Biotechnology is central to modern medicine and Europe’s long-term
competitiveness. From cancer and cardiovascular disease to rare conditions, it
is driving transformative advances for patients across Europe and beyond . 1
Yet innovation in Europe is increasingly shaped by regulatory fragmentation,
procedural complexity and uneven implementation across m ember s tates. As
scientific progress accelerates, policy frameworks must evolve in parallel,
supporting the full lifecycle of innovation from research and clinical
development to manufacturing and patient access.
The proposed EU Biotech Act seeks to address these challenges. By streamlining
regulatory procedures, strengthening coordination and supporting scale-up and
manufacturing, it aims to reinforce Europe’s position in a highly competitive
global biotechnology landscape .2
Its success, however, will depend less on ambition than on delivery. Consistent
implementation, proportionate oversight and continued global openness
will determine whether the a ct translates into faster patient access,
sustained investment and long-term resilience.
Q: Why is biotechnology increasingly seen as a strategic pillar for Europe’s
competitiveness, resilience and long-term growth?
Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America, Middle
East, Africa and Canada, Amgen: Biotechnology sits at the intersection of
health, industrial policy and economic competitiveness. The sector is one of
Europe’s strongest strategic assets and a leading contributor to research and
development growth . 3
At the same time, Europe’s position is under increasing pressure. Over the past
two decades, the EU has lost approximately 25 percent of its global share of
pharmaceutical investment to other regions, such as the United States and
China.
The choices made today will shape Europe’s long-term strength in the sector,
influencing not only competitiveness and growth, but also how quickly patients
can benefit from new treatments.
> Europe stands at a pivotal moment in biotechnology. Our life sciences legacy
> is strong, but maintaining global competitiveness requires evolution .” 4
>
> Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America,
> Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.
Q: What does the EU Biotech Act aim to do and why is it considered an
important step forward for patients and Europe’s innovation ecosystem?
Marrache: The EU Biotech Act represents a timely opportunity to better support
biotechnology products from the laboratory to the market.
By streamlining medicines’ pathways and improving conditions for scale-up and
investment, it can help strengthen Europe’s innovation ecosystem and accelerate
patient access to breakthrough therapies. These measures will help anchor
biotechnology as a strategic priority for Europe’s future — and one that can
deliver earlier patient benefit — so long as we can make it work in practice.
Q: How does the EU Biotech Act address regulatory fragmentation, and where will
effective delivery and coordination be most decisive?
Marrache: Regulatory fragmentation has long challenged biotechnology development
in Europe, particularly for multinational clinical trials and innovative
products. The Biotech Act introduces faster, more coordinated trials, expanded
regulatory sandboxes and new investment and industrial capacity instruments.
The proposed EU Health Biotechnology Support Network and a u nion-level
regulatory status repository would strengthen transparency and
predictability. Together, these measures would support earlier regulatory
dialogue, help de-risk development and promote more consistent implementation
across m ember s tates.
They also create an opportunity to address complexities surrounding combination
products — spanning medicines, devices and diagnostics — where overlapping
requirements and parallel assessments have added delays.5 This builds on related
efforts, such as the COMBINE programme,6 which seeks to streamline the
navigation of the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation , 7 Clinical Trials Regulation8
and the Medical Device Regulation9 through a single, coordinated assessment
process.
Continued clarity and coordination will be essential to reduce duplication and
accelerate development timelines .10
Q: What conditions will be most critical to support biotech
scale-up, manufacturing and long-term investment in Europe?
Marrache: Europe must strike the right balance between strategic autonomy and
openness to global collaboration. Any new instruments under the Biotech Act
mechanisms should remain open and supportive of all types of biotech
investments, recogni z ing that biotech manufacturing operates through globally
integrated and highly speciali z ed value chains.
Q: How can Europe ensure faster and more predictable pathways from scientific
discovery to patient access, while maintaining high standards of safety and
quality?
Marrache: Faster and more predictable patient access depends on strengthening
end-to-end pathways across the lifecycle. The Biotech Act will help ensure
continuity of scientific and regulatory experti z e, from clinical development
through post-authori z ation. It will also support stronger alignment with
downstream processes, such as health technology assessments, which are
critical to success.
Moreover, reducing unnecessary delays or duplication in approval processes can
set clearer expectations, more predictable development timelines and earlier
planning for scale-up.
Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America,
Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen. Via Amgen.
Finally, embedding a limited number of practical tools (procedural, digital or
governance-based) and ensuring they are integrated within existing European
Medicines Agency and EU regulatory structures can help achieve faster
patient access . 11
Q: What role can stronger regulatory coordination, data use and public - private
collaboration play in strengthening Europe’s global position in biotechnology?
Marrache: To unlock biotechnology’s full potential, consistent implementation is
essential. Fragmented approaches to secondary data use, divergent m ember
state interpretations and uncertainty for data holders still limit access to
high-quality datasets at scale. The Biotech Act introduces key building blocks
to address this.
These include Biotechnology Data Quality Accelerators to improve
interoperability, trusted testing environments for advanced innovation, and
alignment with the EU AI Act ,12 European Health Data Space13 and wider EU data
initiatives. It also foresees AI-specific provisions and clinical trial guidance
to provide greater operational clarity.
Crucially, these structures must simplify rather than add further layers of
complexity.
Addressing remaining barriers will reduce legal uncertainty for AI deployment,
support innovation and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness.
> These reforms will create a moderni z ed biotech ecosystem, healthier
> societies, sustainable healthcare systems and faster patient access to the
> latest breakthroughs in Europe .” 14
>
> Gilles Marrache, SVP and regional general manager, Europe, Latin America,
> Middle East, Africa and Canada, Amgen.
Q: As technologies evolve and global competition intensifies, how can
policymakers ensure the Biotech Act remains flexible and future-proof?
Marrache: To remain future-proof, the Biotech Act must be designed to evolve
alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and patient needs. Clear
objectives, risk-based requirements, regular review mechanisms and timely
updates to guidance will enhance regulatory agility without creating unnecessary
rigidity or administrative burden.
Continuous stakeholder dialogue combined with horizon scanning will be essential
to sustaining innovation, resilience and timely patient access over the long
term. Preserving regulatory openness and international cooperation will be
critical in avoiding fragmentation and maintaining Europe’s credibility as a
global biotech hub.
Q: Looking ahead, what two or three priorities should policymakers focus on to
ensure the EU Biotech Act delivers meaningful impact in practice?
Marrache: Looking ahead, policymakers should focus on three priorities for the
Biotech Act:
First, implementation must deliver real regulatory efficiency, predictability
and coordination in practice.
Second, Europe must sustain an open and investment-friendly framework that
reflects the global nature of biotechnology.
And third, policymakers should ensure a clear and coherent legal framework
across the lifecycle of innovative medicines, providing certainty for the use
of artificial intelligence — as a key driver of innovation in health
biotechnology.
In practical terms, the EU Biotech Act will be judged not by the number of new
instruments it creates, but by whether it reduces complexity, increases
predictability and shortens the path from scientific discovery to patient
benefit.
An open, innovation-friendly framework that is competitive at the global level
will help sustain investment, strengthen resilient supply chains and deliver
better outcomes for patients across Europe and beyond.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
References
1. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025.
Retrieved from
https://www.amgen.eu/media/press-releases/2025/05/The_EU_Biotech_Act_Unlocking_Europes_Potential
2. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation to establish measures to
strengthen the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, December
2025. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-establish-measures-strengthen-unions-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-sectors_en
3. EFPIA, The pharmaceutical sector: A catalyst to foster Europe’s
competitiveness, February 2026. Retrieved from
https://www.efpia.eu/media/zkhfr3kp/10-actions-for-competitiveness-growth-and-security.pdf
4. The Parliament, Investing in healthy societies by boosting biotech
competitiveness, November 2024. Retrieved from
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/investing-in-healthy-societies-by-boosting-biotech-competitiveness#_ftn4
5. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025.
Retrieved from
https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf
6. European Commission, combine programme, June 2023. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-topics-interest/combine-programme_en
7. European Commission. Medical Devices – In Vitro Diagnostics, March 2026.
Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-vitro-diagnostics_en
8. European Commission, Clinical trials – Regulation EU No 536/2014, January
2022. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-regulation-eu-no-5362014_en
9. European Commission, Simpler and more effective rules for medical devices –
Commission proposal for a targeted revision of the medical devices
regulations, December 2025. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-sector/new-regulations_en#mdr
10. Amgen Europe, The EU Biotech Act Unlocking Europe’s Potential, May 2025.
Retrieved from
https://www.amgen.eu/docs/BiotechPP_final_digital_version_May_2025.pdf
11. AmCham, EU position on the Commission Proposal for an EU Biotech Act
12. European Commission, AI Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future, June 2024.
Retrieved from
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai
13. European Commission, European Health Data Space, March 2025. Retrieved from
https://health.ec.europa.eu/ehealth-digital-health-and-care/european-health-data-space-regulation-ehds_en
14. The Parliament, Why Europe needs a Biotech Act, October 2025. Retrieved
from
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/partner/article/why-europe-needs-a-biotech-act
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT
* The sponsor is Amgen Inc
* The ultimate controlling entity is Amgen Inc
* The political advertisement is linked to advocacy on the EU Biotech Act.
More information here.
Tag - Africa
BRUSSELS — United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said Thursday there
are “reasonable grounds” to believe both sides in the U.S.-Israel conflict with
Iran may have committed war crimes, as attacks and retaliatory strikes on energy
facilities intensify.
Speaking exclusively to POLITICO on a visit to Brussels before Thursday’s
European Council summit, Guterres said: “If there are attacks either on Iran or
from Iran on energy infrastructure, I think that there are reasonable grounds to
think that they might constitute a war crime.”
Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars natural gas field on Wednesday, then Tehran
launched a retaliatory strike on a major energy complex in Qatar. Beyond that,
Guterres said the growing civilian casualties left both sides in the conflict
open to possible war crimes charges.
“I don’t see any difference. It doesn’t matter who targets civilians. It
is totally unacceptable,” he said.
Representatives for the U.S. and Israeli governments did not immediately respond
to requests for comment on Guterres’ remarks. America and Israel began a bombing
campaign on Feb. 28, killing Iran’s supreme leader and sparking ongoing
retaliatory missile-and-drone attacks from Tehran on sites across the Middle
East.
Having called for deescalation in the region, Guterres appeared to blame Israel
for driving the conflict forward, and called on U.S. President Donald Trump to
persuade Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to bring it to an end.
“The war needs to stop … and I believe that it is in the hands of the U.S. to
make it stop. It is possible [to end the war], but it depends on the political
will to do it,” Guterres told host Anne McElvoy for an episode of the EU
Confidential podcast publishing Friday morning.
“I am convinced that Israel, as a strategy, wants to achieve a total destruction
of the military capacity of Iran and regime change. And I believe Iran has a
strategy, which is to resist for as much time as possible and to cause as much
harm as possible. So the key to solve the problem is that the U.S. decides to
claim that they have done their job.
“President Trump will be able to convince … those that need to be convinced that
the work is done. That the work can end,” Guterres added.
The secretary-general also attributed America’s decision to launch strikes on
Iran to Israel.
“I have no doubt that this was something that corresponds to Israel’s strategy …
to draw the United States into a war. That objective was achieved. But this
is creating dramatic suffering in Iran, [and] in the region, even in Israel. And
it is creating a devastating impact in the global economy and whose consequences
are still too early to foresee. So, we absolutely must end this conflict,” he
said.
But finding an off-ramp might prove difficult, and relations between the U.N.
and the Trump administration remain frosty.
Asked if he had spoken with Trump since the conflict began three weeks ago,
Guterres responded emphatically: “No, no, no … I speak with those I need to
speak to. But this is not a soap opera.”
He claimed, however, to have been “in contact with all sides,” including with
the Trump administration, since hostilities spread across the Gulf.
“It’s vital for the world at large that this war ends quickly,” Guterres said.
“This is indeed spiraling out of control and the recent attacks represent an
escalation that is extremely dangerous.”
Trump said on his Truth Social site that the U.S. had not authorized the attack
by Israel on the South Pars site, and that Israel had “violently lashed out,”
raising questions about how much influence the U.S. has over its ally.
“My hope is that the United States will be able to understand that this has
gone too far,” Guterres said.
The conflict was primarily benefitting Russia, Guterres added, with Moscow
welcoming the distraction from its own war on Ukraine.
“Russia is the biggest beneficiary of the Iran crisis,” Guterres said. “Russia
is the country that is gaining more with what’s happening in this horrible
disaster. Russia is already the winner.”
Meanwhile, European leaders, including U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have said they won’t be sending ships to the
Persian Gulf in response to Trump’s appeal for help to open the Strait of
Hormuz. France has said it will only contribute support vessels “when the
situation is calmer.”
Guterres applauded the restraint shown by the Europeans, despite Trump’s anger
at their refusal to actively support the war or help reopen the Strait of
Hormuz, a critical maritime artery that Iran has largely sealed off, driving up
global energy prices.
“I think these countries made their own reading of the situation, and I
believe they took a decision not to get too much involved, knowing that the most
important objective is the deescalation,” he said.
Listen to the full episode of EU Confidential on Friday morning.
LONDON — Britain will reduce its aid sent to Africa by more than half, as the
government unveils the impact of steep cuts to development assistance for
countries across the world.
On Thursday the Foreign Office revealed the next three years of its overseas
development spending, giving MPs and the public the first look at the impact of
Labour’s decision to gut Britain’s aid budget in order to fund an increase in
defense spending.
Government figures show that the value of Britain’s programs in Africa will fall
by 56 percent from the £1.5 billion in 2024/25 when Labour took office to £677
million in 2028/9. It follows the move to reduce aid spending from 0.5 to 0.3
percent of gross national income.
However, the government did not release the details of the funding for specific
countries, giving Britain’s ambassadors and diplomats time to deliver the news
personally to their counterparts across the world ahead of any potential
backlash from allies.
Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper told MPs that affected countries want Britain
“to be an investor, not just a donor” and “want to attract finance, not be
dependent on aid,” as she pointed to money her department had committed to
development banks and funds which will help Africa raise money.
The decision shows a substantial shift in the government’s focus, moving away
from direct assistance for countries, and funneling much of the remaining money
into international organizations and private finance initiatives.
Chi Onwurah, chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Africa, told
POLITICO that she was “dismayed at the level and extent of the cuts to
investment in Africa and the impact it will have particularly on health and
economic development.”
She added: “I hope the government recognizes that security of the British people
is not increased by insecurity in Africa and increased migration from Africa,
quite the opposite.”
Ian Mitchell from the Center for Global Development think tank noted the move
was “a remarkable step back from Africa by the U.K.”
NEW PRIORITIES
Announcing the cuts in the House of Commons, Cooper stressed that the decision
to reduce the aid budget had been “hugely difficult,” pointing to similar moves
by allies such as France and Germany following the U.S. President Donald Trump’s
decision to dramatically shrink America’s aid programs after taking office in
January 2025.
She insisted that it was still “part of our moral purpose” to tackle global
disease and hunger, reiterating Labour’s ambition to work towards “a world free
from extreme poverty on a livable planet.”
Cooper set out three new priorities for Britain’s remaining budget: funding for
unstable countries with conflict and humanitarian disasters, funneling money
into “proven” global partnerships such as vaccine organizations, and a focus on
women and girls, pledging that these will be at the core of 90 percent of
Britain’s bilateral aid programs by 2030.
A box with the Ukrainian flag on it awaits collection in Peterborough, U.K. on
March 10, 2022. | Martin Pope/Getty Images
Only three recipients will see their aid spending fully protected: Ukraine, the
Palestinian territories and Sudan. Lebanon will also see its funding protected
for another year. All bilateral funding for G20 countries will end.
Despite the government’s stated priorities, the scale of the cuts mean that even
the areas it is seeking to protect will not be protected fully.
An impact assessment — which was so stark that ministers claimed they had to
rethink some of the cuts in order to better protect focus areas such as
contraception — published alongside the announcement found that there will
likely be an end to programs in Malawi where 250,000 young people will lose
access to family planning, and 20,000 children risk dropping out of school.
“These steep cuts will impact the most marginalized and left behind
communities,” said Romilly Greenhill, CEO of Bond, the U.K. network for NGOs,
adding: “The U.K. is turning its back on the communities that need support the
most.”
Last-minute negotiations did see some areas protected from more severe cuts,
with the BBC World Service seeing a funding boost, the British Council set to
receive an uplift amid its financial struggles, and the Independent Commission
for Aid Impact (ICAI) — the aid spending watchdog that had been at risk of being
axed — continuing to operate with a 40 percent budget cut.
GREEN THREAT
Though the move will not require legislation to be confirmed — after Prime
Minister Keir Starmer successfully got the move past his MPs last year — MPs
inside his party and out have lamented the impact of the cuts, amid the ongoing
threat to Labour’s left from a resurgent Green Party under new leader Zack
Polanski.
Labour MP Becky Cooper, chair of the APPG on global health and security said
that her party “is, and always has been, a party of internationalism” but
today’s plans would “put Britain and the world at risk.”
Sarah Champion, another Labour MP who chairs the House of Commons international
development committee said that the announcement confirmed that there “will be
no winners from unrelenting U.K. aid cuts, just different degrees of losers,”
creating a “desperately bleak” picture for the world’s most vulnerable. “These
cuts do not aid our defense, they make the whole world more vulnerable,” she
added.
Her Labour colleague Gareth Thomas, a former development minister, added: “In an
already unsafe world, cutting aid risks alienating key allies and will make
improving children’s health and education in Commonwealth countries more
difficult.”
The announcement may give fresh ammunition to the Greens ahead of May’s local
elections, where the party is eyeing up one of its best nights in local
government amid a collapse in support for Labour among Britain’s young,
progressive, and Muslim voters.
Reacting to the news that Britain will cut its aid to developing countries aimed
at combatting climate change, Polanski said: “Appalling and just unbelievably
short-sighted. Our security here in the U.K. relies on action around the world
to tackle the climate crisis.”
BRUSSELS — The EU’s 27 member countries are set to back a push to send more
naval ships to the Middle East as conflict paralyzes shipping routes, but will
insist on them operating strictly within the parameters of missions that predate
the war in Iran.
Presidents and prime ministers from across the bloc will meet in Brussels
Thursday to discuss their response to the Iran crisis. In a draft statement
being negotiated by ambassadors in advance of the talks — seen by POLITICO — the
leaders show support for an increased naval presence in the region.
“The European Council highlights the role of the EU maritime defensive
operations
EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, and calls for their
reinforcement with more assets,” reads the latest version of the text, dated
March 17. However, the text introduces new language demanding that the vessels
take part in the missions only “in line with their respective mandates.”
The EU-led Aspides is confined to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and was
launched in 2024 in response to Houthi militant attacks on naval traffic
travelling to and from Europe via the Suez Canal. Atalanta, meanwhile, patrols
the east coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean to combat piracy.
The Trump administration has urged European allies to send frigates to escort
naval traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy prices have skyrocketed as a
result of tankers being unable to cross the narrow waterway, which links oil-
and gas-rich exporters like Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the global market.
“I wonder what would happen if we ‘finished off’ what’s left of the Iranian
Terror State, and let the Countries that use it, we don’t, be responsible for
the so called ‘Strait?’ That would get some of our non-responsive ‘Allies’ in
gear, and fast!!!,” U.S. President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social on
Wednesday.
Ahead of the EU summit, a group of countries — Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta and
Cyprus — have written to the bloc’s leadership warning of another potential
maritime crisis caused by the Russian liquefied natural gas carrier Arctic
Metagaz, which has been adrift in the Mediterranean since March 3.
“The precarious condition of the vessel, combined with the nature of its
specialised cargo, gives rise to an imminent and serious risk of a major
ecological disaster in the heart of the Union’s maritime space,” the leaders of
the coastal nations warned.
“In this context, we look to the European Commission to facilitate the
mobilisation and coordination of Member States and existing EU-level mechanisms,
with the goal of ensuring their more efficient, better coordinated and faster
response.”
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul on Wednesday warned of a dangerous
spiral of unintended consequences if the Middle East war escalates further.
“There is a real risk of escalation, which could plunge not only this region but
the entire world into a major crisis,” Wadephul said during a joint press
conference with his French counterpart, Jean-Noël Barrot, in Berlin.
The German government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz was initially far more
supportive of the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran than many other EU countries,
but Merz and his ministers have recently become far more openly critical of the
war as the conflict has expanded and the economic and security impacts on the
EU’s biggest economy have become clearer.
Wadephul suggested some of the risks of the war — including the potential for a
food crisis — had not been fully considered.
“The fertilizer supply from this region [the Middle East] alone is so essential
that a prolonged disruption would threaten to trigger a food crisis across large
parts of Africa,” Wadephul said. “And that must fill us with concern for the
people who would suffer, and of course also for the resulting refugee flows.”
Germany is expected to be among the EU countries most impacted if the escalating
war in the Middle East creates a new refugee crisis.
Wadephul also said he wishes for a change of leadership in Iran “toward a
humane, dignified regime,” but expressed doubt that this goal can be achieved
through military force.
” I just don’t believe it can be brought about militarily from the outside,” he
said.
“We now face a major task to work together with our partners in the United
States and Israel to find a point where the military objectives these two have
set for themselves are achieved, and where we can then move toward de-escalation
and a resolution of the hostilities, while at the same time, of course, ensuring
security for the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf States.”
Trump had warned NATO allies on Sunday that the alliance faces a “very bad
future” if their countries refuse to help secure the Strait of Hormuz, pressing
European allies to support an American effort to reopen the key maritime
corridor. European leaders, however, rejected participation in such a mission.
Era sabato 28 febbraio quando gli Stati Uniti e Israele hanno colpito l’Iran
uccidendo la guida suprema Ali Khamenei. Teheran ha risposto: lo Stretto di
Hormuz è di fatto chiuso e il prezzo del barile di petrolio ora oscilla intorno
ai 100 dollari.
In gran parte del continente africano quasi tutte le merci viaggiano su gomma e
l’aumento del gasolio si traduce in costi più alti per spostare cibo, medicinali
e beni essenziali nei mercati urbani. Anche per l’Africa dunque questa guerra
non è uno spettacolo geopolitico lontano. L’escalation tra Washington,
Gerusalemme e Teheran minaccia le catene di approvvigionamento globali e il
blocco dello Stretto di Hormuz fa esplodere anche i costi del trasporto
marittimo. È un doppio shock: energetico e logistico. E c’è un dettaglio che
racconta questa dipendenza meglio di qualunque statistica: il consumo di
carburante, in Africa, è amplificato dal massiccio uso dei generatori elettrici.
Dal Ciad al Malawi, dal Gabon alla Tanzania, milioni di persone accendono un
generatore per lavorare, per vivere, semplicemente perché la rete elettrica
salta. Ogni litro di gasolio in più al barile pesa direttamente sulla
possibilità di tenere accesa una luce.
L’impennata delle quotazioni del petrolio produce effetti opposti sulle due
sponde del continente: alcuni esportatori guadagnano (in parte) e molti
importatori devono fare i conti con una situazione di assoluta instabilità. Tra
i beneficiari c’è l’Angola, grande esportatore di greggio, che vede rafforzarsi
la bilancia dei pagamenti e le entrate statali grazie all’aumento dei prezzi
internazionali. L’Algeria, uno dei maggiori produttori di petrolio e gas del
continente, si trova nella stessa posizione favorevole: il rialzo degli
idrocarburi porta entrate aggiuntive al bilancio pubblico e alle riserve in
valuta. E se i prezzi dovessero stabilizzarsi oltre i 100 dollari al barile,
anche Nigeria e Libia potrebbero in teoria registrare un significativo aumento
delle entrate energetiche.
Ma anche tra i produttori, i benefici hanno un limite. Nigeria e Ghana esportano
greggio ma importano gran parte dei prodotti raffinati, e l’aumento dei prezzi
internazionali non cancella i rincari dei carburanti per i consumatori. Alla
fine il vantaggio lungo la filiera quasi si annulla. Questa situazione riflette
un paradosso comune a molte economie africane in cui la capacità di raffinazione
locale è spesso del tutto assente e costringe quindi questi paesi a esportare
materie prime e a importare prodotti finiti a costi più elevati. In Tunisia,
importatrice netta di energia, la volatilità dei mercati pesa sui conti
pubblici. Il Marocco importa circa il 90% del proprio fabbisogno energetico.
L’Egitto è stato tra i primi a reagire: il Ministero del Petrolio ha annunciato
rincari compresi tra il 14% e il 17% per diversi prodotti petroliferi, spiegando
che la decisione è legata agli sviluppi geopolitici in Medio Oriente e ai loro
effetti sui mercati globali dell’energia. C’è poi un altro tema, meno visibile
ma altrettanto devastante: i fertilizzanti. Gran parte dei fertilizzanti azotati
mondiali dipendono dal gas del Golfo, e il blocco parziale dello Stretto di
Hormuz sta facendo salire rapidamente anche i prezzi di urea e ammoniaca.
Per produrre i fertilizzanti azotati serve gas naturale, e il Golfo Persico ne
ha tra i più economici al mondo. Qatar, Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi, Iran e
Bahrein producono una fetta enorme del fabbisogno mondiale, e tutta quella
merce, per raggiungere i mercati internazionali, deve passare dallo Stretto di
Hormuz. Con lo Stretto bloccato, i prezzi dell’urea sono schizzati verso l’alto
tanto che i principali produttori della regione hanno sospeso le operazioni o
dichiarato forza maggiore sulle spedizioni. E a differenza del petrolio, per i
fertilizzanti non esistono riserve strategiche: nessuno ne ha accumulate per
un’emergenza come questa. Se un capitano di nave abbastanza coraggioso decidesse
di sfidare i droni e attraversare lo Stretto, preferirebbe trasportare petrolio,
non sacchi di urea.
Per l’Africa subsahariana è una catastrofe annunciata. In contesti già segnati
dall’insicurezza, dal Sahel al Corno d’Africa, l’effetto potrebbe aggravare
crisi umanitarie, migrazioni interne e conflitti locali per via di risorse
sempre più scarse. La nuova guerra in Medio Oriente investe l’Africa su una
serie di fronti intrecciati come scosse di assestamento e il caro-petrolio
potrebbe essere solo il primo colpo.
L'articolo Perché la chiusura dello stretto di Hormuz è una catastrofe
annunciata per l’Africa subsahariana proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
The U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran are driving instability across the Middle
East and ushering in a new, more dangerous geopolitical era that only helps the
EU’s adversaries, European Council President António Costa warned in a speech on
Tuesday.
“The international system is changing dramatically. A world in which power
politics are back in play,” Costa told a meeting of the EU’s diplomatic corps in
Brussels. “We know the new reality — a reality in which Russia violates peace,
China disrupts trade, and the United States challenges the international
rules-based order.”
According to Costa, a former Portuguese prime minister, the U.S.-Israeli strikes
that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have created “severe
consequences” economically after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital
waterway for international trade.
The campaign, he said, has benefited Russia’s war in Ukraine “by flouting
international law,” driving up energy prices and diverting military assets that
could otherwise have been sent to support Kyiv. Oil prices spiked in the wake of
the aerial campaign, with crude briefly rising beyond $100 a barrel earlier this
week and analysts warning it would help the Kremlin plug holes in its wartime
budget.
The EU, Costa went on, wants to see Iranians gain rights and freedoms, “but
freedom and human rights cannot be achieved through bombs. Only international
law upholds them.” Instead, he said, the rules-based international order must be
defended and “violations of international law must not be accepted, whether in
Ukraine, Greenland, Latin America, Africa, in Gaza or in the Middle East.”
The broadside comes as European leaders voice increasing concern over the
strikes on Iran. French President Emmanuel Macron last week cautioned that the
attacks were “outside of international law.” Spanish Prime Minister Pedro
Sánchez has also faced fury from Washington after denying permission for U.S.
military planes to use air bases inside Spanish territory to carry out their
operations.
Costa, a Portuguese Socialist, has hit out at Trump’s threats to place a trade
embargo on Spain over its stance, saying last week that “the EU will always
ensure that the interests of its Member States are fully protected.”
Trump said Sunday night that the war in Iran is “very far ahead of schedule” and
“very complete, pretty much,” and that the conflict would end “very soon.”
Per renderlo presentabile gli hanno messo un nome europeo: Anton Wilhelm. Poi
per evitare equivoci, un’appendice: Amo, Afer. Africano.
Nato sulla Costa d’Oro, nell’area di Axim, tra gli Nzema, arrivò in Europa da
bambino, in un traffico di corpi, dalla Compagnia Olandese delle Indie
Occidentali, poi educato dai duchi di Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel. Arrivò in quel
secolo in cui l’Illuminismo costruiva il suo tempio mentre continuava la
macelleria. Nelle università si discuteva di ragione, natura, libertà. Fuori
dalle aule la libertà aveva un’altra frontiera, molto più precisa: la pelle, il
suo colore.
Lo guardavano imparare come fosse un caso. Per rendere tollerabile
l’ingiustizia. Per trasformare il suo corpo in alibi per la buona coscienza.
Un’eccezione utile: “anche lui può”.
Amo cominciò da dove un secolo che ama le idee non vorrebbe essere toccato: dal
diritto. Ha scritto dei diritti dei “Mori” in Europa. De jure Maurorum in
Europa. Anche solo immaginare quel titolo in quell’aria era già abbastanza:
mettere la parola “diritto” accanto a un corpo che la società tratta come
oggetto è un gesto che chiede conto: che cosa fate, che cosa permettete.
Poi arrivò la filosofia. Amo in De humanae mentis apatheia scriveva che la mente
non sente, che il patire appartiene al corpo, non all’intelletto. Un argomento
tecnico, ma in quella frase ci entrava un’intera epoca. C’è una mente che
elabora libertà, e un corpo che la subisce. In questo modo fissava il meccanismo
più comodo del potere: separare la chiarezza dal dolore, far lavorare la ragione
lontano dalla ferita.
Forse Amo non voleva denunciare niente, forse voleva solo chiarire un problema
di filosofia cartesiana. Eppure, è difficile non sentire come la sua tesi tocchi
un nervo sociale. Perché in quel secolo, come in tanti altri, la sofferenza è
sempre stata amministrata lasciandola ai corpi, tenendo la mente pulita. La
mente discute, il corpo paga. Amo vive dentro questa incrinatura senza poterla
nominare apertamente.
La lingua in cui parla è quella dell’Europa. La forma in cui scrive è quella
dell’Europa. Ma il suo corpo, il suo sguardo, la sua origine sono un promemoria
permanente: che quella lingua e quella forma non sono neutrali, che l’universale
spesso coincide con ciò che è già dominante. E che un uomo può entrare nel
tempio della ragione e restare comunque un ospite provvisorio: accolto finché
non cambia l’aria, tollerato finché non diventa principio.
Amo insegna, pubblica, tiene lezioni. Tuttavia resta sempre “il filosofo
africano”. Non un filosofo, ma un filosofo con aggettivo. E l’aggettivo serve a
farlo apparire irregolare. Serve a impedirgli di diventare troppo normale.
Troppo pericoloso. Perché non sarebbe stato più un caso curioso ma un
interlocutore.
Col tempo quello che era stato un miracolo da esibire rischiava di diventare un
imbarazzo. La sua presenza continuava a creare attrito. Un uomo africano che
discute di ragione in latino dentro le università europee costringe la ragione a
guardarsi l’ombra. Costringe a chiedersi quanto di ciò che chiamiamo
civilizzazione abbia bisogno di un margine, di un corpo sacrificabile per
rimanere pulita.
Poi la sua storia si sfilaccia, come se la documentazione stessa avesse deciso
di non accompagnarlo oltre. Si dice che sia tornato verso la costa africana. E
da qui la sua vita si fa opaca: qualche traccia, poche certezze. Non si sa se
abbia trovato casa, se abbia trovato pace, se abbia trovato soltanto un altro
tipo di solitudine. È come se la storia lo avesse seguito finché è stato utile
al racconto europeo e lo avesse lasciato andare quando diventava troppo
difficile integrarlo senza cambiare la trama sociale. Non c’è una conclusione,
certe vite non finiscono, si interrompono, diventano un altro modo di parlarne.
Bio: Anton Wilhelm Amo (circa 1703 – data di morte incerta) nacque nell’area
della Costa d’Oro (oggi Ghana) e fu portato in Europa da bambino. Studiò in
Germania, scrisse opere di filosofia e diritto, tra cui la dissertazione De
humanae mentis apatheia (1734), e insegnò in ambito universitario. In età adulta
tornò verso l’Africa occidentale; gli ultimi anni della sua vita sono poco
documentati.
L'articolo Anton Wilhelm Amo, la storia del filosofo africano che sfidò l’Europa
illuminista proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
According to Donald Trump, Iranians have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. “The
hour of your freedom is at hand,” he declared, as U.S. and Israeli warplanes
pounded Iranian cities and the compound of the country’s supreme leader. “When
we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will
probably be your only chance for generations.”
Trump’s comments made clear that America is seeking regime change. After decades
of high tensions, tough recriminations and one-off attacks, Washington finally
decided to try getting rid of the country’s government altogether — and it
thinks ordinary Iranians will rise up and finish the job.
The country’s population, after all, is clearly fed up with the Islamic
Republic. Over the last decade, Iranians have repeatedly staged mass
demonstrations against the regime. Those protests typically only go away after
the government responds with horrific force. In December and January, for
example, hundreds of thousands of Iranians spent weeks demonstrating — until
Iranian security officials shot and killed thousands of them. But now, American
and Israeli warplanes are attacking Iran’s military and security apparatus and
destroying other government institutions. They have killed the country’s supreme
leader, Ali Khamenei, and many other top officials. The Trump administration
seems to be betting that the Iranian people will soon take over the regime
change process, resume protesting and successfully remove a greatly weakened
government.
To gauge how likely that response might be, I spoke to political scientists and
Iranian experts, all of whom would love to see “people power” usher in new
leadership in Tehran. But they also expressed deep skepticism that even this
massive air campaign could produce a successful uprising.
For starters, they told me, aerial bombing campaigns have a terrible record at
fomenting regime change in any state. Second, Iran has powerful repressive
organs with a lot of experience in putting down popular unrest. In addition,
Iran’s bureaucracy has been expecting — and preparing for — American attacks for
generations. And even if Washington does successfully fracture or defang the
Islamic Republic, exhausted and shocked Iranians may be too frightened or
focused on survival to flood the streets. The country’s political opposition
remains weak, and it is famously fragmented.
Iranians, of course, do desperately want a better future, and they have been
willing to protest under very difficult conditions. For an autocracy, the
country has high levels of civic engagement. It is therefore possible that
Iranians will succeed where other populations haven’t. But history suggests most
of the country’s people will not heed Trump’s call, and that even if they do,
they will have a hard time winning.
In February 1991, as the American military laid waste to the Iraqi armed forces,
U.S. President George H.W. Bush made an appeal. Speaking on international
television, Bush called on “the Iraqi people to take matters into their own
hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” They didn’t act
immediately. But as soon as America stopped the bombing, thousands of Kurds and
Shiites across the country rose up against the Sunni-dominated government,
hoping that Saddam’s battered regime and weakened military could finally be
defeated.
The Iraqi experience is, unfortunately, typical of what happens when presidents
have tried in the past to use aerial firepower to change governments. The United
States knocked out 90 percent of North Korea’s power generation during the
Korean War in hopes that it would help topple Kim Il-Sung. It didn’t. Washington
plunged North Vietnam into darkness during the Vietnam War; that, too, failed.
Even Bill Clinton’s 1998 bombing of tiny Serbia didn’t give the opposition
movement space to drive Slobodan Milosevic from power. It took another 16
months, and a fraudulent election, before he was forced to leave office.
“Never,” Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago who
studies air power and regime change, replied when I asked whether what
Washington was doing in Iran had succeeded elsewhere. “Bombings have never led
people to take to the streets and topple their leader.”
There are two main reasons why air power has such a terrible record. The first,
Pape said, is because bombings often prompt citizens to turn against the
domestic opposition — no matter how much they hate the leader. “Even the hint
that you are siding with the attacking state is used by rivals to stab you in
the back,” he told me. To understand why, he asked liberals to consider how
Americans might respond if Iran killed Trump and then encouraged the Democratic
Party’s supporters to seize power; conservatives might imagine what would have
happened if Iran did the same to Barack Obama. Just because you don’t like your
country’s leaders, it doesn’t mean that you want to side with an external enemy
who deposes them. The second reason is that bombings by themselves rarely fully
decimate a government’s repressive capacity. “In order to save the pro-democracy
protesters, you’ve got to be right there,” Pape told me. “You have to have
troops on the ground.”
In Iran, both lessons hold value. Iran analysts frequently debate whether
outside attacks could prompt a rally-around-the-flag effect, given how unpopular
the government has been. Most analysts think that reactions will vary widely,
and Iranians are known to be quite nationalistic and weary and wary of
international interventions. As a result, experts said that even many Iranians
who loathe Khamenei will not want to do what America is asking of them —
especially given rising civilian casualties from the U.S. attacks.
To be sure, not everyone will feel squeamish. “There are those who, just out of
sheer desperation, were hoping for a U.S. military intervention,” said Ali Vaez,
the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group. They might be happy
to take to the streets, as Trump asked them to. So might some of the people who
are unhappy with the attacks but want a new government. Yet these Iranians could
run into the second problem: the regime’s substantial capabilities. The Iranian
state has multiple institutions that are capable of and responsible for mowing
down demonstrators. It has large weapons stockpiles that it has spread out
across the country, in part because it expected U.S. hits. That means no matter
how far America and Israel go in dropping bombs, they will struggle to truly
neuter its security forces.
“The U.S. would basically have to do what it did in Afghanistan and Iraq over
the course of several years in the course of a couple of months,” Vaez told me.
“I just don’t see how that would be possible.”
There’s one final obstacle to a popular revolution: Iran’s opposition is
disorganized, weak and riven. “The Islamic Republic may have abjectly failed at
providing its people with a functioning economy and decent standard of living,
but it has been very effective at locking up its opponents. The country has a
politically active diaspora, but it is particularly plagued by
infighting—especially between those who want former Iranian crown prince Reza
Pahlavi to take control of the country and those who oppose him.As a result,
opposition forces will have a hard time coordinating and then overwhelming
whatever regime institutions still exist. “
Already today, the regime has deployed militias on the streets in order to keep
order and prevent upheaval,” Vaez said. Especially after watching thousands of
people die at the regime’s hands in December and January — and then scores more
die in U.S. and Israeli attacks — he was skeptical the Islamic Republic’s foes
would be ready to come together and hold mass protests.
Bombing campaigns may never have incited a successful uprising, but there are
cases where foreign air power has helped topple a dictator. In Libya, NATO began
striking Muammar al-Gaddafi’s forces after Gaddafi began brutalizing his people.
It proved critical. Around six months after the campaign began, rebel forces
drove Gaddafi’s government from power.
Those rebel forces existed before the NATO bombings began. But it is a more
optimistic precedent for those hoping this campaign will bring down the Islamic
Republic. And at least some people are relatively bullish about the country’s
future. Iran may not have an armed, organized opposition, but it does have
deeply committed regime opponents. “Iranians are willing to make tremendous
sacrifices to get rid of their leaders,” Behnam Taleblu wrote in a recent
article outlining how a bombing campaign could open the door to an opposition
takeover. He cited the death toll from the most recent protests, which some
observers place at north of 30,000, as evidence of just how much demonstrators
are prepared to give and how hard suppressing them has become. If the bombing
campaign continues and extends to local police headquarters and lower-level
commanders, Taleblu was optimistic that ordinary Iranians could, indeed, get rid
of any regime remnants. “The Iranian people have the drive and determination
needed,” he concluded.
So far, the American and Israeli attacks are certainly overwhelming.
Decapitation strikes may have a poor track record at inciting regime change, but
few governments have killed quite so many officials in quite so short a period
as Jerusalem and Washington have in the attack’s first 36 hours. In addition to
assassinating Iran’s leader — something the American campaigns in the Korean
War, the War, and the first Gulf War never accomplished — Washington has taken
out many of his top deputies. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme
National Security Council, is dead. So is Iran’s defense minister, the chief of
staff of the armed forces, and the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. And bombs have killed enumerable officials lower down the chain of
command. It’s impossible to say how, exactly, Iranians feel about all this on
average. But videos have come out showing many people celebrating Khamenei’s
death.
“We’re in a different place,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle
East Institute. “This is a moment where you start thinking about dreams.”
But it is still early days, and celebratory clips are not proof that a
government-toppling uprising is near. (There have also been videos of Iranians
mourning the supreme leader.) Even Taleblu told me that, although the United
States and Israel were off to a good start, it was too early to say how things
would play out. In fact, almost every Iran analyst I spoke to hedged when asked
what might come next. The only thing they agreed on was that the country would
be transformed. “The regime as we know it is no longer going to exist,” said
Sanam Vakil, the director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa
Program. “It’s going to evolve into something else.” Too much of the government
has been destroyed for it to carry on as it was.
But that doesn’t mean it will change for the better — or that ordinary Iranians
will have a say in what follows. It is possible, perhaps even more likely, that
America and Israel have identified or will identify a cooperative regime insider
who they will help take charge, as happened in Venezuela. (Alternatively, they
might try to install someone from outside the country.) It is also possible that
one of the Iranian regime’s many contingency plans will prove effective, and
that the country is about to be governed by a new supreme leader. Those
contingency plans could fail, but a different regime official or commander might
unify the system’s surviving elements and ruthlessly consolidate power. Or the
regime might fracture, and different groups will violently compete for control —
as happened in Libya’s post-Qaddafi civil war.
Either way, Iranians will have to fight to have their voices heard. And in a
moment of great chaos, facing great danger and disruption, protesting for
democracy is unlikely to be their first concern.
“I think people are just trying to digest and think about what’s coming next,”
Vakil said. “They are going to be focusing on their own survival.”
Lo ammetto. Sono stato colonizzato, forse non abbastanza, dall’Africa
Occidentale e in particolare dal Sahel. Fin dal mio primo soggiorno in Costa
d’Avorio per un paio d’anni come inesperto insegnante di muratura in un centro
professionale. Assieme ad un amico avevamo scelto il volontariato internazionale
sostitutivo del servizio militare. Correva la fine degli anni ’70, ruggenti,
così saranno in seguito definiti. Da allora l’Africa occidentale non mi avrebbe
più abbandonato se si eccettua uno splendido transito di tre anni a Cordoba, in
Argentina. Anche in quel Paese si trattava di intercettare i fragili sentieri e
le parole che parlavano di lotte per la dignità nelle periferie povere della
città.
Nel frattempo, licenziatomi dalla fabbrica dove avevo ripreso il lavoro, ero
tornato in Costa d’Avorio. Stavolta come missionario di ‘professione’, e cioè
come religioso per l’accompagnamento dei giovani studenti fino all’inizio degli
anni ’90. Fu poi la volta della Liberia che chiudeva, durante il mio soggiorno,
una lunga guerra (in)civile nel 2007. Al ritorno, dopo la pace, ho transitato
uno splendido centro storico nella città di Genova. In carcere ma soprattutto
sulle strade ho avuto modo di incontrare volti africani nel mio Paese di
origine. Arrivò in seguito il Niger, nel Sahel, per quattordici anni, come
testimone privilegiato della drammatica ed esaltante realtà dei migranti.
Ed è stato durante quest’ultimo soggiorno, tra sabbia, vento, tempesta e
soprattutto polvere che il processo di ‘colonizzazione africana’ si è in qualche
modo approfondito, perfezionato e realizzato. Certo l’operazione non si è ancora
totalmente compiuto. D’altronde un proverbio più volte ascoltato in quella
porzione d’Africa l’affermava con chiarezza: “Anche se resta a lungo nello
stagno, il legno non diventerà mai un coccodrillo”. Viene solo ricordato agli
incauti ospiti che l’appartenenza ad una cultura diversa della propria sarà
sempre parziale e precaria. La consapevolezza di questa intrinseca fragilità
rende il processo di colonizzazione dell’ospite un cantiere permanente.
Ho lasciato il Sahel l’anno scorso per un servizio in patria solo per constatare
che il Sahel e l’Africa finora vissuta non mi hanno mai lasciato. Proprio in
quel senso parlo di una certa colonizzazione che sembra essere diventare una
seconda natura, un modo di reinterpretare il mondo e la vita stessa. Ed è in
questa prospettiva che, coinvolto con nostalgia, rammarico e passione, seguo le
vicende e i discorsi che emergono da questo amato continente. Si tratta di
metter assieme, con parole di vento, lo sguardo di un colonizzato da un
trentennio di soggiorno in Africa occidentale. Sguardo che – mi auguro – non
ritornerà mai più normalizzato e omologato al sistema.
Ad esempio sembra del tutto irrilevante, ai capi di stato africani recentemente
riuniti ad Addis Abeba, che migliaia di giovani, donne e bambini continuino a
voler fuggire dal continente. Non degno di menzione che, in numero imprecisato,
trovino la morte nel deserti e nei mari che circondano l’Africa. Nessun
riferimento ai centri di disumanizzazione per migranti finanziati dall’Europa in
Libia. Del tutto inosservata passa, nella dichiarazione finale del vertice, la
morte di centinaia di giovani africani in Ucraina, inviati al fronte con false
promesse da agenzie russe. Il fenomeno era stato denunciato da tempo. I ‘Black
Wagner’ dall’Africa al fronte ucraino in nome e una guerra mai scelta.
Il trentanovesimo vertice dell’Unione Africana si è chiuso con, tra l’altro, il
duplice impegno di far tacere le armi nel conflitto armato del Sudan e nel
Sahel. Quest’ultimo insanguinato dall’azione di gruppi armati ormai da un
decennio. I capi di stato hanno altresì sottolineato la non tolleranza a
ulteriori tentativi di destabilizzazione delle democrazie mediante colpi di
stato militari. Non una parola, invece, sui golpe istituzionali che garantiscono
per molti dei presenti una presidenza a vita. Anzi alcuni di loro, per quale
alchimia politica non si sa, vengono scelti come mediatori di conflitti. Forse
perché affidabili e abili dittatori.
Si nota, sempre nel vertice citato, il richiamo al tempo tragico della tratta
atlantica degli schiavi dimenticando che è esistita, non meno avvilente, la
tratta operata in Africa orientale con le carovane in contesto ‘islamico’. Si
domandano scuse e risarcimenti per questo. Mai però si assiste ad una
autocritica che faccia luce sulle responsabilità locali che hanno reso possibile
il dramma della schiavitù, peraltro già ben esistente e applicata sul posto. Mai
si menziona, per il ‘politicamente corretto’ che spesso nei Paesi del Maghreb
gli africani subsahariani vengano trattati, a tutti gli effetti, da schiavi.
L’Africa ‘bianca’ è diversa.
Con lo sguardo di un colonizzato mi verrebbe da aggiungere che nel continente i
poveri non contano quasi nulla se non quando siamo prossimi alle elezioni. Che i
militari al potere, senza nessun permesso, facciano ciò per cui sono destinati.
Al servizio del popolo tramite il rispetto delle istituzioni. Che smettano, una
volta per tutte, di manipolare e sedurre, con le armi in mano, con inutili e
vane promesse di benessere. Che i politici e gli intellettuali africani abbiano
ancora il coraggio di guardarsi allo specchio e chiedersi dove e come hanno
tradito la loro funzione. Che i religiosi, di ogni confessione, smettano di
sedere accanto alla mensa dei potenti e siano con coerenza, semplici e umili
operatori di giustizia e di verità. E che, infine, i poveri prendano la parola e
danzino l’avvenuta liberazione da ogni paura.
L'articolo Lo ammetto: sono stato colonizzato dal Sahel. E ora spero che il mio
sguardo sul mondo non si omologhi più proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.