LONDON — Green Party leader Zack Polanski is open to forming a discrete non-aggression pact with Labour in order to stop right-winger Nigel Farage from ever entering Downing Street, according to two senior Green officials. Polanski, the leader of the “eco-populist” outfit that is helping squeeze the incumbent Labour government’s progressive vote, has been keen to make the case that his radical politics can halt Farage — whose insurgent Reform UK is riding high in the polls — in his tracks. But the recently elected party chief, who has overseen a big boost to Green polling with his punchy defenses of leftist causes on social media and television, has told allies he “couldn’t live with myself” if he contributed to Farage’s victory, according to a second senior Green official, granted anonymity like others in this piece to speak about internal thinking. Such a move would stop short of a formal Green-Labour deal, instead tapping into tactical voting. Green officials are discussing the prospect of informal, local prioritizations of resources so the best-placed progressive challenger can win, as seen in elections past with Labour and the centrist Liberal Democrats. At the same time, Green advisers are keen to lean into the deep divisions within Labour about whether Starmer should be replaced with another leader to prevent electoral oblivion. Starmer appears deeply unpopular with Green supporters. One YouGov study has him rated just as unfavorably as Conservative chief Badenoch with backers of Polanski’s party. The first Green official argued there is “no advantage in working electorally with Labour under Starmer.” Instead, they’re eyeing up — even expecting — a change in Labour leadership. Polanski has talked up Andy Burnham, the Greater Manchester Labour mayor who is seen as one potential challenger to Starmer.  LABOUR: WE ARE NOT EVEN THINKING ABOUT THAT As the party in power, Labour — which has ramped up its attacks on the Greens in recent weeks — is keen to tamp down talk of working together. Asked about the Greens, a senior U.K. government adviser said: “We are not even thinking about that. We need to focus on being a viable government.”  They expect Polanski’s polling to plummet once there’s more scrutiny of his politics, including his criticism of NATO, as well as his more colorful comments. Back in 2013, as a hypnotherapist, Polanski suggested to a reporter he could enlarge breasts with his mind. “The hypnotist thing goes down in focus groups like a bucket of cold sick,” the government adviser added. There’s skepticism that a non-aggression deal could work anyway, not least because the Greens will be vying for the kind of urban heartlands Labour can’t afford to back down from. Neither party “has an incentive to go soft on one another,” as a result, Luke Tryl, a director at the More in Common think tank, said. “I really doubt they’re going to forgo taking more seats off us in London or Bristol in the greater interest of the left,” said a Labour MP with a keen eye on the polling. “They’re trying to replace us — they’re not trying to be our little friends.” The Labour MP instead argued that voters typically make their minds up in the lead-up to elections as to how best to stop a certain outcome, whether that’s due to past polling or activities on the ground. Zack Polanski has been keen to make the case that his radical politics can halt Nigel Farage — whose insurgent Reform UK is riding high in the polls — in his tracks. | Lesley Martin/Getty Images That can well work against Labour, as seen in the Caerphilly by-election in October. The constituency of the devolved Welsh administration had been Labour since its inception in 1999 — but no more. Voters determined to stop Farage decided it was the center-left Welsh nationalists of Plaid Cymru that represented the best party to coalesce around. Reform’s success was thwarted — but Labour’s vote plummeted in what were once party heartlands.  “There’s no doubt the Greens risk doing to Labour what Farage did to the Conservatives,” said Tryl of More in Common, who pointed out that the Greens may not even win many seats as a result of the fracturing (party officials internally speak of winning only 50 MPs as being a huge ask).   “Labour’s hope instead will have to be that enough disgruntled progressives hold their nose and opt for PM Starmer over the threat of PM Farage.” Labour and the Greens are not the only parties dealing with talk of a pact, despite a likely four-year wait for Britain’s next general election. Ever since 1918, it’s been either the Conservatives or Labour who’ve formed the British government, with Westminster’s first-past-the-post, winner-takes-all system across 650 constituencies meaning new parties rarely get a look in. But the general election in July last year suggested this could be coming apart. Farage has already been forced to deny a report that he views an electoral deal with establishment Conservatives as the “inevitable” route to power. His stated aim is to replace the right-wing party entirely. Conservative Leader Kemi Badenoch is publicly pretty firm that she won’t buddy up with Reform either. “I am the custodian of an institution that has existed for nigh on 200 years,” she said in February. “I can’t just treat it like it’s a toy and have pacts and mergers.” Robert Jenrick, the right-winger who’s widely tipped as her successor, has been more circumspect, however. That appears to be focusing minds on the left. Farage may be polling the highest — but there’s still a significant portion of the public horrified by the prospect of him entering No.10. A YouGov study on tactical voting suggested that Labour would be able to count on a boost in support from Liberal Democrat and Green voters to stave off the threat of Farage. Outwardly, Polanski is a vocal critic of Labour under Starmer and wants to usurp the party as the main vehicle for left-wing politics. The Green leader is aiming to win over not just progressives, but also disenchanted Reform-leaning voters, with his support for wider public ownership, higher taxes on the wealthy, and opposition to controversial measures like scaling back jury trials and introducing mandatory digital IDs. But privately, Polanski is more open to doing deals because in his mind, “at the general election, stopping Farage is the most important objective,” as the first senior Green adviser put it. “We expect to be the main challengers to Reform, but of course we are open to discussing what options exist to help in that central mission of stopping Farage,” they said.

Europe’s security does not depend solely on our physical borders and their defense. It rests on something far less visible, and far more sensitive: the digital networks that keep our societies, economies and democracies functioning every second of the day. > Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a > halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics confirms that telecom operators have become the first line of defense in Europe’s security architecture. Their networks power essential services ranging from emergency communications and cross-border healthcare to energy systems, financial markets, transport and, increasingly, Europe’s defense capabilities. Without resilient networks, the daily workings of Europe would grind to a halt, and so too would any attempt to build meaningful defense readiness. This reality forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Europe cannot build credible defense capabilities on top of an economically strained, structurally fragmented telecom sector. Yet this is precisely the risk today. A threat landscape outpacing Europe’s defenses The challenges facing Europe are evolving faster than our political and regulatory systems can respond. In 2023 alone, ENISA recorded 188 major incidents, causing 1.7 billion lost user-hours, the equivalent of taking entire cities offline. While operators have strengthened their systems and outage times fell by more than half in 2024 compared with the previous year, despite a growing number of incidents, the direction of travel remains clear: cyberattacks are more sophisticated, supply chains more vulnerable and climate-related physical disruptions more frequent. Hybrid threats increasingly target civilian digital infrastructure as a way to weaken states. Telecom networks, once considered as technical utilities, have become a strategic asset essential to Europe’s stability. > Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, > pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO > interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of > sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Our allies recognize this. NATO recently encouraged members to spend up to 1.5 percent of their GDP on protecting critical infrastructure. Secretary General Mark Rutte also urged investment in cyber defense, AI, and cloud technologies, highlighting the military benefits of cloud scalability and edge computing – all of which rely on high-quality, resilient networks. This is a clear political signal that telecom security is not merely an operational matter but a geopolitical priority. The link between telecoms and defense is deeper than many realize. As also explained in the recent Arel report, Much More than a Network, modern defense capabilities rely largely on civilian telecom networks. Strong fiber backbones, advanced 5G and future 6G systems, resilient cloud and edge computing, satellite connectivity, and data centers form the nervous system of military logistics, intelligence and surveillance. Europe cannot deploy cross-border defense capabilities without resilient, pan-European digital infrastructure. Nor can it guarantee NATO interoperability with 27 national markets, divergent rules and dozens of sub-scale operators unable to invest at continental scale. Fragmentation has become one of Europe’s greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The reform Europe needs: An investment boost for digital networks At the same time, Europe expects networks to become more resilient, more redundant, less dependent on foreign technology and more capable of supporting defense-grade applications. Security and resilience are not side tasks for telecom operators, they are baked into everything they do. From procurement and infrastructure design to daily operations, operators treat these efforts as core principles shaping how networks are built, run and protected. Therefore, as the Copenhagen Economics study shows, the level of protection Europe now requires will demand substantial additional capital. > It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to > emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. This is the right ambition, but the economic model underpinning the sector does not match these expectations. Due to fragmentation and over-regulation, Europe’s telecom market invests less per capita than global peers, generates roughly half the return on capital of operators in the United States and faces rising costs linked to expanding security obligations. It is unrealistic to expect world-class, defense-ready infrastructure to emerge from a model that has become structurally unsustainable. A shift in policy priorities is therefore essential. Europe must place investment in security and resilience at the center of its political agenda. Policy must allow this reality to be reflected in merger assessments, reduce overlapping security rules and provide public support where the public interest exceeds commercial considerations. This is not state aid; it is strategic social responsibility. Completing the single market for telecommunications is central to this agenda. A fragmented market cannot produce the secure, interoperable, large-scale solutions required for modern defense. The Digital Networks Act must simplify and harmonize rules across the EU, supported by a streamlined governance that distinguishes between domestic matters and cross-border strategic issues. Spectrum policy must also move beyond national silos, allowing Europe to avoid conflicts with NATO over key bands and enabling coherent next-generation deployments. Telecom policy nowadays is also defense policy. When we measure investment gaps in digital network deployment, we still tend to measure simple access to 5G and fiber. However, we should start considering that — if security, resilience and defense-readiness are to be taken into account — the investment gap is much higher that the €200 billion already estimated by the European Commission. Europe’s strategic choice The momentum for stronger European defense is real — but momentum fades if it is not seized. If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to support advanced defense applications. In that scenario, Europe’s democratic resilience would erode in parallel with its economic competitiveness, leaving the continent more exposed to geopolitical pressure and technological dependency. > If Europe fails to modernize and secure its telecom infrastructure now, it > risks entering the next decade with a weakened industrial base, chronic > underinvestment, dependence on non-EU technologies and networks unable to > support advanced defense applications. Europe still has time to change course and put telecoms at the center of its agenda — not as a technical afterthought, but as a core pillar of its defense strategy. The time for incremental steps has passed. Europe must choose to build the network foundations of its security now or accept that its strategic ambitions will remain permanently out of reach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Connect Europe AISBL * The ultimate controlling entity is Connect Europe AISBL * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on EU digital, telecom and industrial policy, including initiatives such as the Digital Networks Act, Digital Omnibus, and connectivity, cybersecurity, and defence frameworks aimed at strengthening Europe’s digital competitiveness. More information here.

LONDON — Donald Trump’s war against the media has gone international.  Britain’s public service broadcaster has until 10 p.m. U.K. time on Friday to retract a 2024 documentary that he claims did him “overwhelming financial and reputational harm” — or potentially face a $1 billion lawsuit (nearly £760 million). It’s the U.S. president’s first notable battle with a non-American media organization. The escalation from Trump comes as the BBC is already grappling with the double resignations this past weekend of two top executives, Director General Tim Davie and news CEO Deborah Turness, amid the growing furor sparked by the release last week of an internal ombudsman’s report criticizing the Trump program as well as the BBC’s coverage of the Gaza war. Trump told Fox News he believes he has “an obligation” to sue the corporation because “they defrauded the public” and “butchered” a speech he gave. POLITICO walks you through the possible road ahead — and the potential pitfalls on both sides of the Atlantic.  WHY IS TRUMP THREATENING TO SUE?  The U.S. president is objecting to the broadcaster’s reporting in a documentary that aired on Panorama, one of the BBC’s flagship current affairs shows, just days before the U.S. presidential election.  The program included footage from Trump’s speech ahead of the Jan. 6, 2021 Capitol riot, which was selectively edited to suggest, incorrectly, that he told supporters: “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol and I’ll be there with you, and we fight. We fight like hell.”   But those lines were spoken almost an hour apart, and the documentary did not include a section where Trump called for supporters “to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard.”  “I really struggle to understand how we got to this place,” former BBC legal affairs correspondent Clive Coleman told POLITICO. “The first lesson almost you’re taught as a broadcast journalist is that you do not join two bits of footage together from different times in a way that will make the audience think that it is one piece of footage.” The U.S. president’s legal team claimed the edit on the footage was “false, defamatory, disparaging, and inflammatory” and caused him “to suffer overwhelming financial and reputational harm.”  BBC Chair Samir Shah apologized on Monday for the “error of judgment” in the edit. Trump’s lawyers said in their letter that they want a retraction, an apology and appropriate financial compensation — though their client’s subsequent comments suggest that may not satisfy him at this point. DO TRUMP’S CLAIMS STAND A CHANCE?  Trump’s lawyers indicated in their letter that he plans to sue in Florida, his home state, which has a two-year statute of limitations for defamation rather than the U.K.’s one-year limit — which has already passed.  The U.S. president is objecting to the broadcaster’s reporting in a documentary that aired on Panorama, one of the BBC’s flagship current affairs shows, just days before the U.S. presidential election. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images To even gain a hearing, the U.S. president would first need to prove the documentary was available there. The broadcaster confirmed the Panorama episode was not shown on the global feed of the BBC News Channel, while programs on iPlayer, the BBC’s catchup service, were only available in the U.K.  The Trump team’s letter to the BBC, however, claimed the clip was “widely disseminated throughout various digital mediums” reaching tens of millions of people worldwide — a key contention that would need to be considered by any judge deciding whether the case could be brought.  U.S. libel laws are tougher for claimants given that the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment guarantees the right to free speech. In U.S. courts, public figures claiming to have been defamed also have to show the accuser acted with “actual malice.”  The legal meaning doesn’t require animosity or dislike, but instead an intent to spread false information or some action in reckless disregard of the truth — a high burden of proof for Trump’s lawyers.  American libel standards tend to favor publishers more than those in Britain, so much so that in recent decades public figures angry about U.S. news reports have often opted to file suit in the U.K. That trend even prompted a 2010 U.S. law aimed at reining in so-called libel tourism. Yet Trump’s legal team is signaling it will argue that since the full video of Trump’s 2021 speech was widely available to the BBC, the editing itself amounted to reckless disregard and, therefore, actual malice.  BBC Chair Samir Shah apologized on Monday for the “error of judgment” in the edit. | Henry Nicholls/AFP via Getty Images “The BBC’s reckless disregard for the truth underscores the actual malice behind the decision to publish the wrongful content, given the plain falsity of the statements,” his lawyers wrote.  However, a court battle wouldn’t be without risks for Trump. Prateek Swaika, a U.K.-based partner with Boies Schiller Flexner, said pursuing litigation “could force detailed examination and disclosure in connection” with Trump’s Jan. 6 statements —  potentially creating “more reputational damage than the original edit.”  COULD THE BBC SETTLE?  Trump has a long history of threatening legal action, especially against the press, but has lately had success in reaching out-of-court agreements with media outlets — including, most notably, the U.S. broadcasters ABC and CBS.  Trump’s latest claim is the flipside of his $20 billion suit against CBS’s “60 Minutes” over an interview with then-Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris, which Trump claimed was deceptively edited to make Harris look good and therefore amounted to election interference.  CBS settled for $16 million in July, paying into a fund for Trump’s presidential library or charitable causes, though the network admitted no wrongdoing. The settlement came as CBS’ parent company, Paramount, was pursuing a corporate merger that the Trump administration had the power to block — and after Trump publicly said he thought CBS should lose its broadcast license, which is also granted by the federal government. The president doesn’t hold that same sway over the BBC, though the organization does have some U.S.-based commercial operations. Some news organizations have also opted to fight rather than settle past Trump claims, including CNN, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Some news organizations have opted to fight rather than settle past Trump claims, including CNN, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. | Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images “Litigation is always a commercial decision and it’s a reputational decision,” said Coleman, suggesting settlement talks may look appealing compared to fighting a case that could “hang over the heads of the BBC for many, many years, like a dark cloud.”  COULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT STEP IN?  Despite the BBC’s standing as a state broadcaster, the Labour government has so far taken a hands-off approach, perhaps unsurprisingly given Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s ongoing efforts to woo Trump on trade. No. 10 said on Tuesday that the lawsuit threat was a matter for the BBC, though Starmer subsequently reiterated his support for it generally. “I believe in a strong and independent BBC,” Starmer said at prime minister’s questions Wednesday. “Some would rather the BBC didn’t exist … I’m not one of them.” Perhaps eager to stay in Trump’s good books, the PM’s ministers have also avoided attacking the president and instead walked a diplomatic tightrope by praising the BBC in more general terms. Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy on Tuesday reiterated the government’s vision of the BBC as a tool of soft power. The BBC documentary did not include a section where Trump called for supporters “to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard.” | Brendan Smialowski/Getty Images “At a time when the line between fact and opinion, and between news and polemic, is being dangerously blurred, the BBC stands apart,” Nandy told MPs Tuesday. “It is a light on the hill for people here and across the world.”  WHO WOULD FUND ANY PAYOUT?  The BBC is funded by the country’s license fee, which requires any household that has a TV or uses BBC iPlayer to pay £174.50 a year (some people are exempt from paying). In the year ending March 2025, this accounted for £3.8 billion of the corporation’s overall £5.9 billion in income. The remaining £2 billion came from activities including commercial ventures. Any licence fee revenue that funded a settlement with Trump would likely go down very poorly as a political matter, given looming tax increases in the U.K. as well as the U.S. president’s significant unpopularity with British voters. The corporation lost a €100,000 (£88,000) libel case earlier this year against former Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams after a Dublin jury found the broadcaster falsely connected him to a 2006 Irish Republican Army killing, showing there is a precedent for politicians winning cases.  Responding to a question as to whether license fee payers would fund any legal sum, Starmer said Wednesday: “Where mistakes are made, they do need to get their house in order and the BBC must uphold the highest standards, be accountable and correct errors quickly.” Singer Cliff Richard also received £210,000 in damages and around £2 million in legal costs from the BBC in 2019 over a privacy case, though those payments were within the scope of its legal insurance. MIGHT AN ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT WORK?  The BBC has paid damages to a foreign head of state before, including compensating then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in 2019 for an incorrect report. But Trump technically faces rules on accepting foreign payments. There’s every chance that a settlement to Trump could pass through another vehicle, as the with the CBS agreement. ABC’s settlement involved $15 million to a Trump-related foundation alongside $1 million for his legal fees.  Trump’s former attorney Alan Dershowitz suggested just that on Tuesday, saying if the corporation made a “substantial” contribution to a charity “that’s relevant to the president might put this thing behind them.” 

BRUSSELS — The European Commission appears to be slow-walking a decision to take action against Italy over its controversial use of national security powers to stall a banking merger between UniCredit, the Milan-based bank, and its crosstown rival BPM.  Officials at the competition and financial services directorates handed in their assessment of the case weeks ago to President Ursula von der Leyen’s Cabinet, but have yet to hear back, five people familiar with the matter told POLITICO. The assessment is not in favor of Rome, said one of the people, granted anonymity to discuss a private matter.  Commission insiders speculate that the delay has to do with broader political bargaining at the highest level between Brussels and Rome. According to another of the people, von der Leyen is taking care not to annoy Giorgia Meloni because she needs the Italian premier’s support to shore up the increasingly shaky political coalition that backed her for a second term last year. Earlier this year, Italy decided that UniCredit’s €10 billion takeover of BPM was a threat to national security. Under the government’s rules on screening foreign direct investments — known as its “golden power” — Rome imposed conditions on April 18 that effectively prevented UniCredit from completing the deal. The Commission opened a so-called EU Pilot procedure — carried out by its financial services directorate — to determine whether the use of national security measures in a bank merger is in line with EU banking regulations and single-market freedoms. The process can ultimately lead to an infringement procedure — as happened when the Spanish government obstructed BBVA’s acquisition of Catalan bank Banco Sabadell. The Commission’s competition directorate gave a conditional green light to the deal on June 19. A month later it warned Italy that by applying the golden power to a domestic deal, Italy may have violated merger rules as well as other provisions of EU law. The Commission is currently assessing Italy’s replies in both investigations, a spokesperson for the EU executive said. GOLDEN POWER The golden power equips Italy with wide-ranging screening tools to curb bids on national champions by foreign investors that are deemed risks to national security, such as those from China. The use of the tool to derail a domestic merger appeared to flout the EU’s push for greater banking consolidation across Europe — which it sees as necessary for the continent’s financial sector and for the economy more broadly — to compete with U.S. rivals. The largest American bank, JP Morgan, has a market capitalization more than four times that of its nearest European counterpart, Santander. Banking and Financial Services Commissioner Maria Luís Albuquerque has repeatedly spoken out in favor of banking consolidation across the bloc.  The competition and financial services teams had their assessment of the case ready shortly after Italy submitted its last round of responses to the Commission in August, said one of the people who spoke to POLITICO. But von der Leyen’s Cabinet, which ultimately has to sign off on a decision, has taken no action so far, they added. According to Italian media reports, Italy has been trying to buy more time and stave off an infringement procedure by suggesting it could amend its golden power legislation. Financial daily Milano Finanza reported on Tuesday that the Commission has set Nov. 13 for a decision. An Italian official with knowledge of the file said the Commission could very well be slow-walking action against Italy given that Unicredit’s withdrawal from the deal is by now irreversible. | Emanuele Cremaschi/Getty Images An Italian official with knowledge of the file said the Commission could very well be slow-walking action against Italy given that Unicredit’s withdrawal from the deal is by now irreversible. That would allow time to review whether Italy’s golden power is in line with EU competition rules without the pressure of a live deal. “A medium-term, out-of-the-spotlight agreement on golden power could be the best outcome,” this official explained. Reuters, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported last week that Italy could be willing to amend its golden power to address the Commission’s concerns over how it was used in the Unicredit-BPM case. All matters pertaining to the golden power are steered from von der Leyen’s office, said another Commission official who is not directly involved in the matter and was also granted anonymity to speak candidly. It is usually quite simple to perform a technical analysis of such files, but “politics always trumps it,” they added.  Spokespeople for Meloni and Italy’s economy ministry declined to comment.

A message from Brussels to Google: Would you break yourself up, please? The search giant faces an early November deadline to say how it intends to comply with a European Commission decision in September, which found that it had illegally maintained its grip on the infrastructure that powers online advertising. With a €2.95 billion fine in the rearview mirror, the Commission and Google find themselves in an unprecedented standoff as Brussels contemplates the once unthinkable: a structural sell-off of part of a U.S. company, preferably voluntary, but potentially forced if necessary. The situation is “very unusual,” said Anne Witt, a professor in competition law at EDHEC Business School in Lille, France. “Structural remedies are almost unprecedented at the EU level,” Witt added. “It’s really the sledgehammer.” In its September decision, the Commission took the “unusual and unprecedented step,” per Witt, to ask Google to design its own remedy — while signaling, if cautiously, that anything short of a sale of parts of its advertising technology business would fall foul of the EU antitrust enforcer. “It appears that the only way for Google to end its conflict of interest effectively is with a structural remedy, such as selling some part of its Adtech business,” Executive Vice President Teresa Ribera, the Commission’s competition chief, said at the time. As the clock counts down to the deadline for Google to tell the Commission what it intends to do, the possibility of a Brussels-ordered breakup of an American tech champion is unlikely to go unnoticed in Washington, even as the Donald Trump administration pursues its own case against the search giant. (Google accounts for 90 percent of the revenues of Alphabet, the $3.3 trillion technology holding company headquartered in Mountain View, California.) Executive Vice President Teresa Ribera, the Commission’s competition chief. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images Google has said that it will appeal the Commission’s decision, which in its view requires changes that would hurt thousands of European businesses. “There’s nothing anticompetitive in providing services for ad buyers and sellers, and there are more alternatives to our services than ever before,” Lee-Anne Mulholland, its vice president and global head of regulatory affairs, wrote in a blog post in September. PARALLEL PROBES The proposal for a voluntary break up of Google marks the culmination of a decade of EU antitrust enforcement in digital markets in which “behavioral” fixes achieved little, and a unique alignment in both timing and substance between the U.S. and the EU of their parallel probes into the firm’s ad tech empire. “It would have been unthinkable 10 years ago that there would be a case in the U.S.  and a sister case in Europe that had a breakup as a potential outcome,” said Cori Crider, executive director of the Future of Tech Institute, which is advocating for a break-up. The Commission formally launched the investigation into Google’s ad tech stack in 2021, following a drumbeat of complaints from news organizations that had seen Google take control of the high-frequency exchanges where publishers and advertisers agree on the price and placement of online ads.  Google’s control of the exchanges, as well as infrastructure used by both sides of the market, was like allowing Goldman Sachs or Citibank to own the New York Stock Exchange, declared the U.S. Department of Justice in its lawsuit in 2023. It also created a situation in which cash-strapped news organizations on both sides of the Atlantic saw Google eating an increasing share of revenues from online advertising — and ultimately posing a threat to journalism itself. “This is not just any competition law case — this is about the future of journalism,” said Alexandra Geese, a German Green member of the European Parliament. “Publishers don’t have the revenue because they don’t get traffic on their websites, and then Google’s algorithm decides what information we see,” she said. The plight of publishers proved hefty on the other side of the Atlantic too. In April, the federal judge overseeing the U.S. government’s case against Google ruled that the search giant had illegally maintained its monopoly over parts of the ad tech market.   A spokesperson for the company said that the firm disagrees with the Commission’s charges. | Nurphoto via Getty Images The Virginia district court held a two-week trial on remedies in September. The Trump administration has advocated a sale of the exchanges and an unwinding of Google’s 2008 merger with DoubleClick, through which it came to dominate the online ad market. Judge Leonie Brinkema will hear the government’s closing arguments on Nov. 17 and is expected to issue her verdict in the coming months. STARS ALIGN Viewed by Google’s critics, it’s the ideal set of circumstances for the Commission to push for a muscular structural remedy. “If you cannot go for structural remedies now, when the U.S. is on the same page, then you’re unlikely to ever do it,” said Crider. The route to a breakup may, however, be both legally and politically more challenging. Despite the technical alignment, and a disenchantment with the impact that past fines and behavioral remedies have had, the Commission still faces a “big hurdle” when it comes to the legal test, should it not be satisfied with Google’s remedy offer, said Witt. The U.S. legal system is more conducive to ordering breakups, both as a matter of law — judges have a wide scope to remedy a harm to the market — and in tradition, said Witt, noting that the U.S. government’s lawsuits to break up Google and Meta are rooted in precedents that don’t exist in Europe. Caught in the middle is Google, which should file its proposed remedies within 60 days of being served notice of the Commission decision that was announced on Sept. 5. A spokesperson for the company said that the firm disagrees with the Commission’s charges, and therefore with the notion that structural remedies are necessary. The firm is expected to lodge its appeal in the coming days. While Google has floated asset sales to the Commission over the course of the antitrust investigation, only to be rebuffed by Brussels, the firm does not intend to divest the entirety of its ad tech stack, according to a person familiar with the matter who was granted anonymity due to the sensitivity of the case. Ultimately, what happens in Brussels may depend on what happens in the U.S. case. While a court-ordered divestiture of a chunk of Google’s ad tech business is conceivable, U.S. judges have shown themselves to be skeptical of structural remedies in recent months, said Lazar Radic, an assistant law professor at IE University in Madrid, who is affiliated with the big tech-friendly International Center for Law and Economics. “Behavioral alternatives are still on the table,” said Radic, of the U.S. case. The Commission will likely want to align itself with the U.S. should the Virginia court side with the Department of Justice, said Damien Geradin, legal counsel to the European Publishers Council — of which POLITICO parent Axel Springer is a member — that brought forward the case. Conversely, if the court opts for a weaker remedy than is being proposed, the Commission will be obliged to go further, he said. “This is the case where some structural remedies will be needed. I don’t think the [European Commission] can settle for less,” said Geradin.

BRUSSELS — Europe is finally firing back at Elon Musk. Aerospace companies Airbus, Leonardo and Thales said Thursday they had reached a preliminary agreement to combine their space activities to create the kind of European champion that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has envisaged. Announcing “a leading European player in space,” the companies said they would combine their satellite and space systems manufacturing into a €6.5 billion business that will employ around 25,000 people across Europe.  The three-way deal seeks to create a challenger to Musk’s SpaceX — especially in low-earth orbit satellites of the type that power his Starlink internet service. SpaceX’s projected 2025 revenue is around $15 billion. The deal — initially named Project Bromo after a volcano in Indonesia — has been a long time coming. Talks among the three companies were complicated by the involvement of five governments as shareholders or partners. And winning antitrust approval was always going to be a tall order. France, Italy, Germany, Spain and the U.K. will all have an interest in the new company, which will be headquartered in Toulouse in southern France but will be split out into five different legal entities to preserve sovereign interests. The governance structure mirrors that of European missilemaker MDBA.  Airbus, the European aerospace giant, will own a 35 percent stake, while Leonardo of Italy and Thales of France will own 32.5 percent each. There will be a sole yet-to-be-named CEO and managing directors for each country, an Airbus spokesperson told POLITICO. French Economy Minister Roland Lescure hailed the announcement as “excellent news.” “The creation of a European satellite champion allows us to increase investment in research and innovation in this strategic sector and reinforce our sovereignty in a context of intense global competition,” he said in a post on Bluesky. Sounding rather less enthusiastic, a spokesperson for German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said Berlin was following the possible consolidation of the European aerospace industry “with great interest” and was in touch with Airbus and its defense subsidiary. LEAGUE OF CHAMPIONS France and Germany have been vocal on the need to create continental champions — with industry chiefs from both countries recently issuing a joint appeal to Brussels to relax its merger rules to enable companies to gain scale and compete in a global setting. In a twist of irony, the deal involves a company — Airbus — that is widely seen as the only European corporate champion ever built. With roots dating back to 1970, Airbus was created in its current incarnation through a Franco-German-Spanish merger in 2000. France and Germany each own 10 percent stakes and Spain 4 percent. Italy has a 30 percent stake in Leonardo, which in turn owns 33 percent of Thales Alenia Space.  The new company will pool, build and develop “a comprehensive portfolio of complementary technologies and end-to-end solutions, from space infrastructure to services.” It is expected to generate annual synergies producing “mid triple digit million euro” operating income five years after closing, which is expected in 2027, according to a press release.  MERGER HURDLE The tie-up requires a green light from the Commission’s competition directorate, which will have to weigh the tension between its current rulebook for reviewing mergers and von der Leyen’s desire to pick European winners. The joint venture would compete with overseas players on satellites for commercial telecommunications. However, it would face scant competition for military and public procurement tenders in the EU, for example with the European Space Agency (ESA). These are typically restricted to home-grown bidders. Rolf Densing, ESA’s director of operations, has voiced concerns that the deal would leave the agency with limited options for sourcing satellite contracts. Germany’s OHB would be left as its last remaining competitor. OHB’s CEO Marco Fuchs has warned that the deal threatens to create a monopoly that would harm customers and European industry. That could herald a rerun of the tensions that the Commission faced when it blocked a Franco-German train industry merger between Siemens and Alstom in 2019 — although today the political environment is more favorable to the companies.  The Commission’s competition directorate is under pressure to broaden its views on mergers to take into account the bloc’s wider push for growth and an increased capacity to compete with U.S. and Chinese players. A review of the bloc’s merger guidelines is due next year, according to the Commission’s latest work program. Alexandre Léchenet in Paris and Tom Schmidtgen in Berlin contributed reporting.

PARIS — Some signatories of a joint appeal by French and German business bosses to loosen merger rules and scrap environmental laws to promote European industrial “champions” have distanced themselves from the letter, saying they were encouraged to write it by their national governments.  The letter to French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, first reported by POLITICO a week ago, quickly drew rebukes from green NGOs and competition regulators, with France’s Benoît Cœuré challenging the notion that the bloc’s merger rules had prevented the creation of leading European businesses. Co-authored by TotalEnergies CEOs Patrick Pouyanné and Roland Busch of Siemens, the letter was written “in the name of” 46 chief executives who met with the two heads of state during a high-level, closed-door meeting between industry and the governments in Evian, France, in early September.   But since the letter came to light, some of the French companies it claims to speak on behalf of are backtracking.   The letter is a good summary of the discussion held at Evian, said BPIFrance, the French public investment bank. But its CEO, Nicolas Dufourcq, doesn’t consider himself bound by it, he told POLITICO in a written statement.  Dufourcq said the letter was “not a big effort.” Although he was in Evian, he did not see it before it was published, and therefore doesn’t consider that he signed it. The letter complained that the current European competition rules “often hinder the formation of European champions” and urged that, by the end of this year, the mandate of the European Commission’s Competition Directorate be widened to consider strategic mergers in the context of the global market. It also demands that EU leaders get rid of EU rules on supply chain transparency. ‘A LITTLE STRONG’ A representative from a second French company among the signatories said that the origin of the letter was “a little nebulous” and that they were not informed of the wording ahead of time. Granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter, they said that they did not disagree with the letter, but “the wording is a little strong.” Even TotalEnergies, one of the two top signatories, has sought to clarify how the letter came about. Shortly after POLITICO reported on it, the company reached out directly to provide “more context.”  “The CEO of Siemens and TotalEnergies were the co-chairmen of the Evian Franco-German meeting gathering 46 CEOs,” a spokesperson said. “They welcomed Chancellor Merz and President Macron during a special session, and they were encouraged by both leaders to express their priorities as CEOs to develop Europe’s competitiveness.”   The letter, he added, “summarizes the 5 top priorities and call for actions in the short term which resulted from the debates between the CEOs.”   Siemens declined to comment in response to TotalEnergies’ assertions.  NO GERMAN COMPLAINTS No criticism has emerged from German companies, which appeared to be aligned with the message. “The letter emerged from the group discussion, so [Deutsche Börse Group CEO] Stephan Leithner, who was among the participants, was involved, and we support the contents of the letter,” a spokesperson for Deutsche Börse told POLITICO. A spokesperson for Bosch — whose CEO is also listed among the participants — called the initiative one “spearheaded by companies from Europe’s two largest economies.” They added that a central pillar of the demands is “aimed at securing and strengthening the competitiveness of European industry.”  Neither the Elysée nor the German representation in Brussels responded to requests for comment.  Francesca Micheletti and Marianne Gros reported from Brussels, Alexandre Léchenet reported from Paris. Jordyn Dahl contributed reporting from Brussels, and Tom Schmidtgen from Berlin.

Prime Minister Mark Carney won praise from President Donald Trump in the Oval Office Tuesday, avoiding blow-ups or embarrassment, even though he fell short of a breakthrough in the trade stand-off between the two North American neighbors. “We’ve come a long way over the last few months, actually, in terms of that relationship,” Trump declared, adding that he considered Carney “a world-class leader” and a tough negotiator: “I think they’re going to walk away very happy.” “We have great love for each other,” Trump told Carney after the prime minister lauded Trump’s peace efforts around the world, including the Middle East. But the president added: “We have a natural conflict.” Trump’s comments and the generally warm White House reception for the Canadian leader amounted to a win for Carney, who risked burning domestic political capital in Canada absent a deal to lift Trump’s punitive tariffs. Trump’s remarks largely aligned with the expectations the Prime Minister’s Office set ahead of the meeting: the leaders needed face time to make progress on a complex economic relationship. Trump tried to play defense for Carney at one point during a flurry of questions at their Oval Office photo-op, deflecting a question about why Canada couldn’t get a deal with the U.S. while the European Union pulled it off. Asked by reporters what was holding up a trade agreement — given that Trump thinks Carney is such a “good man” who is doing “a great job” — the president responded, to laughter: “Because I want to be a great man, too.” The upbeat rapport between the prime minister and the president follows months of close contact. Carney won an April election in large part on a promise to take on Trump and repair Canada’s tariff-battered economy. The two have exchanged calls and texts regularly, projecting a thaw in cross-border tensions. But that détente is tenuous — last week, Trump revived his familiar “51st state” jab at Canada in remarks to U.S. generals. Trump joked in the Oval Office about “the merger” of Canada and the U.S., but Carney defused the situation: “That wasn’t where I was going.” Even though Carney has softened his approach, including removing countertariffs on many U.S. products, he has yet to strike a trade deal with Trump. Lately, he has turned his attention to next year’s mandatory review of the United States-Mexico Canada Agreement, which currently exempts approximately 85 percent of Canadian products from tariffs. Trump said he is keeping an open mind about the next iteration of USMCA, suggesting he could be open to a bilateral deal with Canada at the expense of Mexico. “We’re allowed to do different deals if we want,” Trump said. “I want to make whatever the best deal is for this country, and also very much with Canada in mind.” Carney is facing domestic pressure to push Trump to lift or reduce levies of 50 percent on steel and aluminum imports, as well as additional tariffs on some autos, softwood lumber and copper. Canada’s 25 percent countertariffs on U.S. steel and aluminum remain. Ontario Premier Doug Ford said Tuesday if Carney can’t forge a deal with Trump soon, it’s time to bring back more retaliatory tariffs. “We need to hit back hard,” Ford told reporters in Toronto. “You sure don’t sit back and get beat up by a bully every single day. It’s like a kid going in the school yard and getting punched in the face every day.” But Ford added this caveat: “Maybe Prime Minister Carney knows something I don’t know. And if that’s the case, he should sit down with the premiers and explain that.” Canada’s United Steelworkers union director Marty Warren said in a statement Tuesday that, “we need urgent action — not more concessions.” “Canada’s softwood lumber industry is on the brink of collapse,” Warren added. A senior Canadian official, who briefed POLITICO in advance of the meeting, said Carney had two trade goals for the trip. The prime minister was eager to “set the playing field early” on USMCA renewal, and to make progress toward that elusive new economic and security pact. Another senior Canadian official, who briefed POLITICO under the same terms, downplayed expectations. “To expect a deal, per se, I think would be far-fetched,” they said. Speaking Tuesday on Parliament Hill, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith said while she hoped for a breakthrough in Washington, there is value in face time. “A lot of times these trade deals get advanced because of a good personal relationship between the leaders,” Smith said. “They seem to have started off on a good foot.” The Carney-Trump meeting occurred on the second anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel that sparked the war in Gaza — a conflict Trump has decided he wants to end with an ambitious 20-point peace plan that is forcing negotiations between Hamas and Israel. Canada is partially offside with Trump’s Middle East peace plan because it has recognized Palestinian statehood alongside Britain, France, Australia and most of America’s major allies. While Carney’s decision has drawn Trump’s ire, it has not impeded trade talks, in part because Carney has heaped praise on the president’s Middle East peace efforts. “For the first time in decades, hundreds of years, thousands of years, this prospect of peace that you’ve made possible, Canada stands foursquare behind those efforts,” Carney told Trump Tuesday.

Global competition policy continues to evolve, and business leaders across Europe and the UK are navigating a more strategic and complex regulatory environment. No longer a siloed and purely technical legal process, merger control has come into focus as a tool to advance wider policy objectives such as innovation, resilience, competitiveness and economic growth. Amid ongoing economic headwinds in the European Union and UK, competition authorities in these jurisdictions are revisiting how they approach merger control, both procedurally and substantively. > No longer a siloed and purely technical legal process, merger control has come > into focus as a tool to advance wider policy objectives such as innovation, > resilience, competitiveness and economic growth. EU’s merger policy at a crossroads Debate about the role of merger control in the EU has intensified since the prohibition of Siemens/Alstom in 2019. That decision highlighted the tension between preserving effective competition in the single market and supporting the creation of “European champions”. Since then, the European Commission has faced political pressure to adapt its framework in light of global competition from the US and China. Notably, the 2024 Draghi report on European competitiveness — now a year old — called for modernising competition policy to support broader strategic objectives such as innovation, investment, resilience and competitiveness. Recent developments show the Commission’s willingness to adapt: * The 2025 Competitiveness Compass echoed Draghi’s call, emphasising the need to close the innovation gap, pursue decarbonisation in ways that preserve competitiveness, reduce strategic dependencies and strengthen economic security. * In May 2025 the Commission launched a comprehensive review of its Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, combining a general consultation with in-depth consultations on specific topics. The review is intended to align merger control with new market realities: digitalisation, globalisation and sustainability. It includes technical questions on how to assess dynamic effects such as innovation, resilience and competitiveness. The review also covers the impact on labour markets — a new focus for merger control. * The Commission has commissioned an economic study on the dynamic effects of mergers, signalling its determination to better understand these effects and an openness to integrate them more fully. From enforcement to investment: The UK’s pro-growth pivot Post-Brexit, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has sought to establish itself as a leading global authority. Its interventions in Meta/Giphy (2021) and Microsoft/Activision (2023) showed a willingness to block deals even when other agencies took a different view. Since the Labour government came into power in July 2024, merger control in the UK has been drawn into a wider debate about growth and investment. This government prioritises economic growth, and ministers have signalled that competition policy should support the pro-growth agenda. The dismissal of CMA Chair Marcus Bokkerink in January 2025 was widely seen as a political intervention, driven by concerns that the authority’s stance risked deterring investment and hampering growth. > Since the Labour government came into power in July 2024, merger control in > the UK has been drawn into a wider debate about growth and investment. As part of this shift, the CMA introduced its 4Ps framework — committing to improved pace, predictability, proportionality and process — with merger control singled out as a critical area for reform, reflecting its important role in shaping investment. The CMA has indicated that it would focus more on mergers with a “distinct and direct” UK impact, reducing the regulatory burden on global deals with no clear UK nexus. In parallel, at the start of the year the CMA launched a review of its approach to merger remedies. Historically sceptical of behavioural remedies (which govern the conduct of the merged firm) and strongly in favour of structural remedies (such as divestitures), the authority is signalling more openness to behavioural solutions, particularly where they can maximise pro-competitive efficiencies and support growth by driving investment. Although slightly pre-dating both the remedies review and Bokkerink’s dismissal, the CMA’s acceptance of an investment commitment remedy in the Vodafone/Three merger was an early sign of this shift. Opportunities for business leaders The shifts in both Brussels and London are not just technical; they reshape the landscape for how deals are assessed. For business leaders, this creates both uncertainty and opportunity: * In the EU, although a firm landing on merger control reform has yet to be reached, we expect it to be favourable for companies to demonstrate a range of benefits from their transaction, such as increasing innovation, resilience and competitiveness for the EU. Being able to evidence these dynamic effects persuasively will be critical but complex. It will also require adapting existing tools. * In the UK, the CMA’s reforms point to a greater emphasis on growth, more openness to behavioural solutions and faster timelines. They give businesses more room to shape the narrative around investment, remedies and the UK’s role in global deals. However, we expect the CMA to continue to be rigorous and, therefore, the quality of arguments and evidence to be key. > The shifts in both Brussels and London are not just technical; they reshape > the landscape for how deals are assessed. How BRG can help BRG’s economists are actively involved in these developments. With offices in Brussels, Paris, London, Rome, Milan and beyond, BRG offers pan-European expertise grounded in regulatory insight and economic rigour. As economic consultants, we can help businesses turn this evolving policy environment into a strategic advantage. We achieve this through various approaches, including: * Quantifying and evidencing dynamic effects, grounding arguments in commercial realities and robust economic modelling. * Developing data-driven submissions, ensuring analysis aligns with the Commission’s and CMA’s evolving priorities. * Designing and testing remedies, assessing when behavioural or structural commitments can address competition concerns without undermining growth. * Translating new regulatory priorities into competition terms, modelling how digital, sustainability or labour-market issues affect incentives, market dynamics and the assessment of mergers. * Bridging competition economics with business strategy, helping clients demonstrate pro-competitive efficiencies and position transactions as supporting broader policy goals. Collaborating closely with BRG colleagues across the US, Asia and South Africa, our EU/UK merger team steers multijurisdictional filings with precision — combining deep local insights and global coordination to deliver seamless execution, a first-rate work product and outstanding client service. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, position or policy of Berkeley Research Group or its other employees and affiliates.