BRUSSELS — Only a few days ago, EU diplomats and officials were whispering furtively about the idea they might one day need to think about how to push back against Donald Trump. They’re not whispering anymore.  Trump’s attempt, as EU leaders saw it, to “blackmail” them with the threat of tariffs into letting him take the sovereign Danish island of Greenland provoked a howl of outrage — and changed the world.  Previous emergency summits in Brussels focused on existential risks to the European Union, like the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the coronavirus pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This week, the EU’s 27 leaders cleared their diaries to discuss the assault they faced from America.  There can be little doubt that the transatlantic alliance has now been fundamentally transformed from a solid foundation for international law and order into a far looser arrangement in which neither side can be sure of the other.  “Trust was always the foundation for our relations with the United States,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as he arrived for the summit in Brussels on Thursday night. “We respected and accepted American leadership. But what we need today in our politics is trust and respect among all partners here, not domination and for sure not coercion. It doesn’t work in our world.”  The catalyst for the rupture in transatlantic relations was the U.S. president’s announcement on Saturday that he would hit eight European countries with tariffs of 10 percent for opposing his demand to annex Greenland.  That was just the start. In an avalanche of pressure, he then canceled his support for the U.K. premier’s decision to hand over the Chagos Islands, home to an important air base, to Mauritius; threatened France with tariffs on Champagne after Macron snubbed his Board of Peace initiative; slapped down the Norwegian prime minister over a Nobel Peace Prize; and ultimately dropped his threats both to take Greenland by military force and to hit countries that oppose him with tariffs.  Here was a leader, it seemed to many watching EU officials, so wild and unpredictable that he couldn’t even remain true to his own words.  But what dismayed the professional political class in Brussels and beyond was more mundane: Trump’s decision to leak the private text messages he’d received directly from other world leaders by publishing them to his 11.6 million followers on social media.  Trump’s screenshots of his phone revealed French President Emmanuel Macron offering to host a G7 meeting in Paris, and to invite the Russians in the sidelines. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.”  Leaking private messages “is not acceptable — you just don’t do it,” said one senior diplomat, like others, on condition of anonymity because the matter is sensitive. “It’s so important. After this, no one can trust him. If you were any leader you wouldn’t tell him anything. And this is a crucial means of communication because it is quick and direct. Now everything will go through layers of bureaucracy.”  Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele. | Gian Ehrenzeller/EPA The value of direct contact through phone texts is well known to the leaders of Europe, who, as POLITICO revealed, have even set up their own private group chat to discuss how to respond when Trump does something inflammatory. Such messages enable ministers and officials at all levels to coordinate solutions before public statements have to be made, the same senior diplomat said. “If you don’t have trust, you can’t work together anymore.”  NO MORE NATO Diplomats and officials now fear the breakdown in personal trust between European leaders and Trump has potentially grave ramifications.  Take NATO. The military alliance is, at its core, a promise: that member countries will back each other up and rally to their defense if one of them comes under attack. Once that promise looks less than solid, the power of NATO to deter attacks is severely undermined. That’s why Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that if Trump invaded the sovereign Danish territory of Greenland it would be the end of NATO.  The fact he threatened to do so has already put the alliance into intensive care, another diplomat said.  Asked directly if she could still trust the U.S. as she arrived at the Brussels summit, Frederiksen declined to say yes. “We have been working very closely with the United States for many years,” she replied. “But we have to work together respectfully, without threatening each other.”  European leaders now face two tasks: To bring the focus back to the short-term priorities of peace in Ukraine and resolving tensions over Greenland; and then to turn their attention to mapping out a strategy for navigating a very different world. The question of trust, again, underpins both.  When it comes to Ukraine, European leaders like Macron, Germany’s Friedrich Merz and the U.K.’s Keir Starmer have spent endless hours trying to persuade Trump and his team that providing Kyiv with an American military element underpinning security guarantees is the only way to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from attacking again in future.  Given how unreliable Trump has been as an ally to Europe, officials are now privately asking what those guarantees are really worth. Why would Russia take America’s word seriously? Why not, in a year or two, test it to make sure?  THE POST-DAVOS WORLD Then there’s the realignment of the entire international system.  There was something ironic about the setting for Trump’s assaults on the established world order, and about the identities of those who found themselves the harbingers of its end.  Among the snow-covered slopes of the Swiss resort of Davos, the world’s business and political elite gather each year to polish their networks, promote their products, brag about their successes, and party hard. The super rich, and the occasional president, generally arrive by helicopter.  As a central bank governor, Mark Carney had been one of the classic Davos set and was a regular attendee: suave, a little smug, and seeming entirely comfortable among snow-covered peaks and even loftier clientele.  Now prime minister of Canada, this sage of the centrist liberal orthodoxy had a shocking insight to share with his tribe: “Today,” Carney began this week, “I’ll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story, and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.”  “The rules-based order is fading,” he intoned, to be replaced by a world of “great power rivalry” in which “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”  “The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.”  Carney impressed those European officials watching. He even quoted Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who has enjoyed outsized influence in recent months due to the connections he forged with Trump on the golf course.  NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who once called Donald Trump “daddy,” also found his private text to Donald Trump made public, in which he praised the president’s “incredible” achievements, adding: “Can’t wait to see you.” |  Jim lo Scalzo/EPA Ultimately, Carney had a message for what he termed “middle powers” — countries like Canada. They could, he argued, retreat into isolation, building up their defenses against a hard and lawless world. Or they could build something “better, stronger and more just” by working together, and diversifying their alliances. Canada, another target of Trump’s territorial ambitions, has just signed a major partnership agreement with China. As they prepared for the summit in Brussels, European diplomats and officials contemplated the same questions. One official framed the new reality as the “post-Davos” world. “Now that the trust has gone, it’s not coming back,” another diplomat said. “I feel the world has changed fundamentally.”  A GOOD CRISIS It will be up to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her team to devise ways to push the continent toward greater self-sufficiency, a state that Macron has called “strategic autonomy,” the diplomat said. This should cover energy, where the EU has now become reliant on imports of American gas.  The most urgent task is to reimagine a future for European defense that does not rely on NATO, the diplomat said. Already, there are many ideas in the air. These include a European Security Council, which would have the nuclear-armed non-EU U.K. as a member. Urgent efforts will be needed to create a drone industry and to boost air defenses.  The European Commission has already proposed a 100,000-strong standing EU army, so why not an elite special forces division as well? The Commission’s officials are world experts at designing common standards for manufacturing, which leaves them well suited to the task of integrating the patchwork of weapons systems used by EU countries, the same diplomat said.  Yet there is also a risk. Some officials fear that with Trump’s having backed down and a solution to the Greenland crisis now apparently much closer, EU leaders will lose the focus and clarity about the need for change they gained this past week. In a phrase often attributed to Churchill, the risk is that EU countries will “let a good crisis go to waste.”  Domestic political considerations will inevitably make it harder for national governments to commit funding to shared EU defense projects. As hard-right populism grows in major regional economies, like France, the U.K. and Germany, making the case for “more Europe” is harder than ever for the likes of Macron, Starmer and Merz. Even if NATO is in trouble, selling a European army will be tough.  While these leaders know they can no longer trust Trump’s America with Europe’s security, many of them lack the trust of their own voters to do what might be required instead. 

LONDON — Prime Minister Keir Starmer usually goes out of his way not to annoy Donald Trump. So he better hope the windmill-hating U.S. president doesn’t notice what the U.K. just did. In a fillip for the global offshore wind industry, Starmer’s government on Wednesday announced its biggest-ever down payment on the technology. It agreed to price guarantees, funded by billpayers to the tune of up to £1.8 billion (€2.08 billion) a year, for eight major projects in England, Scotland and Wales. The schemes have the capacity to generate 8.4 gigawatts of electricity, the U.K. energy department said — enough to power 12 million homes. It represented the biggest “wind auction in Europe to date,” said industry group WindEurope. It’s also an energy strategy that could have been tailor-made to rankle Trump. The U.S. president has repeatedly expressed a profound loathing for wind turbines and has tried to use his powers to halt construction on projects already underway in the U.S. — sending shockwaves across the global industry. Even when appearing alongside Starmer at press conferences, Trump has been unable to hide his disgust at the very sight of windmills. “You are paying in Scotland and in the U.K. … to have these ugly monsters all over the place,” he said, sitting next to Starmer during a visit to his Turnberry golf course last year. The spinning blades, Trump complained, would “kill all your birds.” At the time, the prime minister explained meekly that the U.K. was seeking a “mix” of energy sources. But this week’s investments speak far louder about his government’s priorities. The U.K.’s strategy — part of a plan to run the British power grid on 95 percent clean electricity by 2030 — is a clear signal that for all Starmer’s attempts to appease Trump, the U.K. will not heed Washington’s assertions that fossil fuels are the only way to deliver affordable bills and secure supply. “With these results, Britain is taking back control of our energy sovereignty,” said Starmer’s Energy Secretary Ed Miliband, a former leader of the Labour party. “With these results, Britain is taking back control of our energy sovereignty,” said Energy Secretary Ed Miliband. | Pool photo by Justin Tallis via Getty Images While not mentioning Trump or the U.S., he said the U.K. wanted to “stand on our two feet” and not depend on “markets controlled by petrostates and dictators.” WIND VS. GAS The goal of the U.K.’s offshore wind drive is to reduce reliance on gas for electricity generation. One of the most gas-dependent countries in Europe, the U.K. was hit hard in 2022 by the regional gas price spike that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The government ended up spending tens of billions of pounds to pay a portion of every household energy bill in the country to fend off widespread hardship. It’s a scenario that Miliband and Starmer want to avoid in future by focusing on producing electricity from domestic sources like offshore wind that are not subject to the ups and downs of global fossil fuel markets. Trump, by contrast, wants to keep Europe hooked on gas — specifically, American gas. The U.S. National Security Strategy, updated late last year, states Trump’s desire to use American fossil fuel exports to “project power.” Trump has already strong-armed the European Union into committing to buy $750 billion worth of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a quid pro quo for tariff relief. No one in Starmer’s government explicitly named Trump or the U.S. on Wednesday. But Chris Stark, a senior official in Miliband’s energy department tasked with delivering the 2030 goal, noted that “every megawatt of offshore wind that we’re bringing on is a few more metric tons of LNG that we don’t need to import.” The U.K.’s investment in offshore wind also provides welcome relief to a global industry that has been seriously shaken both by soaring inflation and interest rates — and more recently by a Trump-inspired backlash against net zero and clean energy. “It’s a relief for the offshore sector … It’s a relief generally, that the U.K. government is able to lean into very large positive investment stories in U.K. infrastructure,” said Tom Glover, U.K. country chair of the German energy firm RWE, which was the biggest winner in the latest offshore wind investment, securing contracts for 6.9 gigawatts of capacity. A second energy industry figure, granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record, said the U.K.’s plans were a “great signal for the global offshore wind sector” after a difficult few years — “not least the stuff in the U.S.” The other big winner was British firm SSE, which has plans to build one of the world’s largest-ever offshore wind projects, Berwick Bank — off the coast of Donald Trump’s beloved Scotland.

BRUSSELS — European governments are pressuring the EU to appoint a negotiator to represent their interests on Ukraine, fearing the United States will stitch up a deal with Russia behind their backs. Supporters of the plan — including France and Italy — have secured support in the European Commission and among a handful of other countries for the post, according to three diplomats and officials with direct knowledge of the talks who were granted anonymity to speak to POLITICO. They say Europe can only maintain its red lines, such as Ukraine’s potential future membership in NATO, if the EU has a seat at the table. The unprecedented move would mark a major shift in how Europe engages with the string of bilateral talks brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump, and comes as the continent works to demonstrate it is ready to play a major role in any settlement to end the four-year war. French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have joined forces in recent weeks to call for the opening of diplomatic channels to Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his inner circle, even as White House peace talks falter. “Macron has been advocating in the last days that, in view of the bilateral discussions between the Americans and the Russians, it is important to play at least a role in the discussion,” a senior French official said. “Meloni very much supported that … they’re not naive about what can be reached through these discussions, but on the balance between not engaging and engaging, there’s a growing appreciation [of the merits of engaging] in some capitals.” Major disagreements remain over the details of the position. Critics say appointing a negotiator would imply that Russia is ready to negotiate in good faith and would accept anything other than Ukraine’s total subjugation. Trump’s efforts to broker a deal have failed so far, with the Kremlin refusing to budge from its demand that Ukraine hand over swaths of territory that Russian troops have been unable to conquer. MESSAGE TO MOSCOW Discussions have been taking place in Brussels about what the bloc would contribute to any talks, and how they could be used to ensure Trump doesn’t sideline its concerns. “There are some issues which cannot be discussed with [only] the U.S. when they have direct implications on our security as Europeans,” the official said. “The message to Washington is as important as [the message] to Moscow.” Kurt Volker, who served as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations in Trump’s first term and as ambassador to NATO in 2008-2009 under then-President George W. Bush, told POLITICO that Brussels has to be more assertive if it wants to be included in the talks. “It’s been made clear Trump is going to keep up his dialog with Putin both directly and through [U.S. envoy Steve] Witkoff,” he said. “That’s not going away. So you have to have your own communication if it’s going on — it’s not about being in the same room as the Americans and the Russians, it’s about having any kind of communication.” JOB CREATION European leaders first discussed the idea of a special envoy at an EU summit last March, a senior EU official confirmed. Despite getting broad backing, no decision was taken and the proposals were left out of the subsequent joint statement. The role would have been narrowly focused on representing Brussels in talks alongside Kyiv — an altogether different proposition to Meloni’s suggestion of an interlocutor for Moscow. “Countries that were supportive of a Ukraine envoy may not be supportive of an envoy to speak with Russia,” the official said. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, has consistently positioned herself as the only candidate for any role in negotiations over Ukraine’s future. | Filip Singer/EPA Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, has consistently positioned herself as the only candidate for any role in negotiations over Ukraine’s future. The former Estonian prime minister has been a steadfast ally of Kyiv and has used her role to corral capitals into backing stronger sanctions designed to force Russia to end its war of aggression. “If Europe were to name a special envoy, the question is who does that person represent? Who do they report to?” Volker asked. “If it were [Commission President Ursula]von der Leyen, that sidelines Kaja Kallas and the External Action Service [the EU’s diplomatic corps] — most envoys have typically been within the action service, but then that would be at such a low level when they need to talk to Putin directly, it wouldn’t work. “But then I can just imagine the discussions in the Commission if it were to be the Council who had an envoy. That would never fly.” Officials confirmed that key aspects of the job — such as whether it would represent just the EU or the entire “coalition of the willing,” including the U.K. and others — have yet to be worked out. Ditto the diplomatic rank, and whether to formally appoint a bureaucrat or informally delegate the role to a current national leader. Italian government minister Giovanbattista Fazzolari — an influential ally of Meloni whose Ukrainian wife is credited with building support for Kyiv within Rome’s governing coalition — said over the weekend that former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi should be offered the special envoy job. Another four diplomats, meanwhile, noted that Finnish President Alexander Stubb has often been considered a potential representative for Europe in any talks with Washington and Moscow. The center-right veteran diplomat has struck up friendly relations with Trump while playing golf, while his country shares a border with Russia and has been on the receiving end of hybrid campaigns from the Kremlin. According to one of them, relying on “a sitting leader” means they could be “a bit more free in what they say.” However, “another question is figuring out what is the moment to speak with Putin. Is there a risk that if you do so, you’re also in a way legitimizing his positions?” Two EU officials underlined to POLITICO that no special envoy role exists and that any talk of candidates was premature. That said, a third noted, “none of these jobs exist until they do.” Jacopo Barigazzi contributed reporting. 

Cinquant’anni e non li dimostra. Quest’anno per la Golf GTI spegnerà cinquanta candeline, ma più che una celebrazione dovremmo parlare di un rilancio continuo di identità. Perché la GTI non è mai stata solo una versione sportiva: è stata, fin dall’inizio, un’idea culturale. Un modo diverso di intendere l’auto veloce. Accessibile, concreta, quotidiana. Nel 1976 il mondo aveva ancora voglia di futuro: Concorde accorciava le distanze tra i continenti, Apple muoveva i primi passi in un garage californiano, il cinema usciva nelle sale con Taxi Driver e Rocky, raccontando inquietudini e sogni di riscatto. In quell’aria di cambiamento, mentre l’Europa provava a lasciarsi alle spalle le ombre della crisi energetica, Volkswagen presentava una Golf diversa dalle altre: 110 cavalli, un filo rosso sulla calandra, il pomello del cambio a pallina da golf e i sedili a quadri. Nessuno immaginava che quelle tre lettere – GTI – avrebbero riscritto le regole del gioco. Dovevano essere 5.000 esemplari. Ne vendettero dieci volte tanto nel primo anno. Oggi, a distanza di mezzo secolo, si parla di oltre 2,5 milioni di unità prodotte, un primato che non appartiene solo ai numeri, ma alla memoria collettiva. Il segreto è sempre stato lo stesso: equilibrio. Motore brillante ma gestibile, trazione anteriore sincera, telaio preciso, dimensioni umane. Una sportiva capace di affrontare un passo alpino e, il giorno dopo, andare in ufficio senza chiedere sacrifici. La stampa, allora, parlò di “democratizzazione dell’auto sportiva”. Non era retorica: con 13.850 marchi tedeschi, circa 13.500.000 delle vecchie lire – oggi, con la rivalutazione, poco meno di 50 mila euro: il prezzo di una buona berlina moderna, non certo di una sportiva – la Golf GTI correva come coupé ben più costose, ma senza l’arroganza di volerlo dimostrare. Da lì in avanti la GTI è cresciuta insieme a chi la guidava. Anni Ottanta: più potenza, più carattere, senza perdere leggerezza. Anni Novanta: maturità tecnica, comfort, sicurezza. Duemila: turbo, elettronica, precisione chirurgica. Fino ad arrivare all’ultima evoluzione, la Golf GTI di ottava generazione, oggi affinata e resa ancora più consapevole: 265 cavalli, telaio raffinato, differenziale autobloccante elettronico, sterzo progressivo, un equilibrio dinamico che resta il suo vero marchio di fabbrica. Non la più estrema, non la più appariscente, ma ancora la più “giusta”. Nel 2026 questa storia entra in una nuova fase. Da un lato l’omaggio più potente possibile al passato: la Golf GTI EDITION 50, la GTI di serie più potente di sempre, con 325 cavalli, pensata come sintesi di mezzo secolo di evoluzione tecnica e carattere. Dall’altro lo sguardo avanti, senza nostalgia forzata: l’idea GTI che approda nell’elettrico con la futura ID. Polo GTI, portando prestazioni e identità nel nuovo linguaggio della mobilità. Non è un caso che l’anno del cinquantenario si apra nei luoghi della memoria. La GTI sarà protagonista al Rétromobile di Parigi, e al Bremen Classic Motorshow: due appuntamenti che inaugurano la stagione europea delle auto storiche e, simbolicamente, anche l’anno GTI. Un ponte ideale tra passato e futuro. L'articolo Volkswagen in festa, la Golf GTI compie i suoi primi cinquant’anni proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Genova si è stretta attorno alla famiglia di Emanuele Galeppini, il 16enne morto nella strage di Capodanno a Crans-Montana nel devastante rogo del bar-discoteca Constellation. Questa mattina, nella chiesa parrocchiale di Sant’Antonio a Boccadasse, il feretro del ragazzo è stato accolto da un muro di rose bianche, da corone inviate da Regione Liguria, Comune di Genova e Genoa CFC, e da un cuore di fiori con la scritta “Gli amici di sempre”, un omaggio delle comunità sportive del Golf Club Rapallo e dello sci-club Crans Montana. Ieri da Roma a Lugano sono stati celebrati i funerali degli altri cinque ragazzi morti nell’incendio e le cui famiglie nel dolore attendono “verità e giustizia”. La cerimonia per la giovane promessa del golf è stata officiata dall’arcivescovo di Genova, monsignor Marco Tasca, che ha parlato della sofferenza causata dalla perdita di Emanuele e dei suoi coetanei: “La morte di Emanuele ci lascia storditi e increduli. Il primo pensiero è per lui, per l’interruzione dei sogni e della sua vita. Penso ai suoi genitori, ai parenti, agli amici e a tutti noi, partecipi di questo stordimento”. Il vescovo ha poi ricordato come la fede possa rappresentare una certezza nei momenti di dolore, pur non cancellando la tragedia: “Emanuele è con noi e Dio è con noi. Con fiducia chiediamo che la giustizia faccia il suo corso e la verità emerga”. Durante la cerimonia è intervento il fratellino di Emanuele: “Ciao Ema, per me eri tutto, il mio esempio e il mio migliore amico. Mi mancano le risate, il golf insieme e anche quando mi prendevi in giro. So che ora stai giocando a golf lassù, io continuerò a giocare anche per te. Ti voglio bene per sempre”. A queste parole si sono aggiunti i ricordi della zia e della nonna, che hanno ripercorso la vita del ragazzo tra famiglia, amici e passioni, in particolare il golf, disciplina che Emanuele condivideva con il nonno e che lo aveva sempre accompagnato nei momenti felici. La cerimonia ha visto la partecipazione del governatore della Liguria Marco Bucci e della sindaca di Genova Silvia Salis, oltre a numerosi familiari, amici e cittadini del borgo marinaro di Boccadasse, dove la comunità si è unita nel ricordo del giovane. Dopo la funzione religiosa, la salma è stata trasferita al cimitero monumentale di Staglieno, dove resterà a disposizione dell’autorità giudiziaria, nell’ambito delle indagini sulla strage che ha causato la morte di 40 ragazzi, di cui 23 francesi e 9 italiani. La famiglia del giovane chiede chiarezza sulle cause e aveva chiesto che fosse disposta l’autopsia. L'articolo Crans Montana – Un muro di rose bianche per Emanuele Galeppini, il fratellino: “Continuerò a giocare a golf con te” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Tra le vittime del rogo che ha distrutto il bar-discoteca Le Constellation di Crans-Montana in Svizzera nella notte tra il 31 dicembre e il 1° gennaio c’è anche il 16enne Emanuele Galeppini, promessa del golf italiano che era presente nel bar interrato della struttura distrutta dalle fiamme innescate probabilmente da alcune candele e da un petardo. A darne comunicazione è stata la Federgolf con un comunicato di cordoglio alla famiglia, di origine ligure ma residente a Dubai. “La Federazione Italiana Golf piange la scomparsa di Emanuele Galeppini, giovane atleta che portava con sé passione e valori autentici. In questo momento di grande dolore, il nostro pensiero va alla sua famiglia e a tutti coloro che gli hanno voluto bene. Emanuele, rimarrai per sempre nei nostri cuori”. Nella giornata di ieri – 1 gennaio – il padre del ragazzo aveva lanciato l’appello a TgCom. Il genitore ieri è andato sul posto a cercare il figlio: l’ultimo contatto al telefono tra il ragazzo e la famiglia era avvenuto a mezzanotte. Altre due famiglie di giovanissimi amici che si trovavano con il giovane stanno cercando i loro figli nelle strutture d’emergenza. CHI ERA EMANUELE GALEPPINI Nato a Genova e residente da anni a Dubai con la famiglia, Emanuele Galeppini era considerato una promessa del golf. Nella sua giovane carriera già ottenuto risultati di rilievo e stava continuando il suo percorso di formazione sportiva negli Emirati Arabi Uniti. La Federazione Italiana Golf ha espresso il proprio cordoglio ricordandolo come un giovane atleta capace di unire talento, passione e valori. Anche la comunità golfistica di Dubai e quella internazionale hanno dato notizia della sua morte, confermata dalle autorità. Credit photo: sito ufficiale Federazione Italiana Golf L'articolo Incendio a Crans-Montana, tra le vittime anche la giovane promessa del golf italiano Emanuele Galeppini proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Donald Trump started his second term by calling the European Union an “atrocity” on trade. He said it was created to “screw” Americans. As he imposed the highest tariffs in a century, he derided Europe as “pathetic.” And to round off the year, he slammed the continent as “weak” and “decaying.” In the midst of all this, Ursula von der Leyen, the EU’s top official, somehow summoned the composure to fly to Trump’s Scottish golf resort to smile and shake hands on a one-sided trade deal that will inflict untold pain on European exporters. She even managed a thumbs up in the family photo with Trump afterwards. Yes, it’s been one hell of a year for the world’s biggest trading relationship. The economic consequences will take years to materialize — but the short-term impact is manifest: in forcing Europe to face up to its overreliance on the U.S. security umbrella and find new friends to trade with. With a warning that the following might trigger flashbacks, we take you through POLITICO’s coverage of Europe’s traumatic trade year at the hands of Trump: JANUARY As Trump returns to the White House, we explore how America’s trading partners are wargaming his trade threats. The big idea? Escalate to de-escalate. It’s a playbook we later saw unfold in Trump’s clashes with China and Canada. But, in the event, the EU never dares to escalate. Trump’s return does galvanize the EU into advancing trade deals with other partners — like Mexico or Latin America’s Mercosur bloc. “Europe will keep seeking cooperation — not only with our long-time like-minded friends, but with any country we share interests with,” von der Leyen tells the World Economic Forum the day after Trump is sworn in. FEBRUARY As Trump announces that he will reimpose steel and aluminum tariffs, von der Leyen vows a “firm and proportionate response.” The bloc has strengthened its trade defenses since his first term, and needs to be ready to activate them, advises former top Commission trade official Jean-Luc Demarty: “Especially with a personality like Trump, if we don’t react, he’ll trample us.” That begs the question as to whether trade wars are as easy to win, as Trump likes to say. The short answer is, of course, “no.” Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, meanwhile, packs a suitcase full of concessions on his first mission to Washington. At the end of the month, Brussels threatens to use its trade “bazooka” — a trade-defense weapon called the Anti-Coercion Instrument — after Trump says the European Union was created to “screw” America. MARCH We called it early with this cover story by Nicholas Vinocur and Camille Gijs: Trump wants to destroy the EU — and rebuild it in his image. As Trump’s steel tariffs enter force, Brussels announces retaliatory measures that far exceed those it imposed in his first term. And, as he builds up to his “Liberation Day” tariff announcement, the EU signals retaliation extending beyond goods to services such as tech and banking. (None of these are implemented.) APRIL “They rip us off. It’s so sad to see. It’s so pathetic,” Trump taunts the EU as he throws it into the sin bin along with China, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. In his Liberation Day announcement in the White House Rose Garden, Trump whacks the EU with a 20 percent “reciprocal” tariff. Von der Leyen’s response the next morning is weak: She says only that the EU is “prepared to respond.” That’s because, even though the EU has strengthened its trade armory, its 27 member countries can’t agree to deploy it. The bloc nonetheless busies itself with drawing up a retaliation list of goods made in states run by Trump’s Republican allies — including trucks, cigarettes and ice cream. MAY The EU’s hit list gets longer in response to Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs — with planes and automobiles targeted in a €100 billion counterstrike that looks scary on paper but is never acted on.  We report exclusively that Brussels is ramping up contacts with a Pacific trade group called the CPTPP. And we assess the chances of Trump pressuring the EU into a big, beautiful trade deal by threatening to raise duties on European exports to 50 percent. The verdict? Dream on!  JUNE The setting shifts to the Canadian Rockies — where a G7 summit takes on a G6 vs. Trump dynamic as other leaders seek ways to cooperate with him on Russia and China even as he pummels them with tariffs. Von der Leyen tries her best, turning hawkish on China in a bid to find common ground. Back in Brussels, at a European leaders’ summit, von der Leyen announces her pivot to Asia — floating the idea of a world trade club without the U.S. JULY As the clock counts down to Trump’s July 9 deal deadline, the lack of unity among the EU’s 27 member countries undermines its credibility as a negotiating partner to be reckoned with. There’s still hope that the EU can lock in a 10 percent tariff, but should it take the deal or leave it? The deadline slips and, as talks drag on, it looks more likely that the EU will end up with a 15 percent baseline tariff — far higher than Europe had feared at the start of Trump’s term. Brussels is still talking about retaliation but … yeah … you already know that won’t happen. With Trump in Scotland for a golfing weekend, von der Leyen jets in to shake hands on a historic, but one-sided trade deal at his Turnberry resort. Koen Verhelst also flies in to get the big story. “It was heavy lifting we had to do,” von der Leyen said, stressing that the 15 percent tariff would be a ceiling. AUGUST Despite the thumbs-up in Turnberry, recriminations soon fly that the EU has accepted a bad deal. EU leaders defend it as the best they could get, given Europe’s reliance on the U.S. to guarantee its security. The two sides come out with a joint statement spelling out the terms — POLITICO breaks it down. Not only does the EU come off worse in the Turnberry deal, but it also sacrifices its long-term commitment to rules-based trade in return for Trump’s uncertain support for Ukraine. The realization slowly dawns that Europe’s humiliation could be profound and long-lasting. With the ink barely dry on the accord, Trump takes aim at digital taxes and regulation that he views as discriminatory. It’s a blast that is clearly aimed at Brussels. SEPTEMBER The torrent of trade news slows — allowing Antonia Zimmermann to travel to Ireland’s “Viagra Village” to report how Trump’s drive to reshore drug production threatens Europe’s top pharmaceuticals exporter. OCTOBER EU leaders resist Trump’s pressure to tear up the bloc’s business rules, instead trying to present a red tape-cutting drive pushed by von der Leyen as a self-generated reform that has the fringe benefit of addressing U.S. concerns.    NOVEMBER Attention shifts to Washington as the U.S. Supreme Court hears challenges to Trump’s sweeping tariffs. The justices are skeptical of his invocation of emergency powers to justify them. Even Trump appointees on the bench subject his lawyer to tough questioning.  A row flares on the first visit to Brussels by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Lutnick presses for concessions on EU digital regulation in exchange for possible tariff relief on steel. “Blackmail,” is the counterblast from Teresa Ribera, the EU’s top competition regulator. DECEMBER The year ends as it started, with another Trump broadside against Europe and its leaders. “I think they’re weak,” he tells POLITICO. “They don’t know what to do on trade, either.”

Al Castello Tolcinasco Golf Resort & Spa di Pieve Emanuele (Milano) la Federazione Italiana Golf ha presentato il Programma del Settore Paralimpico per il 2026 e ufficializzato la collaborazione triennale con Kia Italia, che diventa Official Automotive Partner a supporto della mobilità degli atleti paralimpici. Un appuntamento che ha riunito istituzioni sportive, partner e protagonisti del movimento, con gli interventi del presidente FIG Cristiano Cerchiai, del presidente di Kia Italia Giuseppe Bitti, del segretario generale CIP Simone Rasetti e del commissario tecnico della Nazionale Paralimpica FIG Nicola Maestroni. La strategia FIG per il 2026 punta su un Programma Élite dedicato allo sviluppo agonistico di giovani Under 35, anche provenienti da altre discipline, sul rafforzamento della sinergia con INAIL e CIP per favorire reinserimento e qualità della vita dopo un infortunio, e sulla formazione dei tecnici attraverso la Scuola Nazionale FIG. Centrale anche l’accessibilità, con l’accordo con la start-up World4All per la mappatura delle barriere architettoniche nei circoli, in linea con gli standard internazionali e con l’obiettivo di accompagnare il percorso verso l’ingresso del golf alle Paralimpiadi dal 2036. La partnership con Kia Italia sosterrà la mobilità durante raduni ed eventi federali, tra cui l’Open d’Italia ProAbili e i Campionati Europei a Squadre per golfisti con disabilità. “Siamo orgogliosi di sostenere la Federazione Italiana Golf in un progetto che promuove inclusione e accessibilità nello sport – ha dichiarato Giuseppe Bitti, Presidente di Kia Italia –. Con i nostri veicoli vogliamo rendere possibile a tutti, anche agli atleti con disabilità, vivere la passione per il golf. Questa collaborazione riflette i valori di Kia: innovazione, sostenibilità e attenzione alle persone”. L'articolo Golf italiano, la svolta inclusiva. Partnership FIG–Kia per il piano paralimpico 2026 proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

L’off season di Jannik Sinner a Dubai prosegue senza sosta e l’azzurro vuole arrivare agli Australian Open, primo grande appuntamento dell’anno, in buona forma per confermarsi dopo i trionfi degli ultimi due anni. Ma nei momenti liberi Sinner ci ha ormai abituati a partite di golf con Simone Vagnozzi e Darren Cahill, allenatori ma soprattutto amici del numero due al mondo. E nell’ultima – testimoniata da Darren Cahill nelle sue storie Instagram nel pomeriggio di lunedì – Sinner ha confermato il suo feeling con l’erba oltre che nel tennis – indelebile la sua prima storica vittoria a Wimbledon 2025 – anche nel golf con un buon drive, un tiro a lunga distanza giocato dal tee box (lo spazio da dove inizia il match) con cui si manda la pallina a grande distanza lungo il fairway verso il green. Dopo il bel colpo, Sinner si è girato verso il cellulare di Cahill che stava riprendendo tutto e si è rivolto a lui con un sorriso e con il classico dito sulla tempia, gesto che spesso usa dopo un punto faticoso o un vincente dei suoi, come a dire: “È tutta una questione di testa…”. Che sia tennis o qualsiasi altro sport non importa. L'articolo Sorriso e dito sulla tempia, Sinner vuole vincere anche a golf: il confronto con Vagnozzi e Cahill – Video proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

President Donald Trump’s latest round of Europe-bashing has the U.S.’s allies across the Atlantic revisiting a perennial question: Why does Trump hate Europe so much? Trump’s disdain for America’s one-time partners has been on prominent display in the past week — first in Trump’s newly released national security strategy, which suggested that Europe was suffering from civilizational decline, and then in Trump’s exclusive interview with POLITICO, where he chided the “decaying” continent’s leaders as “weak.” In Europe, Trump’s criticisms were met with more familiar consternation — and calls to speed up plans for a future where the continent cannot rely on American security support. But where does Trump’s animosity for Europe actually come from? To find out, I reached out to a scholar who’d been recommended to me by sources in MAGA world as someone who actually understands their foreign policy thinking (even if he doesn’t agree with it). “He does seem to divide the world into strength and weakness, and he pays attention to strength, and he kind of ignores weakness,” said Jeremy Shapiro, the research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on Trump’s strained relations with the continent. “And he has long characterized the Europeans as weak.” Shapiro explained that Trump has long blamed Europe’s weakness on its low levels of military spending and its dependence on American security might. But his critique seems to have taken on a new vehemence during his second term thanks to input from new advisers like Vice President JD Vance, who have successfully cast Europe as a liberal bulwark in a global culture war between MAGA-style “nationalists” and so-called globalists. Like many young conservatives, Shapiro explained, Vance has come to believe that “it was these bastions of liberal power in the culture and in the government that stymied the first Trump term, so you needed to attack the universities, the think tanks, the foundations, the finance industry, and, of course, the deep state.” In the eyes of MAGA, he said, “Europe is one of these liberal bastions.” This conversation was edited for length and clarity. Trump’s recent posture toward Europe brings to mind the old adage that the opposite of love isn’t hate, it’s indifference. Do you think Trump hates Europe, or does he just think it’s irrelevant? My main impression is that he’s pretty indifferent toward it. There are moments when specific European countries or the EU really pisses him off and he expresses something that seems close to hatred, but mostly he doesn’t seem very focused on it. Why do you think that is? He does seem to divide the world into strength and weakness, and he pays attention to strength, and he kind of ignores weakness. And he has long characterized the Europeans as weak for a bunch of different reasons having to do with what seems to him to be a decadence in their society, their immigration, their social welfare states, their lack of apparent military vigor. All of those things seem to put them in the weak category, and in Trump’s world, if you’re in the weak category, he doesn’t pay much attention to you. What about more prosaic things like the trade imbalance and NATO spending? Do those contribute to his disdain, or does it originate from a more guttural place? I get the impression that it is more at a guttural level. It always seemed to me that the NATO spending debate was just a stick with which to beat the NATO allies. He has long understood that that’s something that they felt a little bit guilty about, and that’s something that American presidents had beat them about for a while, so he just sort of took it to an 11. The trade deficit is something that’s more serious for him. He’s paid quite a bit of attention to that in every country, so it’s in the trade area where he takes Europeans most seriously. But because they’re so weak and so dependent on the United States for security, he hasn’t had to deal with their trade problems in the same way. He’s able to threaten them on security, and they have folded pretty quickly. Does some of his animosity originate from his pre-presidency when he did business in Europe? He likes to blame Europeans for nixing some of his business transactions, like a golf course in Ireland. How serious do you think that is? I think that’s been important in forming his opinion of the EU rather than of Europe as a whole. He never seems to refer to the EU without referring to the fact that they blocked his golf course in Ireland. It wasn’t even the EU that blocked it, actually — it was an Irish local government authority — but it conforms to the general MAGA view of the EU as overly bureaucratic, anti-development and basically as an extension of the American liberal approach to development and regulation, which Trump certainly does hate. That’s part of what led Trump and his movement more generally to put the EU in the category of supporters of liberal America. In that sense, the fight against the EU in particular — but also against the other liberal regimes in Europe — became an extension of their domestic political battle with liberals in America. That effort to pull Europe as a whole into the American culture war by positioning it as a repository of all the liberal pieties that MAGA has come to hate — that seems kind of new. That is new for the second term, yeah. Where do you think that’s coming from? It definitely seems to be coming from [Vice President] JD Vance and the sort of philosophers who support him — the Patrick Deneens and Yoram Hazonys. Those types of people see liberal Europe as quite decadent and as part of the overall liberal problem in the world. You can also trace some of it back to Steve Bannon, who has definitely been talking about this stuff for a while. There does seem to be a real preoccupation with the idea that Europe is suffering from some sort of civilizational decline or civilization collapse. For instance, in both the new national security strategy and in his remarks to POLITICO this week, Trump has suggested that Europe is “decaying.” What do you make of that? This is a bit of a projection, right? If you look at the numbers in terms of immigration and diversity, the United States is further ahead in that decay — if you want to call it that — than Europe. There was this view that emerged among MAGA elites in the interregnum that it wasn’t enough to win the presidency in order to successfully change America. You had to attack all of the bastions of liberal power. It was these bastions of liberal power in the culture and in the government that stymied the first Trump term, so you needed to attack the universities, the think tanks, the foundations, the finance industry and, of course, the deep state, which is the first target. It was only through attacking these liberal bastions and conquering them to your cause that you could have a truly transformative effect. One of the things that they seem to have picked up while contemplating this theory is that Europe is one of these liberal bastions. Europe is a support for liberals in the United States, in part because Europe is the place where Americans get their sense of how the world views them. It’s ironic that that image of a decadent Europe coexists with the rise of far-right parties across the continent. Obviously, the Trump administration has supported those parties and allied with them, but at least in France and Germany, the momentum seems to be behind these parties at the moment. That presents them with an avenue to destroy liberal Europe’s support for liberal America by essentially transforming Europe into an illiberal regime. That is the vector of attack on liberal Europe. There has been this idea that’s developed amongst the populist parties in Europe since Brexit that they’re not really trying to leave the EU or destroy the EU; they’re trying to remake the EU in their nationalist and sovereigntist image. That’s perfect for what the Trump people are trying to do, which is not destroy the EU fully, but destroy the EU as a support for liberal ideas in the world and the United States. You mentioned the vice president, who has become a very prominent mouthpiece for this adversarial approach to Europe — most obviously in his speech at Munich earlier this year. Do you think he’s just following Trump’s guttural dislike of Europe or is he advancing his own independent anti-European agenda? A little of both. I think that Vance, like any good vice president, is very careful not to get crosswise with his boss and not contradict him in any way. So the fact that Trump isn’t opposed to this and that he can support it to a degree is very, very important. But I think that a lot of these ideas come from Vance independently, at least in detail. What he’s doing is nudging Trump along this road. He’s thinking about what will appeal to Trump, and he’s mostly been getting it right. But I think that especially when it comes to this sort of culture war stuff with Europe, he’s more of a source than a follower. During this latest round of Trump’s Euro-bashing, did anything stand out to you as new or novel? Or was it all of a piece with what you had heard before? It was novel relative to a year ago, but not relative to February and since then. But it’s a new mechanism of describing it — through a national security strategy document and through interviews with the president. The same arguments have achieved a sort of higher status, I would say, in the last week or so. You could sit around in Europe — as I did — and argue about the degree to which this really was what the Trump administration was doing, or whether this was just a faction — and you can still have that argument, because the Trump administration is generally quite inconsistent and incoherent when it comes to this kind of thing — but I think it’s undoubtedly achieved a greater status in the last week or two. How do you think Europe should deal with Trump’s recurring animosity towards the continent? It seems they’ve settled on a strategy of flattery, but do you think that’s effective in the long run? No, I think that’s the exact opposite of effective. If you recall what I said at the beginning, Trump abhors weakness, and flattery is the sort of ultimate manifestation of weakness. Every time the Europeans show up and flatter Trump, it enables them to have a good meeting with him, but it conveys the impression to him that they are weak, and so it increases his policy demands against them. We’ve seen that over and over again. The Europeans showed up and thought they had changed his Ukraine position, they had a great meeting, he said good things about them, they went home and a few weeks later, he had a totally different Ukraine position that they’re now having to deal with. The flattery has achieved the sense in the Trump administration that they can do anything they want to the Europeans, and they’ll basically swallow it. They haven’t done what some other countries have done, like the Chinese or the Brazilians, or even the Canadians to some degree, which is to stand up to Trump and show him that he has to deal with them as strong actors. And that’s a shame, because the Europeans — while they obviously have an asymmetric dependence on the United States, and they have some weaknesses — are a lot stronger than a lot of other countries, especially if they were working together. I think they have some capacity to do that, but they haven’t really managed it as of yet. Maybe this will be a wake-up call to do that.