Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Zittern um die Versorgungssicherheit: Deutschlands Gasspeicher sind nur noch zu einem Drittel gefüllt. Während Wirtschaftsministerin Katherina Reiche beschwichtigt, warnt die Branche vor Engpässen an extrem kalten Tagen. Joana Lehner von “Energie und Klima am Morgen” berichtet im Gespräch mit Gordon Repinski über die Sorgen der Energiebranche und wie Unternehmen mit kurzfristigem Bedarf in finanzielle Nöte geraten könnten. Ein kostenloses Probe-Abo des Pro-Newsletters gibt es hier. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview erklärt Netzagentur-Chef Klaus Müller, warum er trotz leerer Speicher keine Mangellage sieht, aber mit steigenden Preisen rechnet, wenn auch nicht für private Haushalte.  Beben in Washington: Drei Millionen neu veröffentlichte Seiten der Epstein-Akten erschüttern das Machtzentrum der USA. Mittendrin: Präsident Donald Trump. Washington-Korrespondent Jonathan Martin  von POLITICO analysiert, warum der Zynismus der US-Wähler gegenüber den Institutionen einen neuen Siedepunkt erreicht. Außerdem im Podcast: Zahnarzt nur noch für Selbstzahler? Die Aufregung um den Vorstoß des CDU-Wirtschaftsrates. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 information@axelspringer.de Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

A Bruxelles la macchina della Commissione tenta di mettere a tacere gli allarmi sul rischio di una nuova dipendenza energetica del Vecchio continente: stavolta dal gas importato a caro prezzo dagli Stati Uniti, alleato sempre più scomodo e minaccioso. Oltre a molti analisti, nei giorni scorsi anche due commissari europei – tra cui la vice di Ursula von der Leyen, Teresa Ribera – hanno messo esplicitamente in guardia contro il pericolo di sostituire il gas russo con nuove vulnerabilità geopolitiche. Una lettura evidentemente sgradita, tanto che una portavoce dell’esecutivo Ue è intervenuta per “tamponare” e ridimensionare il paragone: “Le importazioni di gas naturale liquefatto statunitense non possono essere paragonate alla dipendenza che avevamo” dal gas russo “prima della guerra” in Ucraina, ha garantito. L’intervento, arrivato nel giorno della pubblicazione sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale dell’Ue del regolamento per lo stop graduale alle importazioni di gas e gnl dalla Russia, pare una smentita delle parole del commissario europeo all’Energia, Dan Jorgensen, e della vicepresidente esecutiva e commissaria alla concorrenza Ribera. Jorgensen è danese e dunque particolarmente sensibile alle scomposte minacce di Donald Trump sulla Groenlandia. E la settimana scorsa, in un’intervista a un gruppo di media internazionali, ha citato proprio il caso dell’isola artica per ribadire che “la situazione più seria e complessa” per la Ue “sono i rapporti tesi con gli Stati Uniti”. Nell’ambito di quel ragionamento ha aggiunto che c’è crescente preoccupazione all’interno dell’Ue per il rischio di “sostituire una dipendenza con un’altra” e spiegato che, anche se il gas americano al momento resta essenziale, l’intenzione nei prossimi mesi è quella di “approfondire i legami energetici con una serie di paesi, tra cui Canada, Qatar e Algeria“. Lo scorso anno poco meno del 60% del gnl importato in Ue è arrivato proprio da oltreoceano. Ma diversificando l’Ue rischia di provocare l’ira della Casa Bianca, vista la promessa di acquistare 750 miliardi di dollari di idrocarburi Usa di qui al 2028 in tre anni inserita nell’accordo commerciale siglato da von der Leyen e Trump la scorsa estate. Sulla stessa linea di Jorgensen si è espressa anche la vicepresidente esecutiva della Commissione, che ha ribadito le sue posizioni lunedì durante a un simposio a Barcellona. Ribera ha sottolineato come l’invasione russa dell’Ucraina abbia messo a nudo l’eccessiva esposizione energetica dell’Europa: nel 2022 il 45% del gas consumato nell’Ue proveniva dalla Russia, una quota oggi scesa al 12%, mentre le importazioni di Gnl dagli Stati Uniti si sono quadruplicate. “La dipendenza, da qualunque parte provenga, resta dipendenza”, ha avvertito. Poi, con un giro di parole diplomatico, ha aggiunto che gli Usa “fino a relativamente poco tempo fa” gli Usa erano ritenuti “un partner abbastanza affidabile” mentre oggi “lo vediamo come un Paese rilevante con cui manteniamo relazioni molto importanti, che dimostrano fino a che punto la migliore risposta sostenibile nel lungo periodo sia aumentare la nostra autonomia“. Messaggio molto chiaro, tanto più che poco prima l’ex ministra e vicepremier socialista spagnola aveva sottolineato come “l’uso dell’energia e delle materie prime e delle dipendenze tra diverse potenze si stia trasformando in un’arma geopolitica“. Al forum di Davos anche il direttore dell’Agenzia internazionale dell’energia Fatih Birol aveva sottolineato che l’Europa rischia di “mettere tutte le uova in un paniere” sostituendo un grande fornitore (Mosca) con un altro (Washington). Dati di fatto che la Commissione ci tiene però a contestualizzare. Secondo l’esecutivo Ue, la situazione attuale non è sovrapponibile a quella pre-2022 perché la dipendenza dal Gnl è “molto più gestibile” rispetto a quella dalle forniture via gasdotto e offre margini di flessibilità e diversificazione che non esistevano nel rapporto con Mosca. “Sono aspetti molto importanti da tenere a mente quando discutiamo della sostituzione di una dipendenza con un’altra”, ha insistito la portavoce. L'articolo Ue verso una nuova dipendenza dal gnl Usa? La Commissione smentisce due commissari: “Non paragonabile al gas russo” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Europe has a chance Monday to flex its independence from the United States by embracing the energy technology that President Donald Trump hates the most. After a fortnight spent staring into the abyss of conflict with America, ministers from across the continent will meet in Hamburg to agree to massively boost the North Sea’s production of wind energy. The Hamburg Declaration — to be signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the U.K., the Netherlands, and Norway — will pledge to build 100 gigawatts of joint offshore wind projects. That’s more than the current total electricity generation capacity of the U.K. The summit has taken on new meaning since Trump’s attempts to coerce his NATO allies to hand over Greenland pushed the transatlantic alliance to — perhaps beyond —breaking point. “Homegrown clean power,” U.K. Energy Secretary Ed Miliband and EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen wrote in POLITICO on Monday, offers an alternative to the EU’s deepening reliance on imported liquefied natural gas, much of which now comes from the U.S. “Relying so heavily on fossil fuels, whether they come from Russia or anywhere else, cannot give us the energy security and prosperity we need. It leaves us incredibly vulnerable to the volatility of international markets and pressure from external actors,” they said. Harnessing the North Sea’s gusty winds requires political cooperation that bridges national differences, the Brexit divide and political backlash to the expansion of renewables. While the offshore industry in the U.K. has recently seen strong interest, countries such as Germany and France are struggling to get companies to bid for new projects. And clean energy boosterism cannot mask the fact that gas, while slowly declining, is still almost one quarter of Europe’s energy supply and central to Europe’s heavy industry. Nor are all European countries and companies convinced there is any need to stop the boats pouring in from Texas. Trump knows he has Europe over a barrel. Last week at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he derided wind turbines and the Europeans that install them as “losers.” His self-interest was barely veiled. The U.S. is the world’s biggest exporter of LNG and since the EU began shutting off Russian pipeline gas, the bloc’s imports from the U.S. have risen fourfold, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, a non-profit climate group. Trump’s Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, boasted in Davos that U.S. exports had been able to “displace most all of the Russian gas” and foresaw “robust energy trade” going forward; trade that would be, “in the short run … dominated by exports from the United States into Europe.” He called for the EU to remove “barriers” to the new era of transatlantic gas exports, namechecking Europe’s carbon border tax and its corporate environmental regulations. The U.S., he said, is “working with our colleagues here in Europe to remove those barriers.” U.S. gas was celebrated by European officials as key part of their strategy for ditching Russian energy, a savior from across the seas — alongside, of course, the growing the use of renewables like wind and solar. But the growing reliance has taken on an entirely new geopolitical significance under Trump. “The big weakness was and is that fossil fuel supply was moving from one unreliable supply source (Russia) to a set of other potentially unreliable supply sources and that over-dependency on any one of them risked a repeat of previous problems,” said a European Commission official involved in the EU’s efforts to cut dependence on Russian gas, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly. “I just didn’t think we’d have to worry about the U.S. — that was before Trump,” they added. The North Sea summit was first set up in 2022 as an antidote to Russian energy dependence. Its third edition will be overshadowed by fears — voiced by energy analysts, if not necessarily by some European leaders still eager to appease Trump — that the U.S. could weaponize gas in the way Vladimir Putin did against the Europeans before and after his invasion of Ukraine. This year several heads of state, energy ministers as well as the biggest industry players are expected to attend, the German hosts said. The goal is to strengthen the cooperation between neighboring states along the North Sea. Three declarations are set to be signed, according to German government officials familiar with the matter. The heads of states will sign the Hamburg Declaration pledging close cooperation and united efforts to secure critical infrastructure. The energy ministers will also sign their own declaration focusing on the necessary grid infrastructure for offshore wind parks including financing measures and accelerating planning measures. And lastly there will be the Joint Offshore Wind Investment Pact for the North Sea, signed by the energy ministers and key industry players. Both sides are promising to do everything in their power to bring offshore wind back on track. “This is a great opportunity to remind us why the transformation of the energy system matters,” Teresa Ribera, the Commission’s Executive Vice President told POLITICO after Trump’s attack on green energy in Davos. Renewable sources of energy “mean freedom, lower dependence and vulnerabilities.” CAN’T STOP GUZZLING   While pivoting to clean power is an obvious priority, “you cannot dream away the existing dependence on oil and gas imports,” said Thijs Van de Graaf, a specialist in the geopolitics of energy at the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies. The Commission has limited power to dictate where companies obtain their LNG supplies, and the dizzying pace of growth in purchases of the U.S. product will be difficult to reverse. “Unilateral action from the EU to limit its purchases is … unlikely,” argued Jack Reid, a lead economist at economic advisory firm Oxford Economics in a note published last week. He pointed out that for all the EU’s efforts to diversify, Russia remains the bloc’s second largest supplier of LNG. On top of that, the importers themselves are hesitant to curb such a roaring trade. POLITICO asked several German companies and received a range of responses. Some foresaw no change in the U.S. trade, while others, including Uniper, said flexibility may be needed. “This is not a relationship we are stepping back from, on the contrary, we are deepening cooperation with U.S. partners at pace,” said Alexandros Exarchou, the CEO of Atlantic See, a Greek LNG import venture that recently struck a 20-year deal with U.S. firm Venture Global to import half a million tons of LNG annually. Others have more pressing energy challenges to address. For Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reassessing the U.S. trade relationship is unthinkable as war with Russia rages on. “We have no plans to reduce our engagement with U.S. suppliers,” James O’Brien, the head of trading at DTEK’s trading unit, D.Trading, told POLITICO. “In fact, we are actively seeking to expand our volumes to cover the critical supply gap in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe from 2026/27.” The U.S. LNG market remains “the most liquid and flexible in the world,” he said, adding that for Ukraine, U.S. LNG “is not a risk, it is a lifeline.” Many European officials “are still living that old liberal world,” said Van de Graaf, and expect a return to normalcy and stability in EU-U.S. trade. “That ideological position is no longer tenable in light of all of what is transpiring.”

Listen on * Spotify * Apple Music * Amazon Music Davos rückt in den Mittelpunkt der Weltpolitik. Zum Start des World Economic Forum stellt sich die zentrale Frage, wie geschlossen EU, NATO und G7 auf Donald Trump reagieren und welche geopolitischen Weichen in den kommenden Tagen in der Schweiz gestellt werden. Gordon Repinski über ein Forum, das von Trump, Grönland, Zoll-Drohungen und der Zukunft des transatlantischen Verhältnis geprägt wird. In Deutschland rückt derweil auch wegen Trump die Energiepolitik in den Fokus. Die deutschen Gasspeicher sind so leer wie selten zu Jahresbeginn. Was politisch gewollt war, könnte sich mittelfristig als Risiko erweisen. Im Gespräch mit Josh Groeneveld vom POLITICO Pro-Newsletter “Energie & Klima am Morgen” geht es um die Ursachen der niedrigen Füllstände, um Marktmechanismen, LNG-Abhängigkeiten von den USA und wie verwundbar Europa in einer angespannten geopolitischen Lage tatsächlich ist. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview spricht der CDU-Spitzenkandidat für die Landtagswahl in Rheinland-Pfalz, Gordon Schnieder, über Wirtschaftspolitik, Energiepreise und die Erwartungen an Friedrich Merz. Es geht um Vertrauen, Investitionen und Steuerpolitik. Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Gordon Repinski und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig. Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren. Mehr von Host und POLITICO Executive Editor Gordon Repinski: Instagram: @gordon.repinski | X: @GordonRepinski. POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0 information@axelspringer.de Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390 Geschäftsführer: Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna

BRUSSELS — The European Union is on track to get nearly half its gas from the United States by the end of the decade, creating a major strategic vulnerability for the bloc as relations with Washington hit an all-time low. New data shared with POLITICO shows Europe is already importing a quarter of its gas from the U.S., a figure that is set to soar as the bloc’s total ban on Russian gas imports is phased in. It comes as an increasingly belligerent U.S. President Donald Trump flirts with seizing Greenland, a territory of Denmark, in a move that could destroy the NATO alliance and throw transatlantic relations into crisis. Tensions escalated over the weekend when Trump announced he would put new tariffs on European countries including France, Denmark, Germany and the U.K. until a deal to sell Greenland to the U.S. was reached, prompting calls for the EU to retaliate with drastic trade restrictions of its own. The EU’s growing reliance on imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas “has created a potentially high-risk new geopolitical dependency,” said Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz, lead energy analyst at the the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, the think tank that produced the research. “An over-reliance on U.S. gas contradicts the [EU policy] of enhancing EU energy security through diversification, demand reduction and boosting renewables supply,” she said. Alarm over this strategic weak spot is also growing among member countries, with some EU diplomats fretting that the Trump administration could exploit the new dependency to achieve its foreign policy goals. While “there are other sources of gas in the world” beyond the U.S., the risk of Trump cutting off supplies to Europe in the wake of an incursion in Greenland “should be taken into account,” one senior EU diplomat told POLITICO, who like others in this article spoke on condition of anonymity. But “hopefully we’ll not get there,” the official added. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the EU went to drastic lengths to wean itself off Russian natural gas, which in 2021 made up 50 percent of its total imports but now accounts for only 12 percent, according to data from Bruegel, a Brussels-based economic think tank. It accomplished this largely by switching imports of pipeline gas from Russia with liquefied natural gas shipped from the U.S., which at the time was a firm ally. The U.S. is already the biggest exporter of LNG, and its product now accounts for around 27 percent of EU gas imports, up from 5 percent in 2021. France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium are the largest importers; non-EU member the U.K. is also a major importer of U.S. LNG. A raft of new deals with U.S. energy companies could raise that figure to as high as 40 percent of the EU’s total gas intake by 2030, and to around 80 percent of overall LNG imports into the bloc, according to data from IEEFA, a U.S. nonprofit that promotes clean energy. CHANGES AFOOT Despite efforts to switch away from fossil fuels, Europe still relies on carbon-emitting natural gas for a quarter of its total energy needs. Gas is used to generate electricity, heat buildings and power industry. European consumers and manufacturers already face some of the highest energy costs in the world, `making it hard for the EU to refuse cheaper gas from the U.S. despite Washington’s threatening language. An LNG tanker unloads Egyptian liquefied natural gas at the Revithoussa terminal near Athens. | Nicolas Koutsokostas/NurPhoto via Getty Images EU countries have already committed to diversifying their gas imports under new laws passed last year, but officials warn this will be difficult to achieve in the short term, given that the global supply of LNG is limited to just a few countries. They’re pinning their hopes on new production in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, expected in 2030. On top of the future energy deals — including a commitment to buy €750 billion of U.S. energy products as part of last year’s trade agreement — the EU is set to pave new inroads for U.S. gas under a sweeping overhaul of Europe’s energy infrastructure. For instance, the EU has restated its commitment to two major gas pipelines that will connect Malta and Cyprus to mainland Europe, which could facilitate still more flows of American gas. The U.S. is also looking to build a pipeline linking Bosnia to EU-member Croatia. ‘NO ALTERNATIVE‘ To some, the EU’s growing dependence on U.S. gas highlights that it should hasten its transition to renewables as a replacement for fossil fuels. Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, a Socialist EU lawmaker, said demand for natural gas has fallen sharply across the bloc as the green transition picks up, even if demand for U.S. LNG is increasing as an overall proportion of intake. “If we have the courage to keep calm and carry on making profitable investments in efficiency and renewables, we will reduce EU gas demand so much that we will reduce our dependence on U.S. LNG, even as we fully phase out Russian gas,” Pellerin-Carlin told POLITICO. The lawmaker also argued that Trump was unlikely to weaponize LNG supply to the EU as Russian President Vladimir Putin had done, since it would severely damage the interests of key Trump donors in the U.S. LNG industry, who are desperate to find new buyers to absorb soaring supply of the fossil fuel. The issue of U.S. LNG dependence is addressed by a broader EU commitment to energy diversification that was baked into a wider ban on Russian gas set to take effect this year, according to diplomats familiar with the matter. The official line, however, is that the U.S. remains a “strategic ally and supplier,” one of the diplomats said. “The dependence is certainly there, but we’re kind of stuck where we are,” said one European government official. “There’s really no alternative.”

LONDON — Prime Minister Keir Starmer usually goes out of his way not to annoy Donald Trump. So he better hope the windmill-hating U.S. president doesn’t notice what the U.K. just did. In a fillip for the global offshore wind industry, Starmer’s government on Wednesday announced its biggest-ever down payment on the technology. It agreed to price guarantees, funded by billpayers to the tune of up to £1.8 billion (€2.08 billion) a year, for eight major projects in England, Scotland and Wales. The schemes have the capacity to generate 8.4 gigawatts of electricity, the U.K. energy department said — enough to power 12 million homes. It represented the biggest “wind auction in Europe to date,” said industry group WindEurope. It’s also an energy strategy that could have been tailor-made to rankle Trump. The U.S. president has repeatedly expressed a profound loathing for wind turbines and has tried to use his powers to halt construction on projects already underway in the U.S. — sending shockwaves across the global industry. Even when appearing alongside Starmer at press conferences, Trump has been unable to hide his disgust at the very sight of windmills. “You are paying in Scotland and in the U.K. … to have these ugly monsters all over the place,” he said, sitting next to Starmer during a visit to his Turnberry golf course last year. The spinning blades, Trump complained, would “kill all your birds.” At the time, the prime minister explained meekly that the U.K. was seeking a “mix” of energy sources. But this week’s investments speak far louder about his government’s priorities. The U.K.’s strategy — part of a plan to run the British power grid on 95 percent clean electricity by 2030 — is a clear signal that for all Starmer’s attempts to appease Trump, the U.K. will not heed Washington’s assertions that fossil fuels are the only way to deliver affordable bills and secure supply. “With these results, Britain is taking back control of our energy sovereignty,” said Starmer’s Energy Secretary Ed Miliband, a former leader of the Labour party. “With these results, Britain is taking back control of our energy sovereignty,” said Energy Secretary Ed Miliband. | Pool photo by Justin Tallis via Getty Images While not mentioning Trump or the U.S., he said the U.K. wanted to “stand on our two feet” and not depend on “markets controlled by petrostates and dictators.” WIND VS. GAS The goal of the U.K.’s offshore wind drive is to reduce reliance on gas for electricity generation. One of the most gas-dependent countries in Europe, the U.K. was hit hard in 2022 by the regional gas price spike that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The government ended up spending tens of billions of pounds to pay a portion of every household energy bill in the country to fend off widespread hardship. It’s a scenario that Miliband and Starmer want to avoid in future by focusing on producing electricity from domestic sources like offshore wind that are not subject to the ups and downs of global fossil fuel markets. Trump, by contrast, wants to keep Europe hooked on gas — specifically, American gas. The U.S. National Security Strategy, updated late last year, states Trump’s desire to use American fossil fuel exports to “project power.” Trump has already strong-armed the European Union into committing to buy $750 billion worth of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a quid pro quo for tariff relief. No one in Starmer’s government explicitly named Trump or the U.S. on Wednesday. But Chris Stark, a senior official in Miliband’s energy department tasked with delivering the 2030 goal, noted that “every megawatt of offshore wind that we’re bringing on is a few more metric tons of LNG that we don’t need to import.” The U.K.’s investment in offshore wind also provides welcome relief to a global industry that has been seriously shaken both by soaring inflation and interest rates — and more recently by a Trump-inspired backlash against net zero and clean energy. “It’s a relief for the offshore sector … It’s a relief generally, that the U.K. government is able to lean into very large positive investment stories in U.K. infrastructure,” said Tom Glover, U.K. country chair of the German energy firm RWE, which was the biggest winner in the latest offshore wind investment, securing contracts for 6.9 gigawatts of capacity. A second energy industry figure, granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record, said the U.K.’s plans were a “great signal for the global offshore wind sector” after a difficult few years — “not least the stuff in the U.S.” The other big winner was British firm SSE, which has plans to build one of the world’s largest-ever offshore wind projects, Berwick Bank — off the coast of Donald Trump’s beloved Scotland.

BRUSSELS — On Greenland’s southern tip, surrounded by snowy peaks and deep fjords, lies Kvanefjeld — a mining project that shows the giant, barren island is more than just a coveted military base. Beneath the icy ground sits a major deposit of neodymium and praseodymium, rare earth elements used to make magnets that are essential to build wind turbines, electric vehicles and high-tech military equipment. If developed, Greenland, a semi-autonomous part of Denmark, would become the first European territory to produce these key strategic metals. Energy Transition Minerals, an Australia-based, China-backed mining company, is ready to break ground. But neither Copenhagen, Brussels nor the Greenlandic government have mobilized their state power to make the project happen. In 2009, Denmark handed Greenland’s inhabitants control of their natural resources; 12 years later the Greenlandic government blocked the mine because the rare earths are mixed with radioactive uranium. Since then the project has been in limbo, bogged down in legal disputes. “Kvanefjeld illustrates how political and regulatory uncertainty — combined with geopolitics and high capital requirements — makes even strategically important projects hard to move from potential to production,” Jeppe Kofod, Denmark’s former foreign minister and now a strategic adviser to Energy Transition Minerals, told POLITICO. Kvanefjeld’s woes are emblematic of Greenland’s broader problems. Despite having enough of some rare earth elements to supply as much as 25 percent of the world’s needs — not to mention oil and gas reserves nearly as great as those of the United States, and lots of other potential clean energy metals including copper, graphite and nickel — these resources are almost entirely undeveloped. Just two small mines, extracting gold and a niche mineral called feldspar used in glassmaking and ceramics, are up and running in Greenland. And until very recently, neither Denmark nor the European Union showed much interest in changing the situation. But that was before 2023, when the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with the Greenland government to cooperate on mining projects. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed the same year, is an attempt to catch up by building new mines both in and out of the bloc that singles out Greenland’s potential. Last month, the European Commission committed to contribute financing to Greenland’s Malmbjerg molybdenum mine in a bid to shore up a supply of the metal for the EU’s defense sector.  But with United States President Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. “The EU has for many years had a limited strategic engagement in Greenland’s critical raw materials, meaning that Europe today risks having arrived late, just as the United States and China have intensified their interest,” Kofod said. In a world shaped by Trump’s increasingly belligerent foreign policy and China’s hyperactive development of clean technology and mineral supply chains, Europe’s neglect of Greenland’s natural wealth is looking increasingly like a strategic blunder. With Donald Trump threatening to take Greenland by force, and less likely to offer the island’s inhabitants veto power over mining projects, Europe may be too late to the party. | Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images A HOSTILE LAND That’s not to say building mines in Greenland, with its mile-deep permanent ice sheet, would be easy. “Of all the places in the world where you could extract critical raw materials, [Greenland] is very remote and not very easily accessible,” said Ditte Brasso Sørensen, senior analyst on EU climate and industrial policy at Think Tank Europa, pointing to the territory’s “very difficult environmental circumstances.”  The tiny population — fewer than 60,000 — and a lack of infrastructure also make it hard to build mines. “This is a logistical question,” said Eldur Olafsson, CEO of Amaroq, a gold mining company running one of the two operating mines in Greenland and also exploring rare earths and copper extraction opportunities. “How do you build mines? Obviously, with capital, equipment, but also people. [And] you need to build the whole infrastructure around those people because they cannot only be Greenlandic,” he said.  Greenland also has strict environmental policies — including a landmark 2021 uranium mining ban — which restrict resource extraction because of its impact on nature and the environment. The current government, voted in last year, has not shown any signs of changing its stance on the uranium ban, according to Per Kalvig, professor emeritus at the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, a Danish government research organization. Uranium is routinely found with rare earths, meaning the ban could frustrate Greenland’s huge potential as a rare earths producer. It’s a similar story with fossil fuels. Despite a 2007 U.S. assessment that the equivalent of over 30 billion barrels in oil and natural gas lies beneath the surface of Greenland and its territorial waters — almost equal to U.S. reserves — 30 years of oil exploration efforts by a group including Chevron, Italy’s ENI and Shell came to nothing. In 2021 the then-leftist government in Greenland banned further oil exploration on environmental grounds.  Danish geologist Flemming Christiansen, who was deputy director of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland until 2020, said the failure had nothing to do with Greenland’s actual potential as an oil producer. Instead, he said, a collapse in oil prices in 2014 along with the high cost of drilling in the Arctic made the venture unprofitable. Popular opposition only complicated matters, he said. THE CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECT From the skies above Greenland Christiansen sees firsthand the dramatic effects of climate change: stretches of clear water as rising temperatures thaw the ice sheets that for centuries have made exploring the territory a cold, costly and hazardous business. “If I fly over the waters in west Greenland I can see the changes,” he said. “There’s open water for much longer periods in west Greenland, in Baffin Bay and in east Greenland.” Climate change is opening up this frozen land. Climate change is opening up this frozen land. | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images Greenland contains the largest body of ice outside Antarctica, but that ice is melting at an alarming rate. One recent study suggests the ice sheet could cease to exist by the end of the century, raising sea levels by as much as seven meters. Losing a permanent ice cap that is several hundred meters deep, though, “gradually improves the business case of resource extraction, both for … fossil fuels and also critical raw materials,” said Jakob Dreyer, a researcher at the University of Copenhagen.   But exploiting Greenland’s resources doesn’t hinge on catastrophic levels of global warming. Even without advanced climate change, Kalvig, of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, argues Greenland’s coast doesn’t differ much from that of Norway, where oil has been found and numerous excavation projects operate.     “You can’t penetrate quite as far inland as you can [in Norway], but once access is established, many places are navigable year-round,” Kalvig said. “So, in that sense, it’s not more difficult to operate mines in Greenland than it is in many parts of Norway, Canada or elsewhere — or Russia for that matter. And this has been done before, in years when conditions allowed.”    A European Commission spokesperson said the EU was now working with Greenland’s government to develop its resources, adding that Greenland’s “democratically elected authorities have long favored partnerships with the EU to develop projects beneficial to both sides.” But the spokesperson stressed: “The fate of Greenland’s raw mineral resources is up to the Greenlandic people and their representatives.” The U.S. may be less magnanimous. Washington’s recent military operation in Venezuela showed that Trump is serious about building an empire on natural resources, and is prepared to use force and break international norms in pursuit of that goal. Greenland, with its vast oil and rare earths deposits, may fit neatly into his vision. Where the Greenlandic people fit in is less clear.

Ramin Bahrami, pianista iraniano, rifugiato da anni in Italia, e tra i maggiori interpreti contemporanei di Bach, ha commentato le ultime notizie sul suo Paese, da giorni al centro di sanguinose proteste contro il carovita, e ora nel mirino di Donald Trump che ha minacciato di colpire “duramente” l’Iran se verranno uccisi altri manifestanti. Secondo il quotidiano libanese Al-Akhbar, il presidente Usa avrebbe raggiunto un accordo con il premier israeliano Benjamin Netanyahu per attaccare il “Paese degli Ayatollah” se non interromperà completamente il suo programma nucleare. “È una situazione inquietante e drammatica. – ha detto l’artista all’AdnKronos – Qui non si tratta di interesse umanitario da parte degli Stati Uniti, siamo di fronte ad atti che vanno al di là di ogni legge internazionale, di ogni diritto politico e umanitario. Qui si punta solo a interessi economici colossali. Questa cosa è valsa per il Venezuela, ed è applicabile all’Iran, come a Cuba“. E ancora: “Sono indignato. Qui siamo di fronte a guerre di conquista economica, fatte cancellando ogni diritto. Nessuno vuole salvare nessuno. Si vogliono salvare solo le proprie tasche. Del resto il Presidente americano ha detto chiaro e tondo che a lui interessano solo i soldi e il petrolio del Venezuela e la stessa cosa dicasi anche per l’Iran che è il quinto produttore del petrolio mondiale e tra i principali esportatori di gas nel mondo. Questa è la mia posizione che credo sia la stessa di tutti quelli che amano la pace e la tranquillità”. Insomma per l’artista “in questi momenti, se non ci vogliamo perdere del tutto, abbiamo bisogno della cultura con la C maiuscola. Io da un uomo di cultura chiedo che tutti gli intellettuali del mondo si mettano assieme e lancino un grido perché si ritorni al buon senso. Perché non è possibile una cosa del genere. Stupito che molte personalità del mondo della musica internazionale non abbiano preso nessuna posizione. Questo è gravissimo”. L'articolo “Trump punta all’Iran solo perché quinto produttore del petrolio mondiale e ricco di gas. Nessun interesse umanitario”: l’attacco del maestro Bahrami proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

The U.S. intervention in Venezuela is forcing a geopolitical reckoning — in Washington, throughout the Western Hemisphere and around the world. President Donald Trump’s decision to launch a surprise military action and extract Nicolás Maduro ended a years-long standoff with Caracas in a matter of hours — but the move has opened up a new set of questions. What does this mean for the rest of Latin America? How will adversaries like Russia, China and Iran recalibrate? What will be the impact on the global energy markets? And does this mark a permanent shift in the U.S.’s projection of power? In his statements since the operation began,Trump has provided few hints about what comes next beyond the assurance that the operation was decisive and the United States will be “running” Venezuela for at least some period of time. To assess how the fall of Maduro — and the manner of his removal — could reshape global politics, POLITICO Magazine asked a range of experts, from regional analysts to national security veterans, to weigh in on this decision by the Trump administration and forecast how it will reverberate in the rest of the world. Here’s what they said. ‘THE AXIS OF AUTHORITARIANS… MAY FEEL ADDITIONAL URGENCY TO PROVE THEIR VALUE’ BY RYAN BERG Ryan Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Trump administration is serious about the Western Hemisphere strategy outlined in the recent National Security Strategy document, with a Trump Corollary over the hemisphere. The fact that President Trump launched this operation hours after Nicolás Maduro met with China’s special envoy sends a clear and unequivocal message to China and its role in the Americas. It also sends the message that the ‘axis of authoritarians’ is strong during peacetime, but not decisive for one another in moments of greatest need, when it comes to questions of regime security. Trump already pointed it out in his remarks on the military operation today, where he specifically drew attention to other successful U.S. attacks on adversaries, including against Iran. The axis of authoritarians, and especially Russia and China, may feel additional urgency to prove their value in the face of pressure against their allies such as Venezuela. ‘ONE COULD EASILY IMAGINE A CHINESE INDICTMENT OF A TAIWANESE LEADER’ BY JUSTIN LOGAN Justin Logan is the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. The geopolitical impacts of the Venezuela raid and the capture of its dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife will be limited because its impact on the global balance of power will be limited. Still, one can foresee two small but potentially significant consequences. First, other major powers could seize in the future on the administration’s claim that the attack was legal because Maduro was under indictment in the United States. One could easily imagine a Chinese indictment of a Taiwanese leader, under specious grounds, as lubricating a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Then the United States would be left arguing the analogy is unsound because the U.S. indictment was legitimate, whereas the Chinese indictment was not. Second, President Trump prides himself on being unpredictable, and this attack will only deepen other countries’ belief in the volatility of U.S. foreign policy. Leaders crosswise with the Trump administration will likely think more carefully about how they can hedge their bets, whether that means developing closer relationships with China or Russia, or coming up with better and clearer plans for avoiding similar campaigns as the one in Caracas. More fear will be coupled with more careful thinking about how to counter a capricious United States. ‘WITHOUT VENEZUELAN OIL, CUBA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL FINALLY COLLAPSE’ BY STEPHEN KINZER Stephen Kinzer, a longtime foreign correspondent for the New York Times, is a senior fellow at the Watson School for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. Trump is the most resource-focused American president since Eisenhower. He sees Venezuelan oil as a grand prize. When he demands that countries stop buying oil from Russia and Iran, and they ask him what alternative they have, he would love to be able to answer: “I’ll give you oil from Venezuela.” It is a considerable geopolitical weapon. That, however, is a long-term dream. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s motive is more immediate. He comes out of a communal background centered on a 65-year-old dream: overthrowing Fidel Castro. The fact that Castro is dead doesn’t matter — Rubio and his Florida cheering squad still want to destroy him. They see intervention in Venezuela as important not for itself, but as a way to cut Cuba’s lifeline. Rubio hopes that without Venezuelan oil, Cuba’s political system will finally collapse. That would turn both countries into submissive clients — or into bloody battlegrounds where a new generation of Latin Americans will seek to defy what the Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto César Sandino called “the eagle with larcenous claws.” ‘A SYNONYM FOR OVERCONFIDENT FAILURE’ BY EMMA ASHFORD Emma Ashford is a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. America has always made an exception for Latin America. Even as the founding fathers clearly stated their desire for the United States to stand apart from European power politics, they acknowledged America’s special interests — and willingness to act upon them — in its own hemisphere. Later presidents would claim the mantle of the Monroe Doctrine to justify repeated military interventions and regime change in the region. The seizure of Nicolás Maduro from his country in the middle of the night might have violated various domestic and international laws. But it was not at odds with America’s historic willingness to bend all kinds of rules in its own backyard. In geopolitical terms, then, the most important aspect of this strike may be to show that the administration is serious about the so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Outlined in the recently published National Security Strategy, this corollary promises to “deny non-Hemispheric competitors” like Russia and China access to the region. That message could not have been displayed more clearly than last night, when a Chinese delegation, recently arrived for talks with Maduro, was awakened like the rest of Caracas by the sound of airstrikes. America is reasserting its traditional role in the region and signaling that the Western Hemisphere is closed to outside powers. In reality, this might end up signaling instead that America’s addiction to regime change is just as disastrous in the Western hemisphere as it was in the Middle East. Right now, the Trump administration’s plan appears to be a relatively modest leadership change: the removal of Maduro and his replacement with someone inside the regime who will be more cooperative. Donald Trump explicitly rejected the notion of democratic regime change when he told journalists that María Corina Machado could not summon enough support to lead the country. But this vision of a U.S.-coopted government in Venezuela could very easily go wrong, from a military coup to open chaos in the streets and a much larger U.S. intervention. It is simply too early to tell — and history suggests that our ability to predict the aftermath of targeted regime change is poor. If the worst does happen, what then will be the message received in Beijing or Moscow? Will it be a message of strength and security, one that encourages them not to meddle in Latin America? Or will it instead be a reminder that American presidents can always be trusted to act against our own worst interests? If Donald Trump’s luck does not hold, then the “Trump Corollary” may end up as little more than a synonym for overconfident failure. ‘LONGER TERM, VENEZUELA COULD PLAY A MUCH BIGGER ROLE IN THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET’ BY BOB MCNALLY Bob McNally is the founder and president of Rapidan Energy Group, an independent energy market, policy and geopolitical analysis firm based in the Washington, D.C. area. From an energy perspective, near-term U.S. pressure on Venezuela is a relatively minor factor. Global oil markets have ample supply, with Venezuela contributing only about 4 percent to China’s and the U.S.’s crude imports. Yes, Chinese “teapot” refineries would lament the loss of cheap barrels if that happened. But it’s not a major threat to China’s oil sector, much less its economy or national security. Longer term, Venezuela could play a much bigger role in the global oil market given its enormous, if costly, reserves. However, it is essential to recognize that achieving long-term potential will be a long and winding road, with numerous political, commercial and market risks. Many ask us if Washington would ask a post-Maduro, pro-U.S. government to leave OPEC. Venezuela was a founder of OPEC. We doubt it because it would anger Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and in 2020, President Trump learned to appreciate OPEC’s supply management after he begged it to cut production to save U.S. shale. Rapidan has told clients for weeks that odds were 70 percent that President Trump would successfully replace or co-opt Maduro. While Maduro was successfully removed to U.S. custody, this transition is not yet complete. It’s unclear who will succeed the current government, when it will happen, and how it will relate to the U.S., other alliances, and energy markets. What remains clear is that President Trump is determined to make Venezuela his first concrete manifestation of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. U.S. pressure and diplomacy will continue until the U.S. is satisfied that its foreign policy, national security, anti-narcotics and energy interests are met. ‘THREATEN THE LEADERS OF RECALCITRANT ALLIES AND WEAK ADVERSARIES’ BY DANIEL W. DREZNER Daniel W. Drezner is academic dean and distinguished professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author of Drezner’s World. In the summer of 2024, I cautioned in POLITICO that a second Trump administration would be likely to increase, not decrease U.S. military adventurism: “Even though the term is directed at him a lot, Trump is not an isolationist — he is a mercantilist who prefers using force in this hemisphere.” The use of force to depose Nicolás Maduro is a pretty strong data point supporting this contention. Going forward, one interesting effect to look for from this U.S. action is how other heads of state and heads of government respond. A constant of Trump’s foreign policy has been to focus on pressuring or flattering the individual leaders of other countries. Some of my colleagues have labeled this a “neo-royalist” worldview, focusing on individual elites rather than laws or institutions. The obvious implication of this action is that the Trump administration is unconcerned with international laws or norms when it comes to attacking foreign leaders. I strongly suspect that the Trump administration will use this Maduro action to threaten the leaders of recalcitrant allies and weak adversaries that they might be next on the chopping block — and such threats might actually work. Just as U.S. members of Congress have expressed fears of personal attacks during the Trump years due to his violent rhetoric, countries that lack great power patronage might prove to be more pliable to continued U.S. pressure. Of course, the other effect could be for other country leaders to bind themselves more closely to other great powers as a form of political insurance against the United States. Stay tuned. ‘COMPLICATING HIS OWN GRAND STRATEGY’ BY DANIEL R. DEPETRIS Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune. The nighttime U.S. air assault and special operations raid that nabbed Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife was impeccably planned and executed. President Trump is rightly proud of the results; Maduro, a man who outlasted the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy, will soon find himself in a U.S. courtroom as a criminal defendant. If Maduro’s capture tells us anything, it’s that Trump is dead serious about implementing his so-called Trump Corollary in the Western Hemisphere. In less than a year, Latin America has transformed from a perpetual backwater of U.S. grand strategy to one of its main theaters. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy codified the Western Hemisphere as not only a core U.S. security priority but Washington’s exclusive domain, where non-hemispheric powers aren’t welcome. Latin American leaders who cater to U.S. demands like Argentine President Javier Milei and El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele will be rewarded; those who don’t, like Maduro, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Colombian President Gustavo Petro, will face intense U.S. economic and rhetorical pressure — including the looming threat of a snatch-and-grab operation in the middle of the night. The current U.S. policy is driven less by spreading democracy and instituting regional economic integration and more about exercising raw power. Of course, the United States is not the first country on the planet to want to preserve its advantage in its own near-abroad — and yet maintaining hegemony through coercion is not without costs. Even small powers don’t like to be dictated to, and if the pressure gets too intense or if the demands become intolerable, they may choose to enact strategies of hedging or outright balancing to defend their own security interests. With respect to Latin America specifically, the most likely alternative waiting in the wings is China, which is already the top trading partner of choice for many of the region’s governments. It would be the height of irony, then, if Trump’s military operation in Venezuela winds up complicating his own grand strategy over the long term. ‘A MAD DASH FOR VENEZUELA’S RESOURCES’ BY LELAND LAZARUS Leland Lazarus is founder and CEO of Lazarus Consulting, a geopolitical risk firm focusing on U.S.-China and China-Latin America relations. The U.S. ousting Maduro potentially kills multiple birds with one stone: It could increase oil supply in the U.S. and reduce oil prices, curb drug trafficking, dislodge China, Russia, and Iran from their strategic beachhead, and weaken other regional adversaries like Cuba and Nicaragua. But it may also precipitate a mad dash for Venezuela’s resources. China in particular risks losing oil flows, more than $60 billion in sunk loans, and one of its reliable political footholds in the Western Hemisphere. Two specific examples illustrate this: The House Select Committee on the CCP recently identified that the oil tanker SKIPPER, seized by the U.S., had ties to China. And in November last year at a business forum in Miami, María Corina Machado said that, in 2012, China’s state-owned CITIC company conducted the only full geological survey of Venezuela’s critical mineral resources, and it is the only company that has that survey to this day. I’m concerned that the U.S. ostentatiously invoking the Monroe Doctrine may actually cause pushback across the region, because local people don’t want a return to unfettered U.S. imperialism. Moreover, I’m concerned that the administration doesn’t have a well thought out Day After plan. President Trump said the U.S. will “run” Venezuela until there’s a peaceful transition. How do we ensure that Machado doesn’t return to a Venezuela full of factions? What if members of Maduro’s inner circle engage in a protracted guerrilla war, with weapons supplied from Cuba, Nicaragua, China, Russia or Iran? These are issues that must be worked out now to avoid an Iraq or Afghanistan repeat. ‘UKRAINE AND TAIWAN SHOULD BE VERY AFRAID’ BY RYAN CROCKER Ryan Crocker was a career foreign service officer who served as ambassador in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon. The immediate comparison that comes to mind is Operation Just Cause, the overthrow and arrest of Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama in December 1989. A more costly military operation (23 U.S. soldiers killed in action), but with a clear outcome: Within a week, the Panamanian electoral commission had declared the winning candidate in the contested May 1989 elections as the rightful president. It is much less clear what happens next in Venezuela. Maduro is gone, but the regime endures — his vice president has been sworn in as president. With no boots on the ground, how do we shape events? The international reaction to Operation Just Cause included a UN Security Council resolution of condemnation introduced by the Soviet Union, supported by China — and vetoed by the U.S., UK and France. It will be very interesting to see what happens this time. If Russia and China are silent, it will be a huge step towards the emergence of a balance-of-power world. Ukraine and Taiwan should be very afraid. ‘LATIN COUNTRIES WILL REASSESS THEIR VERY LIMITED ABILITY TO DETER U.S. MILITARY ATTACKS’ BY STEPHEN MCFARLAND Stephen McFarland is a retired U.S. diplomat who was ambassador to Guatemala. He served twice in Venezuela, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in eight other posts in Latin America. This is a watershed moment for U.S. relations with Latin America, a new “Monroe Doctrine” era. The U.S. did not just capture Maduro and sweep aside the Venezuelan military; it also announced the U.S. will “run” Venezuela until there is a democratic transition, recover property and interests that Venezuela seized from U.S. companies, and rebuild the oil industry there to protect U.S. access to energy. Inexplicably, President Trump has also minimized the role in the future Venezuelan government of María Corina Machado, who had unified the opposition and led it to victory in the 2024 presidential elections. The message is that the U.S. will do whatever it wants in the hemisphere to maintain access to natural resources, and that it has the military force to do so. In response, there is little most countries in the region — which largely oppose Maduro, but worry about their sovereignty in the face of an omnipotent U.S. — can do right now beyond criticize the Trump administration. Indeed, some nations will hope for a reduction in Venezuelan migration to their countries, while others will keep quiet to avoid U.S. trade sanctions. Cuba and Nicaragua must fear they are next on the regime change list, and Colombia and Mexico must fear U.S. military attacks against narcotics traffickers. Outside the continent, Russia might seek to trade acquiescence on Venezuela for U.S. accommodation regarding Ukraine. Longer term, Latin countries will reassess their very limited ability to deter U.S. military attacks; a generation from now, the region may be less beholden to the U.S. and have more, not fewer, links to extra-regional players. A continent that fears the U.S., rather than sees it as a powerful partner, bodes ill for America’s long-term strategic interests. A critical variable is whether the U.S. can direct a stable and sustainable democratic transition in Venezuela. Will Venezuelan migration drop, and will emigres return to Venezuela? Will Venezuelans accept the U.S. rules for oil production and exports? Regime change and nation rebuilding are extremely difficult, prolonged and require much more than military supremacy. If the U.S. does not achieve a democratic transition in Venezuela, if it gets bogged down like in Iraq and Afghanistan and is distracted from other hemispheric issues, it will have lost its big bet on regime change in Venezuela. ‘THE U.S. JUST CEDED THE HIGH GROUND TO RALLY WORLD SUPPORT TO DEFEND TAIWAN’ BY CURT MILLS Curt Mills is executive director of The American Conservative magazine. Probably the most significant result of Jan. 3 is that the U.S. just ceded the high ground to rally world support to defend Taiwan. It is pretty telling that Trump’s White House bled allies even on the global hard right with this maneuver. What is also distressing is the clear lack of a plan from the administration. Speaking at Mar-a-Lago, President Trump seemed open to allowing heretofore Maduro’s henchwoman, the apparent acting President Delcy Rodríguez, to succeed Maduro. But Rodriguez seemed less than cooperative, demanding her boss’s release and affirming that only Maduro is legitimate in her eyes. Does America now have to go back in? Finally, it was depressing to hear how much the Global War on Terror legacy hangs over the American military. It’s all well and good that the U.S. perfected special operations during the Middle East wars, as the Joint Chiefs chair Dan Caine said, but America famously also lost those wars in the end despite all the tactical successes. The only redeemable macro justification for hawkishness in Latin America is driving China out of our backyard. But, bafflingly, Trump promised China: “There’s not gonna be a problem. They’re gonna get oil.” Oil, that is, presumably plundered from the Venezuelan people. ‘TOO EARLY FOR ANYONE TO CELEBRATE A POTENTIAL OIL-BACKED RESOURCE BOOM’ BY DIEGO RIVERA RIVOTA Diego Rivera Rivota is a Senior Research Associate at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. The U.S.-led operation that occurred today in central Caracas and in some key Venezuelan security facilities is nothing short of historical. While it indeed represents the end of the Nicolás Maduro regime, we don’t know who will rule Venezuela from now — whether it’s a U.S.-led transitional regime, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and other Maduro’s apparatchiks, or somebody else. In this context, the geopolitical implications of extracting the leader — albeit illegitimate and deeply unpopular — of the country with the largest crude oil reserves are quite complicated and may have deeper ramifications across the globe. Indeed, today’s and the coming days’ developments may be received in other capitals as a signal of a transition to an international system in which powerful countries can run spheres of influence, as happened in most of the 19th and the early 20th century. With regards to global oil markets, it is important to note that holding the largest reserves of crude oil by no means translates into the ability to swiftly bring enormous production of oil to the world’s market. Venezuela’s oil production peaked in 1997 at over 3.5 million barrels per day , only to collapse to 0.9 million barrels per day in 2024, following years of mismanagement and corruption. Reversing an almost two-decade-long trend is not impossible, but it would require enormous amounts of financing, clear incentives for oil and gas companies, and time. This would only be possible with some minimal preconditions of governance, stability and clear incentives for companies to invest in Venezuela — something easier to say than to do. On top of that, the world has also changed since 2006. The global demand outlook looks very uncertain, with very limited growth and plateauing sometime in the 2030s. On top of that, to stay only in the Latin American neighborhood, Brazil and Argentina have significantly increased their oil production in the last five years, while Guyana has emerged from zero to almost surpassing Venezuela’s current production, according to preliminary data from 2025. In sum, it would be too early for anyone to celebrate a potential oil-backed resource boom for the U.S. ‘STRONG INCENTIVES TO QUIETLY APPEASE WASHINGTON’ MIE HOEJRIS DAHL Mie Hoejris Dahl is a Danish freelance journalist based in Mexico City and Bogotá. She has reported inside Venezuela and covered the 2024 presidential elections and its aftermath. The U.S. attacks on Venezuela and capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3 sent shock waves through Latin America and the world. Within hours, world leaders began staking out positions that laid bare growing dividing lines. The presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Mexico all rushed to condemn the U.S. attacks on Venezuela. They have each been on the receiving end of U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats and rhetorical bullying in recent months — and may worry about being next, in one form or another. The U.S. attacks on Venezuela have sharpened global and regional divides. One line runs between authoritarian allies of Maduro — such as Cuba, Iran and Russia — that denounce the operation as imperial overreach, and democratic actors that long pushed for an end to Maduro’s rule but are uneasy with regime change by force. Within Latin America, another divide is emerging between Trump‑aligned, mostly right‑wing leaders who applaud the ouster, and non‑aligned — often leftist — presidents who condemn it on sovereignty grounds. In the weeks ahead, Latin American leaders — especially those not politically aligned with Trump — are likely to double down on calls for peace, respect for sovereignty and adherence to international law in multilateral forums. At the same time, even the loudest critics of the operation will have strong incentives to quietly appease Washington. Many Latin American governments are likely to invest more in counternarcotics and migration control.

I controlli alle caldaie devono essere effettuati o l’obbligo è stato sospeso? Il dubbio è scaturito a seguito della diffusione delle bozze di un decreto del ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza energetica, che andrà a regolamentare la frequenza dei controlli che dovranno essere effettuati su alcuni impianti. Il Mase è intervenuto a chiarire che il testo che è circolato nei giorni scorsi è ancora una bozza e non la versione definitiva. Il provvedimento – al momento ancora in fase di elaborazione e che, grazie al quale, verrà recepita la direttiva europea – ha uno scopo ben preciso: garantire alle caldaie degli standard elevati di sicurezza. Ma non solo: l’obiettivo è quello di migliorare l’efficienza energetica e ottimizzare il rapporto tra i costi che devono essere sostenuti e i benefici per la collettività. Il tutto passerà attraverso la semplificazione delle attività ispettive. ISPEZIONI SULLE CALDAIE, COSA CAMBIA IN REALTÀ Il chiarimento più importante del ministero, indubbiamente, riguarda la distinzione che intercorre tra il controllo di efficienza energetica e le ispezioni (o gli accertamenti). Il primo è un controllo periodico della caldaia, che deve essere effettuato da un tecnico abilitato, il secondo (ossia le ispezioni o gli accertamenti) sono dei controlli che verranno effettuati a campione dalle autorità competenti. Da un punto di vista strettamente operativo, la bozza del decreto prevede l’aumento dei controlli che devono essere effettuati su alcune tipologie di impianti. I tecnici abilitati dovranno passare qualche volta in più ad analizzare quelli a gas con una potenza compresa tra i 70 e i 100 kilowatt: l’intervallo è destinato a scendere da quattro a due anni. CAMBIANO LE SOGLIE MINIME A cambiare sono anche le soglie minime per le quali scatta l’obbligo di effettuare il controllo: dagli attuali 10 kilowatt si passerebbe a 20 kilowatt. Non cambia, invece, la cadenza quadriennale che è stata prevista per gli impianti a gas che sono compresi tra i 20 ed i 70 chilowatt. L’esonero varrebbe per quasi tutte le caldaie domestiche a gas, che nel nostro paese sono grossomodo 20 milioni. Di queste almeno 7 milioni hanno più di quindici anni di età. Il decreto avrebbe poi previsto delle ispezioni periodiche per accertare che vengano rispettati i periodi di accensione e le temperature interne degli edifici che sono aperti al pubblico. Non sono previsti dei cambiamenti per gli impianti che sono alimentati a combustibili solidi: in questo caso la frequenza dei controlli rimarrebbe sempre la stessa, quindi ogni due anni. UN CONTROLLO OGNI QUATTRO ANNI BASTA? Non ci sarà uno stop al controllo delle caldaie, ma è valida l’osservazione sollevata dall’Unione Artigiani della provincia di Milano e di Monza Brianza, riportata dal Corriere della Sera, che sottolinea come l’obiettivo di aumentare l’efficienza energetica, in questo caso, non sarebbe stata centrata. I controlli verrebbero effettuati ogni quattro anni nelle caldaie che sono state installate nella maggior parte delle case, anche se verrebbe lasciata alle Regioni la possibilità di farne qualcuno in più, ma dovrebbero motivare la scelta. Secondo l’associazione questo dettaglio rischia di scoraggiare i territori nei quali sono stati attivati dei modelli di controllo più avanzati. La pulizia delle caldaie e le verifiche sull’efficienza sono due attività che si alternano, riuscendo a garantire minori emissioni, una maggiore efficienza e dei risparmi sui consumi. I controlli sulle caldaie a gas sono importanti prima di tutti per le famiglie che le utilizzano. Basti pensare che nel periodo compreso tra il 2019 ed il 2023 – stando ai dati messi in evidenza dal Comitato Italiano Gas – ci sono stati 1.119 incidenti legati al gas canalizzato per usi civili: sono morte 128 persone e 1.784 sono rimaste infortunate. L'articolo Controlli caldaie: cosa cambia davvero per i 20 milioni di impianti domestici proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.