible knot to untie. But for the past three years, a growing revolution has been taking place in close to 4,000 schools across 22 European countries, reaching over one million children. > For many children, school meals are the only reliable window of high-quality > nutrition in a day otherwise dominated by a broken food system. Through the EU-funded initiative SchoolFood4Change (SF4C), cities and schools have gone far beyond updating their menus; they have dismantled the old model entirely. While thousands have begun transforming how food is sourced, prepared and valued, more than 850 schools have taken the leap even further by fully implementing the Whole School Food Approach (WSFA). The results, published by Rikolto in a new report this week, offer a blueprint for an EU-wide roll-out of the model. “Evidence proves the framework works, yet we are currently hitting a bureaucratic ceiling,” explains Amalia Ochoa, head of sustainable food systems at ICLEI Europe and coordinator of SF4C. “Healthy school meals combined with food education represent the most accessible pathway to food system transformation, directly benefiting the 93 million children and young people across Europe. By aligning existing initiatives under a coherent framework, the EU can deliver on its promises to public health and both economic and environmental sustainability in one integrated approach.” Breaking the silos The WSFA works because it shifts the focus from the individual plate to the entire ecosystem. It recognizes that school meals are not an isolated education cost, but a powerful crossroads where public health, regional economics and environmental policy meet. Credit: LAYLA AERTS The approach integrates four pillars: meaningful policy leadership; sustainable procurement (favoring local and organic); hands-on education (gardening and cooking); and community partnership. When procurement is aligned with regional sustainability goals, magic happens. Children understand the value of food, waste less and local farmers gain a stable, predictable market, shielding them from global market volatility, while simultaneously lowering the long-term healthcare costs associated with diet-related diseases. The missing ingredient: it’s not just the food, it’s the people However, the report reveals a critical bottleneck. The biggest barrier to scaling this success isn’t necessarily the cost of the ingredients; it is the lack of dedicated coordination. > School meals are not an isolated education cost, but a powerful crossroads > where public health, regional economics and environmental policy meet. Transformation requires human power. It needs local coordinators who can navigate the labyrinth between a city’s health department, the procurement office and the school board. Too often, we fund the infrastructure but forget the implementation. For the WSFA to become an EU-wide standard, national and regional authorities need to move beyond project-based thinking. It’s not just another subsidy; it’s a strategic investment in Europe’s social and ecological resilience. As Thibault Geerardyn, director at Rikolto Europe, notes in the report:“The true obstacle to scaling up is institutional, not ideological. Changes in policy must be embedded in the current system, not merely added to it as a ‘nice to have’ project.” The mandate for change: a strategic imperative As the EU begins implementing its new mandate, school food offers a rare ‘triple dividend’ that hits every major political target on the Brussels agenda. It serves as a public health shield, a guaranteed market for local farmers and a tangible safety net for the European Child Guarantee. > Systemic change cannot be led by temporary staff or volunteers. The EU can > make the difference. However, this potential remains locked as long as school food is treated as a secondary concern. Systemic change cannot be led by temporary staff or volunteers. The EU can make the difference. We call on the European Parliament and Commission to: 1. Standardize quality: establish an EU-wide minimum standard of healthy school food and education to drive quality upwards across all member states. 2. Fund the coordinators: move away from short-term grants toward long-term strategic investment in the permanent operational implementation and coordination needed to guide schools through this transition. You cannot build a resilient system on temporary project cycles. 3. Connect the dots: create an interdepartmental taskforce. School food is currently a political orphan, sitting awkwardly between agricultural, health, youth and social policies. It needs a permanent home in the EU institutions and a unified strategy. The revolution is on the menu. We have the recipe. We have the evidence from more than 850 schools. Now, what’s needed is the political courage to serve it. Read the full evidence-based report here: “From Pilots to Policy: Evidence from Three Years of Implementing the Whole School Food Approach in Europe.” This article has been published with funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 101036763. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Rikolto België vzw * The ultimate controlling entity is Rikolto België vzw * The political advertisement is linked to encouraging change to European policy on food systems with calls to action for EU Institutions. Reference to the Green Deal, the European Child Guarantee, and agricultural reform. More information here.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Die Berlinale 2026 ist längst vorbei, aber die Debatte beginnt erst richtig. Antisemitismus-Vorwürfe, antiisraelische Töne und die Sorge vor einer politischer Vereinnahmung überschatten das Festival und dessen Zukunft. Rixa Fürsen über die Frage: Wie lassen sich Kunstfreiheit und Meinungsfreiheit mit der klaren Ächtung von Antisemitismus vereinbaren? Im 200-Sekunden-Interview geht es dann mit Katrin Göring-Eckardt (Grüne) ebenfalls um die Kontroverse: Was tun gegen einen augenscheinlich tief sitzenden Antisemitismus in Teilen der Kulturszene? Welche politischen Konsequenzen braucht es? Die AfD verbucht einen juristischen Teilerfolg. Das Verwaltungsgericht Köln untersagt dem Verfassungsschutz vorerst, die gesamte AfD als rechtsextremistisch einzustufen. Was bedeutet das praktisch für die Partei, für den Verfassungsschutz und für die politische Debatte? Einschätzungen dazu von Pauline von Pezold, Host unseres ⁠POLITICO-Podcasts „Inside AfD“⁠. Und zum Schluss: ein Blick in die „schwarz-gelbe“ Kartoffelküche. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. ⁠Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.⁠ Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: ⁠@gordon.repinski⁠ | X: ⁠@GordonRepinski⁠. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 ⁠information@axelspringer.de⁠ Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna **(Anzeige) Eine Nachricht von Roche Deutschland: Deutschlands Zukunft entscheidet sich bei Innovation. Darum investieren wir heute Milliarden in Forschung, Produktion und Wertschöpfung in Deutschland – für Souveränität, Sicherheit und Unabhängigkeit. Denn klar ist: Wo Innovation ausgebremst wird, verliert eine Schlüsselindustrie an Tempo. Und Deutschland an gesunder Zukunft.**

Andrej Babiš built his fortune making fertilizer. But another, lesser-known arm of his business empire has helped bring more than 170,000 children into the world across Europe. The Czech prime minister’s name is rarely attached to FutureLife, one of Europe’s largest IVF clinic networks, spanning 60 clinics in 16 countries from Prague to Madrid to Dublin. But is just one part of a commercial empire that spans nitrogen-based fertilizers and industrial farms, assisted reproduction, online lingerie stores and more. And the Czech leader holds this portfolio while sitting at the table negotiating EU budgets, health rules and industrial policy. Yet in Brussels, nobody can answer a deceptively simple question: Which of the companies associated with Babiš receives EU money — and how much? “We might be giving him money and we don’t even know,” said Daniel Freund, a German Green lawmaker who led the European Parliament’s inquiries into Babiš during his first term as Czechia’s prime minister from 2017 to 2021. In 2021, the Parliament overwhelmingly adopted a resolution condemning Babiš over conflicts of interest involving EU subsidies and companies he founded. Under EU rules, member countries are responsible for checking conflicts of interest and reporting on who ultimately benefits from EU funds. But there is no single EU-wide register linking ultimate beneficial owners to all EU payments — making cross-border oversight difficult. The issue has resurfaced as Babiš returns to power and once again takes a seat among other EU heads of state and government in the European Council. In that exclusive body, he helps negotiate the bloc’s long-term budget, agricultural subsidies and other funding frameworks that shape the sectors in which his companies might operate. For years, debates over Babiš’s conflicts of interest have revolved around a single name — Agrofert, the agro-industrial empire that EU and Czech auditors found had improperly received over €200 million in EU and national agricultural subsidies. The payment suspensions and repayment demands continue: This week, Czech authorities halted some agricultural subsidies to Agrofert pending a fresh legal review of the company’s compliance with conflict-of-interest rules. Babiš has consistently rejected accusations of wrongdoing. His office said he “follows all binding rules” and that “there is no conflict of interests at the moment,” adding that Agrofert shares are managed by independent experts and that he “is not and will never be the owner of Agrofert shares.” In a parliamentary debate earlier this month, he dismissed the controversy as politically motivated, accusing opponents of having “invented” the conflict-of-interest issue because they were unable to defeat him at the ballot box. But critics argue that the renewed focus on Agrofert obscures a far broader commercial footprint. “Agrofert is only half of the problem,” said Petr Bartoň, chief economist at Natland, a private investment group based in Prague. “The law does not say ‘thou shalt not benefit from companies called Agrofert.’ It says you must not benefit from any companies subsidized by or receiving public money.” The concern, critics argue, arises from the sheer number of companies and sectors with which Babiš remains associated. THE INVISIBLE PILLAR Separate from Agrofert sits Hartenberg Holding, a private-equity vehicle Babiš co-founded with financier Jozef Janov in 2013. He holds a majority stake in the fund through SynBiol, a company he fully owns and which, unlike Agrofert, has not been transferred into any trust arrangement. With assets worth around €600 million, Hartenberg invests in health care, retail, aviation and real estate. Yet it has attracted only a fraction of the scrutiny directed at the agricultural holding, according to Lenka Stryalová of the Czech public-spending watchdog Hlídač státu. “Alongside Agrofert, there is a second, less visible pillar of Babiš’s business activities that is not currently intended to be placed into blind trusts,” she said. That pillar includes FutureLife, whose 2,100 specialists help individuals and couples conceive across Czechia, Slovakia, the U.K., Ireland, Romania, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Estonia. The clinics operate in a policy-sensitive space shaped primarily by national health reimbursement systems and insurance rules, rather than decisions taken directly in Brussels. Those systems, however, function within a broader EU regulatory framework governing cross-border care and state aid. Hartenberg owns 50.1 percent of FutureLife. The company said in a statement that Babiš has no operational role, no board seat and no decision-making authority. It added that FutureLife clinics operate like other health care providers and, where applicable, are reimbursed by national public health insurance systems under the same rules as other providers. Like thousands of other companies, some FutureLife entities received pandemic-era wage support under Czechia’s Covid relief programs. There is no evidence of any irregularity in those payments.  But health care is only one corner of the portfolio. Through Hartenberg, Babiš-linked capital also flows into everyday retail life. Astratex, a Czech-founded online lingerie retailer that began as a catalogue business before moving fully online in 2005, now operates localized e-shops across roughly 10 European markets and generates tens of millions of euros in annual revenue. Hartenberg acquired a controlling stake in 2018, marking one of the fund’s early expansions into cross-border digital retail. In Czechia, shoppers may also encounter Flamengo florist stands, a network of around 200 outlets selling bouquets, potted plants and funeral flower arrangements inside supermarkets and shopping malls. Hartenberg acquired a majority stake in the chain in 2019, backing its expansion and push into online delivery. Other online businesses linked to Babiš include sports equipment, and wool and textile retailers. Through Hartenberg, Babiš has also invested in urban development and real estate. Hartenberg was an early majority investor in the project company behind Prague’s Císařská vinice, a premium hillside development of villas and apartments near Ladronka park, partnering with developer JRD to finance construction. JRD Development Group said the project company is now 100 percent owned by JRD and that neither Babiš nor companies linked to him hold any direct or indirect ownership interest. The firm added that the development has not received EU funds or other public financial support. None of the Hartenberg businesses have ever been accused of misusing EU subsidies. But the long-running “Stork’s Nest” case, first investigated more than a decade ago and still unresolved, shows how difficult it can be to follow Babiš’s business web. The alleged fraud involved a €2 million EU subsidy provided in 2008 to the 31-room Čapí Hnízdo (Stork’s Nest) recreational and conference center in central Czechia, then part of Babiš’s Agrofert conglomerate. Prosecutors have accused Babiš and his associates of manipulating the center’s ownership and concealing his control of the business in order to obtain the subsidy. Babiš has always denied wrongdoing, telling POLITICO in 2019 that the case was politically motivated. He was acquitted in 2023, but an appeals court later overturned that verdict and ordered a retrial, which remains pending. Today, the resort itself is no longer part of Agrofert. It is owned by Imoba, a company fully controlled by Babiš’s SynBiol, the same holding that controls Hartenberg. Hartenberg itself holds no stake in Stork’s Nest. Taken together, Babis’ non-Agrofert portfolio spans health care reimbursement systems, online retail regulation, aviation safety oversight, real estate and city-planning decisions across multiple EU jurisdictions. In theory, a Czech consumer could encounter Babiš-linked companies at nearly every stage of life: the fertilizer on the fields that grow the wheat, the bread on the supermarket shelf, the bouquet for the wedding, the apartment in Prague and even the clinic that helps bring the next generation into the world. And at the end, perhaps, the flowers once more. WHY BRUSSELS CAN’T KEEP TRACK During Babiš’s previous term, the European Commission concluded that trust arrangements he put in place did not eliminate his effective control over Agrofert. A leaked legal document reported by POLITICO this month has since renewed accusations that his latest trust setup does not fully address those concerns either. Babiš rejects that interpretation, saying the arrangement complies with Czech and EU law and insisting he has done “much more than the law required” to distance himself from the company. The Commission said it does not maintain a consolidated list of companies ultimately owned or controlled by Babiš across member countries. Nor does it hold a comprehensive accounting of EU funds received by companies linked to him beyond Agrofert. Instead, responsibility for collecting beneficial ownership data lies primarily with national authorities implementing EU funds. The Commission can audit how member countries manage conflicts of interest and take measures to protect the EU budget if needed, but it does not itself aggregate that information across borders. The Commission confirmed to POLITICO that it has asked Czech authorities to explain how conflicts of interest are being prevented in relation to companies under Babiš’s control beyond Agrofert. Czech Regional Development Minister Zuzana Mrázová on Thursday acknowledged receiving the Commission’s letter earlier this month, saying it will be answered in line with applicable legislation and adding that, in her view, the prime minister has done everything necessary to comply with Czech and EU law. “From my perspective, there is no conflict of interest,” she said. Freund argues that the corporate complexity has become a problem in its own right. “The tracking of beneficial owners or beneficial recipients of EU funds is at the moment very difficult or sometimes even impossible,” said the EU lawmaker. Part of the difficulty lies in Europe’s fragmented ownership registers, which exist on paper across the EU but don’t speak the same language or even list the same owners. Freund described them as “inconsistent,” with some national databases listing Babiš in connection with certain companies while others do not. Babiš’s defenders argue that his steps regarding Agrofert go beyond what Czech law strictly requires. Critics counter that the law was never written with billionaires running multi-sector empires in mind and that resolving the conflict of interest identified by auditors in relation to Agrofert does not settle the wider concerns raised by the scale of his business interests. “For some reason, the perception has been created that once Agrofert is resolved, that resolves the conflict of interest,” Bartoň said. “As if the president were the arbiter of what needs and needs not be dealt with.” In reality, many companies owned through Hartenberg and Synbiol structures continue to operate in areas shaped by public spending, regulation and political decisions without being part of any divestment or trust arrangement. Those assets “still not only [pose] conflict of interest,” said Bartoň, but they are “not even in the process of being dealt with.” From fertilizer to fertility to funeral flowers, the structure is easy enough to trace in everyday life. It is far harder to trace on paper. Ketrin Jochecová contributed to this report.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Der CDU-Parteitag in Stuttgart am Freitag und Samstag wird für Friedrich Merz zum Stimmungstest. Als Kanzler ist er sowieso präsent, als Parteichef steht er nun im Mittelpunkt. Es geht um sein Ergebnis, um Geschlossenheit und um die Frage, wie stark er in der eigenen Partei wirklich ist. Eine Analyse von Gordon Repinski. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview: Wiebke Winter, Mitglied der Klima-Union und von der Jungen Union für das Präsidium nominiert. Sie setzt auf Generationengerechtigkeit, spricht über Rente, Klimapolitik und über die Erwartungen an Friedrich Merz. Außerdem geht es ins Kanzleramt und damit irgendwie zur Berlinale. Jury-Chef Wim Wenders und Intendantin Tricia Tuttle treffen den Kanzler. Rasmus Buchsteiner über Filmförderung, Streaming und darüber, wie kulturbegeistert der Kanzler ist. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. ⁠Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.⁠ Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: ⁠@gordon.repinski⁠ | X: ⁠@GordonRepinski⁠. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 ⁠information@axelspringer.de⁠ Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna **(Anzeige) Eine Nachricht von Amazon: Unabhängige Verkaufspartner stehen heute für über 60 % aller bei Amazon verkauften Produkte. Ein Beispiel ist 3Bears aus München: Caroline und ihr Team haben ihre Leidenschaft in ein erfolgreich wachsendes Unternehmen verwandelt. Über Amazon bringt 3Bears hochwertigen Porridge auf Frühstückstische in ganz Europa. Sie sind eines von rund 47.000 deutschen kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen, die bei Amazon erfolgreich verkaufen. Jetzt mehr erfahren auf: AboutAmazon.de.**

Donald Trump wants the U.S. to own Greenland. The trouble is, Greenland already belongs to Denmark and most Greenlanders don’t want to become part of the U.S. While swooping into Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, and taking over Venezuela-style seems fanciful ― even if the military attack on Caracas seems to have provided a jolt to all sides about what the U.S. is capable of ― there’s a definite pathway. And Trump already appears to be some way along it. Worryingly for the Europeans, the strategy looks an awful lot like Vladimir Putin’s expansionist playbook. POLITICO spoke with nine EU officials, NATO insiders, defense experts and diplomats to game out how a U.S. takeover of the mineral-rich and strategically important Arctic island could play out. “It could be like five helicopters … he wouldn’t need a lot of troops,” said a Danish politician who asked for anonymity to speak freely. “There would be nothing they [Greenlanders] could do.” STEP 1: INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN TO BOOST GREENLAND’S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT Almost immediately upon taking office, the Trump administration began talking up independence for Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. An unshackled Greenland could sign deals with the U.S., while under the status quo it needs Copenhagen’s approval. To gain independence, Greenlanders would need to vote in a referendum, then negotiate a deal that both Nuuk and Copenhagen must approve. In a 2025 opinion poll, 56 percent of Greenlanders said they would vote in favor of independence, while 28 percent said they would vote against it. Americans with ties to Trump have carried out covert influence operations in Greenland, according to Danish media reports, with Denmark’s security and intelligence service, PET, warning the territory “is the target of influence campaigns of various kinds.” Felix Kartte, a digital policy expert who has advised EU institutions and governments, pointed to Moscow’s tactics for influencing political outcomes in countries such as Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. “Russia mixes offline and online tactics,” he said. “On the ground, it works with aligned actors such as extremist parties, diaspora networks or pro-Russian oligarchs, and has been reported to pay people to attend anti-EU or anti-U.S. protests. “At the same time, it builds large networks of fake accounts and pseudo-media outlets to amplify these activities online and boost selected candidates or positions. The goal is often not to persuade voters that a pro-Russian option is better, but to make it appear larger, louder and more popular than it really is, creating a sense of inevitability.” Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, told CNN on Monday that “nobody is going to fight the U.S. militarily over the future of Greenland.” | Joe Raedle/Getty Images On Greenland, the U.S. appears to be deploying at least some of these methods. Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, told CNN on Monday that “nobody is going to fight the U.S. militarily over the future of Greenland.” Last month, Trump created the position of special envoy to Greenland and appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry to the role. He declared his goal was to “make Greenland a part of the U.S.”  Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, on a visit to the territory in March, said “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination.” He added: “We hope that they choose to partner with the United States, because we’re the only nation on Earth that will respect their sovereignty and respect their security.” STEP 2: OFFER GREENLAND A SWEET DEAL Assuming its efforts to speed up Greenland’s independence referendum come to fruition, and the territory’s inhabitants vote to leave Denmark behind, the next step would be to bring it under U.S. influence. One obvious method would be to fold Greenland into the U.S. as another state — an idea those close to the president have repeatedly toyed with. Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was on Monday forced to say that “the U.S. has no right to annex” Greenland after Katie Miller — the wife of Stephen Miller — posted to social media a map of the territory draped in a U.S. flag and the word “SOON.” A direct swap of Denmark for the U.S. seems largely unpalatable to most of the population. The poll mentioned above also showed 85 percent of Greenlanders oppose the territory becoming part of the U.S., and even Trump-friendly members of the independence movement aren’t keen on the idea. But there are other options. Reports have circulated since last May that the Trump administration wants Greenland to sign a Compact of Free Association (COFA) — like those it currently has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. Under the deals, the U.S. provides essential services, protection and free trade in exchange for its military operating without restriction on those countries’ territory. The idea resurfaced this week. Kuno Fencker, a pro-independence Greenlandic opposition MP who attended Trump’s inauguration and met with Republican Congressman Andy Ogles last year, said he tries to “explain to [the Americans] that we don’t want to be like Puerto Rico, or any other territory of the United States. But a Compact of Free Association, bilateral agreements, or even opportunities and other means which maybe I can’t imagine — let them come to the table and Greenlanders will decide in a plebiscite.” Compared to Nuuk’s deal with Copenhagen, things “can only go upwards,” he said.  Referring to Trump’s claim that the U.S. has a “need” for Greenland, Fencker added: “Denmark has never said that they ‘needed’ Greenland. Denmark has said that Greenland is an expense, and they would leave us if we become independent. So I think it’s a much more positive remark than we have ever seen from Denmark.” But Thomas Crosbie, an associate professor of military operations at the Royal Danish Defense College that provides training and education for the Danish defense forces, warned that Greenland is unlikely to get the better of Trump in a negotiation. “Trump’s primary identity as a deal-maker is someone who forces his will on the people he’s negotiating with, and someone who has a very long track record of betraying people who he’s negotiated deals with, not honoring his commitments, both in private and public life, and exploiting those around him … I really see zero benefits to Greenlandic people other than a very temporary boost to their self esteem.” And, he added, “it would be crazy to agree to something in the hope that a deal may come. I mean, if you give away your territory in the hopes that you might get a deal afterwards — that would be just really imprudent.” STEP 3: GET EUROPE ON BOARD Europe, particularly Denmark’s EU allies, would balk at any attempt to cleave Greenland away from Copenhagen. But the U.S. administration does have a trump card to play on that front: Ukraine. As peace negotiations have gathered pace, Kyiv has said that any deal with Putin must be backed by serious, long-term U.S. security guarantees. Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, on a visit to the territory in March, said “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination.” | Pool photo by Tom Brenner vis Getty Images The Americans have prevaricated on that front, and in any case, Kyiv is skeptical about security guarantees, given those it has received from both Russia and the West in the past have amounted to nothing. One potential scenario an EU diplomat floated would be a security-for-security package deal, under which Europe gets firmer assurances from the Trump administration for Ukraine in exchange for an expanded role for the U.S. in Greenland. While that seems like a bitter pill, it could be easier to swallow than the alternative, annoying Trump, who may retaliate by imposing sanctions, pulling out of peace negotiations — or by throwing his weight behind Putin in negotiations with Ukraine. STEP 4: MILITARY INVASION But what if Greenland — or Denmark, whose “OK” Nuuk needs to secede — says no to Trump? A U.S. military takeover could be achieved without much difficulty.  Crosbie, from the Royal Danish Defense College, said Trump’s strategists are likely presenting him with various options. “The most worrisome would be a fait accompli-type strategy, which we see a lot and think about a lot in military circles, which would be simply grabbing the land the same way Putin tried to grab, to make territorial claims, over Ukraine. He could just simply put troops in the country and just say that it’s American now … the United States military is capable of landing any number of forces on Greenland, either by air or by sea, and then claiming that it’s American territory.” According to Lin Mortensgaard, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies and an expert on Greenlandic security, Washington also has around 500 military officers, including local contractors, on the ground at its northern Pituffik Space Base and just under 10 consulate staff in Nuuk. That’s alongside roughly 100 National Guard troops from New York who are usually deployed seasonally in the Arctic summer to support research missions.  Greenland, meanwhile, has few defenses. The population has no territorial army, Mortensgaard said, while Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command in the capital includes scant and out-of-date military assets, largely limited to four inspection and navy vessels, a dog-sled patrol, several helicopters and one maritime patrol aircraft. As a result, if Trump mobilizes the U.S. presence on the ground — or flies in special forces — the U.S. could seize control of Nuuk “in half an hour or less,” Mortensgaard said. “Mr. Trump says things and then he does them,” said Danish Member of European Parliament Stine Bosse. “If you were one of 60,000 people in Greenland, you would be very worried.” Any incursion would have no “legal basis” under U.S. and international law, said Romain Chuffart, who heads the Washington, D.C.-based Arctic Institute, a security think tank. Any occupation beyond 60 days would also require approval from the U.S. Congress.  Meanwhile, an invasion would “mean the end of NATO,” he said, and the “U.S. would be … shooting itself in the foot and waving goodbye to an alliance it has helped create.” Beyond that, a “loss of trust by key allies … could result in a reduction in their willingness to share intelligence with the U.S. or a reduction in access to bases across Europe,” said Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. troops in Europe. “Both of these would be severely damaging to America’s security.” Reports have circulated since last May that the Trump administration wants Greenland to sign a Compact of Free Association (COFA) — like those it currently has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. | Joe Raedle/Getty Images NATO would be left unable to respond, given that military action must be approved unanimously and the U.S. is the key member of the alliance, but European allies could deploy troops to Greenland via other groupings such as the U.K.-Scandinavian Joint Expeditionary Force or the five-country Nordic Defence Cooperation format, said Ed Arnold, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. But for now, NATO allies remain cool-headed about an attack. “We are still far from that scenario,” said one senior alliance diplomat. “There could be some tough negotiations, but I don’t think we are close to any hostile takeover.” Max Griera, Gerardo Fortuna and Seb Starcevic contributed reporting.

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Endlich Gold für Deutschland? Das Bundeskabinett beschließt heute die Unterstützung für eine deutsche Olympia-Bewerbung für 2036, 2040 oder 2044. Gordon Repinski analysiert den anstehenden Wettstreit der Regionen zwischen München, Rhein-Ruhr, Hamburg und Kiel sowie Berlin und erklärt, warum Kanzler Friedrich Merz jetzt sechs Millionen Euro für den Bewerbungsprozess zusagt.  Im 200-Sekunden-Interview: Christiane Schenderlein. Die für Sport zuständige Staatsministerin im Kanzleramt verteidigt erklärt, was in der möglichen  Bewerbung steckt, warum auch ein Olympia in Berlin 100 Jahre nach 1936 eine Chance sein kann und wie die Spiele als Motor für Infrastruktur und Bürokratieabbau dienen sollen. Außerdem: Die Zahl der ukrainischen Geflüchteten in Berlin steigt so stark wie seit 2023 nicht mehr. Jasper Bennink berichtet über die zeitgleiche Maßnahme der Koalition Ukrainern, die künftig kein Bürgergeld, sondern Leistungen aus dem Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz zu geben und so Geld zu sparen. Und: Rasmus Buchsteiner meldet sich aus Peking. Er begleitet Vizekanzler und Finanzminister Lars Klingbeil, der dort an über Elektrobusse staunt, aber gleichzeitig überraschend deutlich davor warnt, nach Russland nun in eine Abhängigkeit von China zu geraten Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski.

BERLIN — Germany’s governing parties have agreed on a fresh compromise for revamping military service, after an earlier political deal was derailed last month. The new agreement, finalized Wednesday night by senior lawmakers from the center-right Christian Democrats and the center-left Social Democrats, marks the coalition’s second attempt to settle one of the country’s most contentious defense reforms.  The earlier draft collapsed after Defense Minister Boris Pistorius intervened to halt a model that relied on automatic lottery triggers to fill personnel gaps. That sparked a wider debate over how far Germany should go in compelling young people to serve. The newly negotiated compromise, released Thursday morning, takes a different path. It introduces mandatory registration and medical screening, but makes any move toward compulsory service dependent on a separate parliamentary decision — a political middle ground. Under the new plan, all 18-year-olds will be formally registered for service, with men required to complete a compulsory questionnaire about their fitness and willingness to serve. In a significant shift, the parties agreed to reinstate mandatory medical examinations for male 18-year-olds starting with those born in 2008, giving the government early visibility into who could serve if needed. But the real compromise lies in the next step. Instead of automatically activating call-ups when volunteer numbers fall short — the mechanism that fueled political resistance last month — the plan creates a “needs-based service duty” that can only begin if parliament votes for it. If lawmakers decide the security situation or staffing shortfalls justify compulsory service, the Bundeswehr would select only the required number of recruits through a structured process, resorting to a lottery only as a final measure. To strengthen the voluntary pathway, the deal includes new incentives: €2,600 monthly pay, a subsidy for a car or truck driver’s license after one year of service and a new status for long-serving volunteers. The compromise proposal also anchors a legal troop-growth target of 255,000 to 270,000 active soldiers plus around 200,000 reservists, aligned with Germany’s NATO commitments and reviewed twice a year by parliament. Currently, Germany has around 182,000 soldiers. The draft law is expected to be introduced to parliament for a vote by the end of the year.

President Donald Trump careened into the weekend with no sign of abandoning his futile “kill the filibuster” strategy to end the shutdown, despite a stinging week of political rebukes. Trump on Friday repeated his calls for Senate Republicans to terminate the 60-vote Senate rule — a “nuclear” off-ramp that even he has admitted has little chance of becoming reality. Those demands, echoed by administration officials, including Office of Management and Budget Director Russ Vought, came after deep Republican losses during Tuesday’s off-year elections, a Supreme Court hearing that called Trump’s tariff power into doubt and new signs of cracking in public support for his party’s handling of the shutdown. “I am totally in favor of terminating the filibuster, and we would be back to work within 10 minutes after that vote took place,” Trump told reporters Friday. “It doesn’t make any sense that a Republican would not want to do that.” The president’s insistence on an unproductive filibuster strategy — and Senate Republicans exhibiting a rare refusal to go along with his agenda — provides little clarity on how the shutdown, now in its 39th day, may end. Shortly after Trump demanded senators remain in Washington to reach a deal, Majority Leader John Thune said he would bring the chamber back on Saturday. But what, if anything, senators vote on this weekend is unknown. Trump’s posture reflects his belief that he’s in a filibuster arms race with Democrats, who he fears would immediately repeal the rule if they retake the chamber and use it to pass sweeping legislation. The push mirrors the failed effort he deployed during his first term to scrap the filibuster, as he similarly warned that Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer and Democrats would do it if Republicans didn’t. Democrats did not. “The president is showing the American people that he’s looking at this from every angle to end the shutdown, and he’s willing to call out his own party to do something,” said a former Trump official, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly. “There’s a political tool piece of this,” the former official added. Democrats’ victories by higher-than-expected margins in Tuesday’s elections — when an ideologically diverse set of candidates won on a common message about cost-of-living — alarmed the White House and buoyed the faction of the Democratic Party urging senators to lock in and fight for health care subsidy concessions. Trump this week said the shutdown contributed to Republican losses, as he and his allies only intensified their pleas to terminate the filibuster in order to advance his agenda ahead of next year’s midterms. “If Republicans in the Senate capitulate, it’ll be a mess. I do. I think it’ll be bad for the party,” said Alex Bruesewitz, an outside Trump adviser. “And I hope Republicans in the Senate learn how to fight for their voters. Otherwise, I don’t think that they’re going to continue to get elected. I really don’t, which is unfortunate, but I think the president and his judgment should be trusted by now.” But the president’s allies also concede that the White House knows the votes aren’t there, and that Trump’s filibuster talk is part of a broader messaging push to gain shutdown leverage. “I think they’re gonna cut a deal, I really do,” said one longtime White House ally. The person, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly, added that Trump was using the threat of filibuster repeal “to scare the Democrats into cutting a deal.” “He wants to get things done,” the person added. “He’s frustrated by what’s going on in Congress.” But Democrats’ efforts on Friday also did little to advance those negotiations. Republicans balked at Schumer’s counterproposal: attaching a one-year extension of expiring Affordable Care Act subsidies to a spending stopgap. A White House official, granted anonymity to speak about internal thinking, described Schumer’s proposal as a “massive climbdown” from Democrats’ initial position and “shows they’re under massive internal pressure.” “They should open the government, and we’ll meet with them on the tax credit and work with them on it,” the official said, reiterating that the White House’s position has not changed. Republican leaders also criticized Schumer’s latest offer, with Thune calling it a “nonstarter” and saying the “Obamacare extension is the negotiation.” The president, for his part, left Washington for Mar-a-Lago on Friday, despite his call for the Senate to remain in session. But Trump didn’t offer any clarity on what sort of deal, if anything, he might support to reopen federal agencies. “If they can’t reach a Deal,” the president said in a Truth Social post, “the Republicans should terminate the Filibuster, IMMEDIATELY, and take care of our Great American Workers!”