Tag - Africa

​​What the EU Biotech Act delivers for Europe
Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1         Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation, procedural complexity and uneven implementation across  m ember s tates. As scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel, supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical development to manufacturing and patient access.  The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination  and supporting scale-up and manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive global biotechnology landscape .2       Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness will determine whether the  a ct translates into faster patient access, sustained investment and long-term resilience.  Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen:  Biotechnology sits at the intersection of health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to  research and development  growth . 3    At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25  percent of its global share of pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the  United States  and China.   The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector, influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients can benefit from new treatments.  > Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy > is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4   > >  Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do  and why is it considered an important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?  Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market. By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future  —  and one that can deliver earlier patient benefit  —  so long as we can make it work in practice.  Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will effective delivery and coordination be most decisive? Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.   The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a  u nion-level regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory dialogue, help de-risk development   and promote more consistent implementation across  m ember  s tates.   They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination products  —  spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics  —  where overlapping requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8 and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment process. Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and accelerate development timelines .10 Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech scale-up, manufacturing  and long-term investment in Europe?  Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.   Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and quality?   Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle.  The Biotech Act will help ensure continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which  are  critical to success.   Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier planning for scale-up.    Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen. Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing  European Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster patient access . 11 Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?  Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent  m ember   state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks to address this.   These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and alignment with the EU AI Act ,12  European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance to provide greater operational clarity.  Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of complexity.   Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment, support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.  > These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier > societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the > latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14 > > Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, > Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.  Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?  Marrache:  To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary rigidity or administrative burden.  Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a global biotech hub.  Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?  Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the Biotech Act:    First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability and coordination in practice. Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that reflects the global nature of biotechnology.  And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use of  artificial intelligence   —  as a key driver of innovation in health biotechnology.  In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient benefit. An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References 1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential 2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en 3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf 4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4 5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en  7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en 8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January 2022. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en 9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices – Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr 10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025. Retrieved from https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf   11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act 12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024. Retrieved from https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai 13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en 14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved from https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT * The sponsor is Amgen Inc * The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc * The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act. More information here.
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UN chief suggests both sides may be committing war crimes in US-Israel conflict with Iran
BRUSSELS — United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said Thursday there are “reasonable grounds” to believe both sides in the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran may have committed war crimes, as attacks and retaliatory strikes on energy facilities intensify. Speaking exclusively to POLITICO on a visit to Brussels before Thursday’s European Council summit, Guterres said: “If there are attacks either on Iran or from Iran on energy infrastructure, I think that there are reasonable grounds to think that they might constitute a war crime.”  Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars natural gas field on Wednesday, then Tehran launched a retaliatory strike on a major energy complex in Qatar. Beyond that, Guterres said the growing civilian casualties left both sides in the conflict open to possible war crimes charges. “I don’t see any difference. It doesn’t matter who targets civilians. It is totally unacceptable,” he said. Representatives for the U.S. and Israeli governments did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Guterres’ remarks. America and Israel began a bombing campaign on Feb. 28, killing Iran’s supreme leader and sparking ongoing retaliatory missile-and-drone attacks from Tehran on sites across the Middle East. Having called for deescalation in the region, Guterres appeared to blame Israel for driving the conflict forward, and called on U.S. President Donald Trump to persuade Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to bring it to an end. “The war needs to stop … and I believe that it is in the hands of the U.S. to make it stop. It is possible [to end the war], but it depends on the political will to do it,” Guterres told host Anne McElvoy for an episode of the EU Confidential podcast publishing Friday morning. “I am convinced that Israel, as a strategy, wants to achieve a total destruction of the military capacity of Iran and regime change. And I believe Iran has a strategy, which is to resist for as much time as possible and to cause as much harm as possible. So the key to solve the problem is that the U.S. decides to claim that they have done their job. “President Trump will be able to convince … those that need to be convinced that the work is done. That the work can end,” Guterres added. The secretary-general also attributed America’s decision to launch strikes on Iran to Israel. “I have no doubt that this was something that corresponds to Israel’s strategy … to draw the United States into a war. That objective was achieved. But this is creating dramatic suffering in Iran, [and] in the region, even in Israel. And it is creating a devastating impact in the global economy and whose consequences are still too early to foresee. So, we absolutely must end this conflict,” he said. But finding an off-ramp might prove difficult, and relations between the U.N. and the Trump administration remain frosty.   Asked if he had spoken with Trump since the conflict began three weeks ago, Guterres responded emphatically: “No, no, no … I speak with those I need to speak to. But this is not a soap opera.” He claimed, however, to have been “in contact with all sides,” including with the Trump administration, since hostilities spread across the Gulf.  “It’s vital for the world at large that this war ends quickly,” Guterres said. “This is indeed spiraling out of control and the recent attacks represent an escalation that is extremely dangerous.” Trump said on his Truth Social site that the U.S. had not authorized the attack by Israel on the South Pars site, and that Israel had “violently lashed out,” raising questions about how much influence the U.S. has over its ally. “My hope is that the United States will be able to understand that this has gone too far,” Guterres said. The conflict was primarily benefitting Russia, Guterres added, with Moscow welcoming the distraction from its own war on Ukraine. “Russia is the biggest beneficiary of the Iran crisis,” Guterres said. “Russia is the country that is gaining more with what’s happening in this horrible disaster. Russia is already the winner.” Meanwhile, European leaders, including U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have said they won’t be sending ships to the Persian Gulf in response to Trump’s appeal for help to open the Strait of Hormuz. France has said it will only contribute support vessels “when the situation is calmer.” Guterres applauded the restraint shown by the Europeans, despite Trump’s anger at their refusal to actively support the war or help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime artery that Iran has largely sealed off, driving up global energy prices. “I think these countries made their own reading of the situation, and I believe they took a decision not to get too much involved, knowing that the most important objective is the deescalation,” he said. Listen to the full episode of EU Confidential on Friday morning.
Defense
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War in Ukraine
Britain steps back from Africa with new aid cuts
LONDON — Britain will reduce its aid sent to Africa by more than half, as the government unveils the impact of steep cuts to development assistance for countries across the world. On Thursday the Foreign Office revealed the next three years of its overseas development spending, giving MPs and the public the first look at the impact of Labour’s decision to gut Britain’s aid budget in order to fund an increase in defense spending. Government figures show that the value of Britain’s programs in Africa will fall by 56 percent from the £1.5 billion in 2024/25 when Labour took office to £677 million in 2028/9. It follows the move to reduce aid spending from 0.5 to 0.3 percent of gross national income. However, the government did not release the details of the funding for specific countries, giving Britain’s ambassadors and diplomats time to deliver the news personally to their counterparts across the world ahead of any potential backlash from allies. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told MPs that affected countries want Britain “to be an investor, not just a donor” and “want to attract finance, not be dependent on aid,” as she pointed to money her department had committed to development banks and funds which will help Africa raise money. The decision shows a substantial shift in the government’s focus, moving away from direct assistance for countries, and funneling much of the remaining money into international organizations and private finance initiatives. Chi Onwurah, chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Africa, told POLITICO that she was “dismayed at the level and extent of the cuts to investment in Africa and the impact it will have particularly on health and economic development.” She added: “I hope the government recognizes that security of the British people is not increased by insecurity in Africa and increased migration from Africa, quite the opposite.” Ian Mitchell from the Center for Global Development think tank noted the move was “a remarkable step back from Africa by the U.K.” NEW PRIORITIES Announcing the cuts in the House of Commons, Cooper stressed that the decision to reduce the aid budget had been “hugely difficult,” pointing to similar moves by allies such as France and Germany following the U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to dramatically shrink America’s aid programs after taking office in January 2025. She insisted that it was still “part of our moral purpose” to tackle global disease and hunger, reiterating Labour’s ambition to work towards “a world free from extreme poverty on a livable planet.” Cooper set out three new priorities for Britain’s remaining budget: funding for unstable countries with conflict and humanitarian disasters, funneling money into “proven” global partnerships such as vaccine organizations, and a focus on women and girls, pledging that these will be at the core of 90 percent of Britain’s bilateral aid programs by 2030. A box with the Ukrainian flag on it awaits collection in Peterborough, U.K. on March 10, 2022. | Martin Pope/Getty Images Only three recipients will see their aid spending fully protected: Ukraine, the Palestinian territories and Sudan. Lebanon will also see its funding protected for another year. All bilateral funding for G20 countries will end. Despite the government’s stated priorities, the scale of the cuts mean that even the areas it is seeking to protect will not be protected fully. An impact assessment — which was so stark that ministers claimed they had to rethink some of the cuts in order to better protect focus areas such as contraception — published alongside the announcement found that there will likely be an end to programs in Malawi where 250,000 young people will lose access to family planning, and 20,000 children risk dropping out of school. “These steep cuts will impact the most marginalized and left behind communities,” said Romilly Greenhill, CEO of Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs, adding: “The U.K. is turning its back on the communities that need support the most.” Last-minute negotiations did see some areas protected from more severe cuts, with the BBC World Service seeing a funding boost, the British Council set to receive an uplift amid its financial struggles, and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) — the aid spending watchdog that had been at risk of being axed — continuing to operate with a 40 percent budget cut. GREEN THREAT Though the move will not require legislation to be confirmed — after Prime Minister Keir Starmer successfully got the move past his MPs last year — MPs inside his party and out have lamented the impact of the cuts, amid the ongoing threat to Labour’s left from a resurgent Green Party under new leader Zack Polanski. Labour MP Becky Cooper, chair of the APPG on global health and security said that her party “is, and always has been, a party of internationalism” but today’s plans would “put Britain and the world at risk.” Sarah Champion, another Labour MP who chairs the House of Commons international development committee said that the announcement confirmed that there “will be no winners from unrelenting U.K. aid cuts, just different degrees of losers,” creating a “desperately bleak” picture for the world’s most vulnerable. “These cuts do not aid our defense, they make the whole world more vulnerable,” she added. Her Labour colleague Gareth Thomas, a former development minister, added: “In an already unsafe world, cutting aid risks alienating key allies and will make improving children’s health and education in Commonwealth countries more difficult.” The announcement may give fresh ammunition to the Greens ahead of May’s local elections, where the party is eyeing up one of its best nights in local government amid a collapse in support for Labour among Britain’s young, progressive, and Muslim voters. Reacting to the news that Britain will cut its aid to developing countries aimed at combatting climate change, Polanski said: “Appalling and just unbelievably short-sighted. Our security here in the U.K. relies on action around the world to tackle the climate crisis.”
Defense
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British politics
Budget
EU leaders soften call to send naval ships to Middle East
BRUSSELS — The EU’s 27 member countries are set to back a push to send more naval ships to the Middle East as conflict paralyzes shipping routes, but will insist on them operating strictly within the parameters of missions that predate the war in Iran. Presidents and prime ministers from across the bloc will meet in Brussels Thursday to discuss their response to the Iran crisis. In a draft statement being negotiated by ambassadors in advance of the talks — seen by POLITICO — the leaders show support for an increased naval presence in the region. “The European Council highlights the role of the EU maritime defensive operations EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, and calls for their reinforcement with more assets,” reads the latest version of the text, dated March 17. However, the text introduces new language demanding that the vessels take part in the missions only “in line with their respective mandates.” The EU-led Aspides is confined to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and was launched in 2024 in response to Houthi militant attacks on naval traffic travelling to and from Europe via the Suez Canal. Atalanta, meanwhile, patrols the east coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean to combat piracy. The Trump administration has urged European allies to send frigates to escort naval traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy prices have skyrocketed as a result of tankers being unable to cross the narrow waterway, which links oil- and gas-rich exporters like Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the global market. “I wonder what would happen if we ‘finished off’ what’s left of the Iranian Terror State, and let the Countries that use it, we don’t, be responsible for the so called ‘Strait?’ That would get some of our non-responsive ‘Allies’ in gear, and fast!!!,” U.S. President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social on Wednesday. Ahead of the EU summit, a group of countries — Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta and Cyprus — have written to the bloc’s leadership warning of another potential maritime crisis caused by the Russian liquefied natural gas carrier Arctic Metagaz, which has been adrift in the Mediterranean since March 3. “The precarious condition of the vessel, combined with the nature of its specialised cargo, gives rise to an imminent and serious risk of a major ecological disaster in the heart of the Union’s maritime space,” the leaders of the coastal nations warned. “In this context, we look to the European Commission to facilitate the mobilisation and coordination of Member States and existing EU-level mechanisms, with the goal of ensuring their more efficient, better coordinated and faster response.”
Defense
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Missions
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Germany’s foreign minister warns Iran war could plunge ‘entire world into major crisis’
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Wednesday warned of a dangerous spiral of unintended consequences if the Middle East war escalates further. “There is a real risk of escalation, which could plunge not only this region but the entire world into a major crisis,” Wadephul said during a joint press conference with his French counterpart, Jean-Noël Barrot, in Berlin. The German government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz was initially far more supportive of the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran than many other EU countries, but Merz and his ministers have recently become far more openly critical of the war as the conflict has expanded and the economic and security impacts on the EU’s biggest economy have become clearer. Wadephul suggested some of the risks of the war — including the potential for a food crisis — had not been fully considered. “The fertilizer supply from this region [the Middle East] alone is so essential that a prolonged disruption would threaten to trigger a food crisis across large parts of Africa,” Wadephul said. “And that must fill us with concern for the people who would suffer, and of course also for the resulting refugee flows.” Germany is expected to be among the EU countries most impacted if the escalating war in the Middle East creates a new refugee crisis. Wadephul also said he wishes for a change of leadership in Iran “toward a humane, dignified regime,” but expressed doubt that this goal can be achieved through military force. ” I just don’t believe it can be brought about militarily from the outside,” he said. “We now face a major task to work together with our partners in the United States and Israel to find a point where the military objectives these two have set for themselves are achieved, and where we can then move toward de-escalation and a resolution of the hostilities, while at the same time, of course, ensuring security for the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf States.” Trump had warned NATO allies on Sunday that the alliance faces a “very bad future” if their countries refuse to help secure the Strait of Hormuz, pressing European allies to support an American effort to reopen the key maritime corridor. European leaders, however, rejected participation in such a mission.
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Perché la chiusura dello stretto di Hormuz è una catastrofe annunciata per l’Africa subsahariana
Era sabato 28 febbraio quando gli Stati Uniti e Israele hanno colpito l’Iran uccidendo la guida suprema Ali Khamenei. Teheran ha risposto: lo Stretto di Hormuz è di fatto chiuso e il prezzo del barile di petrolio ora oscilla intorno ai 100 dollari. In gran parte del continente africano quasi tutte le merci viaggiano su gomma e l’aumento del gasolio si traduce in costi più alti per spostare cibo, medicinali e beni essenziali nei mercati urbani. Anche per l’Africa dunque questa guerra non è uno spettacolo geopolitico lontano. L’escalation tra Washington, Gerusalemme e Teheran minaccia le catene di approvvigionamento globali e il blocco dello Stretto di Hormuz fa esplodere anche i costi del trasporto marittimo. È un doppio shock: energetico e logistico. E c’è un dettaglio che racconta questa dipendenza meglio di qualunque statistica: il consumo di carburante, in Africa, è amplificato dal massiccio uso dei generatori elettrici. Dal Ciad al Malawi, dal Gabon alla Tanzania, milioni di persone accendono un generatore per lavorare, per vivere, semplicemente perché la rete elettrica salta. Ogni litro di gasolio in più al barile pesa direttamente sulla possibilità di tenere accesa una luce. L’impennata delle quotazioni del petrolio produce effetti opposti sulle due sponde del continente: alcuni esportatori guadagnano (in parte) e molti importatori devono fare i conti con una situazione di assoluta instabilità. Tra i beneficiari c’è l’Angola, grande esportatore di greggio, che vede rafforzarsi la bilancia dei pagamenti e le entrate statali grazie all’aumento dei prezzi internazionali. L’Algeria, uno dei maggiori produttori di petrolio e gas del continente, si trova nella stessa posizione favorevole: il rialzo degli idrocarburi porta entrate aggiuntive al bilancio pubblico e alle riserve in valuta. E se i prezzi dovessero stabilizzarsi oltre i 100 dollari al barile, anche Nigeria e Libia potrebbero in teoria registrare un significativo aumento delle entrate energetiche. Ma anche tra i produttori, i benefici hanno un limite. Nigeria e Ghana esportano greggio ma importano gran parte dei prodotti raffinati, e l’aumento dei prezzi internazionali non cancella i rincari dei carburanti per i consumatori. Alla fine il vantaggio lungo la filiera quasi si annulla. Questa situazione riflette un paradosso comune a molte economie africane in cui la capacità di raffinazione locale è spesso del tutto assente e costringe quindi questi paesi a esportare materie prime e a importare prodotti finiti a costi più elevati. In Tunisia, importatrice netta di energia, la volatilità dei mercati pesa sui conti pubblici. Il Marocco importa circa il 90% del proprio fabbisogno energetico. L’Egitto è stato tra i primi a reagire: il Ministero del Petrolio ha annunciato rincari compresi tra il 14% e il 17% per diversi prodotti petroliferi, spiegando che la decisione è legata agli sviluppi geopolitici in Medio Oriente e ai loro effetti sui mercati globali dell’energia. C’è poi un altro tema, meno visibile ma altrettanto devastante: i fertilizzanti. Gran parte dei fertilizzanti azotati mondiali dipendono dal gas del Golfo, e il blocco parziale dello Stretto di Hormuz sta facendo salire rapidamente anche i prezzi di urea e ammoniaca. Per produrre i fertilizzanti azotati serve gas naturale, e il Golfo Persico ne ha tra i più economici al mondo. Qatar, Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi, Iran e Bahrein producono una fetta enorme del fabbisogno mondiale, e tutta quella merce, per raggiungere i mercati internazionali, deve passare dallo Stretto di Hormuz. Con lo Stretto bloccato, i prezzi dell’urea sono schizzati verso l’alto tanto che i principali produttori della regione hanno sospeso le operazioni o dichiarato forza maggiore sulle spedizioni. E a differenza del petrolio, per i fertilizzanti non esistono riserve strategiche: nessuno ne ha accumulate per un’emergenza come questa. Se un capitano di nave abbastanza coraggioso decidesse di sfidare i droni e attraversare lo Stretto, preferirebbe trasportare petrolio, non sacchi di urea. Per l’Africa subsahariana è una catastrofe annunciata. In contesti già segnati dall’insicurezza, dal Sahel al Corno d’Africa, l’effetto potrebbe aggravare crisi umanitarie, migrazioni interne e conflitti locali per via di risorse sempre più scarse. La nuova guerra in Medio Oriente investe l’Africa su una serie di fronti intrecciati come scosse di assestamento e il caro-petrolio potrebbe essere solo il primo colpo. L'articolo Perché la chiusura dello stretto di Hormuz è una catastrofe annunciata per l’Africa subsahariana proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
Iran
Africa
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Petrolio
US, Russia, China tearing down rules-based order, EU Council chief Costa warns
The U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran are driving instability across the Middle East and ushering in a new, more dangerous geopolitical era that only helps the EU’s adversaries, European Council President António Costa warned in a speech on Tuesday. “The international system is changing dramatically. A world in which power politics are back in play,” Costa told a meeting of the EU’s diplomatic corps in Brussels. “We know the new reality — a reality in which Russia violates peace, China disrupts trade, and the United States challenges the international rules-based order.” According to Costa, a former Portuguese prime minister, the U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have created “severe consequences” economically after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for international trade. The campaign, he said, has benefited Russia’s war in Ukraine “by flouting international law,” driving up energy prices and diverting military assets that could otherwise have been sent to support Kyiv. Oil prices spiked in the wake of the aerial campaign, with crude briefly rising beyond $100 a barrel earlier this week and analysts warning it would help the Kremlin plug holes in its wartime budget. The EU, Costa went on, wants to see Iranians gain rights and freedoms, “but freedom and human rights cannot be achieved through bombs. Only international law upholds them.” Instead, he said, the rules-based international order must be defended and “violations of international law must not be accepted, whether in Ukraine, Greenland, Latin America, Africa, in Gaza or in the Middle East.” The broadside comes as European leaders voice increasing concern over the strikes on Iran. French President Emmanuel Macron last week cautioned that the attacks were  “outside of international law.” Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has also faced fury from Washington after denying permission for U.S. military planes to use air bases inside Spanish territory to carry out their operations. Costa, a Portuguese Socialist, has hit out at Trump’s threats to place a trade embargo on Spain over its stance, saying last week that “the EU will always ensure that the interests of its Member States are fully protected.” Trump said Sunday night that the war in Iran is “very far ahead of schedule” and “very complete, pretty much,” and that the conflict would end “very soon.”
Middle East
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Anton Wilhelm Amo, la storia del filosofo africano che sfidò l’Europa illuminista
Per renderlo presentabile gli hanno messo un nome europeo: Anton Wilhelm. Poi per evitare equivoci, un’appendice: Amo, Afer. Africano. Nato sulla Costa d’Oro, nell’area di Axim, tra gli Nzema, arrivò in Europa da bambino, in un traffico di corpi, dalla Compagnia Olandese delle Indie Occidentali, poi educato dai duchi di Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel. Arrivò in quel secolo in cui l’Illuminismo costruiva il suo tempio mentre continuava la macelleria. Nelle università si discuteva di ragione, natura, libertà. Fuori dalle aule la libertà aveva un’altra frontiera, molto più precisa: la pelle, il suo colore. Lo guardavano imparare come fosse un caso. Per rendere tollerabile l’ingiustizia. Per trasformare il suo corpo in alibi per la buona coscienza. Un’eccezione utile: “anche lui può”. Amo cominciò da dove un secolo che ama le idee non vorrebbe essere toccato: dal diritto. Ha scritto dei diritti dei “Mori” in Europa. De jure Maurorum in Europa. Anche solo immaginare quel titolo in quell’aria era già abbastanza: mettere la parola “diritto” accanto a un corpo che la società tratta come oggetto è un gesto che chiede conto: che cosa fate, che cosa permettete. Poi arrivò la filosofia. Amo in De humanae mentis apatheia scriveva che la mente non sente, che il patire appartiene al corpo, non all’intelletto. Un argomento tecnico, ma in quella frase ci entrava un’intera epoca. C’è una mente che elabora libertà, e un corpo che la subisce. In questo modo fissava il meccanismo più comodo del potere: separare la chiarezza dal dolore, far lavorare la ragione lontano dalla ferita. Forse Amo non voleva denunciare niente, forse voleva solo chiarire un problema di filosofia cartesiana. Eppure, è difficile non sentire come la sua tesi tocchi un nervo sociale. Perché in quel secolo, come in tanti altri, la sofferenza è sempre stata amministrata lasciandola ai corpi, tenendo la mente pulita. La mente discute, il corpo paga. Amo vive dentro questa incrinatura senza poterla nominare apertamente. La lingua in cui parla è quella dell’Europa. La forma in cui scrive è quella dell’Europa. Ma il suo corpo, il suo sguardo, la sua origine sono un promemoria permanente: che quella lingua e quella forma non sono neutrali, che l’universale spesso coincide con ciò che è già dominante. E che un uomo può entrare nel tempio della ragione e restare comunque un ospite provvisorio: accolto finché non cambia l’aria, tollerato finché non diventa principio. Amo insegna, pubblica, tiene lezioni. Tuttavia resta sempre “il filosofo africano”. Non un filosofo, ma un filosofo con aggettivo. E l’aggettivo serve a farlo apparire irregolare. Serve a impedirgli di diventare troppo normale. Troppo pericoloso. Perché non sarebbe stato più un caso curioso ma un interlocutore. Col tempo quello che era stato un miracolo da esibire rischiava di diventare un imbarazzo. La sua presenza continuava a creare attrito. Un uomo africano che discute di ragione in latino dentro le università europee costringe la ragione a guardarsi l’ombra. Costringe a chiedersi quanto di ciò che chiamiamo civilizzazione abbia bisogno di un margine, di un corpo sacrificabile per rimanere pulita. Poi la sua storia si sfilaccia, come se la documentazione stessa avesse deciso di non accompagnarlo oltre. Si dice che sia tornato verso la costa africana. E da qui la sua vita si fa opaca: qualche traccia, poche certezze. Non si sa se abbia trovato casa, se abbia trovato pace, se abbia trovato soltanto un altro tipo di solitudine. È come se la storia lo avesse seguito finché è stato utile al racconto europeo e lo avesse lasciato andare quando diventava troppo difficile integrarlo senza cambiare la trama sociale. Non c’è una conclusione, certe vite non finiscono, si interrompono, diventano un altro modo di parlarne. Bio: Anton Wilhelm Amo (circa 1703 – data di morte incerta) nacque nell’area della Costa d’Oro (oggi Ghana) e fu portato in Europa da bambino. Studiò in Germania, scrisse opere di filosofia e diritto, tra cui la dissertazione De humanae mentis apatheia (1734), e insegnò in ambito universitario. In età adulta tornò verso l’Africa occidentale; gli ultimi anni della sua vita sono poco documentati. L'articolo Anton Wilhelm Amo, la storia del filosofo africano che sfidò l’Europa illuminista proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
Africa
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Cultura
Donald Trump is betting on an Iranian uprising. He might be disappointed.
According to Donald Trump, Iranians have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. “The hour of your freedom is at hand,” he declared, as U.S. and Israeli warplanes pounded Iranian cities and the compound of the country’s supreme leader. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will probably be your only chance for generations.” Trump’s comments made clear that America is seeking regime change. After decades of high tensions, tough recriminations and one-off attacks, Washington finally decided to try getting rid of the country’s government altogether — and it thinks ordinary Iranians will rise up and finish the job. The country’s population, after all, is clearly fed up with the Islamic Republic. Over the last decade, Iranians have repeatedly staged mass demonstrations against the regime. Those protests typically only go away after the government responds with horrific force. In December and January, for example, hundreds of thousands of Iranians spent weeks demonstrating — until Iranian security officials shot and killed thousands of them. But now, American and Israeli warplanes are attacking Iran’s military and security apparatus and destroying other government institutions. They have killed the country’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and many other top officials. The Trump administration seems to be betting that the Iranian people will soon take over the regime change process, resume protesting and successfully remove a greatly weakened government. To gauge how likely that response might be, I spoke to political scientists and Iranian experts, all of whom would love to see “people power” usher in new leadership in Tehran. But they also expressed deep skepticism that even this massive air campaign could produce a successful uprising. For starters, they told me, aerial bombing campaigns have a terrible record at fomenting regime change in any state. Second, Iran has powerful repressive organs with a lot of experience in putting down popular unrest. In addition, Iran’s bureaucracy has been expecting — and preparing for — American attacks for generations. And even if Washington does successfully fracture or defang the Islamic Republic, exhausted and shocked Iranians may be too frightened or focused on survival to flood the streets. The country’s political opposition remains weak, and it is famously fragmented. Iranians, of course, do desperately want a better future, and they have been willing to protest under very difficult conditions. For an autocracy, the country has high levels of civic engagement. It is therefore possible that Iranians will succeed where other populations haven’t. But history suggests most of the country’s people will not heed Trump’s call, and that even if they do, they will have a hard time winning. In February 1991, as the American military laid waste to the Iraqi armed forces, U.S. President George H.W. Bush made an appeal. Speaking on international television, Bush called on “the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” They didn’t act immediately. But as soon as America stopped the bombing, thousands of Kurds and Shiites across the country rose up against the Sunni-dominated government, hoping that Saddam’s battered regime and weakened military could finally be defeated. The Iraqi experience is, unfortunately, typical of what happens when presidents have tried in the past to use aerial firepower to change governments. The United States knocked out 90 percent of North Korea’s power generation during the Korean War in hopes that it would help topple Kim Il-Sung. It didn’t. Washington plunged North Vietnam into darkness during the Vietnam War; that, too, failed. Even Bill Clinton’s 1998 bombing of tiny Serbia didn’t give the opposition movement space to drive Slobodan Milosevic from power. It took another 16 months, and a fraudulent election, before he was forced to leave office. “Never,” Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago who studies air power and regime change, replied when I asked whether what Washington was doing in Iran had succeeded elsewhere. “Bombings have never led people to take to the streets and topple their leader.” There are two main reasons why air power has such a terrible record. The first, Pape said, is because bombings often prompt citizens to turn against the domestic opposition — no matter how much they hate the leader. “Even the hint that you are siding with the attacking state is used by rivals to stab you in the back,” he told me. To understand why, he asked liberals to consider how Americans might respond if Iran killed Trump and then encouraged the Democratic Party’s supporters to seize power; conservatives might imagine what would have happened if Iran did the same to Barack Obama. Just because you don’t like your country’s leaders, it doesn’t mean that you want to side with an external enemy who deposes them. The second reason is that bombings by themselves rarely fully decimate a government’s repressive capacity. “In order to save the pro-democracy protesters, you’ve got to be right there,” Pape told me. “You have to have troops on the ground.” In Iran, both lessons hold value. Iran analysts frequently debate whether outside attacks could prompt a rally-around-the-flag effect, given how unpopular the government has been. Most analysts think that reactions will vary widely, and Iranians are known to be quite nationalistic and weary and wary of international interventions. As a result, experts said that even many Iranians who loathe Khamenei will not want to do what America is asking of them — especially given rising civilian casualties from the U.S. attacks. To be sure, not everyone will feel squeamish. “There are those who, just out of sheer desperation, were hoping for a U.S. military intervention,” said Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group. They might be happy to take to the streets, as Trump asked them to. So might some of the people who are unhappy with the attacks but want a new government. Yet these Iranians could run into the second problem: the regime’s substantial capabilities. The Iranian state has multiple institutions that are capable of and responsible for mowing down demonstrators. It has large weapons stockpiles that it has spread out across the country, in part because it expected U.S. hits. That means no matter how far America and Israel go in dropping bombs, they will struggle to truly neuter its security forces. “The U.S. would basically have to do what it did in Afghanistan and Iraq over the course of several years in the course of a couple of months,” Vaez told me. “I just don’t see how that would be possible.” There’s one final obstacle to a popular revolution: Iran’s opposition is disorganized, weak and riven. “The Islamic Republic may have abjectly failed at providing its people with a functioning economy and decent standard of living, but it has been very effective at locking up its opponents. The country has a politically active diaspora, but it is particularly plagued by infighting—especially between those who want former Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi to take control of the country and those who oppose him.As a result, opposition forces will have a hard time coordinating and then overwhelming whatever regime institutions still exist. “ Already today, the regime has deployed militias on the streets in order to keep order and prevent upheaval,” Vaez said. Especially after watching thousands of people die at the regime’s hands in December and January — and then scores more die in U.S. and Israeli attacks — he was skeptical the Islamic Republic’s foes would be ready to come together and hold mass protests. Bombing campaigns may never have incited a successful uprising, but there are cases where foreign air power has helped topple a dictator. In Libya, NATO began striking Muammar al-Gaddafi’s forces after Gaddafi began brutalizing his people. It proved critical. Around six months after the campaign began, rebel forces drove Gaddafi’s government from power. Those rebel forces existed before the NATO bombings began. But it is a more optimistic precedent for those hoping this campaign will bring down the Islamic Republic. And at least some people are relatively bullish about the country’s future. Iran may not have an armed, organized opposition, but it does have deeply committed regime opponents. “Iranians are willing to make tremendous sacrifices to get rid of their leaders,” Behnam Taleblu wrote in a recent article outlining how a bombing campaign could open the door to an opposition takeover. He cited the death toll from the most recent protests, which some observers place at north of 30,000, as evidence of just how much demonstrators are prepared to give and how hard suppressing them has become. If the bombing campaign continues and extends to local police headquarters and lower-level commanders, Taleblu was optimistic that ordinary Iranians could, indeed, get rid of any regime remnants. “The Iranian people have the drive and determination needed,” he concluded. So far, the American and Israeli attacks are certainly overwhelming. Decapitation strikes may have a poor track record at inciting regime change, but few governments have killed quite so many officials in quite so short a period as Jerusalem and Washington have in the attack’s first 36 hours. In addition to assassinating Iran’s leader — something the American campaigns in the Korean War, the War, and the first Gulf War never accomplished — Washington has taken out many of his top deputies. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, is dead. So is Iran’s defense minister, the chief of staff of the armed forces, and the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And bombs have killed enumerable officials lower down the chain of command. It’s impossible to say how, exactly, Iranians feel about all this on average. But videos have come out showing many people celebrating Khamenei’s death. “We’re in a different place,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. “This is a moment where you start thinking about dreams.” But it is still early days, and celebratory clips are not proof that a government-toppling uprising is near. (There have also been videos of Iranians mourning the supreme leader.) Even Taleblu told me that, although the United States and Israel were off to a good start, it was too early to say how things would play out. In fact, almost every Iran analyst I spoke to hedged when asked what might come next. The only thing they agreed on was that the country would be transformed. “The regime as we know it is no longer going to exist,” said Sanam Vakil, the director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program. “It’s going to evolve into something else.” Too much of the government has been destroyed for it to carry on as it was. But that doesn’t mean it will change for the better — or that ordinary Iranians will have a say in what follows. It is possible, perhaps even more likely, that America and Israel have identified or will identify a cooperative regime insider who they will help take charge, as happened in Venezuela. (Alternatively, they might try to install someone from outside the country.) It is also possible that one of the Iranian regime’s many contingency plans will prove effective, and that the country is about to be governed by a new supreme leader. Those contingency plans could fail, but a different regime official or commander might unify the system’s surviving elements and ruthlessly consolidate power. Or the regime might fracture, and different groups will violently compete for control — as happened in Libya’s post-Qaddafi civil war. Either way, Iranians will have to fight to have their voices heard. And in a moment of great chaos, facing great danger and disruption, protesting for democracy is unlikely to be their first concern. “I think people are just trying to digest and think about what’s coming next,” Vakil said. “They are going to be focusing on their own survival.”
Middle East
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Lo ammetto: sono stato colonizzato dal Sahel. E ora spero che il mio sguardo sul mondo non si omologhi più
Lo ammetto. Sono stato colonizzato, forse non abbastanza, dall’Africa Occidentale e in particolare dal Sahel. Fin dal mio primo soggiorno in Costa d’Avorio per un paio d’anni come inesperto insegnante di muratura in un centro professionale. Assieme ad un amico avevamo scelto il volontariato internazionale sostitutivo del servizio militare. Correva la fine degli anni ’70, ruggenti, così saranno in seguito definiti. Da allora l’Africa occidentale non mi avrebbe più abbandonato se si eccettua uno splendido transito di tre anni a Cordoba, in Argentina. Anche in quel Paese si trattava di intercettare i fragili sentieri e le parole che parlavano di lotte per la dignità nelle periferie povere della città. Nel frattempo, licenziatomi dalla fabbrica dove avevo ripreso il lavoro, ero tornato in Costa d’Avorio. Stavolta come missionario di ‘professione’, e cioè come religioso per l’accompagnamento dei giovani studenti fino all’inizio degli anni ’90. Fu poi la volta della Liberia che chiudeva, durante il mio soggiorno, una lunga guerra (in)civile nel 2007. Al ritorno, dopo la pace, ho transitato uno splendido centro storico nella città di Genova. In carcere ma soprattutto sulle strade ho avuto modo di incontrare volti africani nel mio Paese di origine. Arrivò in seguito il Niger, nel Sahel, per quattordici anni, come testimone privilegiato della drammatica ed esaltante realtà dei migranti. Ed è stato durante quest’ultimo soggiorno, tra sabbia, vento, tempesta e soprattutto polvere che il processo di ‘colonizzazione africana’ si è in qualche modo approfondito, perfezionato e realizzato. Certo l’operazione non si è ancora totalmente compiuto. D’altronde un proverbio più volte ascoltato in quella porzione d’Africa l’affermava con chiarezza: “Anche se resta a lungo nello stagno, il legno non diventerà mai un coccodrillo”. Viene solo ricordato agli incauti ospiti che l’appartenenza ad una cultura diversa della propria sarà sempre parziale e precaria. La consapevolezza di questa intrinseca fragilità rende il processo di colonizzazione dell’ospite un cantiere permanente. Ho lasciato il Sahel l’anno scorso per un servizio in patria solo per constatare che il Sahel e l’Africa finora vissuta non mi hanno mai lasciato. Proprio in quel senso parlo di una certa colonizzazione che sembra essere diventare una seconda natura, un modo di reinterpretare il mondo e la vita stessa. Ed è in questa prospettiva che, coinvolto con nostalgia, rammarico e passione, seguo le vicende e i discorsi che emergono da questo amato continente. Si tratta di metter assieme, con parole di vento, lo sguardo di un colonizzato da un trentennio di soggiorno in Africa occidentale. Sguardo che – mi auguro – non ritornerà mai più normalizzato e omologato al sistema. Ad esempio sembra del tutto irrilevante, ai capi di stato africani recentemente riuniti ad Addis Abeba, che migliaia di giovani, donne e bambini continuino a voler fuggire dal continente. Non degno di menzione che, in numero imprecisato, trovino la morte nel deserti e nei mari che circondano l’Africa. Nessun riferimento ai centri di disumanizzazione per migranti finanziati dall’Europa in Libia. Del tutto inosservata passa, nella dichiarazione finale del vertice, la morte di centinaia di giovani africani in Ucraina, inviati al fronte con false promesse da agenzie russe. Il fenomeno era stato denunciato da tempo. I ‘Black Wagner’ dall’Africa al fronte ucraino in nome e una guerra mai scelta. Il trentanovesimo vertice dell’Unione Africana si è chiuso con, tra l’altro, il duplice impegno di far tacere le armi nel conflitto armato del Sudan e nel Sahel. Quest’ultimo insanguinato dall’azione di gruppi armati ormai da un decennio. I capi di stato hanno altresì sottolineato la non tolleranza a ulteriori tentativi di destabilizzazione delle democrazie mediante colpi di stato militari. Non una parola, invece, sui golpe istituzionali che garantiscono per molti dei presenti una presidenza a vita. Anzi alcuni di loro, per quale alchimia politica non si sa, vengono scelti come mediatori di conflitti. Forse perché affidabili e abili dittatori. Si nota, sempre nel vertice citato, il richiamo al tempo tragico della tratta atlantica degli schiavi dimenticando che è esistita, non meno avvilente, la tratta operata in Africa orientale con le carovane in contesto ‘islamico’. Si domandano scuse e risarcimenti per questo. Mai però si assiste ad una autocritica che faccia luce sulle responsabilità locali che hanno reso possibile il dramma della schiavitù, peraltro già ben esistente e applicata sul posto. Mai si menziona, per il ‘politicamente corretto’ che spesso nei Paesi del Maghreb gli africani subsahariani vengano trattati, a tutti gli effetti, da schiavi. L’Africa ‘bianca’ è diversa. Con lo sguardo di un colonizzato mi verrebbe da aggiungere che nel continente i poveri non contano quasi nulla se non quando siamo prossimi alle elezioni. Che i militari al potere, senza nessun permesso, facciano ciò per cui sono destinati. Al servizio del popolo tramite il rispetto delle istituzioni. Che smettano, una volta per tutte, di manipolare e sedurre, con le armi in mano, con inutili e vane promesse di benessere. Che i politici e gli intellettuali africani abbiano ancora il coraggio di guardarsi allo specchio e chiedersi dove e come hanno tradito la loro funzione. Che i religiosi, di ogni confessione, smettano di sedere accanto alla mensa dei potenti e siano con coerenza, semplici e umili operatori di giustizia e di verità. E che, infine, i poveri prendano la parola e danzino l’avvenuta liberazione da ogni paura. L'articolo Lo ammetto: sono stato colonizzato dal Sahel. E ora spero che il mio sguardo sul mondo non si omologhi più proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
Africa
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